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HISTORY 


OF 


AITCIENT    PHILOSOPHY 


HISTORY 


OP 


ANCIENT    PHILOSOPHY 


BY 
DR.  W.  WINDELBAND 

PROFESSOR   OF   PHILOSOPHY   IN   THE    UNIVERSITV   OF   STRASSBURG 


^ut^arijetj  STranslation 

BY 

HERBERT  ERNEST  CUSHMAN,  Ph.D. 

INSTRUCTOR  IN   PHILOSOPHY   IN   TUFTS   COLLEGE 

.Secontj  3EtJitt0n  ■ 

FROM  THE  SECOND   GERMAN  EDITION 


NEW   YORK 
CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S   SONSj 

1906 


Copyright,  1899, 
By  Charles  Scribnek's  Sons. 


All  rights  reserved. 


Sffntbersttg  Pr«g : 
John  Wilson  and  Son,  Cambridge,  U.  S.  A. 


o 


s 


JO 


TO 

WILLIAM   R.  SHIPMAN,  LL.D. 

^rofrasnt  of  Engliaf)  in  Cufts  CoUtat, 

MY      FRIEND     AND      COUNSELLOR. 


98351 


TRANSLATOR'S   PREFACE 

Professor  Windelband's  G-eschichte  der  Alien  Philo- 
sophie  is  already  well  known  to  German  philosophical 
readers  as  one  of  the  famous  Miiller  series  of  hand-books, 
and  yet  to  that  wider  circle  of  English  readers  it  is  still  a 
foreign  book.  In  many  quarters  technical  scholars  of 
Greek  philosophy  have  already  commended  its  important 
innovations,  and  to  these  its  erudition  and  scholarship  are 
patent.  In  its  translation,  however,  under  the  title  of  "The 
History  of  Ancient  Philosophy,"  it  will  reach  the  general 
reader  and  serve  as  an  introduction  to  the  beginner  in  phi- 
losophy. I  have  personally  never  been  able  to  see  why  the 
approaches  to  the  study  of  philosophy  have  been  made  as 
difficult  and  uninviting  as  possible.  In  other  hard  sub- 
jects all  sorts  of  helps  and  devices  are  used  to  allure  the 
beginner  within.  Into  philosophy  the  begiuner  has  always 
had  to  force  his  way  with  no  indulgent  hand  to  help.  In 
the  past  the  history  of  thought  has  too  often  been  entirely 
separated  from  the  history  of  affairs,  as  if  the  subjec- 
tive historical  processes  could  have  been  possible  with- 
out the  objective  concrete  events.  Professor  Windelband 
has  gone  far  to  lead  the  general  reader  to  the  history 
of  thought  through  the  history  of  the  affairs  of  the  Greek 
nation.  This  is,  to  my  mind,  the  difficult  but  absolutely 
necessary  task  of  the  historian  of  thought,  if  he  wislies 
to  reach  any  but  technical  philosophers.     This  work  occu- 


Vlli  PREFACE 

pies  a  unique  position  in  this  respect,  and  may  mark  the 
beginning  of  an  epoch  in  the  rewriting  of  the  history  of 
philosophy. 

I  am  indebted  to  many  friends  for  help  in  my  transla- 
tion of  this  work.  The  reader  will  allow  me  to  mention  in 
particular  Professor  George  H.  Palmer,  of  Harvard,  my 
friend  and  former  teacher,  for  introducing  me  to  the  work ; 
and  my  colleagues,  Professor  Charles  St.  Clair  Wade  for 
much  exceedingly  valuable  assistance,  and  especially  Pro- 
fessors Charles  E.  Fay  and  Leo  R.  Lewis,  whose  generous 
and  untiring  aid  in  the  discussion  of  the  whole  I  shall 
ever  remember.  Whatever  merits  the  translation  may 
have,  are  due  in  no  small  measure  to  their  help;  for 
whatever  defects  may  appear,  I  can  hold  only  myself 
responsible. 

So  complete  are  the  bibliographies  here  and  elsewhere 
that  I  have  found  it  necessary  to  append  only  a  list  of  such 
works  as  are  helpful  to  the  English  reader  of  Ancient 
Philosophy. 

HERBERT  ERNEST  CUSHMAN. 

Tufts  College,  June,  1899. 


PKEFACE 

TO  THE  SECOND   GERMAN  EDITION 

Having  undertaken  to  prepare  a  r^sumd  of  the  history  of 
ancient  philosophy  for  the  Handhuch  der  Klassischen  Alter- 
turnswissenschaft,  it  seemed  expedient  to  offer  to  my  trained 
readers,  not  an  extract  from  the  history  of  the  literature  of 
the  Greeks  and  Romans,  which  can  be  found  elsewhere ; 
but  rather  a  short  and  clear  presentation,  such  as  would 
awaken  interest  and  give  an  insight  into  the  subject  matter 
and  the  development  of  ancient  philosophy.  The  necessity 
of  a  new  edition  gives  evidence  that  this  presentation  has 
won  itself  friends  far  beyond  the  circle  of  those  most 
nearly  interested.  This,  moreover,  would  not  have  hap- 
pened had  I  not  abandoned  the  idea  of  presenting  a  col- 
lation from  the  data  usually  furnished,  and  had  I  not  given 
to  the  subject  the  form  which  my  long  personal  experience 
as  an  academic  teacher  had  proved  to  be  most  available. 
As  a  result  I  found  myself  in  the  somewhat  painful  posi- 
tion of  being  compelled  to  present  didactically  many  very 
considerable  deviations  from  the  previous  conception  and 
treatment,  without  being  able  in  the  limitations  of  this 
r^sum^  to  advance  for  experts  my  reasons  save  in  short 
references.  I  should  have  been  very  glad  if  I  could  have 
found  time  to  justify  my  innovations  by  accompanying  de- 
tailed discussions.  But,  unfortunately,  the  execution  of 
my  whole  purpose  has  been  postponed  up  to  this  time 
through  more  important  and  imperative  tasks.     The  new 


X  PREFACE 

edition,  therefore,  finds  me  again  in  the  same  position  of 
being  compelled  to  trust  more  in  the  force  of  the  general 
relations  of  the  subject  matter  and  in  the  emphasis  briefly 
laid  upon  important  moments,  than  in  a  leisurely  extended 
polemical  presentation,  which  would  otherwise  have  been 
usual  in  this  particular  field. 

For  the  chief  matters  in  which  I  have  gone  my  own  ways 
—  the  separation  of  Pythagoras  from  the  Pythagoreans 
and  the  discussion  of  the  latter  under  "  Efforts  toward 
Reconciliation  between  Heracleitanism  and  the  Theory  of 
Parmenides,"  the  separation  of  the  two  phases  of  Atomism 
by  the  Protagorean  Sophistic,  the  juxtaposition  of  Deraoc- 
ritus  and  Plato,  the  conception  of  the  Hellenic-Roman  phil- 
osophy as  a  progressive  application  —  first  ethical  and  then 
religious  —  of  science,  to  which  I  have  also  organically  con- 
nected Patristics,  —  all  this  the  reader  finds  unchanged  in 
its  essentials.  My  treatment  of  these  questions  has  found 
recognition  in  many  quarters,  but  in  many  also  an  expected 
opposition ;  and  the  reader  may  be  assured  that  I  have 
always  been  grateful  for  this  latter,  and  have  given  it  care- 
ful consideration.  This  weighing  of  objections  was  the 
more  needful  since  I  had  occasion  in  the  mean  time  to  deal 
with  the  same  questions  in  a  larger  connection  and  from 
a  different  point  of  view.  The  trained  eye  will  not  fail  to 
recognize  in  this  second  edition  the  influence  of  the  objec- 
tions of  experts,  even  where  these  have  not  convinced  me. 
in  the  numerous  small  changes  in  the  presentation,  and  in 
the  choice  of  bibliography  and  citations.  Here,  again,  the 
revising  hand  needed  to  follow  many  a  kindly  suggestion  in 
the  discussions  of  this  book,  and  accept  many  a  gratifying 
explanation  in  the  works  that  have  appeared  during  the 
past  five  years. 

The  only  change  in  the  external  form  of  the  book  is  in 
the  very  desirable  addition  of  an  index  to  the  philosophers 
discussed. 


PREFACE  xi 

Then  may  my  brief  treatise  continue  to  fulfil  its  task : 
to  solicit  friends  appreciative  of  a  noble  cause,  to  preserve 
alive  the  consciousness  of  the  imperishable  worth  which 
the  creations  of  Greek  thought  possess  for  all  human 
culture. 

WILHELM  WINDELBAND. 

Strassburg,  April,  1893. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Paob 

Translator's  Preface vii 

Author's  Preface  (to  second  German  edition)      ...      is. 


INTRODUCTION 

1.  Significance  of  ancient  philosophy  to  European  civilization  1 

2.  Division  of  ancient  philosophy 3 

3.  Historical  methods 5 

4-6.     Sources  and  developments  of  ancient  philosophy      ...  8 


A.  — GREEK   PHILOSOPHY 

Introduction:  The  preliminary  conditions  of  philosophy  in 
the  Greek  intellectual  life  of  the  seventh  and  sixth  cen- 
turies B.  c 16-36 

7.  Geographical  survey 16 

8.  Social  and  political  relations .  17 

9.  The  period  of  ethical  reflection :  the  Seven  Wise  Men  .     .  18 

10.  Practical  and  special  learning 20 

11.  Religious  ideas 2^ 

12.  The  reformation  by  Pythagoras 28 

13.  The  first  problems  of  science 33 

1.     The  Milesian  Nature  Philosophy.     Pages  36-45. 

14.  Thales •     .  36 

15.  Anaximander 39 

16.  Anaximenes 43 


xiv  TABLE  OF    CONTENTS 

Pass 

2.   The  Metaphysical  Conflict.  —  Heracleitus  and 
THE  Eleatics.    Pages  46-71. 

17.  Xenophanes 46 

18.  Heracleitus 52 

19.  Parmenides 59 

20.  Zeno  and  Melissus 65 

3.   Efforts  toward  Reconciliation.     Pages  71-100. 

21.  Empedocles 73 

22.  Anaxagoras 80 

23.  The  beginnings  of  Atomism  :  Leucippus 87 

-  24.  The  Pythagoreans 93 

4.   The  Greek  Enlightenment.  —  The  Sophists 
and  Socrates.     Pages  100-151. 

25.  Eclecticism  and  special  research 100 

26.  The  Sophists 108 

27.  Socrates 123 

28.  The  Megarian  and  Elean-Eretriau  Schools      .     .     .     .     .  135 

29.  The  Cynic  School 140 

30.  The  Cyrenaic  School 145 

5.   Materialism    and    Idealism.  —  Democritus    and 
Plato.     Pages  151-223. 

31.  The  life  and  writings  of  Democritus 155 

32.  The  theoretic  philosophy  of  Democritus 159 

The  practical  philosophy  of  Democritus 170 

The  life  and  writings  of  Plato 174 

The  theory  of  Ideas  of  Plato 189 

The  ethics  of  Plato 204 

The  nature  philosophy  of  Plato 216 

6.   Aristotle.    Pages  224-292. 

38.  The  Older  Academy 224 

39.  The  life  and  writings  of  Aristotle 230 

40.  The  logic  of  Aristotle 247 

41.  The  metaphysics  of  Aristotle 257 

42.  The  physics  of  Aristotle 268 

43.  The  ethics  and  poetics  of  Aristotle 282 


TABLE  OF    CONTENTS  XV 


B.  —  HELLENIC-ROMAN    PHILOSOPHY 

Page 

44.  Introduction       . 293 

1.    The  Controversies  of  the  Schools.    Pages  298-329 

45.  The  Peripatetics 298 

46.  The  Stoics 303 

47.  The  Epicureans 319 

2.    Skepticism  and  Syncretism.     Pages  329-349. 

48.  The  Skeptics 329 

49.  Eclecticism 337 

\50.     Mystic  Platonism 341 

3.   Patristics.     Pages  349-365, 

51.  The  Apologists 352 

52.  The  Gnostics  and  their  opponents 355 

53.  The  Alexandrian  School  of  Catechists :    Origen  .     .     .     .  361 

4.    Neo-Platonism.     Pages  365-383. 

54.  The  Alexandrian  School :  Plotinus 366 

55.  The  Syrian  School :  Jamblichus .  375 

56.  The  Athenian  School :  Proclus 377 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 385 

INDEX 389 


HISTORY 


OF 


ANCIENT    PHILOSOPHY 


INTRODUCTION 

1.  Scientific  interest  in  ancient,  especially  in  Greek, 
philosophy,  is  not  confined  to  the  value  that  it  possesses  as 
a  peculiar  subject  for  historical  research  and  for  the  study 
of  the  growth  of  civilization.  But  it  is  also  equally  con- 
cerned in  the  permanent  significance  that  the  content  of 
ancient  thought  possesses  by  reason  of  its  place  in  the 
development  of  the  intellectual  life  of  Europe. 

The  emphasis  falls  primarily  upon  the  lifting  of  mere 
knowing  to  the  plane  of  systematic  knowledge,  or  science. 
Not  content  with  his  storing  of  practical  facts,  and  with 
his  fantastic  speculations  born  of  his  religious  needs,  the 
Greek  sought  knowledge  for  its  own  sake.  Knowledge, 
like  art,  was  developed  as  an  independent  function  from 
its  involvement  in  the  other  activities  of  civilization.  So, 
first  and  foremost,  the  history  of  aacifint  philosojihyJa^iiML^. 
insight  into  the  origin  of  European  science  in  general. 

It  is,  however,  at  the  same  time  the  history  of  the  birth 
of  the  separate  sciences.  For  the  process  of  differentia- 
tion, which  begins  with  distinguisliing  thought  from  con- 
duct and  mythology,  was  continued  within  the  domain  of 
science  itself.  With  tlie  accumulation  and  organic  ar- 
rangement of  its  facts,  the  early,  simple,  and  unitary  science 
to  which  the  Greeks  gave  the  name  (f)i\oao<j>{a,  divided  into 

1 


2  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

the  special  sciences,  the  single  cfiiX,oa-o<f){ai,  and  these  then 
continued  to  develop  on  more  or  less  independent  lines. 

Concerning  the  history  and  meaning  of  the  name  of  "  phi- 
losophy," see  especially  R.  Haym,  in  Ersch  and  Gruber's  Ency- 
Mopddie,  III.  division,  vol.  24  ;  Ueberweg,  Grimdriss,  I.  §  1  ; 
Windelband,  Praeludien.,  p.  1  ff.  Tlie  word  became  a  technical 
term  in  the  Socratic  school.  It  meant  there  exactly  what  sci- 
ence means  in  German.  In  later  time,  after  the  division  into 
the  special  sciences,  the  word  philosophy  had  the  sense  of 
ethico-religious  practical  wisdom.     See  §  2. 

The  beginnings  of  scientific  life  that  are  thus  found  in 
ancient  philosophy  are  most  influential  upon  the  entire 
development  that  follows.  With  proportionately  few  data, 
Greek  philosophy  produced,  with  a  kind  of  grand  simplicity, 
conceptual  forms  for  the  intellectual  elaboration  of  its  facts, 
and  with  a  remorseless  logic  it  developed  every  essential 
point  of  view  for  the  study  of  the  universe.  Therein  con- 
sists the  peculiar  character  of  ancient  thought  and  the  high 
didactic  significance  of  its  history.  Our  present  language 
and  our  conception  of  the  world  are  thoroughly  permeated 
by  the  results  of  ancient  science.  The  naive  ruggedness 
with  Avhich  ancient  philosophers  followed  out  single  motives 
of  reflection  to  their  most  one-sided  logical  conclusions, 
brings  into  clearest  relief  that  practical  and  psychological 
necessity  which> 'governs  not  only  the  evolution  of  the 
problems  of  philosophy,  but  also  the  repeated  historical 
tendencies  toward  the  solution  of  these  problems.  We 
may  likewise  ascribe  a  typical  significance  to  the  universal 
stages  of  development  of  ancient  philosophy,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  philosophy  at  first  turned  with  undaunted  courage 
to  the  study  of  the  outer  world ;  thwarted  there,  it  turned 
back  to  the  inner  world,  and  from  this  point  of  view,  with 
renewed  strength,  it  attempted  to  conceive  the  World-All. 
Even  the  manner  in  which  ancient  thought  placed  its 
entire  apparatus  of  conceptual  knowledge  at  the  service  of 


INTRODUCTION  3 

social  and  religious  needs  has  a  peculiar  and  more  than 
historical  value. 

The  real  significance  of  ancient  philosophy  will  be  much  ex- 
aggerated if  one  tries  to  draw  close  analogies  between  the  dif- 
ferent phases  of  modern  philosophy  and  its  exponents,  and 
those  of  the  ancients.  Read  K.  v.  Reichlin-Meldegg,  D.  Paral- 
lelismus  d.  alien  u.  neuen  Philosophie,  Leipzig  and  Heidelberg, 
1865.  A  detailed  parallelism  is  impossible,  because  all  the 
forms  of  the  modern  history  of  civilization  have  so  much  more 
nearly  complete  presuppositions,  and  are  more  complicated  than 
those  of  the  ancient  world.  The  typical  character  of  the  latter 
is  valid  in  so  far  as  they  have  "  writ  large  "  and  often  nearly 
grotesquely  the  simple  and  elemental  forms  of  mental  life, 
which  among  moderns  are  far  more  complicated  in  their 
combinations. 

2.  The  total  of  that  which  is  usually  designated  as 
ancient  philosophy  falls  into  two  large  divisions,  which 
must  be  distinguished  as  much  in  respect  to  the  civilizations 
that  form  their  background  as  in  respect  to  the  intel- 
lectual principles  that  move  them.  These  divisions  are, 
(1)  Greek  philosophy,  and  (2)  Hellenic-Roman  philosophy. 
We  may  assume  the  year  of  the  death  of  Aristotle,  322  b.  c, 
ste  the  historical  line  of  demarcation  between  the  two. 

Greek  philosophy  grew  out  of  an  exclusive  national 
culture,  and  is  the  legitimate  offspring  of  the  Greek  spirit. 
The  Hellenic-Roman  philosophy  came,  on  the  otlier  hand, 
out  of  much  more  manifold  and  contradictory  intellectual 
movements.  After  the  days  of  Alexander  the  Great  a 
culture  that  was  so  cosmopolitan  that  it  broke  down  all 
national  barriers,  increased  in  ever-widening  circles  among 
the  nations  upon  the  Mediterranean  Sea.  The  fulfilment  of 
these  intellectual  movements  was  objectively  expressed  in 
the  Roman  Empire,  subjectively  in  Christianity ;  and,  be  it 
remarked,  the  Hellenic-Roman  philosophy  forms  one  of  the 
mightiest  factors  in  this  very  process  of  amalgamation. 

Moreover,  there  is  a  not  less  important  difference  in  the 
scientific  interest  of  the  two  periods.     Greek  philosophy 


4  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

began  with  an  independent  desire  for  knowledge.  It  was 
ever  concerned  in  the  quest  for  knowledge  that  was  free 
from  all  subordinate  purposes.  It  perfected  itself  in  Aris- 
totle, partly  in  his  logic,  which  was  a  universal  theory  of 
knowledge,  and  partly  in  the  scheme  of  a  developed  system 
of  sciences.     The  energy  of  this  purely  theoretic  interest 

«^  was  gradually  extinguished  in  the  following  time,  and  was 
only  partly  maintained  in  unpretentious  work  upon  the 
objective  special  sciences.     The  practical  question  how  the 

'^  Wise  Man  should  live  entered  into  "  philosophy,"  however, 
and  knowledge  was  no  longer  sought  on  account  of  itself 
but  as  a  means  of  right  living.  In  this  way  the  Hellenic- 
Roman  philosophy  fell  into  dependence  upon  the  general 
but  temporary  changes  in  society,  —  a  thing  that  never 
happened  in  purely  Greek  philosophy.  Then  later  its 
original  ethical  tendency  changed  entirely  into  the  effort  to 
find  by  means  of  science  a  satisfaction  for  religious  aspira- 
tion. Jn  Greece,  philosophy,  therefore,  was  science  that 
had  ripened  into  independence ;  in  Hellenism  and  the 
Roman  Empire,  philosophy  entered  with  a  full  possession 
of  its  consciousness  into  the  service  of  the  social  and 
religious  missiou  of  man. 

It  is  obvious,  from  the  elasticity  of  all  historical  divisions, 
that  this  antithesis  is  not  absolute,  but  only  relative.  The  post- 
Aristotelian  philosophy  is  not  entirely  lacking  in  endeavors 
for  the  essentially  theoretical,  nor  indeed  among  the  purely 
Greek  thinkers  are  there  wanting  those  who  set  for  philosophy 
ultimately  practical  ends,  —  the  Socratics  for  example.  How- 
ever, comparison  of  the  different  definitions  which  in  the  course 
of  antiquity  have  been  given  for  the  problem  of  philosophy, 
justifies,  on  the  whole,  the  division  we  have  chosen,  which  takes 
the  purpose  of  philosophy  in  its  entirety  as  the  principium 
divisionis. 

These  divisions  approach  most  nearly  among  later  writers 
those  of  Ch.  A.  Brandis  in  his  shorter  work,  Gesch.  d.  Entivick. 
d.  griechischen  Phil.  u.  Hirer  Nachwirkungen  im  romischen 
Reiche  (2  vols.,  Berlin,  1862  and  1864),  although  he  distin- 
guishes formally  three  periods   here,  as  in   his  larger  work. 


INTRODUCTION .  5 

These  periods  are  :  (1)  pre-Socratic  philosophy ;  (2)  the  devel- 
opment from  Socrates  to  Aristotle;  (3)  post-Aristotelian  phi- 
losophy. Yet  he  unites  the  first  two  divisions  as  "  the  first 
half,"  and  distinctly  recognizes  their  inner  relationship  in  con- 
trast to  the  third  division,  which  forms  "  the  second  half." 
Zeller  and  Schwegler  also  employ  these  three  periods  as  the 
basis  of  their  work  upon  the  Greeks,  while  Ritter  puts  the 
Stoics  ancT  Epicureans  also  in  the  second  period.  Hegel,  on 
the  other  hand,  treats  the  entire  Greek  philosophy  until  Aris- 
totle as  the  first  period,  to  which  he  adds  the  Graeco-Roman 
philosophy  as  the  second  and  the  neo-Platonic  philosophy  as 
the  third.  Ueberweg  accepts  the  divisions  of  Ritter,  with  this 
variation,  —  he  transfers  the  Sophists  from  the  first  period  to 
the  second. 

We  purposely  desist  from  dividing  here  the  two  chief  periods 
of  philosoph}'  into  subordinate  periods.  The  demand  for  com- 
prehensiveness, which  alone  Avould  justify  further  divisions,  is 
satisfied  with  the  simple  general  divisions,  while  a  comprehen- 
sive view  of  the  steps  in  development  is  provided  for  in  another 
manner  by  the  treatment  of  individual  doctrines.  If  a  completer 
subdivision  should  be  insisted  upon,  the  following  might  be 
adopted  :  — 

(a)  Greek  philosophy  into  three  periods :  — 

(1)  The  cosmological,  which  includes  the  entire  pre-Socratic 
speculation,  and  reaches  down  to  about  450  b.  c.  (§§  1-3)  ; 

(2)  The  anthropological,  to  which  belong  the  men  of  the 
Greek  Enlightenment,  i.  e.,  the  Sophists,  Socrates,  and  the  so- 
called  Socratic  schools  (§  4)  ; 

(3)  The  systematic,  which  by  its  uniting  the  two  preceding 
periods  is  the  flowering  period  of  Greek  science. 

(b)  Hellenic-Roman  philosophy  into  two  sections  :  — 

(1)  The  school-controversies  of  the  post-Aristotelian  time, 
with  the  accompanying  essential  ethical  tendency,  critical  skep- 
ticism, and  retrospective  erudition  (§§1  and  2). 

(2)  Eclectic  Platonism,  with  its  bifurcation  into  the  rival  sys- 
tems of  Christian  and  neo-Platonic  religions  (§§3  and  4). 

3.  The  scientific  treatment  of  the  history  of  philosophy 
or  of  a  part  of  that  history,  as  in  this  treatise,  has  a 
double  task.  On  the  one  hand  it  must  determine  the 
actual  number  of  those  concepts  which  are  claimed  to  be 
"  philosophic,"  and  must  conceive  them  in  their  genesis, 
particularly  in  their  relation  to  each  other.     On  the  other 


6  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

hand,  it  must  determine  the  value  of  each  individual 
philosophic  doctrine  in  the  development  of  the  scientific 
consciousness. 

In  the  first  regard  the  history  of  philosophy  is  purely  an 
historical  science.  As  such,  it  must  without  any  predilec- 
tion proceed,  by  a  careful  examination  of  the  tradition,  to 
establish  with  philological  exactness  the  content  of  the 
philosophic  doctrines.  It  must  explain  their  origin  with 
all  the  precautionary  measures  of  the  historical  method. 
It  furthermore  must  make  clear  their  genetic  relations,  on 
the  one  hand,  to  the  personal  life  of  the  philosophers,  and, 
on  the  other,  to  civilization  as  a  whole.  In  this  way  it 
will  be  plain  how  philosophy  has  attained  to  an  actual 
process  of  development. 

From  this  historical  point  of  view,  however,  there  arises 
for  the  history  of  philosophy  the  critical  task  of  determin- 
ing the  results  which  the  various  systems  of  philosophy 
have  yielded  for  the  construction  of  the  human  concep- 
tion of  the  world.  The  point  of  view  for  this  critical  study 
need  not  be  the  peculiar  philosophical  attitude  of  history. 
Nevertheless  it  must,  on  the  one  hand,  be  that  of  inner 
criticism,  which  tests  the  teaching  of  a  philosophical  sys- 
tem by  logical  compatibility  and  consistency  ;  it  must,  on 
the  other  hand,  be  that  of  historical  generalization,  which 
estimates  philosophical  teaching  according  to  its  intellec- 
tual fruitfulness  and  its  practical  historical  efficacy . 

The  history  of  ancient  philosophy  as  a  science  has  to 
meet  very  great  and  sometimes  insuperable  difficulties  in 
the  fragmentary  character  of  the  literary  sources.  On  the 
other  hand,  in  its  critical  problem,  it  is  fortunate  in  being 
able,  after  a  development  of  nearly  two  thousand  years,  to 
judge  the  value  of  individual  teaching  with  no  personal 
bias. 

The  different  points  of  view  taken  in  investigating  the  his- 
tory of  philosophy  are  as  follows :  — 


INTRODUCTION  7 

(1)  The  naive  point  of  view  of  description.  According  to 
this  the  teachings  of  the  different  philosophers  are  supposed  to 
be  reported  with  historical  authenticity.  So  soon,  however,  as 
any  report  is  claimed  to  be  of  scientific  value,  the  tradition 
must  be  criticised;  and  this,  as  all  other  historical  criticism, 
can  be  accomplished  only  by  investigating  the  sources. 

(2)  The  genetic  point  of  view  of  explanation,  which  has  three 
possible  forms,  — 

(a)  The  psychological  explanation.  This  represents  the  per- 
sonality and  individual  relations  of  the  respective  philosophers 
as  the  actual  causes  or  occasions  of  their  opinions. 

(&)  The  pragmatic  method.  This  is  an  attempt  to  under- 
stand the  teaching  of  each  philosopher  by  explaining  the  contra- 
dictions and  unsolved  problems  of  his  immediate  predecessors. 

(c)  The  kulfiir-historisch  view.  This  sees  in  the  philosophical 
systems  the  progressive  consciousness  of  the  entire  ideal  de- 
velopment of  the  human  mind. 

(3)  The  speculative  attitude  of  criticism.  Starting  from  a 
sj'stematic  conviction,  this  seeks  to  characterize  the  different 
phases  of  philosophical  development  by  the  contributions  thereto 
which  they  have  severally  furnished.  (Compare  Hegel,  in  Vor- 
lesunyen  iiber  d.  Gesch.  d.  Phil.,  Complete  Works,  Vol.  XIII. 
19  ff. ;  Ueberweg,  Grandriss,  I.  §  3  ;  Windelband,  Gesch.  d. 
Phil.,  Freiburg  i.  B.,  1892,  §§  1  and  2.)  Until  within  the  previous 
century  enumeration  of  the  placita  pliilosopTiorum,  with  some 
little  application  of  the  pragmatic  method,  essentiall}'  predomi- 
nated in  the  history'  of  philosophy.  Hegel,  with  all  the  exagger- 
ation of  this  speculative  point  of  view,  was  the  first  to  raise 
philosophy  from  a  mere  collection  of  curiosities  to  a  science. 
His  constructive  and  fundamental  idea  —  that  in  the  historical 
order  of  philosophical  theories  the  categories  of  true  philoso- 
phy repeat  themselves  as  progressive  achievements  of  human- 
ity—  involved  an  emphasis  upon  the  Jcultur-historisch  and  the 
pragmatic  explanations,  and  this  required  only  the  individual- 
istic psychological  supplementation.  On  account  of  Hegel's 
speculative  conception,  on  the  other  hand,  historical  criticism 
fell  with  the  disappearance  of  faith  in  the  absolute  philosophy. 
By  this  historical  criticism  the  mere  establishment  of  the  facts 
and  their  genetic  explanation  are  changed  into  a  complete  philo- 
sophical science.  Hegel  created  the  science  of  the  history  of 
philosophy  according  to  its  ideal  purposes,  but  not  until  after  his 
day  was  safe  ground  presented  for  achieving  such  a  science  by 
the  philological  method  of  getting  the  data  without  presupposi- 
tions. Upon  no  territory  has  this  method  since  recorded  such 
far-reaching  success  as  upon  the  field  of  ancient  philosophy. 


8  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHY 

4.  The  scientific  helps  to  the  study  of  ancient  philos- 
ophy fall  into  three  classes  :  — 

(rt)  The  Original  Sources.  Only  a  very  few  of  the 
writings  of  ancient  philosophers  have  been  preserved. 
As  to  complete  single  works  in  the  purely  Greek  philos- 
ophy, they  are  to  be  found  only  in  Plato  and  Aristotle. 
The  original  sources,  however,  are  richer  in  the  Hellenic- 
Roman  period.  The  writings  of  the  ancient  Greek  think- 
ers are  preserved  in  only  a  fragmentary  way  through 
incidental  citations  of  later  literature. 

The  most  comprehensive  collection  not  especially  mentioned 
hereafter,  is  that  of  F.  W.  A.  MuUach,  Fragmenta  philosopho- 
rum  Gnvcorum  (3  vols.,  Paris,  1860-81).  Yet  it  satisfies  to- 
day neither  the  demands  for  completeness  nor  for  accuracy. 

Nevertheless  the  works  that  have  come  down  to  us  are 
by  no  means  to  be  accepted  in  toto  and  on  trust.  Not 
alone  unintentionally,  but  also  from  its  desire  to  give  to 
its  own  teaching,  so  far  as  possible,  the  nimbus  of  ancient 
wisdom,  later  antiquity  substituted  in  many  instances  its 
own  compositions  for  the  writings  of  the  ancients,  or  in- 
terpolated their  texts.  The  sources  of  Greek  philosophy 
in  particular  are  not  only  in  a  very  fragmentary  but  also 
in  a  very  uncertain  state,  and  we  are  still  limited  to  a 
conjecture  of  a  greater  or  less  degree  of  probability  in 
regard  to  many  very  weighty  questions.  The  philological- 
historical  criticism,  which  seems  indispensable  under  these 
circumstances,  requires  a  safe  criterion  for  our  guidance,  and 
this  criterion  we  possess  in  the  works  of  Plato  and  Aristotle. 

Opposed  to  the  easy  credulity  with  which  in  the  previous 
century  (according  to  Buhle)  tradition  was  received,  Schleier- 
macher  had  the  especial  merit  of  having  begun  and  incited  a 
fruitful  criticism.  Brandis,  Trendelenburg,  Zeller,  and  Diels 
were  likewise  the  .leaders  in  this  direction. 

5.  (J)  The  Corroborative  Testimony  of  Antiquity.  Early 
(according  to  Xenophon)  in  ancient  literature  we  find  tes- 


INTRODUCTION  9 

timony  on  the  life  and  death  of  notable  philosophers.  Of 
importance  for  us,  moreover,  are  the  passages  in  whicli 
Plato  and  Aristotle — especially  in  the  beginning  of  his 
3fetaphi/sics  —  linked  their  own  teaching  to  the  early  phi- 
losophy. At  the  time  of  Aristotle  there  arose  a  widely 
spread,  partly  historical  and  partly  critical  literature,  con- 
cerning what  was  then  ancient  philosophy.  Unfortunately, 
this  has  been  lost,  excepting  a  few  fragments.  Especially 
deplorable  is  the  loss  of  the  writings  of  this  character  of 
Aristotle  and  his  immediate  disciples, — Theophrastus  in 
particular.  Similar  works,  likewise  no  longer  extant,  issued 
from  the  Academy,  in  which,  moreover,  commentating  also 
had  its  beginning  at  an  early  time.  So,  also,  the  historical 
and  critical  works  of  the  Stoics  have  gone  forever. 

This  historiography  of  philosophy,  the  so-called  dox- 
ography,  with  its  commentating  and  collating,  developed 
enormously  in  the  Alexandrian  literature,  and  had  its  three 
philosophical  centres  in  Pei'gamus,  Rhodes,  and  Alexandria. 
These  voluminous  and  numerous  works  in  their  original 
form  are  in  the  main  lost.  Yet  with  all  recognition  of 
the  erudition  that  doubtless  permeated  them,  it  must  still 
be  maintained  that  they  have  exercised  a  bewildering 
influence  in  various  ways  upon  succeeding  writers,  who 
took  excerpts  directly  out  of  them.  Besides  this  almost 
unavoidable  danger  of  reading  later  conceptions  and  theo- 
ries into  the  old  teaching,  there  appear  three  chief  sources 
of  error, — 

(1)  In  the  inclination  to  fix  the  succession  of  ancient  philoso- 
phers after  the  manner  of  the  later  successions  of  scholarchs. 

(2)  In  the  fantastic  tendency  to  dignify  ancient  Greece  with 
the  miraculous  and  the  extraordinar}*. 

(3)  Finally,  in  the  effort  that  sprang  out  of  an  undefined  feel- 
ing of  the  dependence  of  Grecian  upon  Oriental  culture.  En- 
couraged by  a  now  acquaintance  with  the  East,  some  scholars 
have  tried  to  knit  every  significant  fact  as  closely  as  possible 
with  Oriental  influence. 


10  HISTOEY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Statements  at  only  third  or  fourth  hand  are  left  over  to 
us  from  the  Roman  period.  The  historical  notes  in  the 
fragments  of  Varro,  in  the  writings  of  Cicero  (Rud.  Hirzel, 
Untersuch.  zu  C.  pJiilos.  Schriften,  3  parts,  Leipzig,  1877- 
1883),  as  well  as  of  Seneca,  Lucretius,  and  Plutarch,  are 
valuable,  but  must  be  used  with  care.  The  philosophical- 
historical  writings  of  Plutarch  are  lost.  The  compila- 
tion preserved  under  his  name,  De  physicis  philosophorum 
decretis  (in  Diibner's  edition  of  the  Morals,  Paris,  1841), 
is,  according  to  Diels,  an  abstract  of  the  Placita  of  Aetius, 
dating  back  to  Theophrastus,  and  was  made  perhaps  in  the 
middle  of  the  second  century.  The  spurious  book  Trepl 
<f)L\o(T6(f)ov  i(TTopia<;,  which  is  falsely  ascribed  to  Galen,  is  in 
the  main  identical  with  it  (published  in  the  nineteenth  vol- 
ume of  Kiihii'schen  Gesamtmisgahe').  Many  later  excerpts 
of  Favorinus  are  included  among  the  uncritically  collected 
reports ;  so,  also,  those  of  Apuleius  and  of  Gellius  (Nodes 
atticce,  ed.  Hertz,  Leipzig,  1884-85 ;  see  also  Mercklin, 
Die  Zitiermethode  u.  Quellenberiutzung  des  A.  Gr.,  Leipzig, 
1860).  Lucian's  writings  must  also  be  mentioned  in  this 
connection.  Those  numberless  historical  accounts  in  the 
writings  of  Galen  (especially  De  placitis  Hijjpocratis  et 
Platonis,  separately  pubHshed  by  Iwan  Miiller,  Leipzig, 
1874)  and  of  Sextus  Empiricus  {Op.  ed.  Bekker,  Berlin, 
1842  :  TTvppoivetot  virorvTroxrei^  and  irpa  /j,a0r]fMaTiKov<i)  are 
philosophically  more  trustworthy.  Out  of  the  same  period 
grew  the  work  of  Flavius  Philostratus,  Vitce  sopJiistarum 
(ed.  Westermann,  Paris,  1849),  and  of  Athenaeus,  Deipno- 
sophistce  (ed.  Meineke,  Leipzig,  1857-69).  Finally,  there 
is  the  book  which  was  regarded  for  a  long  time  almost  as 
the  principal  source  for  a  history  of  ancient  philosophy ; 
viz.,  that  of  Diogenes  Laertius,  irepl  ^Iwv,  hcyfjudrmv  koI 
aTTOcfyOeyfidrcov  rcov  iv  (j)iho(TO(f)ia  evSoKifirja-dvToyv  ^i^Xia 
8eKa  (ed.  Cobet,  Paris,  1850). 

Another  kind  of  secondary  sources  is  furnished  by  the 


INTRODUCTION  11 

writings  of  the  church  fathers,  who  have  polemical,  apolo- 
getic, and  dogmatic  aims  in  reproducing  the  Greek  phi- 
losophy. This  is  especially  true  of  Justin  Martyr,  Clement 
of  Alexandria,  Origen  {Kara  KeXo-ou),  Hippolytus  (^Refuta- 
tio  omnmm  hceresium,  ed.  Duncker,  Gbtt.,  1859,  the  first  hook 
of  this  being  formerly  supposed  to  be  a  work  of  Origen 
under  the  title  (j)i\oao(f)ovfi€va),F,nseh'n\s  (^Prcep.  evmig.,cd. 
Dindorf,  Leipzig,  1868),  and  in  certain  respects  also  Tertul- 
lian  and  Augustine.  The  importance  of  the  church  fathers 
as  sources  for  the  study  of  ancient  philosophy  has  attained 
recently  to  a  completer  and  more  fruitful  recognition, 
especially  since  the  impulse  given  by  Diels  to  their  study. 

Finally,  the  activity  in  commentating  and  historical  re- 
search was  carried  on  in  a  lively  fashion  in  the  neo- 
Platonic  school.  The  chief  work  indeed,  that  of  Porphyry, 
is  not  preserved  (^tXocro^o?  laropla).  On  the  other  hand, 
the  writings  of  the  neo-Platonists  in  general  offer  numerous 
historical  data  ;  and,  as  already  the  earlier  commentaries 
of  Alexander  of  Aphrodisias  {zu  Arii^f.  Met.,  ed.  Hayduck, 
Berlin,  1891,  and  zu  Arlsf.  Top.,  M.  Wallies,  Berlin,  1891  ; 
smaller  works  by  Ivo  Bruns,  Berlin,  1898),  —  so  the  com- 
mentaries of  Themistius,  and  especially  Simplicius,  contain 
many  carefully  and  intelligently  compiled  excerpts  from 
the  direct  and  indirect  sources  of  earlier  times.  Among 
the  latest  writers  of  ancient  literature  the  collections  of 
Stobaeus  and  Photius,  and  those  also  of  Hcsychius,  appear 
useful  for  the  history  of  philosophy. 

Compare  Diels,  Doxogmphi  Gneci  (Berlin,  1879).  An  ex- 
cellent and,  for  a  beginning,  an  extraordinarily  instructive 
collection  of  the  most  important  passages  from  the  primary  and 
secondary  sources  is  that  of  Ritter  and  Preller  in  their  Histnria 
philosophiie  Grteco-romanw  ex  fontinm  locis  contexta  (7  ed.  is 
brought  out  by  Schulthess  and  Wellmann,  Gotha,  1888). 

6.  ((?)  The  Modern  Expositions.  Scliolarly  treatment 
of    ancient    philosophy   was    in    modern    literature    con- 


12  HISTORY   OF   ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHY 

fined  at  first  to  a  brief  criticism  of  the  latest  works  of 
antiquity.  Thus,  the  occasional  historical  collections  con- 
cerned with  ancient  philosophy  which  we  find  in  the 
Humanistic  literature,  in  the  main  led  back  to  neo-Platonic 
sources.  The  very  first  work,  the  History  of  Philosophy/, 
by  Thomas  Stanley  (London,  1665),  scarcely  more  than 
reproduced  the  reports  of  Diogenes  Laertius.  Bayle  in  his 
Dictionnaire  historique  et  critique  (1  ed.,  Rotterdam,  1697), 
gave  a  powerful  impulse  to  critical  treatment.^ 

Later  appeared  the  writings  of  Brucker,  thoroughgoing, 
industriously  compiled,  but  in  point  of  fact  not  equal  to 
the  task :  Kurze  Fragen  aus  der  philosophischen  Historie 
(Ulm,  1731  f.),  Historia  critica  philosophice  (Leipzig, 
1742  f.),  Institutiones  historice  philosophice  (Leipzig,  1717  ; 
a  compendium  for  a  school  manual). 

With  the  formation  of  the  great  schools  of  philosophy, 
particularly  in  Germany,  the  history  of  philosophy  began 
to  be  treated  with  reference  to  its  single  directions  and 
systems.  In  the  front  D.  Tiedemann  came  with  his  em- 
pirical-sceptical Geist  der  Philosophie  (Marburg,  1791  ff.). 
Then  followed,  from  the  Kantian  point  of  view,  J.  G.  Buhle 
with  Lehrbuch  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  (Gott.,  1796 
ff.)  ;  Tennemann,  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  1798  ff.) ; 
then  the  Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  (5tli 
ed.),  Amad.  Wendt,  Leipzig,  1829,  a  much  used  epitome, 
commending  itself  by  its  careful  literary  data ;  and  J.  F. 
Fries,  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  (1  vol.,  Halle,  1837). 
From  the  Schellingen  point  of  view,  there  are  Fr.  Ast's 
Grundriss  einer  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  (Landshut, 
1807)  ;  E.  Reinhold,  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  nach  den 
Hauptpunkten  ihrer  Entwickelung  (Jena,  1858).  From 
the  point  of  view  of  Schleiermacher,  are  his  own  notes 
for  his  lectures  on  the  history  of  philosophy  in  a  collection 

^  Upon  which  a  philosophical  article  of  value  in  part  even  to-day  has 
been  published  in  German  by  H.  Jacob  (1797-98,  Halle). 


INTRODUCTION  13 

of  three  parts,  four  volumes  (Berlin,  1839)  :  H.  Ritter, 
Die  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  (Hamburg,  1829  ff.)  ;  F. 
Ch.  Potter,  Die  Greschichte  der  Philosophie  in  Umriss 
(Elberfeld,  1873).^  From  the  Hegelian  point  of  view, 
are  Hegel's  lectures  upon  the  history  of  philosophy  in  his 
complete  works,  XIII.  ff. ;  J.  E.  Erdmann,  Crrundriss 
der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  (3  ed.,  Berlin,  1878). 
Prom  the  Herbartian  point  of  view,  is  Ch.  A.  Thilo,  Kurze 
pragmatisehe  Geschichte  der  Philosophic  (Cothen,  2  ed., 
1880).  With  especial  reference  to  the  factual  development 
of  problems  and  concepts,  ancient  philosophy  has  also  been 
treated  by  W.  "Windelband,  Geschichte  der  Philosophie 
(Freiburg  i.  Br.,  1892).  Of  the  other  numerous  complete 
presentations  of  the  history  of  philosophy,  that  of  J.  Berg- 
mann  (Berlin,  1892)  may  be  finally  mentioned.  Of  the 
presentations  in  other  languages  than  German  which  also 
give  valuable  contribution  to  the  study  of  ancient  philosophy, 
may  be  here  mentioned :  V.  Cousin,  Histoire  gene'rale  de  la 
philosophie  (12  ed.,  Paris,  1884);  A.  ^s'cher,  Histoire  de 
philosophie  eiiropeenne  (Paris,  5  ed.,  1892)  ;  A.  Fouillee, 
Histoire  de  la  Philosophie  (Paris,  3  ed.,  1882)  ;  R.  Blakey, 
History  of  the  Philosophy  of  Mind  (London,  1848)  ;  G.  H, 
Lewes,  A  Biograpihical  History  of  Philosophy  (London, 
4  ed.,  1871,  German  ed.,  Berlin,  1871). 

The  e<>mpletest  literary  data  for  the  historiography  of  philos- 
oph}',  and  particularly  ancient  pliilosophy,  are  found  in  Ueber- 
weg,  Grunclriss  d.  Philos.,  a  work  which  presents  also  in  its 
remarkable  continuation  by  M.  Heinze  (7  ed. ,  Berlin,  1886)  an 
indispensable  completeness  in  its  annotations.  The  texts  fur- 
nished by  Ueberweg  himself  were  at  first  only  superficially 
systematized  by  him,  and  were  given  an  unequal,  confused,  and, 
for  beginners,  untransparent  character  by  his  later  additions, 
interpolations,  and  annotations. 

1  An  inspiring  statement  of  the  development  of  ancient  philosophy  is 
also  that  of  Brandis's  Geschichte  der  Philos.  seit  Kant,  1  Part  (Breslau, 
1842). 


14  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

The  profouuder  philological  studies  at  the  beginning  of 
the  nineteenth  century  were  advantageous  to  the  history 
of  ancient  philosophy,  since  a  critical  sifting  of  tradition 
and  a  philological  and  methodical  basis  for  historical- 
philosophical  research  was  facilitated  (compare  Zeller,  JiatAr- 
bueher  der  Gegenwart,  1843).  The  greatest  credit  for  such 
a  stimulus  is  due  to  Schleiermacher,  whose  translation  of 
Plato  was  a  powerful  example,  and  whose  special  works 
upon  Heracleitus,  Diogenes  of  ApoUonia,  Anaximander, 
and  others  have  been  placed  in  Part  III.  book  2,  of  his  col- 
lected works.  Among  the  numerous  special  researches  are 
to  be  mentioned  A.  B.  Krische's  Forschungen  auf  dem 
(rebiete  der  alien  Philosophie  (Gdtt.,  1840)  ;  also  A.  Trende- 
lenburg, JSistorische  Beitrdge  zur  Philosophie  (Berlin, 
1846  f.),  the  author  of  which  deserves  credit  for  his  stimula- 
tion of  Aristotelian  studies ;  H.  Siebeck,  Untersuchungen  zur 
Philosophie  der  Griechen  (2  ed.,  Freiburg  i.  Br.,  1888) ; 
G.  Teichmiiller,  Studienzur  Greschichte der Begriffe  (Berlin, 
1874  ff.)  ;  0.  Apelt,  Beitrdge  zur  Geschichte  der  grieehischen 
Philosophie  (Leipzig,  1891)  ;  E.  Norden  (the  same  title), 
Leipzig,  1892. 

As  the  first  product  of  these  critico-philological  studies, 
we  may  consider  the  praiseworthy  work  of  Ch.  A.  Brandis, 
Handbuch  der  Geschichte  der  grieehisch-romischen  Philoso- 
phie (Berlin,  1835-60),  by  the  side  of  which  the  author 
placed  a  shorter  and  especially  finely  conceived  exposition, 
Geschichte  der  Entwickelungen  der  grieehischen  Philosophie 
undihrer  Nachwirhungen  im  romisehen  Reiche  (Berlin,  1862 
u.  1864).  With  less  exhaustiveness,  but  with  a  peculiar 
superiority  in  the  development  of  the  problems,  Ludw. 
Striimpell  (2d  part,  Leipzig,  1854,  1861),  K.  Prantl 
(Stuttgart,  2  ed.,  1863),  and  A.  Schwegler  (3  ed.,  espe- 
cially, by  Kostlin,  Freiburg,  1883)  treated  the  same  subject. 
All  these  valuable  works,  and  with  them  the  numerous 
synopses,  compendiums,  and  compilations  (see  Ueberweg, 


INTRODUCTION  15 

above  mentioned,  pp.  27-29),  are  overshadowed  beside  that 
masterpiece  and,  for  many  reasons,  final  word  upon  ancient 
philosophy :  E.  Zeller,  Die  Philosophie  der  Griechen  (Tu- 
bingen, 1844  ff. :  the  first  book  is  published  in  the  fifth  edi- 
tion, the  second  in  the  fourth  edition,  the  others  in  the  third 
edition).^  Here,  upon  the  broadest  philological-historical 
foundation  and  upon  original  sources,  a  philosophical, 
authoritative,  and  illuminating  statement  is  given  of  the 
entire  development.  Zeller  has  published  a  clever  sum- 
mary of  the  whole  in  Grundriss  d.  Gesch.  der  Alten  Philos. 
(4  ed.,  Leipzig,  1893). 

The  special  sides  of  ancient  philosophy  have  been  presented 
in  the  followiug  notable  works  :  — 

Logic  :  K.  Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Logik  imAbendlande  (vols.  1  and 
2,  Leipzig,  1855  and  1861)  ;  P.  Natorp,  Forsdiimgen  z.  Gesch. 
des  Erkenntnissprohlems  im  Altertum  (Berlin,  1884) ;  Giov. 
Cesca,  La  teoria  della  conoscenza  nella  Jilos.  greca  (Verona, 
1887). 

Psychology  :  H.  Siebeck,  Gesch.  d.  Psy.  (vol.  1,  Gotha,  1880 
and  1884) ;  A.  E.  Chaignet,  Histoire  de  la  psy.  des  grecs 
(Paris,  1887-92). 

Ethics  :  L.  v.  Henuing,  D.  Prinzipien  d.  Elhik,  etc.  (Berlin, 
1825)  ;  E.  Feuerlein,  D.  p)hilos.  Sittenlehre  in  ihrea  geschicht- 
lichen  Haiqjtformen  (Tubingen,  1857  and  1859) ;  Paul  Janet, 
Histoire  de  la  philosophie  morale  et  politique  (Paris,  1858)  ;  J. 
Mackintosh,  The  Progress  of  Ethical  Philosophy  (London.,  1862) ; 
W.  Whewell,  Lectiires  on  the  History  of  Morcd  Philosophy 
(London,  1862)  ;  R.  Blakey,  History  of  Moral  Science  (Edin- 
burgh, 1863);  L.  Schmidt,  D.  Ethik  d.  al.  Griechen  (Berlin, 
1881) ;  Th.  Zeigler,  D.  Ethik  d.   Gr.  u.  Romer  (Bonn,   1881)  ; 

C.  Kostlin,  Gesch.  d.  Ethik  (l  vol.,  Tubingen,  1887)  ;  especially 
compare  R.  Eucken,  D.  Lebensanschauungen  d.  grossen  Denker 
(Leipzig,  1890). 

The  following  particular!}-  treat  special  topics  :  M.  Heinze, 

D.  Lehre  v.  Logos  (Leipzig,  1872)  ;  D.  Lehred.  Eadaemonismus 
in  griech.  Philos.  (Leipzig,  1884)  ;  CI.  Biiunjcker,  Das  Problem 
d.  Materie  in  d.  griech.  Philos.  (Miinster,  1890)  ;  J.  Walter, 
Gesch.  d.  Aesthetik  im  Altertum  (Leipzig,  1893), 

^  Referred  to  in  this  work  usually  as  I^.,  II*. ,  etc.  —  Tr. 


16  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

A.   GREEK  PHILOSOPHY 

Introduction 

The  Preliminary/  Conditions  of  Philosophy  in  the  Greek 
Intellectual  Life  of  the  Seventh  and  Sixth  Centuries  B.  C} 

7.  The  history  of  the  philosophy  of  the  Greeks,  like  the 
history  of  their  political  development,  requires  a  larger  con- 
ception of  the  geography  of  the  country  than  the  present 
conception  of  its  political  relations  would  imply.  Our 
usual  present  idea  of  ancient  Greece  is  of  a  country 
wherein  Athens  by  its  literature  overshadowed  the  other 
portions,  and  by  the  brilliancy  of  its  golden  age  eclipsed  its 
earlier  history.  Ancient  Greece  was  the  Grecian  sea  with 
all  its  coasts  from  Asia  Minor  to  Sicily  and  from  Gyrene  to 
Thrace.  The  natural  link  of  the  three  great  continents  was 
this  sea,  with  its  islands  and  coasts  occupied  by  the  most 
gifted  of  people,  which  from  the  earliest  historical  times 
had  settled  all  its  coasts.  (Homer.)  Within  this  circle, 
the  later  so-called  Motherland,  the  Greece  of  the  continent 
of  Europe,  played  at  the  beginning  a  very  subordinate  role. 
In  the  development  of  Greek  culture,  however,  leadership 
fell  to  that  branch  of  the  race  which  in  its  entire  history 
was  in  closest  contact  witli  the  Orient,  thejoniaiis.  This 
race  laid  the  foundation  of  later  Greek  development,  and 
by  its  commercial  activity  established  the  power  of  Greece. 
At  first  as  seafarers  and  sea-robbers  in  the  train  of  the 
Phoenicians,  in  the  ninth  and  eighth  centuries  tlie  lonians 
won  an  increasing  independence,  and  in  the  seventh  cen- 
tury they  commanded  the  world's  trade  between  the  three 
continents. 

Over  the  entire  Mediterranean,  from  the  Black  Sea  to 
the  Pillars  of  Hercules,  the  Greek  colonies  and  trade  cen- 

1  Reference  should  be  made  to  corresponding  sections  in  historical 
parts  of  this  book  for  details. 


GREEK  PHILOSOPHY  17 

tres  were  extended.  Even  Egypt  opened  its  treasures  to 
the  enterprising  Ionian  spirit.  At  the  head  of  these  cities 
of  commerce,  and  at  the  same  time  the  leader  of  the  Ionian 
League,  Miletus  appeared  in  the  seventh  century  as  the 
most  powerful  and  most  notable  centre  of  the  Greek  genius. 
It  likewise  became  the  cradle  of  Greek  science.  For  here 
iirTonTa~of  Asia  Minor  the  riches  of  the  entire  world  were 
heaped  together ;  here  Oriental  luxury,  pomp,  material 
pleasure  held  their  public  pageants  ;  here  began  to  awaken 
the  sense  of  the  beautv  of  living  and  the  love  of  higher 
ideals,  while  rude  customs  still  ruled  upon  the  continent  of 
Europe.  The  spirit  became  free  from  the  pressure  of  daily 
need,  and  in  its  play  created  the  works  of  noble  leisure,  of 
art,  and  of  science.  The  cultured  man  is  he  who  in  his 
leisure  does  not  become  a  mere  idler. 

8.  Thus,  while  wealth  acquired  fi'om  trade  afforded  the 
basis  for  the  free  mental  development  of  the  Greek,  so,  on 
the  other  hand,  this  same  wealth  led  to  changes  of  polit- 
ical and  social  conditions  which  were  likewise  favorable  to 
the  development  of  intellectual  life.  Originally,  aristo- 
cratic families  had  ruled  Ionian  cities,  and  they  were 
probably  descended  from  the  warlike  bands  that  in  the  so- 
called  Ionian  migration  from  the  continent  of  Europe  had 
settled  the  islands.  But  in  time,  through  their  commerce, 
there  grew  up  a  class  of  well-conditioned  citizens,  who  re- 
stricted and  opjwsed  the  power  of  the  aristocracy.  On  the 
one  hand  bold  and  ambitious,  on  the  other  thoughtful  and 
patriotic  men  took  advantage  of  these  democratic  ten- 
dencies, and  after  destroying  the  power  of  tlie  oligarchy 
tried  to  set  up  monarchies  and  equalize,  as  far  as  possible, 
the  interests  of  all  classes. 

The  tyranny  based  on  democratic  principles  is  the  typical 
governmental  rule  of  this  time,  and  extended  its  power, 
although  not  without  vigorous  and  often  long  partisan 
struggles,  from   Asia   Minor   across   the   islands   even  to 

2 


18  HISTORY  OP  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

European  Greece.  Thrasybulus  in  Miletus,  Polycrates  in 
Samos,  Pittacus  in  Lesbos,  Periander  in  Corinth,  Peisistra- 
tus  in  Athens,  Gelon  and  Hiero  in  Syracuse,  —  these  men 
had  courts  that  at  this  time  constituted  the  centres  of  in- 
tellectual life.  They  drew  poets  to  them ;  they  founded 
libraries ;  they  supported  every  movement  in  art  and  sci- 
ence. But,  on  the  other  hand,  this  political  overthrow 
drove  the  aristocrats  into  gloomy  retirement.  Discon- 
tented with  public  affairs,  the  aristocrats  withdrew  to  pri- 
vate life,  which  they  adorned  with  the  gifts  of  the  Muses. 
Heracleitus  is  a  conspicuous  example  of  this  state  of 
affairs.  Thus  the  reversed  relations  favored  in  many  ways 
the  unfolding  and  extending  of  intellectual  interests. 

This  enrichment  of  consciousness,  this  increase  in  a 
higher  culture  among  the  Greeks  of  the  seventh  and  sixth 
centuries,  showed  itself  first  in  the  development  of  lyric 
poetry,  in  which  the  gradual  transition  from  the  expression 
of  universal  religious  and  political  feeling  to  that  which  is 
personal  and  individual  formed  a  typical  process.  In  the 
passion  and  excitement  of  internecine  political  conflict, 
the  individual  becomes  conscious  of  his  independence  and 
worth,  and  he  "  girds  up  his  loins  "  to  assert  his  rights 
everywhere.  In  the  course  of  time  satirical  poetry  grew 
beside  the  lyric,  as  the  expression  of  a  keen  and  cleverly 
developed  individual  judgment.  There  was,  moreover,  still 
more  characteristic  evidence  of  the  spirit  of  the  time  in  the 
so-called  Gnomic  poetry,  the  content  of  which  is  made  up 
of  sententious  reflections  upon  moral  principles.  This  sort 
of  moralizing,  which  appeared  also  in  fable-poetry  and  in 
other  literature,  may  be  regarded  as  symptomatic  of  the 
deeper  stirring  of  the  national  spirit. 

9.  Now,  any  extended  reflection  upon  maxims  of  moral 
judgment  shows  immediately  that  the  validity  of  morality 
has  been  questioned  in  some  way,  that  social  consciousness 
has  become  unsettled,  and  that  the  individual  in  his  growing 


GREEK  PHILOSOPHY  19 

independence  has  transcended  the  bounds  authoritatively 
drawn  by  the  universal  consciousness.  Therefore  it  was 
entirely  characteristic  of  this  Gnomic  poetry  to  recommend 
moderation;  to  show  how  universal  standards  of  life  had 
been  endangered  by  the  unbridled  careers  of  single  per- 
sons, and  how  in  the  presence  of  threatening  or  present 
anarchy  the  individual  must  try  to  re-establish  these  rules 
through  independent  reflection. 

The  end  of  the  seventh  and  the  beginning  of  the  sixth 
centuries  in  Greece  formed,  therefore,  an  epoch  of  peculiar 
ethical  reflection,  which  is  usually  called,  after  the  manner 
of  the  ancients,  the  Age  of  the  Seven  Wise  Men.  It  was  an 
age  of  reflection.  The  simple  devotion  to  the  conventions 
of  the  previous  age  had  ceased,  and  social  consciousness  was 
profoundly  disturbed.  Individuals  began  to  go  their  own 
ways.  Notable  men  appeared,  and  earnestly  exhorted  ^ 
society  to  come  back  to  its  senses.  Rules  of  life  were 
established.  In  riddle,  in  anecdote,  in  epigram,  the  moral- 
izing sermon  was  made  palatable,  and  "  winged  words  " 
passed  from  mouth  to  mouth.  But,  let  it  be  remembered, 
these  homilies  are  possible  only  when  the  individual  op- 
poses the  vagaries  of  the  mob,  and  with  independent  judg- 
ment brings  to  consciousness  the  maxims  of  right  conduct. 

Tradition  selected  early  seven  of  such  men,  to  whom  it 
gave  the  name  of  the  Wise  Men.  They  were  not  men  of 
erudition,  nor  of  science,  but  men  of  practical  wisdom,  and 
in  the  main  of  remarkable  political  ability .^  They  pointed 
out  the  right  thing  to  do  in  critical  moments,  and  therefore 

^  With  this  conception  about  the  Seven  Wise  Men,  it  is  conceivable 
that  Plato  (Protag. ,  343  a)  should  characterize  them  as  forerunners  of 
the  old  strong  Dorian  morality  in  contrast  to  the  innovations  of  the 
Ionian  movement :  ^rjXaral  koL  ipatrrai  koL  ixaOrjrai  rrjs  AaKtSaifwvlcov 
naibfias- 

2  Dicaiarchus  called  them  ovtc  aofpovs  ovrt  (pikocrocpovs,  avvfrovs  Sf 
rivai  Koi  vofiodfTiKovs.     Diog.  Laert.,  I.  40. 


20  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

in  public  and  private  matters  were  authorities  to  their 
fellow-citizens.  The  spirit  of  Gnomic  poetry  was  prom- 
inent in  the  apothegms,  the  catchwords,  which  they  are 
supposed  to  have  uttered.  Nothing  was  repeated  by  them 
so  often  and  with  so  many  phrasings  as  the  fiijBh  ayav  ! 

Tradition  is  not  agreed  as  to  the  names  of  "  the  Seven." 
Four  ^  only  are  mentioned  by  all :  Bias  of  Priene,  who  upon  the 
invasion  of  the  Persians  recommended  to  the  lonians  a  migra- 
tion to  Sardinia;  Pittacus,  who  was  tyrant  of  Mitylene,  about 
600  B.  c. ;  Solon,  the  law-giver  of  Athens  and  the  Gnomic  poet ; 
Thales,  founder  of  the  Milesian  philosophy,  who  advised  the 
lonians  to  form  a  federation  with  a  joint  council  in  Teos.  The 
names  of  the  others  vary.  The  later  age  ascribed  to  the  Seven 
all  kinds  of  aphorisms,  letters,  etc.  (collected  and  translated 
into  German,  but  without  critical  investigation,  by  C.  Dilthey, 
Darmstadt,  1835).^ 

While  in  this  way,  through  political  and  social  relations, 
the  independence  of  individual  judgment  was  educated 
first  on  its  practical  side,  and  the  propensity  was  formed 
for  expressing  such  judgment,  it  was  an  inevitable  con- 
sequence that  a  similar  emancipation  of  single  individuals 
from  the  ordinary  way  of  thinking  should  take  place  within 
the  domain  of  tlieory.  Independent  judgment  naturally  ap- 
peared at  this  point,  and  formed  its  own  views  about  the 
connection  of  things.  Nevertheless  this  propensity  could 
manifest  itself  only  in  a  revision  and  reconstruction  of 
those  materials,  which  the  individuals  discovered  partly  in 
the  intellectual  treasures  accumulated  previously  in  the 
nation's  practical  life,  and  partly  in  the  religious  ideas. 

10.  The  practical  knowledge  of  the  Greeks  had  in- 
creased to  very  remarkable  dimensions  between  the  time  of 
Hesiod's  Works  and  Days  and  the  year  600  b.  c.  The 
inventive,  trade-driving  lonians  undoubtedly  had  learned 
very  much  from  the  Orientals,  with  whom  they  had  inter- 

^  Compare  Cic.  Rep.,  I.  12.      Also  Lael.,  7. 
-  Bruiico,  Act.  Sem.-Erl,  III.  299  ff. 


GREEK  PHILOSOPHY  21 

course  and  of  whom  they  were  rivals.  Among  these, 
especially  among  the  Egyptians,  Phoenicians,  and  Assyrians, 
there  existed  knowledge  that  had  been  garnered  through 
many  centuries,  and  it  is  incredible  that  the  Greeks  should 
not  have  appropriated  it  wherever  opportunity  offered. 

The  question  how  much  the  Greeks  learned  from  the  Orient 
has  passed  through  many  stages.  In  opixtsition  to  the  un- 
critical, often  fantastic,  and  untenable  statements  of  the  later 
Greeks,  who  tried  to  derive  everything  important  of  their  own 
teaching  from  the  honorable  antiquity  of  Oriental  tradition, 
later  philology,  in  its  admii-ation  for  everything  Greek,  has 
persistently  espoused  the  theory  of  an  autochthonic  genesis. 
But  the  more  the  similarities  with  the  Oriental  civilization, 
and  the  relations  between  the  different  forms  of  the  old  and 
the  Greek  culture  have  been  brought  to  the  light  by  acquaint- 
ance with  the  ancient  Orient,  dating  from  the  beginning  of 
this  century ;  and  the  more,  on  the  other  hand,  philosophy 
imderstood  tlie  continuity  of  the  historical  moments  of  civiliza- 
tion ;  so  much  the  more  decided  became  the  tendency  to  refer 
the  beginnings  of  Greek  science  to  Oriental  influences,  particu- 
larly in  the  history  of  philosophy.  With  brilliant  fancy  A.  R<)th 
(Gesch.  iinserer  abendlandischen  Pliilos.^  Mannheim,  1858  f.,) 
attempted  to  rehabilitate  the  accounts  of  the  ueo-Platonists, 
who  by  interpretation  and  perversion  had  read  into  the  mythic 
narratives,  which  were  introduced  from  the  Orient,  Greek  philo- 
sophical doctrines  ;  he  then  rediscovered  these  doctrines  as  prime- 
val wisdom.  With  a  forced  construction,  Gladisch  {D.  lieligion 
«.  d.  Phitos.  in  Hirer  veltfjesch.  Entwkk.,  Breslau,  1852)  tried  to 
see  in  all  the  beginnings  of  Greek  philosophy  direct  relations 
to  individual  Oriental  peoples ;  and  he  so  conceived  the  re- 
lationship that  the  Greeivs  are  supposed  to  have  appropriated  in 
succession  the  ripe  products  of  all  the  other  civilizations. 
This  appears  from  the  following  titles  of  his  special  essay's : 
Die  Pythafjoreer  und  die  Schinesen  (Posen,  18-11)  ;  Die  Eleaten 
und  die  Indier  (Posen,  1844)  ;  Empedokles  tind  die  Egypter 
(Leipzig,  1858)  ;  Heracleitos  und  Zoroaster  (Leipzig,  1859)  ; 
Anaocagoras  und  Israeliten  (Leipzig,  1864).  Besides  the  fact 
that  they  first  found  many  analogies  through  an  artful  in- 
terpretation, both  Roth  and  Gladisch  fell  into  the  error  of 
transmuting  analogies  into  causal  relations,  where  equally 
notable  disparities  might  also  have  been  found.  ^Moreover, 
where,  as  usual,  religion  is  concerned,  that  of  the  Greeks,  which 


22  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

has  influenced  the  beginnings  of  science  in  so  many  ways,  was 
found  to  be  in  genetic  and  historical  relationship  with  that  of 
the  Orient. 

Such  exaggerations  are  certainly  censurable.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  would  be  denying  the  existence  of  the  sun  at 
noontide  to  refuse  to  acknowledge  that  the  Greeks  in  great 
measure  owe  their  information  to  contact  with  the  barbarians. 
It  is  here  even  as  in  the  history  of  art.  The  Greeks  imported 
a  large  amount  of  information  out  of  the  Orient.  This  con- 
sisted in  special  facts  of  knowledge,  particularly  of  a  mathe- 
matical and  astronomical  kind,  and  consisted  perhaps  besides  in 
certain  mythological  ideas.  But  with  the  recognition  of  this  sit- 
uation, which  recognition  in  the  long  run  is  inevitable,  one  does 
not  rob  the  Greeks  in  the  least  of  their  true  originality.  For  as 
they  in  art  derived  particular  forms  and  norms  from  Egyptian 
and  Assyrian  tradition,  but  in  the  employment  and  reconstruction 
of  these  used  their  own  artistic  genius,  so  there  flowed  in  upon 
them  too  from  the  Orient  many  kinds  of  knowledge,  arising  out 
of  the  work  and  practical  needs  of  many  centuries,  and  various 
kinds  of  mythological  tales,  born  of  the  religious  imagination. 
But  nevertheless  they  were  the  first  to  transmute  this  knowledge 
into  a  wisdom  sought  on  account  of  itself.  This  spirit  of  sci- 
ence, like  their  original  activity,  resulted  from  emancipated  and 
independent  individual  thought,  to  which  Oriental  civilization 
had  not  attained. 

Principally  in  matbamatics  and  astronomy  do  the  Greeks 
appear  as  the  pupils  of  the  Orientals.  Since  economic  needs 
compelled  the  Phoenicians  to  make  an  arithmetic,  and  from 
early  times  led  the  Egyptians  to  construct  a  geometry,  it  is 
probable  that  in  these  things  the  Greeks  were  pupils  rather 
than  teachers  of  their  neighbors.  A  proposition  like  that 
concerning  proportionality  and  its  application  to  perspective, 
Thales  did  not  communicate  to  the  Egyptians,  but  derived 
from  them.^  Although  there  are  further  ascribed  to  him 
propositions  like  that  concerning  the  halving  of  the  circle 
by  the  diameter,  the  isosceles  triangle,  the  vertical  angles, 
the  equality  of  triangles  having  a  side  and  two  angles  equal, 
yet  it  may  be  safely  concluded  in  every  instance  that  these 
elementary  propositions  were  generally  known  to  the  Greeks 

1  See  §  24. 


GREEK  PHILOSOPHY  23 

of  his  time.  It  is  likewise  a  matter  of  indifference  whether 
Pythagoras  himself  discovered  the  theorem  named  after  him 
or  whether  his  school  established  it,  whether  the  discovery 
was  the  result  of  pure  geometrical  reasoning  or  was  an  actual 
measurement  with  the  square  and  by  an  arithmetical  calcu- 
lation, as  Roth  says.  Here,  again,  the  reality  of  such  knowl- 
edge at  that  time  is  rendered  certain,  and  its  suggestion,  at 
least,  from  the  Oriental  circle  is  probable.  In  any  case, 
however,  these  studies  in  Greece  soon  flourished  in  a  high 
degree.  Anaxagoras  was  reported,  for  instance,  to  have 
busied  himself  in  prison  with  the  squaring  of  the  circle. 
Astronomical  thought  had  a  similar  status,  for  Thales  pre- 
dicted an  eclipse  of  the  sun,  and  it  is  highly  probable  that 
he  here  availed  himself  of  the  Chaldasan  Saros.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  cosmographical  ideas  ascribed  to  the  oldest 
philosophers  point  to  an  Egyptian  origin,  especially  that 
view,  authoritative  for  later  time,  of  concentric  spherical 
shells  in  which  the  planets  were  supposed  to  move  around 
the  earth  as  a  centre.  From  all  reports  it  appears  that  the 
questions  concerning  the  constitution  of  the  world,  of  the 
size,  distance,  form,  and  rotation  of  the  planets,  of  the  incli- 
nation of  the  ecliptic,  etc.,  keenly  interested  every  one  of 
the  ancient  thinkers.  The  Milesians  still  thought  the  earth 
to  be  fiat,  cylindrical,  or  plate-shaped,  floating  upon  a  dark, 
cold  atmosphere  and  in  the  middle  of  a  world  sphere,  ^he 
Pythagoreans  seem  to  be  the  first  independently  to  discover 
the  spherical  shape  of  the  earth.  In  the  physics  of  this 
time  the  interest  in  meteorology  is  dominant.  Every  phi- 
losopher felt  bound  to  explain  the  clouds,  air,  wind,  snow, 
hail,  and  ice.  Not  until  later  did  an  interest  in  biology 
awaken,  and  the  mysteries  of  reproduction  and  propagation 
called  forth  a  multitude  of  fantastic  hypotheses  (Parmeni- 
des,  Empedocles,  etc.). 

Deficiency  in  physiological  and  anatomical   knowledge 
obviously  delayed  for  a  long  time  the  progress  of  medical 


24  HISTOKY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

science.  Therefore  we  are  safe  in  saying  ^  that  medical 
science  was  inherited  in  its  original  tradition  entirely  inde- 
pendently of  all  other  sciences  as  the  esoteric  teaching  of 
certain  priestly  families ;  and  that  philosophy  also  hardly 
had  any  connection  with  medicine  down  to  about  the  time 
of  the  Pythagoreans.  Medicine  consisted  simply  in  empir- 
ical rules,  technical  facts,  and  a  mass  of  data  accumulated 
during  the  experience  of  centuries.  It  was  not  an  aetiological 
science,  but  an  art  practised  in  the  spirit  of  religion.  We 
have  still  the  oath  of  the  Asclepiades  (a  priestly  order  of 
this  sort,  which  however  liad  also  lay  brethren),  who  as  well 
as  the  gymnasts  practised  the  art  of  healing.  Such  medical 
orders  or  schools  existed  notably  in  Rhodes,  Cyrcne,  Cro- 
tona,  Cos,  and  Cnidus.  Rules  for  the  treatment  of  the  sick 
were  partly  codified  in  documents,  and  Hippocrates  knew  two 
versions  of  the  yvM/xaL  KviSiai  (Cnidian  sentences),  the  more 
valuable  of  which  (larpiKooTepov)  came  from  Euryphon  of 
Cnidus. 

Likewise  the  geographical  knowledge  of  the  Greeks  had 
reached  a  high  degree  of  completeness  about  this  time. 
The  broad  commercial  activity  whereby  they  visited  the 
Mediterranean  Sea  and  all  its  coasts  had  essentially  trans- 
formed and  enriched  the  Homeric  picture  of  the  world.  It  is 
stated  that  Anaximander  drew  up  the  first  map  of  the  world. 
The  statement  of  Herodotus "  is  interesting,  that  Aris- 
tagoras,  by  showiug  such  a  chart  in  Laceda?mon,  sought  to 
awaken  the  continental  Greeks  to  a  realizing  sehse  of  the 
menaced  geographical  situation  of  Greece  by  the  Persian 
Empire. 

Historical  knowledge  too  was  beginning  to  be  accu- 
mulated at  this  time,  —  yet  strikingly  late  for  a  people 
like  the  Greeks.  From  the  old  epic  had  issued  the  thco- 
gonic  poetry,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  heroic  on  the  other. 

1  Haser,  Lehrbuch  d.  Gesch.  d.  Medizin,  2  ed.,  §§  21-25. 

2  V.  49. 


GREEK  PHILOSOPHY  25 

Collections  of  saga  and  of  the  histories  of  the  founding  of 
cities,  as  they  had  been  gathered  by  the  logographers,  were 
added  to  these  for  the  first  time  in  the  Ionian  cities  of  Asia 
Minor.  Men,  who  after  long  journeys  gave  to  their  logog- 
raphies  greater  extent  and  variety  of  interest,  introduced 
then  that  form  of  historical  presentation  which  we  may 
still  recognize  in  Herodotus.  At  the  same  time,  however, 
this  was  pressed  into  the  background  by  the  grouping  of  all 
accounts  around  the  important  event  of  the  Persian  wars. 
In  place  of  fantastic  fables  about  strange  people  in  the 
form  that  Aristeas  of  Proconnesus  related  them,  we  now 
have  the  more  sober  reports  of  the  logographers.  Of  these 
there  appeared,  in  the  sixth  century,  Cadmus,  Dionysius, 
and  especially  Hecateius  of  Miletus,  with  his  7repi7]y7]ai<i,  in 
which  geography  and  history  are  closely  interwoven.  In 
these  men  realistic  considerations  had  taken  the  place  of 
^sthetical,  and  their  writings  therefore  have  the  prose 
rather  than  the  poetic  forjn. 

About  600  B.  c.  the  intellectual  circle  of  the  Greeks  was 
replete  with  this  manifold  and  important  knowledge,  and  it 
is  clear  that  there  were  men,  otherwise  favorably  conditioned 
in  life,  who  took  a  direct  and  immediate  interest  in  knowl- 
edge which  had  hitherto  been  employed  for  the  most  varied 
practical  ends.  They  planned  how  to  order,  classify,  and 
extend  these  acquisitions.  It  is  likewise  comprehensible 
how  scientific  schools  for  the  same  purposes  were  formed, 
as  it  might  hap{)en,  around  distinguished  men,  and  how  in 
these  schools  by  co-operative  labor  a  kind  of  scholastic 
order  and  tradition  maintained  itself  from  one  generation 
to  another. 

After  the  investigations  of  H.  Diels  (Philos.  Aufsdtze  z.  Zel- 
lerjubilaum,  Berlin,  1887,  ]).  241  f.)  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted 
that  in  this  very  early  time  the  scientific  life  of  the  Greeks 
constituted  itself  into  closed  corporations,  and  that  the  learned 
societies  already  at  that  time  carried  all  tlie  weight  of  judicial- 
religious  associations  (pCaa-oi)  which  v.  Wilamowitz-Mollendprt 


26  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

(Antigonos  von  Karystos,  p.  263  f.)  has  already  proved  for  the 
later  schools.  The  Pythagoreans  were  undoubtedly  such  an 
association.  The  schools  of  physicians  were  organized  on  the 
same  principle,  —  perhaps  still  more  rigorously  in  the  form  of 
the  priestly  orders.  Why,  then,  should  this  not  be  the  case 
with  the  schools  of  Miletus,  Elea,  and  Abdera? 

11.  Likewise,  in  the  religious  notions  of  the  Greeks  lay 
certain  definite  points  of  departure  for  the  beginnings  of 
their  philosophy,  especially  since  those  religious  notions 
were  in  the  liveliest  fermentation  about  the  time  of  the 
seventh  and  sixth  centuries.  This  is  accounted  for  by 
the  great  vitality  which  from  the  beginning  characterized 
the  religious  existence  of  the  Greeks  by  reason  of  their 
unparalleled  development.  Out  of  the  early  differentiation 
of  originally  common  ideas,  out  of  the  capricious  formation 
of  local  cults  within  families,  tribes,  cities,  and  provinces, 
incidentally  also  out  of  the  introduction  of  distinctive 
foreign  religious  ceremonies,  there  grew  up  a  rich  and,  as 
it  were,  confusingly  iridescent  variety  of  religions.  Stand- 
ing over  against  this,  epic  poetry  had  already  created  its 
Olympus,  its  poetic  purification,  and  its  human  ennobling 
of  the  original,  mythical  forms.  These  products  of  poetry 
came  to  be  the  national  religious  property  of  the  Hellenes. 
But  along  with  the  veneration  of  these  products  there 
were  the  old  cults  that  shut  themselves  up  only  the  more 
closely  in  the  Mysteries,  in  which  now  as  ever  the  peculiar 
energy  of  religious  craving  expressed  itself  in  a  service 
of  expiation  and  redemption.  With  the  advance  of  civiliza- 
tion, however,  the  aesthetic  mythology  succumbed  to  a 
gradual  change  in  two  directions  which  had  been  blended 
indistinguishably  in  the  Olympian  forms.  The  first  direc- 
tion was  toward  mythical  explanation  of  nature  ;  the  second 
was  toward  ethical  idealizing. 

The  first  tendency  showed  itself  in  the  development  of 
the  cosmogonic  out  of  the  epic  poetry.     Cosmogonic  poetry 


GREEK  PHILOSOPHY  27 

shows  how  the  individual  poets  with  their  peculiar  fancies 
studied  the  question  of  the  origin  of  things,  and  in  addition 
mythologized  the  great  powers  of  nature  in  a  traditional  or 
freely  creative  form.  Two  groups  can  be  distinguished 
among  them,  corresponding  to  the  different  interpreta- 
tions of  Homeric  poetry.  Such  of  the  Orphic  theogonies, 
which  go  back  thus  far,  belong,  with  the  sole  exception  of 
Hesiod,  to  one  group,  and  Epimenides  and  Acusilaus  are 
among  its  better  defined  historic  names.  Whether  they 
presuppose  only  Chaos  or  Night  as  the  original  powers, 
or  whether  with  these  Air,  Earth,  Heaven,  or  something 
else,  —  they  appear  reasonably  enough  in  Aristotle  as  ol  e/c 
vvKTO'i  >y€vv(ovT€<;  6e6\o<yoi.  For  it  is  always  some  dark  and 
reasonless  primeval  ground  from  which  they  evolve  material 
things,  and  they  may  be  considered  as  representatives  of 
the  evolutionist  idea.  Likewise  in  this  respect  Milesian 
science  followed  immediately  in  their  wake,  and  had  in 
part  the  same  principles  but  with  greater  clearness  of 
thought  (§§  14-16).  Over  against  these  was  the  later  ten- 
dency whose  representatives  were  regarded  by  Aristotle  as 
standing  between  the  poets  and  philosophers  (/jLefMcy/jbivot 
avTwv).  By  these  the  Perfect  was  supposed  as  the  form- 
ing (creative)  principle  at  the  beginning  of  time.  To 
them  belongs,  besides  the  entirely  mythical  Hermotimus  of 
Clazomenae,  ^  the  historical  Pherecydes  of  Syrus,  a  contem- 
porary of  the  earliest  philosophers  and  a  man  who  wrote 
his  conceptions  in  prose.  He  presupposed  Zeus  as  the  per- 
sonality giving  order  and  reason  to  the  world,  and  that 
Time  2  and  Earth  act  with  Zeus  as  original  principles 
(xpovoq,  %^ft)f^).  He  appears  to  have  represented  in  grotesque 
images  the  "  five-fold "  development  of  individual  things 
out  of  the  rational  principle. 

1  Whom  some  try  to  identify  with  Anaxagoras.     See  Carus,  Nach' 
gelassene  Werhe,  4  vols.,  330  f. ;  Zeller,  I^.  924  f. 
*  Xpovos  may  mean  something  else.     Zeller,  P.  73. 


28  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Sturz  (Leipzig,  1834)  has  published  the  fragments  of 
Phereeydes.  Roth,  out  of  most  uueertaiu  data,  Gesch.  unserer 
abe7idlandischen  J*hilos.,  II.  161  f.,  tried  to  attribute  to  Phere- 
eydes the  introduction  into  Greece  of  Egyptian  metaphysics 
and  astronomy.  J.  Conrad  (Coblenz,  1857),  R.  Zimmermann, 
Studien  a.  Kritlken  (Vienna,  1870,  If.),  also  treat  the  "  phi- 
losophy" of  Phereeydes.  See  H.  Diels,  xirch.  f.  Gesch.  d. 
Fhilos.,  I.  11. 

These  later  cosmogonies  were  apparently  already  under 
the  influence  of  the  ethical  movement,  which  had  pressed 
into  the  circle  of  religious  ideas,  and,  as  against  the  nature- 
mythical  interpretation  that  ascribed  aesthetic  cjiaracter  to 
the  different  gods,  sought  to  embody  in  them  the  ideal  of 
moral  life.  The  second  tendency  comes  to  light  in  the 
Gnomic  poetry  in  particular.  Zeus  is  thus  (Solon)  honored 
less  as  creator  of  Nature  than  as  ruler  of  the  moral  world. 
The  fifth  century,  in  following  out  this  idea,  saw  the 
Homeric  mythology  expressed  completely  in  ethico-allc- 
gorical  terms  (especially  ascribed  to  Metrodorus  of  Lamp- 
sacus,  a  pupil  of  Anaxagoras).  Three  moments  especially 
in  the  ethicizing  of  religious  ideas  appear :  (1)  the  gradual 
stripping  off  of  naive  anthropomorphism  from  the  gods, 
which  led  to  a  violent  opposition  to  aesthetic  mythology  on 
the  part  of  Xenophanes,  who  was  a  direct  descendant  in  this 
respect  of  the  Gnomic  poets  ;  (2)  necessarily  connected 
with  the  above,  the  development  of  the  monotheistic  germs 
contained  in  the  previous  ideas ;  (3)  the  emphasis  on  the 
tliought  of  moral  retribution  in  the  form  of  faith  in  immor- 
tality and  transmigration.  So  far  as  the  last  two  thoughts 
belonged  with  a  greater  or  less  degree  of  clearness  also  to 
the  Mysteries,  they  were  in  some  degree  the  centre  of  an 
ethical  reaction  against  the  pantheon  "  constructed  by  the 
poets." 

12.  In  this  direction  tended  the  great  movement  which 
shook  the  western  part  of  civilized  Greece  about  the  end  of 
the  sixth  century,  and  in  many  ways  influenced  the  devel- 


GREEK  PHILOSOPHY.  29 

opraent  of  science.     This  movement  is  the  etJdco-religious 
reformation  of  Pythagoras. 

It  is  absohitely  necessary,  in  tlie  interest  of  historical  clear- 
ness, to  distinguish  Pythagoras  from  the  Pythagoreans,  and  the 
practice  of  the  former  from  the  science  of  the  latter.  The  in- 
vestigations of  modern  time  have  more  and  more  led  to  tliis 
distinction.  The  accounts  of  the  later  ancients  (neo-Pythago- 
rean  and  neo-Platonic)  had  gathered  so  many  myths  about  the 
personality  of  Pythagoras,  and  had  so  ascribed  to  him  the  ripest 
and  highest  thoughts  of  Greek  philosophy  through  direct  and 
indirect  falsification,  that  he  became  a  mysterious  and  entirely 
inconceivable  form.  But  the  fact  that  the  cloud  of  myths 
should  thicken  from  century  to  century  in  ancient  time  around 
him,  makes  it  necessary^  to  go  back  to  the  oldest  and,  at 
the  same  time,  most  authoritative  accounts.  Therein  it  ap- 
pears that  neither  Plato  nor  Aristotle  knew  anything  about 
a  philosophy  of  Pythagoras,  but  simply  make  mention  of  a 
philosoplij'  of  the  "  so-called  Pythagoreans."  Nowhere  is  the 
"number  theory"  referred  to  the  "Master"  himself.  It  is 
also  to  be  regarded  as  highly  probable  that  Pythagoras  himself 
wrote  nothing.  At  an}' rate,  notliing  is  preserved  which  can  be 
confidently  attributed  to  him,  and  neitlier  Plato  nor  Aristotle 
knew  of  anj'thing  of  the  sort.  On  the  other  hand,  the  first  philo- 
sophical writing  of  the  school  is  that  of  Philolaus,^  the  con- 
temporary of  Anaxagoras,  and  therefore  of  Socrates  and 
Demoeritus.  This  philosophic  teaching  will  be  set  forth  in 
the  place  which  belongs  to  it  chronologically  in  the  develop- 
ment of  Greek  philosophy  (§  24).  Pythagoras  himself,  how- 
ever, in  the  light  of  historical  criticism,  appears  only  as  a  kind 
of  founder  of  religion,  and  a  man  of  grand  ethical  and  political 
efficiency.  His  work  had  an  important  place  among  the  causes 
and  the  preliminar}'  conditions  of  the  scientific  life  in  Greece. 

Concerning  the  life  of  Pythagoras  Httle  is  certain.  He  came 
from  an  old  Tyrrhean-Pliliasian  stock,  wliich  had  migrated  to 
his  home,  Samos,  at  the  latest  in  the  time  of  his  grandfather. 
Here  he  was  born,  somewhere  between  tiie  3'ears  o.SO  and  570, 
as  the  son  of  Mnesarchus,  a  rich  merchant.  It  is  not  impos- 
sible that  differences  that  arose  Itetween  him  and  Polycrates,  or 
tlie  antipathy  of  the  aristocrat  to  this  tj'rant,  drove  him  out  of 

^  See  Zeller,  1*.  256  ff.,  against  A.  Roth  (Gesch.  unserer  abendlan.  Phi- 
los.,  II.  b,  2G1  £.,  48  f.).  Zeller  shows  clearly  that  Pythagoras  had  no 
philosophy. 

■^  Diog.  Laert..  VTII.  1.5.  8."). 


30  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Samos,  where  he  seems  to  have  entered  already  upon  a  career 
similar  to  that  of  his  later  life.  It  is  not  to  be  determined 
with  perfect  surety,  but  may  be  regarded  as  by  no  means  im- 
probable, that  he  made  a  kind  of  educative  journey  to  investi- 
gate the  sanctuaries  and  cults  of  Greece.  At  this  time  he 
came  to  know  Pherecydes.  This  journey  may  have  extended 
also  into  foreign  lands  as  far  as  Egypt.^  About  the  year  530, 
however,  he  settled  in  Magna  Graecia,  the  region  where  (at 
a  time  when  Ionia  already  was  struggling  with  Persia  for 
existence)  were  brought  together,  in  the  most  splendid  way, 
Greek  power  and  Greek  culture.  Here  was  still  a  more  motley 
mixture  of  Hellenic  stocks,  and  here  between  cities,  and  in  the 
cities  between  parties,  the  battle  for  existence  was  most  passion- 
ately waged.  Pythagoras  appeared  here  and  preached,  founded 
his  new  sect,  and  met  with  the  most  decided  success.  He 
chose  the  austere  and  aristocratic  Crotona  as  the  centre  of  his 
operations.  It  appears  that  his  sect  co-operated  in  the  decisive 
battle  (510  b.  c.)  in  which  Crotona  destroyed  its  democratic 
rival,  the  voluptuous  Sybaris.  But  very  soon  after  that  event 
democracy  became  predominant  in  Crotona  itself  and  in  other 
cities,  and  the  Pythagoreans  were  cruelly  persecuted.  These 
persecutions  were  more  than  once  repeated  in  the  first  half  of 
the  fifth  century,  and  the  sect  was  entirely  dispersed.  Whether 
Pythagoras  in  one  of  these  persecutions,  perhaps  even  in  the 
very  first  instigated  by  Cylon  in  504,  found  his  end,  or  whether 
in  another  way,  or  where,  when,  and  how,  is  uncertain.  His 
death  is  surrounded  by  myths,  but  we  shall  have  to  place  it 
at  about  500. 

Jamblichus,  De  vita  Pythagorica^  and  Porphyry,  De  vita 
Pytliagorce  (ed.  Kissling,  Leipzig,  1815-16,  etc.),  H.  Ritter, 
Geschichte  der  pythagorischen  Fhilosophie  (Hamburg,  1826)  ;  B. 
Krische,  De  societatis  a  Pythagora  in  urhe  Grotoniatarum  con- 
ditve  scopo  politico  (Gottingen,  1830)  ;  E.  Zeller,  Pyth.  u.  die 
Pyth.-saga,  Vortrag  u.  Abhdl.  I.  (Leipzig,  1865)  30  ff. ;  Ed. 
Chaignet,  Pythagore  et  la  philosophie  jiythagoricienne  (Paris, 
1873) ;  L.  V.  Schroeder,  Pyth.  u.  d.  Inder  (Leipzig,  1884)  ;  P. 
Tannery,  Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Ph.,  I.  29  ff. 

On  the  one  hand,  Pythagoras  found  his  purpose  in  the 
moral  clarification  and  purification  of  the  world  of  religious 

^  There  is  scarcely  a  ground  for  doubting  the  testimony  of  Isocrates 
(Busir,  11).  The  circumstances  of  the  second  half  of  the  sixth  century 
make  it  appear  as  in  no  wise  an  exceptional  case  that  the  sou  of  a  patri- 
cian of  Samos  should  journey  to  Egypt. 


GREEK  PHILOSOPHY  31 

ideas.  He  stood  in  this  respect  entirely  in  line  with  the 
progress  and  innovation  of  the  time,  and  he  antagonized,  as 
a  point  of  view  antiquated  or  coming  to  be  so,  the  religion 
of  the  poets,  in  which  he  missed  a  moral  earnestness.  On 
the  other  hand,  he  was  inspired  by  the  same  ethical  impulse 
against  that  weakening  of  the  moral  bond  to  which  the 
new  methods  of  Greek  social  life  threatened  to  lead,  and 
in  fact  had  already  led.  He  called,  therefore,  for  a  return 
to  the  old  institutions  and  convictions.  Especially  in 
politics,  he  represented  a  reaction  in  favor  of  the  aristoc- 
racy as  opposed  to  the  growing  democratic  movement.  This 
opposition  determined  the  peculiar  position  of  the  Pythag- 
orean society.  The  society  was,  in  truth,  one  of  the  most 
important  factors  in  the  religious  and  intellectual  advance 
of  the  Greek  spirit,  and  at  the  same  time  it  flung  itself 
against  the  current  of  the  time  as  regards  ethics  and 
politics.^  As  to  the  latter,  the  Ionian  Pythagoras  preferred 
the  more  conservative  Dorian  character,  and  the  "  Italian 
philosophy"  founded  by  him  passed  among  the  ancients 
as  an  antithesis  to  the  Ionian. 


The  emphasis  upon  the  unity  of  the  divine  Being  and  a 
purely  moral  conception  of  the  same  was  carried  no  farther 
by  Pythagoras  and  by  the  Pythagoreans  than  by  the  Gnomic 
poets.  Neither  was  the  conception  of  tiie  purely  spiritual  here 
attained,  nor  a  scientific  foundation  and  presentation  given 
to  ethical  concepts,  nor,  finally,  a  sharp  contradiction  made  to 
the  polytheistic  popular  religion.  (Of  course  we  do  not  in- 
clude in  this  statement  the  doctrines  of  the  neo-Pythagorean 
and  neo-Platonic  schools.)  On  the  contrary,  Pythagoras  had 
the  pedagogic  acumen  to  develop  these  higher  conceptions  from 
those  existing  in  the  myths  and  religious  ceremonies.  He  used 
in  this  way  the  Mysteries,  especially  the  Orphic,  and  he  himself 
appears  to  have  been  connected  with  the  cult  of  Apollo  in 
particular.  He  laid  particular  emphasis  upon  the  doctrine  of 
immortality  and  its  application  to  a  theory  of  moral  religious 
retribution,  and  this  also  took  the  mythic  form  of  the  doctrine 

1  Similarly  and  on  a  larger  scale  this  is  repeated  by  Plato's  work. 


32  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

of  metempsychosis.  But  doubtless  the  Mysteries  themselves 
contained  nmch  in  harmony  with  the  doctrine  of  transmigra- 
tion, especially  those  Mysteries  of  the  ehthonic  divinities. 
But  to  the  ordinary  Greeks  transmigration  was  and  remained 
a  foreign  conception,  which  in  early  times  they  had  mocked 
at,^  and  they  were  most  inclined  to  lay  it  at  the  door  of  foreign 
influence. 

Whatever  of  the  Pythagorean  ethical  teaching  is  certainly 
proved,  may  be  found  in  the  Gnomic  teachings.  But  at  all 
events  we  see  there,  in  the  consciousness  of  duty,  in  introspec- 
tion, and  in  subordination  to  authority,  a  greater  earnestness 
and  rigor,  with  at  the  same  time  a  decided  abandonment  of 
sense-pleasure  and  a  powerful  tendency  to  spiritualize  life.^ 
Many  ascetic  tendencies  doubtless  were  already  connected 
with  this.  The  pronounced  political  turn  which  Pythagoras 
at  the  same  time  gave  to  his  society  determined  its  fate  and 
led  it  first  to  victory,  then  to  destruction.  Yet  this  political 
tendency  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  original,  but  as  the  natural 
consequence  of  the  moral-religious  ideal  of  life. 

In  order  to  attain  such  a  goal,  Pythagoras  founded  at 
first  in  Crotona  his  religious  society,  which  soon  spread 
over  a  greater  part  of  Magna  Graecia.  But  this  sect  was, 
to  be  sure,  at  first  only  a  kind  of  Mysteries,  and  nearest 
related  to  it  were  the  Orphics.  It  is  to  be  distinguished 
from  these  only  so  far  as  it  expressly  determined  also  the 
political  and  in  part  even  the  private  life  of  its  members  by 
its  regulations.  It  sought  to  evolve  also  a  general  educa- 
tion and  an  all-round  method  of  life  out  of  its  moral- 
religious  principle.  Its  most  commendable  foatui-e  was, 
that  within  the  society  the  external  goods  of  life  were 
relatively  little  prized,  and  the  common  activities  were 
directed  toward  fostering  science  and  art.  Thus,  the 
religious  in  time  became  a  scientific  d'laao^;.  To  Pythago- 
ras himself  may  be  referred  the  thorough  study  of  music, 

1  See  Xenophanes'  witty  distich  against  it :  Dio;:;.  Laort.,  VIIT.  36. 

2  The  so-called  "  golden  poem  "  wherein  the  Pytliagorean  rules  of 
life  arc  laid  down  Avas,  according  to  IVIullach,  collated  by  Lysis.  Zeller 
is  certainly  right  in  saying  that  it  was  probably  earlier  handed  down 
in  verse  form. 


GREEK  PHILOSOPHY  33 

and  perhaps  in  the  same  connection  the  beginnings  of 
mathematical  investigations  which  therefore,  like  medicine, 
have  a  point  of  depai'ture  equally  independent  of  that  of 
"  general  philosophy."  ^ 

It  is  no  longer  certain  how  much  the  society  directed  by 
Pythagoras  himself  was  in  possession  of  all  of  the  rules  by  whicli, 
according  to  later  accounts,  the  community  life  of  the  members, 
their  initiatiou,  their  education  even  to  the  particulars  of  each 
day's  duties,  were  provided  for.  The  conception  taken  from 
later  analogies  is  scarcely  credible,  that  the  Pythagoreans 
were  a  secret  society  in  which  the  novitiate  first  after  a  long 
preparation  and  after  the  performance  of  many  symbolical 
formalities  could  share  in  the  "  mysteries."  Roth  in  particular 
has  tried  to  re-establish  this  distinction  of  the  esoteric  and  ex- 
oteric. Pythagoreanism  was  certauily  no  more  and  no  less 
a  secret  society  than  all  the  other  Mysteries,  and  there  is  not 
the  slightest  ground  for  assuming  a  secret  science  in  it.  That 
the  stimulus  given  by  Pythagoras  to  the  spiritual  community 
of  life  was  concerned  with  music  and  mathematics,  may  safely 
be  accepted.  All  else  is  doubtful,  and  probably  fabulous.  So, 
too,  it  is  impossible  to  find  out  anything  certain  as  to  the  founder's 
personal  familiarity  with  these  subjects.  Elveu  the  well-known 
geometrical  proposition  is  not  to  be  attributed  to  him  in  entire 
confidence.  He  himself  belongs  rather  to  the  religious  and 
political  life.  But  the  spirit  in  which  he  founded  his  school 
was  of  such  a  natui'e  that  scientific  interest  could  and  actually 
did  flourish  in  it. 

13.  In  Greek  national  life  such  were  the  essential  condi- 
tions for  the  origin  of  the  philosophy  which  appeared  at  the 
beginning  of  the  sixth  century  as  an  independent  phenom- 
enon. Its  entire  course,  however,  since  it  was  dependent 
upon  the  general  civilization  of  the  nation,  shows  a  gradual 
drifting  from  circumference  to  centre.  The  beginnings  lie 
scattered  in  those  circles  of  Hellenic  life  wliere,  in  friendly 
as  well  as  in  hostile  contact  with  neighboring  peoples,  it 
first  developed  into  full  independence.  Afterwards  in  the 
entire  Sophistic  Enlightenment  philosophy  centred  itself  in 

^  See  (t.  Cantor,  Vorlesungen  iiber  d.  Gesch.  d.  ^fftlh.,  T.  125  f. 

3 


34  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

the  Athens  of  Pericles  ;  and  there  through  the  great  per- 
sonality of  Socrates  it  became  naturalized,  it  perfected  itself, 
and  established  its  great  schools. 

Subjectively  viewed,  the  development  of  Greek  science  is 
a  fully  rounded  whole.  Like  all  naive  and  natural  think- 
ing, it  began  with  a  recognition  of  the  outer  world.  Its  first 
tendency  was  entirely  cosmological,  and  it  passed  through 
the  physical  into  metaphysical  problems.  Foundering  in 
these  and  at  the  same  time  troubled  by  the  dialectic  of 
public  life,  the  Spirit  made  itself  an  object  of  reflection. 
A.n  anthropological  period  began,  in  which  man  appeared 
as  the  most  worthy  object  of  consideration,  and  ultimately 
as  the  only  object  of  investigation.  Finally,  science  in  its 
perfected  strength,  acquired  in  the  profound  study  of  the 
laws  of  its  reason,  turned  back  to  the  old  problems,  the 
conquest  of  which  came  to  it  now  in  great  systematic 
continuity. 

See  §  2,  note.  —  Hegel,  Gesch.  der  Pldlos.^  Complete  Works, 
Vol.  XIII.  188.  If  one  strips  away  the  formal  from  Hegel's 
terminology,  which  served  him  in  his  systematization  of  the 
historical  processes,  then  one  meets  here,  as  so  often  in  Hegel, 
an  inspired  insight,  with  which  he  apprehended  the  essential 
features  in  the  development  of  historical  phenomena. 

The  origins  of  scientific  reflection  are  to  be  sought  in  the 
cities  of  the  seacoast  of  Ionia,  which  were  in  a  flourishing 
condition  about  600  b.  c.  The  happy  nature  of  the  Ionian 
race  was  here  accompanied  by  all  the  necessary  material, 
social,  and  intellectual  requisitions  for  science.  Its  men- 
tal alertness,  its  frequently  dangerous  curiosity  for  the  novel, 
and  its  creative  talent  were  remarkable.  Here,  for  the 
first  time,  mature  minds  brought  their  independent  judg- 
ment to  bear  not  only  upon  practical  but  upon  theoretical 
questions.^     The  idea  of  the  connection  of  things  was  no 

^  Plutarch  Sol.,  3  (concerning  Thales)  ;  ntpaiTepco  rqs  xp«'«$'  e;«ea-^ai 
Trj  deiapia. 


GREElv  PHILOSOPHY  35 

longer  formed  after  the  models  of  mythology,  but  by  per- 
sonal reflection  and  meditation.  Nevertheless  these  new 
endeavors  leading  to  science  grew  out  of  the  circle  of  reli- 
gious ideas,  and  thereby  did  science  prove  itself  to  be  one 
of  the  functions  which  had  been  differentiated  out  of  the 
original  religious  life  of  human  society.  At  first  science 
treated  the  same  problems  that  concerned  mythological 
fancy.  The  difference  between  the  two  does  not  He  in 
their  subject  matter,  but  in  the  form  of  their  interrogation 
and  the  nature  of  their  reply.  Science  begins  where  a 
conceptual  problem  takes  the  place  of  curiosity  as  to  se- 
quences, and  where,  therefore,  fancies  and  fables  are 
replaced  by  the  investigations  of  permanent  relations. 

The  common  task  for  the  Greek  philosopher  lay  in  the 
necessity  to  understand  the  change  of  things,  their  origi- 
nation, destruction,  and  transmutation  into  one  another. 
This  very  change,  this  process  of  happening  (^Geschehen} 
was  accepted  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  was  not  required 
to  be  explained  or  reduced  to  its  causes.  It  had  rather  to 
be  described,  objectified,  and  conceptually  stated.  The  myth 
accomplished  this  in  the  form  of  a  narrative.  To  the  ques- 
tion. What  existed  previously  ?  it  made  answer  with  a 
description  of  the  origin  of  the  world,  and  tells  of  the 
battles  of  Titans  and  how  they  finally  produced  this  world. 
Among  men  of  science  this  interest  in  the  past  gave  way 
to  an  interest  in  what  is  permanent.  They  no  longer 
asked  for  the  temporal  but  for  the  real  j^f'ius  of  perceived 
Being.  Face  to  face  with  the  perpetual  vicissitudes  of  in- 
dividual things,  they  expressed  the  thought  of  a  world- 
unity,  by  asking  what  is  permanent  amid  the  changes. 
Consequently  they  formed  as  the  goal  of  their  research 
the  concept  of  a  world-stuff  that  changes  into  all  things, 
and  into  which  all  things  return  when  these  things  vanish 
from  perception.  The  idea  of  a  temporal  origin  of  things 
gives  place  to  that  of  eternal  Being,  and  thus  arises  the 


36  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

apxVy^  the  first  concept  of  Greek  philosophy.  Tlie  first 
question  of  Greek  science  was,  •'  What  is  the  stuff  out  of 
which  the  world  is  made,  and  how  is  the  stuff  changed 
into  single  things  ?  "  Science  thus  arose  from  cosmogonies 
and  theogonies. 

The  transition  from  the  myth  to  science  consists  in 
stripping  off  the  historical,  in  rejecting  chronological  nar- 
ration, and  in  reflecting  upon  the  Unchangeable.  The  first 
science  was  obviously  an  investigation  of  nature. 

See  S.  A.  Byk.  Die  vorsocratische  Philos.  d.  Or.  in  ihreroryan- 
ischen  Gliedening,  2  parts,  Leipzig,  1875  and  1877. 

1.  The  Milesian  Nature  Philosophy 

14.  The  principal  centre  for  these  beginnings  in  science 
was  the  chief  of  the  Ionian  cities,  Miletus.  From  two  gen- 
erations of  scientists  in  this  city,  tradition  has  preserved 
three  names  :'  Thales,"Anaximandei',  and  Anaximenes.^ 

^  Arist.  Met.,  I.  3,  983,  b.  8.  :  (^  ov  yap  (oriv  anavra  ra  ovra  ku\  (^ 
ov  yiyverai  wpotTov  Ka'i  fli  o  (fyddperai  TeXfvraiov,  t^s  p.tv  oitrtns  irrrofxffov- 
(Trjs,  Tois  8e  nddfcri  p.€Ta^a\\ov(Ti]s,  tovto  arcixfiov  koi  ravrr^v  ap\rji>  (fyaaiv 
(ipai  tSh>  ovratv.  Omitting  the  deduction  of  the  Aristotelian  categories, 
ovfria  and  nddos,  this  definition  of  dpxrj,  which  furnishes  an  immediate 
suggestion  of  the  transition  from  the  temporal  to  the  conceptual,  may 
be  taken  as  historical  in  the  sense  that  it  existed  among  the  old  lonians. 
It  is  of  little  importance  who  introduced  the  term  apx'}  in  this  concep- 
tual way.  Simpl.  Phys.,  6  recto,  24,  13  asserts  it  to  be  due  to  Anaxi- 
niander.     The  thought  was  already  present  in  Thales. 

2  It  is  evident  that  one  need  not  limit  the  Milesian  philosophy  to 
these  three  well-known  men ;  but  nothing  is  traditionally  certain. 
For  the  allusion  of  Theophrastus,  who  (Simpl.  Phys.,  6)  speaks  of  pre- 
decessors of  Thales,  may  also  be  applied  to  the  cosmogonies  ;  and  the 
reports  of  Aristotle,  according  to  which  the  physicists  were  those  who 
accepted  as  dpxf)  the  intermediaries  between  air  and  water  (Z)e  ccelo, 
III.  5,  303  b,  12)  or  between  air  and  fire  (Phys.,  I.  4,  187  a,  14)  leave 
open  the  possibility  and  probability  that  he  has  in  mind  the  later  eclec- 
tic stragglers.     Compare  §  25. 


THE   MILESIAN   NATUKE  PHILOSOPHY  -^^ 

R.  Ritter,  Gesch.der  ionisclien  Philosophie  (Berlin,  1821)  ;  R 
Seydel  Der  Fortschritt  der  Metaphysik  unter  den  dltesten  ioni- 
sclien Pliilosophen  (Leipzig,  1861)  ;  P.  Tannery,  Four  Vhistoire 
de  la  science  hellene,  I.  (Paris,  1887). 

Thales  (about  600  3.  c.)  answered  the  question  concern- 
ing the  substantial  constitution  of  the  world  (^Weltstoff) 
by  declaring  it  to  be  water.  This  is  the  only  assertion  that 
can  be  attributed  to  him  with  perfect  certainty.  Even 
Aristotle,^  who  could  give  only  traditional  rc])orts  concern- 
ing Thales,  us  early  as  his  time  had  only  conjectures  about 
the  grounds  of  this  assertion.  When  Aristotle  states  that 
the  moist  character  of  the  animal  seed  and  animal  nuti'i- 
tion  was  the  occasion  for  this  statement  of  "i'hales  (and  to 
Aristotle's  inference,^  all  later  supplementary  conjectures 
apf)ear  to  refer),  we  are  permitted  to  attribute  this  inference 
to  the  specific  interest  in  biology,  which  appealed  strongly 
to  the  Stagirite,  but,  for  all  we  know,  not  at  all  to  Thales. 
More  probable  is  the  conjecture,  likewise  reported  by 
Aristotle,^  which  brings  the  teaching  of  Thales  into  connec- 
tion with  ancient  cosmological  ideas.  In  these  the  ocean 
was  considered  the  oldest  and  most  important  thing.  It 
would  be  exceedingly  strange  if  the  Ionian  thinker,  in  an- 
swer to  the  question  as  to  the  constitution  of  the  world, 
had  not  decided  in  favor  of  the  element  so  important  to  liis 
people.  The  thought  of  its  infinite  mobility,  its  transfor- 
mation into  earth  and  air,  its  all-engulfing  violence,  could 
not  but  have  held  an  important  place  in  the  minds  of  sea- 
faring folk.  The  reported  cosmographical  ■*  ideas  of  Thales 
also  agree  with  this,  for  he  is  said  to  have  thought  that  the 
earth  floated  in  water,  and  to  have  given,  in  connection 
with  this,  a  Neptunian  explanation  of  earthquakes. 

^  Met.,  I.  3,  983  b,  22,  XajSwi'  lacos  ttjv  vTroXtj^f/iv. 

2  Pint.  Plac.  phU.,  I.  3  {Dox.,  27G).     Compare  Zeller,  1*.  175,  2. 

8  See  beyond. 

*  Arist.  De  ccelo,  IT.  13,  294  a,  28. 


38  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

But  it  makes  no  difference  whether  Thales  came  to  his 
assertion  more  through  organic  than  inorganic  observations. 
So  much  is  clear,  that  the  chemical  composition  of  water, 
the  pure  HoO,  did  not  determine  his  choice  of  it  as  the  cos- 
mic matter.  Rather  its  fluid  state  of  aggregation  and  the 
important  rfile  that  it  played  in  the  mobile  life  of  nature 
determined  his  decision,  so  that  in  the  ancient  reports 
vypov  is  often  substituted  for  vhcap.  The  idea  of  Thales 
seems  to  have  been  to  select  as  the  world  stuff  that  form 
of  matter,  which  promised  to  make  most  readily  compre- 
hensible, the  transformation  on  the  one  hand  to  the  solid, 
on  the  other  to  the  volatile.  More  definite  data  concern- 
ing the  modus  operandi  of  these  changes  do  not  appear  to 
have  been  furnished  by  Thales.  It  must  remain  problemat- 
ical whether  he,  like  the  later  philosophers,  conceived  this 
process  of  change  as  a  condensation  and  rarefaction. 

At  any  rate,  Thales  represented  this  fluid  cosmic  matter 
as  in  continuous  self-motion.  Of  a  force  moving  matter 
and  distinguishable  from  it,  he  taught  nothing.^  In 
naively  considering  an  event  as  a  thing  requiring  no 
further  explanation,  he  advocated,  like  his  followers,  the 
so-called  hylozoistic  theory,  which  represents  matter  as 
eo  ipso  moving  and  on  that  account  animated.  Witli  this 
are  compatible  his  iravra  TrXrjpr)  Oecov  ehai^  and  his  ascrip- 
tion of  a  soul  to  the  magnet.^  The  scientific  view  of  the 
world  had  obviously  at  this  stage  not  yet  excluded  the  im- 
aginative view  of  nature  held  by  Greek  mythology. 

^  According  to  the  statements  of  the  later  writers  (Cicero,  De  nat. 
dcor.,  I.  10),  Thales  placed  in  antithesis  to  the  cosmic  matter  the  form- 
ing divine  spirit.  Such  statements  betray,  on  the  one  hand,  the  termi- 
nology of  the  Stoics,  and  on  the  other  lead  us  to  infer  a  confounding  of 
Thales  -with  Anaxagoras.  The  hylozoism  of  all  the  ancient  physicists, 
including  Thales,  is  affirmed  by  Aristotle  in  Met.,  I.  3. 

2  Arist.  De  anima,  I.  5,  411  a,  8. 

8  Jbid.f  I.  2,  405  a,  20. 


THE   MILESIAN   NATURE   PHILOSOPHY  39 

The  time  in  which  Thales  lived  is  determined  by  an  eclipse, 
which  he  is  said  to  have  predicted.  In  accordance  with  modern 
investigations  (Zech,  Astronomische  Untersuchuiigcn  Hher  die 
loichtUjsteii  Finsternisse,  Leipzig,  1853),  this  mnst  be  placed  in 
the  year  585  b.  c.  His  life  falls,  at  all  events,  in  the  flourishing 
period  of  Miletus  under  Thrasybulus.  The  j'ear  of  his  birth 
cannot  be  exactly  determined ;  his  death  may  be  placed 
directly  after  the  Persian  invasion  in  the  middle  of  the  sixth 
century  (Diels,  lihein.  Mas.,  XXXI.  15  f.).  He  belonged  to 
the  old  family  of  the  Thelides,  which  sprang  from  the  Bojotian 
Cadmians,  who  migrated  into  Asia  Minor.  Hence  the  state- 
ment that  he  was  of  Phamician  derivation  (Zeller,  I^.  1G9,  1). 
See  §  9  for  his  practical  and  political  activity;  §  10,  for  his 
knowledge  of  mathematics  and  physics.  The  P^gyptian  jour- 
neys which  later  literature  reports,  are  at  least  doubtful ; 
although,  provided  that  he  was  engaged  in  commerce,  they  are 
not  impossible.  None  of  the  writings  of  Thales  are  cited  by 
Aristotle,  and  it  is  consequently  doubtful  if  he  committed  any- 
thing to  writing. 

15.  If  Thales  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  first  physicist,  wo 
meet  the  first  metaphysician  in  the  person  of  his  somewhat 
younger  countryman,  Anaximander  (611-545  b.  c).  For 
his  answer  to  the  question  concerning  the  constitution  of 
the  universe  is  already  to  be  essentially  distinguished,  in  its 
content  as  well  as  in  its  fundamentals,  from  that  of  ThalcSo 
Thales  had  sought  to  find  the  cosmic  matter  in  the  empiri- 
cally known,  and  had  seized  upon  what  appears  as  the  most 
completely  mutable.  If  Anaximander  was  not  content  with 
this  theory,  it  was  on  account  of  his  pronounced  principle  ^ 
that  the  cosmic  matter  must  be  thought  as  infinite,  so  that  it 
may  not  be  thought  to  exhaust  itself  in  its  creations.  From 
this  it  followed  immediately  that  the  cosmic  matter  cannot 
be  found  among  empirically  given  forms  of  matter,  all  of 
which  are  limited.  Thus  there  remained  for  the  definition 
of  the  cosmic  matter  only  the  quality  of  its  spatial  and 
temporal  infinity.  Consequently  Anaximander  said  that 
the  apxv  is  the  aireipov. 

^  Arist.  P%.s.,  III.  8,  208  a,  8-.  see  Plut.  Plac-,  I.  3  (7)ox.,  277),  u^q 


40  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

The  most  important  aspect  of  this  dictum  is  that  her^ 
for  the  first  time,  is  the  step  taken  from  the  concrete  to  the 
abstract,  from  the  anschauUch  to  the  hegrijflich.  Anaxi- 
mander  explained  the  sensuously  given  by  the  concept. 
The  advance  consisted  in  the  fact  that  the  atrevpov  is  dis- 
tinguished from  all  perceptible  forms  of  matter.  Anaxi- 
mander  thus  referred  the  world  of  experience  to  a  reality 
beyond  experience,  the  idea  of  which  arises  from  a  concep- 
tual postulate.  He  characterized  this  transcendent  reality 
by  all  the  predicates  which  his  mind  conceived  as  requisite 
for  the  cosmic  matter.  He  called  it  aOdvarov  koX  avooXe- 
dpov,  cfyevvqrov  Kol  d<f)0apTov  ;^  he  described  it  as  including 
all  things  (irepce^eiv)  and  as  determining  their  motion 
{Kv^epvav)  ;  ^  and  he  designated  it  in  this  sense  as  to  Oelov. 

But  with  tliis  first  metaphysical  concept  began  then  also 
the  difficulty  of  giving  a  content  to  it.  That  Anaximander 
conceived  the  direipov  to  be  pre-eminently  a  spatial  and 
temporal  infinity,  follows  from  the  way  in  which  he  arrived 
at  this  principle.  Concerning  his  attitude,  however,  toward 
the  question  of  the  qualitative  determination  of  the 
direipov,  both  antiquity  and  still  more  modern  investiga- 
tors have  apparently  had  divided  opinions.  The  simplest 
and  the  most  natural  theory  to  entertain  is  the  following : 
that  Anaximander  did  not  express  himself  about  the  quality 
of  this  imperceivable  cosmic  matter,  for  the  ancient  ac- 
counts agree  that  he  did  not  identify  it  with  any  one  of  the 
known  elements.  More  questionable,  certainly,  is  it  whether 
he,  as  Herbart  (Complete  Works,  I.  196)  and  his  school 
(Striimpell,  I.  29)  are  inclined  to  accept,  expressly  denied 
the  qualitative  determination  of  the  cosmic  matter,  which 
would  have  anticipated  the  Platonic-Aristotelian  conception 

1  Arist.  Phys.,  III.  4,  203  b,  8.  Likewise  dtdwf  and  ayijpto,  see 
Hippol.  Ref.  hccr.,  I.  6  (Dox.,  559). 

2  Which  expression  does  not  mean,  as  Roth  thinks  {Gesch.  unserer 
abendl.  Philos.,  II.  142),  "  a  mental  guidance."     See  Zeller,  I*.  204,  I. 


THE   MILESIAN  NATURE  PHILOSOPHY  41 

of  matter  as  an  undetermined  possibility.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  certain  that  Anaximander  thought  of  the 
direcpov  always  as  corporeal,^  and  only  the  kind  of  cor- 
poreality can  be  subject  to  controversy.  The  hypothesis, 
too,  expressed  repeatedly  in  later  antiquity,  is  untenable, 
viz.,  that  he  asserted  the  cosmic  matter  to  be  an  inter- 
mediary state  between  water  and  air,  or  air  and  fire.  On 
the  contrary,  the  combination  of  the  Anaximandrian  prin- 
ciple with  the  fxly/xa  of  Empedocles  and  Anaxagoras^  which 
Aristotle  gives,  led  even  in  antiquity  to  the  conception 
of  the  airecpov  as  a  mixture  of  all  the  empirical  material 
elements.  If  now,  also,  the  adherence  of  Anaximander  to 
hylozoisticjmonisnijs  —  as  Aristotle  says  it  is  —  so  very 
^rtaiii  that  one  cannot  make  him  (with  Ritter,  op.  cit.^ 
the  father  of  mechanical  physics,  in  opposition  to  Ionian 
dynamics,^  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  incontrovertible  that 
Anaximander  in  some  conjecturable,  obscure  way  must 
have  stated  that  the  airapov  contains  in  itself  all  known 
material  elements,  and  then  differentiates  these  elements 
in  the  cosmic  process.*  Doubtless  he  held  an  attitude  of 
uncertainty  as  to  the  relationship  of  the  aireipov  to  these 
particular  elements,  similar  to  the  mythological  primeval 
idea  of  Chaos,  which  idea,  to  be  sure,  had  already  been 
greatly  purified,  but  not  yet  thoroughly  elaborated  and 
assimilated. 

Accordingly  Anaximander  was  doubtless  content  in 
merely  indicating  as  eKKpiuecrdat  the  development  of  par- 

1  Compare  Zeller,  I*.  186,  1,  as  against  Michelis,  De  an.  hifinito 
(Braunsberg,  1874). 

2  Arist.  Met.,  XT.  2,  10G9  b,  22  :  to  whifh  add  especially  /%.<:.,  I.  4, 
187  a,  20  :  ol  S  eV  roi  ems  ivovcrai  ras  fvavTiorrjTas  (KKpivea-Oai,  utcmfp 
Ava^ifiav8p6s  (f>r)(Ti  ktX.      Compare  §  22. 

^  IJrandis,  llandhurh,  I.  125. 

*  Arist.  Mi'L,  XT.  2,  and  Tbeophrastiis  (Sinipl.  7^////.<t.,  6)  interpret 
tills  as  a  fium/xei  inclusion.  The  anfipou  became  to  them  their  aupiaros 
vXt). 


42  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

ticular  things  from  the  cosmic  matter.  Indeed  he  caused 
the  antithetical  Warm  and  Cold  to  be  differentiated  from 
the  uTretpov  as  its  first  qualitative  determinations.  Out  of 
the  mixture  of  these  two  qualities  was  supposed  to  be 
formed  then  the  Fluid,  the  fundamental  material  of  the 
finite  empirical  world.  Thus  the  metaphysical  basis  to  the 
theory  of  Thales  was  complete  ;  for  Anaximander  taught 
that  the  particular  parts  of  the  world  had  been  differentiated 
out  of  the  Fluid.  These  were  the  earth,  air,  and  the  fire 
encircling  the  whole. 

The  philosoi)her  inserted  into  this  meteorological  account 
of  the  origin  of  the  world  a  multitude  of  single  astronom- 
ical ideas  (§  10)  which,  even  if  they  appear  childish  to 
us  to-day,  nevertheless  not  only  show  a  many-sided  in- 
terest in  nature,  but  also  presuppose  independent  obser- 
vations and  conclusions.  Anaximander  reflected  upon  the 
facts  of  organic  life  also,  and  there  is  preserved  one  obser- 
vation of  his  in  accord  ^  with  tiie  modern  evolution  theory. 
This  is  to  the  effect  that  animals  appeared  when  the  primi- 
tive liquid  earth  dried  up,  and  were  originally  fish  in  form. 
Then  some  of  them,  adapting  themselves  to  their  new  envi- 
ronment, became  land  animals.  This  process  oi  develop- 
ment, in  its  naive  explanation,  includes  even  jnan. 

The  single  qualitative  differentiations  are  lost  again  in 
the  perpetual  life-process  of  the  cosmic  matter,  in  the  same 
way  that  they  arise  out  of  the  aireipov.  Anaximander,  in  the 
single  fragment  verbally  preserved  to  us,  has  described  this 
reabsorption  in  a  poetic  ^  manner  —  reminding  us  of  original 
Oriental-religious  ideas  —  as  a  kind  of  compensation  for  the 
injustice  of  individual  existence,  e'^  wv  he  7)  y4vriai<i  ian 
Tot?  oval,  Kai  rrjv  ^Oopav  eU  ravra  yCveaOai  Kara  to  %/oeft)i/. 
SiSovat  ryap  avra  BIktjv  koX  riaiv  [dWtjXoL^;]  Tr]<;  aSiKia<i  Kara 

1  Plut.  Plac,  V.  19  (Box.,  430) ;  Hippol.  Ref.  hoer.,  T.  6  {Doz.,  560> 
Compare  Teiehraiiller,  Studien,  I.  63  f. 

2  Simpl.  Phys.,  6^  24,  13. 


THE   MILESIAN  NATURE   PHILOSOPHY  43 

rt]v  Tov  ')(^p6vov  rd^iv.  To  this  Anaxiinander  united  the 
theory,  also  similarly  Oriental,  that  the  cosmic  matter  in 
perpetual  transformation  creates  out  of  itself  world-systems, 
and  again  absorbs  them.^  Whether  to  the  view  of  an  end- 
less plurality  of  successive  world-formations  was  connected 
also  that  of  a  jdurality  of  co-existing  worlds,  contained  in 
the  primitive  matter,  remains  undecided  and  not  probable.^ 

The  deterrahiation  of  the  dabes  of  the  life  of  Anaximander 
rests  uix>n  the  arbitrary  statement  of  ApoUodorus,  that  in  the 
second  year  of  the  fifty-eighth  Olympiad  he  was  sixty-four  years 
old  and  directly  afterwards  died.  (Diog.  Laert.,  II.  2.)  This  is 
not  far  from  the  truth.  Further  of  his  biography  is  not  known. 
His  work,  to  which  some  one  gave  the  title  irepl  cftvaew,  was  in 
prose,  and  appears  to  have  been  lost  very  early.  Compare  Schlei- 
ermacher,  Ueber  An.,  Complete  TFor/tVs',  HI.  2,  171  f. ;  Biisgen, 
Ueber  das  arrupov  des  A.  (Wiesbaden,  1867)  ;  NeuhJiuser, -4/<«ic. 
Milesius,   (Bonn,  1883). 

16.  We  turn  back  from  the  metaphysical  to  the  physical 
point  of  "view"  when  AVe  pass  from  Anaximander  to  Anaxi- 
menes,  for  the  latter  sought  the  cosmic  matter  again  in  the 
empirically  known.  Nevertheless  the  reflections  of  Anaxi- 
mander were  not  ineffectual  ui)on  his  successor.  For  when 
he  substituted  the  air  in  place  of  the  water  of  Thales,  he 
had  especial  reference  to  the  postulate  of  Anaximander : 
he  explained  that  the  air  is  the  aTretpo?  dpxn-  He  found  the 
claims  of  the  metaphysician  to  be  thus  satisfied  by  the  em- 
pirical material.^    At  the  same  time  he  chose  the  air  on 

1  Plut.  Strom.,  fr.  2  {Dox.,  579). 

2  SeeZeller,  I.  212  f. 

*  This  is  attested  expressly  by  Simplicius,  Phys.,  G"-,  24,  26  :  see  Eus. 
Prcep  ,  I.  8,  3  (Dox.,  579)  and  especially  .S'c7;o/.  in  Ai'ist.,  514  a,  33  ;  aneipov 
pev  Koi  avTos  vnedero  ttjv  t\px^v,  ov  pfjv  ?rt  dopicTTov  ktX.  It  is  thus  impossible 
to  premise  with  Ritter  (Gcxch.  der  Ph'dos.,  217)  that  Auaximenes  made 
a  distinction  between  the  air  as  a  metaphysical  cosmic  matter  and  the 
same  as  an  empirical  element.  Brand  is  also,  who  first  entertained  this 
view  in  his  handbook,  I.  144,  has  later  (Gesch.  d.  Entw.,  I.  56,  2)  not  laid 
8o  much  stress  on  it. 


44  HISTOKY   OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

account  of  its  easy  mutability :  olofievo^  apKeiv  to  tov  depo^ 
evaWoianov  irpo^  fiera^oXrjv  {Scliol.  in  Arist.,  514  a,  33).  If 
we  add  to  this,  finally,  the  single  statement  which  is  pre- 
served of  his  writings :  ^  olov  rj  yjrv)(^r)  -fj  rj/xeTepa  arjp  ovaa 
crvjKpaTel  rjfid^,  kol  oXop  tov  Koa/xov  irvevfia  koI  dr)p  7re/3te%et,^ 
we  know  that  his  main  object  was  to  declare  the  cosmic 
matter  to  be  the  most  alive  and  most  continuously  mobile 
of  the  known  elements.  We  likewise  meet  here  a  very 
definite  idea  of  the  manner  in  which  tiie  dp^v  changes  into 
other  kinds  of  matter  :  ^  his  theory  of  condensation  and  rare- 
faction (^fidv(0(TL<i  or  dpalwaL^  —  TrvKvwai'i^.  Out  of  the 
air  through  rarefaction  originates  fire :  tbrough  condensa- 
tion, wind,  clouds,  rain,  water,  earth,  stones,  successively 
come.  In  this  enumeration  there  appears  considerable 
definiteness  in  meteorological  observations,  and  at  the 
same  time  the  physicist's  tendency  to  use  the  state  of 
aggregation  as  a  standard  for  the  different  changes  in 
the  cosmic  matter.  Milesian  science  already  knew  the 
connection  of  the  state  of  aggregation  with  the  tempera- 
ture ;  and  Anaximencs  taught'*  that  rarefaction  is  identical 
with  increase  of  warmth,  condensation  with  increase  of 
cold. 

From  these  general  observations  Anaximencs  not  only 
gave  a  great  number  of  explanations  of  particular  phe- 
nomena in  which  he  showed  himself  to  have  been  a  many- 
sided  and  sharp-sighted  physicist,  but  he  also  gave  a  theory 
of  the  origin  of  the  world.     To  the  latter  was  appended  the 

1  Plut.  Plac,  1.  3  {Dox.,  278). 

2  Far  from  favoring  a  purely  spiritual  interpretation  of  the  world 
principle,  by  Anaximencs,  as  Koth  (Gesch.  d.  abendl.  Philos.,  II.  250  f.) 
will  have  it,  this  passage  shows  the  naive  materialism  of  earliest  science 
as  it  also  appears  in  the  casual  remark  of  Anaximander  that  the  soul  is 
air.  The  materiality  of  the  cosmic  matter  of  Anaximencs  is  proved 
beyond  a  doubt  by  his  theory  of  condensation  and  rarefaction. 

8  Hipp.  Ref.  h.,L  7  (Dox.,  560). 
*  Plat.  Depr.frig.,  7,  3,  947. 


THE  MILESIAN  NATURE   PHILOSOPHY  45 

safely  attested  ^  conception  of  a  periodic  change  of  world- 
formings  and  world-destructions,  i.  e.,  of  a  successive 
plurality  of  worlds.  It  is  not  certain,  however,  that  he 
thought  the  destruction  of  the  world  to  be  conflagration. 

Nothing  is  known  of  the  life  of  Anaximenes,  and  its  chro- 
nological determination  is  difficult.  See  Zeller,  I*.  219,  1. 
Against  the  conjectures  of  Diels  (Rhein.  Mus.,  XXXI.  27) 
there  is  the  probable  theory  that  by  the  "  capture  of  Sardis," 
with  which  his  death  is  said  to  be  coincident  (Diog.,  II.  3),  we 
are  to  understand  the  capture  by  the  lonians  in  the  year  499. 
Accordingly  his  birth  would  have  to  be  in  the  53d  Olympiad,  as 
Hermann  has  it  (De  philos.  Jonic.  cetatibus,  Gottingen,  1849). 
Roth  (II.  a,  246  f. ;  b,  42  f.)  makes  the  date  too  late  by  placing 
it  in  the  58th  Olympiad.  His  ircfA  t^i'trfo)?  was  written  ^  yXuxra-q 
'laSia-ATj  (cai  aVepiTTw.  This  is  tlie  beginning  of  a  dry  practical 
prose  which  shows  itself  contemporaneously  in  the  historiog- 
raphy of  his  countryman  Hecataeus. 

With  the  destruction  of  Miletus  after  the  battle  of  Lade, 
494,  and  the  fall  of  the  independence  of  Ionia,  the  first 
development  of  Greek  science  along  the  lines  of  natural 
philosophy  came  to  an  end.-^  When,  at  least  a  generation  * 
after  Anaximenes,  in  another  Ionian  city,  Ephesus,  the 
great  scientific  theory  of  Hcracleitus  appeared,  the  new 
theory  did  not  leave  the  old  theory  unused.  Hcracleitus, 
on  the  other  hand,  joined  to  the  old  theory  4fi^ religious 
and  metaphysical  problems  Avhich  had  appeared  in  the 
mean  time  from  other  directions. 

1  Simpl.  Phys.,  25  7  T 

^  According  to  Diog.  Laert.,  II.  2. 

^  The  great  chronological  chaf^ni  between  Anaximenes  and  Ileraclei- 
tus  is  consistent  with  the  entirely  different  handling  of  the  problems  by 
the  latter.  Therefore  the  customary  way  of  making  Heracleitus  a 
follower  of  the  Milesians  is  the  less  tenable,  since  the  teaching  of 
Heracleitus  absolutely  presupposes  that  of  Xenophanes. 

*  If  one  places  the  death  of  Anaximenes  at  525  (Diels  and  Zeller) 
and  that  of  Heracleitus,  at  the  earliest,  at  475,  then  the  chasm  appears 
still  greater. 


46  HISTORY  OP  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 


2.  The  Metaphysical  Conflict  —  Heracleitus  and  the 

Eleatics. 

The  advance  from  the  speculations  in  nature-philosophy 
of  the  Milesians  to  the  conceptual  investigations  in  Being 
and  Becoming  of  Heracleitus  and  his  Eleatic  opponents 
was  the  result  of  a  reaction,  which  the  conception  of  the 
world  created  by  Ionian  science  necessarily  exerted  upon 
the  religious  ideas  of  the  Greeks.  The  monistic  tendency 
which  science  showed  in  seeking  the  unitary  cosmic  matter 
was  in  implicit  opposition  to  polytheistic  mythology,  and 
necessarily  became  more  and  more  accentuated.  It  was 
inevitable,  therefore,  that  Greek  science  on  the  one  hand 
should  emphasize  and  reinforce  the  monistic  suggestion 
which  it  found  in  the  field  of  religious  ideas,  but  on  the 
other  that  it  should  fall  so  much  the  more  into  sharper 
opposition  to  the  polytheism  of  the  state  religion. 

17.  The  imperturbable  champion  of  this  conflict,  the 
man  who  stands  as  the  religious-philosophical  link  between 
the  Milesian  nature  philosophy  and  the  two  great  metaphys- 
ical systems  of  Heracleitus  and  Parmenides,  and  at  the 
same  time  the  man  who  is  the  messenger  of  philosophy 
from  the  East  to  the  West,  is  Xenophanes,^  the  rhapsodist 

^  The  disposition  of  the  material  of  the  text,  whereby  Xenophanes, 
who  is  generally  called  the  "founder"  of  the  Eleatic  school,  has  been 
separated  from  this  school,  is  justified  by  these  two  facts :  firstly,  the 
theory  of  Xenophanes  in  point  of  time  and  subject  matter  precedes  that 
of  Heracleitus,  and  th6  theory  of  Heracleitus  in  the  same  respects  pre- 
cedes that  of  Parmenides  ;  secondly,  that  Xenophanes  is  neither  a 
genuine  Eleatic,  nor  yet  a  representative  of  the  Eleatic  theory  of 
Being,  enunciated  first  by  Parmenides.  The  importance  of  Xenophanes 
lies  not  within  a  metaphysical  but  a  religious-philosophical  territory, 
and  his  strength  does  not  consist  in  conceptual  thought  (Arist.  Met.,  I. 
5,  986  b,  27,  calls  him,  as  opposed  to  Parmenides,  dypoiKorepov)  but  in 
the  powerful  and  grand  thought  of  Oneness.  See  Brandis,  Handbuch, 
I.  359. 


THE  METAPHYSICAL  CONFLICT  47 

of  Colophon,  who  sang  in  Magna  Grsecia  (570-470).  To 
him  antiquity  referred  as  the  first  champion  against  the 
anthropomorphic  element  in  the  popular  religion.  He 
criticised  the  representation  of  gods  in  human  form,^  and 
made  sport  of  the  poets  who  attributed  to  celestials  the 
passions  and  sins  of  men.^  He  asserted  the  singleness  of 
"the  liighest  and  true  God.^  If  we  may  believe  that  herein 
he  taught  nothing  but  what  was^  already  provided  for  and 
hinted  at,  if  not  indeed  definitely  presented,  in  the  Pythag- 
orean doctrine  as  known  to  him,  and  possibly  even  earlier 
in  the  Mysteries,  —  then  that  wiiich  maivcs  Xenophanes  a 
philosopher  is  the  basis  which  he  developed  for  monothe- 
ism from  the  philosophy  of  the  Milesian  physics.  We  can 
condense  his  teaching  into  a  sentence :  the  ap^-q  is  the 
Godhead.  According  to  his  religious  conviction,  God  is 
the  original  ground  of  all  things,  and  to  him  are  due  all 
attributes  which  the  physicists  had  ascribed  to  the  cosmic 
matter.  He  is  unoriginated  and  imperishable  ;  *  and,  as 
the  cosmic  matter  was  identical  with  the  World-All  for  the 
lonians,  so  for  Xenophanes  was  God  identical  to  the  world- 
all.  He  contains  all  things  in  himself,  and  he  is  at  the 
same  time  ev  koI  irav.^    This    philosophical  monotheism, 

1  Compare  the  well-known  verse  iu  Clem.  Alex.  Strom.,  V.  714 
(fr.  5,  6). 

2  Compare  Sext.  Emp.  Adv.  math.,  IX.  193  and  I.  289. 

^  '•  Ei?  deoi  eu  re  dfoiat  Koi  dudpa>Troi(ri  fiiyicTTOs  ovre  Se/xaf  dvTjTolaiv 
ofioiios  ovT€  voTjixa.^^  The  metaphysical  monotheism  in  Xenophanes  and 
later  in  the  Greek  thinkers  —  in  a  certain  sense  even  in  Plato  —  is 
allied  with  tlie  recognition  also  of  subordinate 'deities  which  are  treated 
as  parts  of  the  world.  The  Stoa  was  the  first  to  attempt  to  analyze 
this  relationship  in  a  conceptual  way.  Side  by  side  with  the 
metaphysical  monotheism,  there  thus  continued  to  exist  a  mythical 
polytheism. 

*  According  to  Arist.  Rhet.,  II.  23,  1399  b,  6,  Xenophanes  declared 
it  impious  to  speak  of  birth  and  death,  of  origination  and  extinction, 
of  a  Godhead,  dfi(f>OTfpa>s  yap  avfiSaiveiv  pf]  tlvai  tovs  Gtois  norf. 

5  Compare  Simpl.  Phys.,  6%  22,  2G  ;  tv  to  ovkox  itav  .  .  .  Sevtxfxivtjv  .  .  . 
inroridfaOoi, 


48  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

SO  energetically  defended  against  the  polytheism  of  the 
t^  myth,  is  consequently  not  theistic  but  entirely  pantheistic, 
as  we  use  the  terms.  World  and  God  to  Xenophanes  are 
identical,  and  all  the  single  things  of  perception  lose  them- 
selves in  that  one,  unchanging,  universal  essence.^  In  con- 
sequence of  his  religious  predilection,  however,  Xenophanes 
emphasized  the  singleness  of  the  divine  cosmic  principle 
more  decidedly  than  the  Milesians,  to  whom  this  is  a  self- 
evident  principle,  owing  to  their  concept  of  tlie  apxh'  I^ 
remains  indeed  doubtful  whether  the  entire  Zeno-like  argu- 
ment for  this,  founded  on  the  superlatives  "  mightiest " 
and  "  best,"  can  be  ascribed  to  him.^  To  the  quality  of 
singleness,  however,  Xenophanes  further  ascribed  to  the 
cosmic  deity  that  of  unity  ^  in  the  sense  of  qualitative 
unity  and  inner  homogeneity.  Nevertheless,  of  what  tliis 
consists  he  had  as  little  to  say  as  Anaximander  con- 
cerning the  qualitative  constitution  of  the  aTreipov.  In  his 
poetry  he  attributed  to  the  Godhead  in  an  incidental  way 
all  possible  functions  and  powers,  spiritual  ^  as  well  as 
material.^  Yet  out  of  the  mass  of  his  utterances  Aristotle 
could  obtain  ^  only  an  indefinite  and  obscure  assertion  of 
the  essential  homogeneity  of  all  being.  It  was  of  greater 
importance,  however,  for  future  philosophical  development 
that  Xenophanes  followed  to  its  logical  conclusion  the  con- 
cept of  qualitative  unity ;  and  that  moreover  he  extended 

^  According  to  Sext.  Emp.  Pyrr.  hypot.,  T.  33,  the  sillograph 
Timon  makes  him  say ;  ottttj?  yap  ffiov  voov  fvpvcraifii,  Ets  tu  ravro  re  Uau 
dveXvfTO  •  Trav  8'  fov  aU\  Ildvrri  dve^Koiifvov  fiiav  els  (fjvaiv  earaO  ofioiav. 

'^  De  Xen.  Zen.  Gorgias,  977  a,  23  ;  Simpl.  Phys.,  1.  c. 

*  In  which  the  ambiguity  of  the  ev  played  a  great  r61e. 

*  Sext.  Emp.  Adv.  math.,  IX.  144  :  ovXos  opa.  ovXos  Se  voel,  ovXos  8e  t 
aKOvei.  Simpl.  Phys.,  G"",  23,  18:  dXX*  dndvtvde  nouoio  voov  (fipevi  ttuvtu 
Kpa8ai<'ei. 

^  Thus  the  often  mentioned  ball-shape  of  the    Godhead  or  of  the 
World.     Compare  Hippol.  Re/,  h,  I.  14  (Dox,,  565). 
«  Met.^  I.  5,  986  b,  22,     Compare  Plat.  Soph.^  242  d. 


THE   METAPIIYSICAL  CONFLICT  49 

it  over  temporal  differentiations  in  such  a  way  that  he 
ascribed  unchangeabihty  to  the  Godhead  in  every  respect.^ 
He  thereby  enters  into  significant  opposition  to  his  prede- 
cessors.2  From  the  concept  of  the  divine  «/>%/;,  there  van- 
ished the  character  of  mutability  which  had  played  so 
great  a  role  in  the  Milesian  hylozoism. 

In  the  emphasis  upon  this  claim  that  the  ap^r]  is  un- 
originated  and  imperishable,  and  must  also  be  immobile, 
excluding  therefore  Kiv'r)cn<i  as  well  as  aWoLOiai'^,  lay  tlie 
distinctive  innovation  of  the  teaching  of  Xcnophanes. 
For  just  here  the  concept  of  the  dpxn  could  no  longer 
serve  as  an  explanation  of  empirical  events.  However, 
Xenophanes  did  not  himself  appear  to  have  been  conscious 
of  the  chasm  he  left  between  his  metaphysical  principle, 
and  the  plurality  and  changeableness  of  individual  things.^ 
For  in  an  obviously  naive  *  manner  he  conjoined  to  his 
religious  metaphysics  a  multitude  of  physical  theories. 
Nevertheless  he  does  not  appear  as  an  independent  in- 
vestigator in  physics,  but  he  simply  follows  the  views  of 
Anaximander,  with  whose  entire  doctrine  he  seems  to 
have  been  perfectly  familiar,''  and  adds  certain  more  or 
less  happy  observations  of   his   own.     Among   the   latter 

1  Eus.  Prcep.  ev.,  T.  8,  4  :  eivni.  Xf'yet  to  nav  dfl  o^oiov.  Ilippolyt.  B.ef., 
I.  14  :  ore  tv  to  irav  edTiv  e^to  /xera/SoX^s  He  also  denied  movement 
to  the  world-all  ;  compare  Simpl.  P/tt/s  ,  C,  23,  G  :  alel  8'  ev  tcovtm  re  uevtiv 
Kivovfxfvov  oiibtv  ov8e  fifTep)(fadai  niv  fVtTrpeTrft  aXXodtv  «XXj;. 

-  This  very  opposition  Aristotle  emphasizes  in  connection  with 
Met.,  T.  5. 

^  It  is  possible,  also,  that  he  endeavored  to  avoid  a  difficnlty  here  by  an 
indefinite  expression,  just  as  Diogenes,  If.  1.  reports  that  Anaximander 
(no  source  of  authority  given)  taught :  to  ^iv  fxeprj  fj.€Tal3dX\eiv.  to  8e 
nav  dfitTaffkriTov  (ivai. 

^  Thus  he  lets  stand  the  plurality  of  mythical  gods  under  the  meta- 
physical Godhead. 

^  Theophrastus  appears  to  think  him  the  pupil  of  Anaximander  See 
Zeller,  II  508,  1. 

I 


50  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

belong  the  very  childish  ideas  about  astronoinieal  objects. 
For  instance,  the  stars  were  to  him  clouds  of  lire,  which 
were  quenched  when  they  set  and  were  enkindled  when  they 
rose  ;  ^  he  attached  great  significance  ^  to  the  earth  as  the 
fundamental  element  of  the  empirical  world  (with  the 
addition  of  the  water),  and  he  thought  it  to  be  endless^  in 
its  downward  direction.  His  statement  was  more  happy 
about  the  petrifactions  he  had  observed  in  Sicily,  as  a  proof 
of  the  original  drying  of  the  earth  from  its  muddy  condi- 
tion.* Yet  Xenophanes  apparently  held  such  physical 
theories  concerning  the  individual  and  temporary  in  small 
esteem  compared  to  his  religious  metaphysics,  which  he 
championed  vehemently.  To  this  only  can  his  sceptical 
remarks  in  one  of  his  fragments^  refer. 

The  differing  statements  as  to  when  Xenophanes  lived  can 
be  reconciled  most  easily  by  assuming  that  the  time  when  he, 
according  to  his  own  statement  (Diog.  Laert.,  IX.  19),  at  twenty- 
five  began  his  wanderings,  coincided  with  the  invasion  by  the  Per- 
sians under  Ilarpagus  (546,  in  consequence  of  which  so  many 
lonians  left  their  homes).  He  himself  testifies  (loc.  cit.)  that 
his  wanderings  lasted  sixty-seven  years,  at  which  time  he  must 
have  attained  the  age  of  at  least  ninety-two.  Impoverished 
during  the  emigration,  if  not  already  poor,  which  is  less  prob- 
able, he  supported  himself  as  a  rhapsodist  by  the  public  render- 
ing of  his  own  verses.  In  old  age  he  settled  in  Elea,  the 
founding  of  which  in  537  by  the  fugitive  Phoenicians  he  cele- 
brated in  two  thousand  distiehs.  According  to  the  preserved 
fragments,  his  poetic  activity  was  essentially  of  the  Gnomic 
order  (§  9),  He  embodied  his  teaching  in  a  didactic  poem  in 
hexameter,  of  which  only  a  few  fragn)ents  remain.  These 
have  been  collated  by  MuUach  ;  also  by  Karsten,  Philosophorum 
Grcecorum  operum  reliquice^  I.  1  (Amsterdam,  1835)  ;  Reinhold, 
De  genuina  Xenophanis  doclrina  (Jena,  1847),  and  in  the  dif- 
ferent works  about  Xenophanes  by  Franz  Kern    (Proyramm, 

1  Stob.  Eel,  I.  522  {Dox.,  348). 

2  Achilles  Tatius  in  Isagoge  ad  Aratum,  128. 

3  *^unpl.  Phijs.  41^  189,  1.     Sext.  Emp.  Adv.  math.,  IX.  361. 
*  Hippol.  Re/.,  I.  14  (Dox.  5G5). 

5  Sextus  Emp.,  VII.  49,  110  ;  VIII.  326.     Stob.  Ed.,  I.  224. 


THE  METAPHYSICAL  CONFLICT  51 

Naumburg,  1864;  Oldenburg,  1876;  Danzig,  1871;  Stettin, 
1874,  1877) ;  Freudenthal,  Die  Theologie  des  Xetiophanes  (Bres- 
lau,  1886).     Compare  Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos.,  1.  322  f. 

The  pseudo- Aristotelian  treatise  De  Xe)iophane,Zenone,Gor- 
gia  (printed  in  the  works  of  Aristotle,  and  in  Mullach,  Fragm. 
1.  271,  also  under  the  title  De  Melisso,  Xeiwphane  el  Gorgia), 
came  from  the  Peripatetic  school.  According  to  the  investiga- 
tions of  Brandis,  Bergk,  Ueberweg,  Vermehren,  and  Zeller,  we 
may  believe  that  the  last  part  of  this  work  doubtless  treats  of 
Gorgias,  and  the  first  part  almost  as  surely  of  jNIelissus.  The 
middle  portion  presupposes  an  older  presentation  about  Xenoph- 
anes  which  was  referred  wrongly  by  a  later  commentator  to 
Zeno,  and  was  supplemented  with  some  statements  about  Zeno's 
views  drawn  from  other  sources.  This  part  of  the  treatise  can 
be  used  only  with  the  greatest  judgment,  and  then  as  illustra- 
tive of  what  on  the  one  hand  the  fragments,  and  on  the  other 
the  reports,  of  Aristotle  give. 

The  teaching  of  Xenophanes,  immature  as  it  appears,"" 
nevertheless  discloses  the  inadequacy  of  the  Milesian  con- 
cept of  the  apxv-  Ii^  01'  behind  the  change  of  single  things, 
he  said,  should  be  sought  a  cosmic  principle  that  creates 
them  all,  but  yet  itself  always  remains  unchanged.  But 
if  we  sei'iously  conceive  of  this  cosmic  principle  of 
Xenophanes  as  utterly  unchangeable,  and  at  the  same 
time  regard  it  as  the  sole  and  all-embracing  actuality,  it  is 
impossible  to  understand  its  capacity  of  being  ceaselessly 
transmuted  into  individual  tilings.  The  two  thought-mo- 
tifs that  had  been  fundamental  in  the  concept  of  the  a/)%?7 
now  part  company,  —  on  the  one  hand,  the  reflection  upon 
the  fundamental  fact  of  the  cosmic  process  (Geschehen), 
on  the  other  the  fundamental  ])ostulate  of  the  permanent, 
of  the  unchangeably  self-determined,  of  Being.  The  more 
difficult  their  reconciliation  appeared,  the  more  conceivable 
is  it  that  the  young  science,  at  whose  command  there  was 
as  yet  no  wealth  of  mediating  data,  and  which  on  the  other 
hand  was  developed  with  na'ive  unconcern,  should  fall  upon 
the  expedient  of  thinking  out  each  motif  by  itself  wnthout 
regard  for  the  other.     From  this  courageous  onesidedness. 


52  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

undaunted  as  it  was  at  paradoxical  consequences,  origi- 
nated the  two  great  metaphysical  systems  whose  opposition 
determined  later  thought.  These  are  the  theories  of  Hera- 
cleitus  and  Parmenides. 

18.  Tlie  doctrine  of  absolute,  ceaseless,  and  universal 
mutability  already  was  even  in  antiquity  regarded  as  the 
kernel  of  Heracleitanism,  Its  watchword  is  irdvra  pel ;  and 
when  Plato  ^  gave  the  plirase  a  new  turn,  otl  iravra  x^P^l 
Kal  ovBev  fj^vei,  he  gave  at  the  same  time  the  obverse  of 
the  proposition,  viz.,  the  denial  of  the  permanent.  Here  in 
this  is  Heracleitus,  '*  the  Dark,"  essentially  distinguished 
from  the  Milesian  philosophers,  with  whom  he,  under  the 
name  of  the  "  Ionian  natural  philosophers,"  is  generally 
classed  (§  16).  Heracleitus  found  nothing  permanent  in 
the  perceptual  world,  and  he  gave  up  search  for  it.  In 
the  most  varied  phrase  he  presented  the  fundamental 
truth  of  the  continuous  transmutation  of  all  things  into 
one  another.  From  every  realm  of  life  he  seized  ex- 
amples, in  order  to  point  out  the  passage  of  opposites  into 
each  other.  He  described  in  bold  figures  the  ceaselessness 
of  change,  which  was  to  him  the  essence  of  the  world,  and 
needed  no  derivation  and  explanation.  There  are  no  truly 
existing  things,  but  all  things  only  become  and  pass  aioay 
again  in  the  play  of  perpetual  world-movement.  The  ap-^ri  is 
not  so  much  immutable  matter  in  independent  motion,  as 
the  Milesians  had  said,  but  is  the  motion  itself,  from  which 
all  forms  of  matter  are  later  derived  as  products.  This 
thought  is  stated  by  Heracleitus  by  no  means  with  con- 
ceptual clearness,  but  in  sensuous  pictures.  Already  the 
Milesian  investigators  had  noted  that  all  motion  and 
change  are  connected  with  temperature  changes  (§  16),  and 
so  Heracleitus  thought  that  the  eternal  cosmic  motion  ex- 
pressed itself  by  fire.  Fire  is  the  apxVi  ^^"t  "'>t  as  a  stuff 
identical  with  itself  in  all  its  changes,  but  rather  as  the 

1  Cratyl.,  402  a. 


p 


THE  METAPHYSICAL  CONFLICT  53 

ever-uniform  process  itself,  in  which  all  things  rise  and 
pass  away.  It  is  the  world  itself,  therefore,  in  its  unorigi- 
nating  and  unperishing  mutability.^ 

The  exceptional  difflculty  of  this  relationship  was  remarked 
by  the  ancients,  and  from  it,  especially,  the  P^phesian  got  his 
nickname,  o-zcorcno?.  Herein  appeared  the  amalgamation  of 
the  abstract  and  the  concrete,  of  the  sensuous  and  the  sj-mboli- 
cal,  which,  in  general,  ciiaracterized  the  entire  thought  and 
habit  of  expression  of  Heraeleitus.  Neither  to  oracular  pride 
nor  to  the  assumption  of  mysteriousness  (Zeller,  1*.  570  f.)  is 
this  deficiency  to  be  attributed  in  his  writing,  but  to  inability 
to  find  an  adequate  form  for  his  aspiring  abstract  thought. 
Besides  this,  a  priestly  ceremoniousness  of  tone  is  unmistak- 
able. Hence  the  wrestling  with  language  which  appears  in 
nearly  all  the  fragments ;  hence  the  rhetorical  vehemence  of 
expression  and  a  heaping  up  of  metaphors,  in  whicli  a  power- 
ful and  sometimes  grotesque  fancy  is  displayed.  Concerning 
especially  his  fundamental  teachiug,  his  words  seem  to  show  in 
isolated  passages  that  he  had  only  substituted  fire  for  water  or 
air.  But  more  exact  search  shows  that  the  dp^j  meant  quite  a 
different  thing  to  him.  He  also  identified  fire  and  the  world-all 
and  fire  and  the  Godhead;  —  nay,  hylozoic  pantheism  finds  in 
the  teaching  of  Heraeleitus  its  own  most  perfect  expression. 
Yet  he  meant  that  this  world  principle  is  only  the  movement 
represented  in  the  fire.     It  is  the  cosmic  process  itself. 

Heraeleitus  proceeded  from  the  point  of  view  that  the 
fire-motion  is  originally  in  itself  the  final  ground  of  things, 
and  accordingly  no  permanent  Being  is  fundamental  in  it. 
He  found  fire  to  be  the  condition  of  every  change,  and 
therefore  the  object  of  scientific  knowledge.  But  he  did 
not  only  mean  this  in  the  sense  that  "  nothing  is  perma- 
nent save  change,"  but  also  in  the  higher  sense  that  this 

eternal  mOV£ment  eomplf"<^r.q   it«o1f  in   Hpfprminp<1   nnrl  ovnr-^ 

recurrenlL-foFmsr  From  this  metaphysical  thesis  he  at- 
tempted to  understand  the  probldm  of  the  ever-permanent 
series  of  repetitions,  the  rhythm  of  movement  and  the  law 

^  Fr.  46  (Schust.)  Kocrfiov  rov  avrov  airavTOiv  ovre  tis  dtcov  ovre  avOpar 
BXBV  fTTOirfiTfv,  oAX  Tjv  del  Koi  eariv  nvp  ael^oiov. 


54  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY  ^   \ 

of  change.  In  obscure  and  undeveloped  form  originated 
here  the  conception  of  natural  law.  It  appeared  in  the 
vesture  of  the  mythical  Eifiap/Mevr],  as  an  all-determining 
Fate,  or  an  all-povv^erful  JUij,  menacing  every  deviation 
with  punishment.  Since  it  is  to  bo  regarded  as  the  peculiar 
object  of  reason,  he  called  it  the  ^0709,  —  the  reason  that 
rules  the  world. 

In  the  later  presentations  of  t'\  s  theory,  in  which  its  Stoicism 
appears,  it  is  difficult  to  get  at  what  is  in  itself  peculiarly 
Heracleitan  (Zeller,  l"*.  606  f.).  But  the  fundamental  thought 
of  a  world-order  of  natural  phenomena  cannot  be  denied  to 
Heracleitus.  Compare  M.  Heinze,  Die  Lehre  vom  Logos  in  der 
griechischen  Philosophie  (Leipzig,  1872). 

The  most  universal  form  yf  the  cosmic  process  was,  there- 
fore, for  Heracleitus  that  of  opposition  and  its  elimination. 
From  the  notion  of  the  "  flow  of  all  things,"  it  followed 
that  every  single  thing  in  its  continuous  change  unites 
in  itself  perpetually  opposing  determinations.  Everything 
is  only  a  transition,  a  point  of  limit  between  the  vanishing 
and  the  about-to-be.  The  life  of  nature  is  a  continuous  pass- 
ing into  one  another  of  ill  opposites,  and  out  of  their  strife 
come  the  individual  things  :  TroXe/io?  iravrcov  fieviraTTJp  eari, 
irdvrmv  he  ^acrCKev'i.^  But  as  these  antitheses  ultimately 
arise  only  out  of  the  universal  and  all-embracing,  living,  fiery, 
cosmic  force,  so  they  find  their  adjustment  and  reconciliation 
in  this  same  fire.  Fire  is,  in  this  respect,  the  "  unseen  hai- 
mony."^  The  world-all  is  consequently  the  self-divided^ 
and  the  self-reuniting  unity .^     It  is  at.  one  and  the  same 

1  Fr.  75. 

^  Compare  Fr.  8  :  Apfiovlr)  yap  ay''avr)<:  (f)av(pTJ<:  Kyfirrcov.  iv  jjTas  8ia<f>opas 
KOI  (TepoTqrai  6  p.Lyvva>v  6(os  Zupv^f  ;,•.•.  KaTfbvatv.  Coiiip.  Zeller,  1*. 
604  f.  The  dcf)avTis  here  obviously  characterizes  the  metaphysical  in 
opposition  to  the  physical. 

^  Plato,  Si/mp  ,  187  a  :  to  tv  buKpepoptvov  ai/ro  avra.  Compare  Soph., 
242  c  ;  also  Fr.  98. 

*  Heracleitus  sought  to  picture  this  relationship  in  the  obviously  unfop 


THE   METAPHYSICAL  CONFLICT  55 

time  strife  and  peace ;  or  what  seems  to  mean  ^  the  same 
in  Heracleitus'  terminology,  it  is  at  one  and  the  same  time 
want  and  fulness.^ 

The  physical  application  of  these  principles  afforded 
a  thoroughgoing  theory  of  the  elemental  changes  in  the 
universe.  Action  and  reaction  take  place  in  orderly  suc- 
cession, and  indeed  in  such  wise  that  they  are  constantly 
balanced  in  their  results.  Thus  it  happens  that  single 
things  have  the  appearance  of  persisting,  when  two  oppos- 
ing forces  temporarily  hold  each  other  in  equilibrium, 
as,  for  instance,  the  river  appears  as  a  permanent  thing 
because  just  as  much  water  flows  to  a  point  as  flows  from 
it.  Heracleitus  designated  this  rhythm  of  change  as  the 
two  "  Ways  "  which  are  identical,  the  686^  Kara)  and  the 
oho^  dvw?  By  the  first  Way  the  original  fire  changes 
itself  into  water  and  then  into  earth  thi-ough  condensation  ; 
by  the  second  the  earth  changes  back  through  liquefac- 
tion to  water  and  then  to  fire.  This  double  process  is 
true  in  one  respect  for  the  entire  world  ;  for  in  regularly 
recurrent  periods*  it  develops  into  individual  things  from 
the  original  fire,  and  then  returns  to  the  initial  condition 
of  pure  fire.  Hence  comes  the  idea  of  alternating  world- 
formation  and  world-destruction.^     On  the  other  hand,  this 

tiinate  figure  of  the  bow  and  the  lyre  :  TraKim-ovos  [-rponos]  yap  appovlr) 
Koa-fiov  oKoxTTrep  to^ov  koI  Xvpj/y.     As  to  the  meaning,  see  Zeller,  I*.  598  f. 
^  JbUl,  64 L 

2  Fr.  67.  From  these  determinations  apparently  come  ve'iKos  and 
(^iXoTfjf,  the  different  conditions  developed  by  Empedocles  (§  21). 

3  Compare  Diog  Laert.,  IX.  8.  The  designations  *cdrw  and  avco  are  to 
be  understood  as  first  of  all  spatial,  but  they  appear  to  have  acquired  a 
connotation  of  value.  A  thing  becomes  less  valuable,  the  farther  it  is 
from  the  fiery  element. 

*  He  has  suggested  for  these  the  Great  Year  (18,000  or  10,800  years  ?)  ; 
following  perhaps  the  Chaldeans. 

°  The  acceptance  of  successive  world-formations  and  destructions 
in  Heracleitus  may  be  looked  upon  as  assured  from  the  deductions  of 
Zeller,  I*.  626-640. 


56  HISTORY   OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

orderly  change  of  matter  verifies  itself  in  every  single 
series  in  nature.  How  far  Hcracleitus,  however,  applied 
his  view  to  particular  physical  objects,  wo  do  not  know. 
In  cosmogony,  he  appears  to  have  been  satisfied  with  bring- 
ing the  "  sea"  out  of  the  primitive  fire,  and  then  out  of  the 
sea  the  earth  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  the  warm 
air.  The  only  detail  authoritatively  attested  — one  that  re- 
minds us  of  Xenophanes  —  that  the  sun  is  a  mass  of  vapor, 
taking  fire  in  the  morning  and  becoming  extinguished 
in  the  evening,  reconciles  us  to  the  loss  of  other  theories 
of  Heracleitus,  in  case  he  had  any.  For  Heracleitus  was 
less  a  physicist  than  a  metaphysician.  He  thought  out 
a  single  fundamental  principle  with  profound  reflection 
and  vivid  imagination.  His  interest  lay  in  the  most 
general  of  principles  and  in  anthropological  questions. 

It  can  scarcely  be  accidental  that  in  the  preserved  fragments 
of  Heracleitus  there  is  little  peculiarly  physical,  but  much  that 
is  metaphysical  and  anthropological.  If  his  writing  actually 
had  three  Aoyoi  (Diog,  Laert.,  IX.  5),  of  which  one  dealt  with 
TTcpi  Tov  TravTos,  and  both  the  others  were  ttoXitikos  and  OeoXoyiKoc, 
this  is  proof  that  we  have  to  do  with  a  philosopher  who  did 
not,  as  his  Milesian  predecessors,  accord  a  merely  casual 
consideration  to  human  life,   but  made  it  his  prime  study. 

The  conflict  of  the  pure  fire  and  the  lower  elements  into 
which  everything  changes  repeats  itself  in  man.  The  soul 
as  the  living  principle  is  fire,  and  finds  itself  a  captive  in 
a  body  made  out  of  water  and  earth,  which,  on  account  of 
its  inherent  rigidness,  is  to  the  soul  an  abhorrent  object. 
With  this  theory  Heracleitus  united  ideas  of  transmigra- 
tion, of  retribution  after  death,  and  the  like  ;  and  lie,  as 
Pythagoras,  seems  to  have  attached  it  to  certain  Mysteries. 
In  general  he  took  a  position  in  religious  matters  similar 
to  that  of  Pythagoras.  Without  breaking  entirely  with 
the  popular  faith,  he  espoused  an  interpretation  of  the 
myths  that  inclined  toward  monotheism  and  had  an 
ethical   import. 


THE   METAPHYSICAL  CONFLICT  57 

The  vitality  of  the  soul,  and  consequently  its  perfection 
in  every  respect,  depends  on  its  deriving  its  nourishment 
from  the  cosmic  fire,  the  universal  reason,  the  X0709.  The 
breath  is  the  physical  medium  of  obtaining  this  nourish- 
ment, and  cessation  of  the  breath  stops  activity.  A  further 
medium  of  life,  however,  is  sense  j)erception,  which  is  the 
absorption  of  the  outer  through  tlie  inner  fire;  and  this 
accounts  for  the  depression  of  soul-activity  in  sleep.  The 
drier  and  more  fiery,  the  better  and  wiser  is  the  soul,  and 
the  more  does  it  participate  in  the  universal  cosmic  reason. 
Since  the  cosmic  reason  is  cosmic  law,  the  reasonableness 
of  man  consists  in  liis  conformity  to  law,  and  in  his  con- 
scious subordination  to  it.  On  that  account  Heracleitus 
regarded  the  ethical  and  political  tasks  of  mankind  as 
expressions  of  the  supremacy  of  law.  His  entire  aristo- 
cratic hate  against  the  democracy,  that  had  attained  to 
power,  is  revealed  in  diatribes  against  the  anarchy  of  the 
multitudes  and  their  caprice.  Only  in  subordination  to 
order  and  in  the  last  instance  to  cosmic  law,  can  man 
win  that  serenity  which  constitutes  his  happiness.  In  an 
apprehension  of  law,  however,  and  in  subordination  to 
the  universally  valid,  Heracleitus  found  the  theoretical  goal 
of  mankind.  Only  the  reason  and  not  sense  perception 
guai-antees  the  attainment  of  this  goal,  and  without  the 
reason  eyes  and  ears  are  bad  w^itnesses.^     The  great  mass 

1  The  well-known  Fragment  ll(Sext.  F.m]).  Adr.  77ialh.,Vll.  126), 
KaK  "i  ndprvpts  dv6pa>iroi(nv  6(f)da\fio\  Koi  Sna  Qap^dpovi  ^j^v^as  (\6vTaiv, 
is  usually  interpreted  as  a  disdain  of  sense  knowledge.  Schuster 
(p.  19  f.)  has  made  an  attempt  (confuted  by  Zeller,  I*.  572  f.,  656  f.)  to 
stamp  Heracleitus  as  a  sensualist  on  account  of  his  theory  of  perception. 
The  correct  position  lies  in  the  mean  between  these  two  authorities.  Right 
knowledge  indeed  arises  in  sense  when  the  right  soul  elaborates  it. 
The  criterion  to  which  all  things  are  referred  is  here  again  conformity 
to  law,  which  is  universally  valid  and  won  only  through  thought.  In 
sleep  and  through  mere  individual  perception  every  one  has  only  his  own, 
and  therefore  a  false,  world  of  ideas.     The  analogy  in  practical  life  is 


58  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

of  mankihd  in  this  respect  are  badly  off.  They  do  not 
reflect,  but  live  on  as  the  deluded  victims  of  sense,  whose 
greatest  deception  consists  in  its  simulation  of  permanent 
Being  amid  the  transitoriness  of  all  the  phenomena  of 
perception. 

Heracleitus  of  Ephesus,  son  of  Blyson,  belonged  to  the  most 
eminent  family  of  his  native  city,  which  traced  its  origin  to 
Codrus.  In  this  family  the  dignity  of  apxf^v  /3ao-tAeus  was  in- 
herited, and  Heracleitus  is  said  to  have  surrendered  it  to  his 
brother.  The  dates  of  his  birth  and  death  are  not  exactly 
known.  If  he  survived  the  banishment  of  his  friend  Hennodo- 
rus  (compare  E.  Zeller,  De  Herm.  Ephesio,  Marburg,  1851),  who 
was  forced  from  the  city  by  the  democratic  ascendency  after 
the  throwing  off  of  Persian  doi^ination,  his  death  can  scarcely 
have  been  before  470.  About  this  time  he  himself  went  into 
retirement  to  devote  himself  to  science.  His  birth,  since  he  is 
said  to  have  lived  about  sixty  j'ears,  can  be  placed  between 
540-530.  With  these  dates,  moreover,  the  statements  of 
Diogenes  Laertius  agree,  for  Diogenes  places  the  cik/a?/  of 
Heracleitus  in  the  sixtj'-ninth  Olympiad.  His  own  writing, 
in  poetically  ceremonial  prose,  supposes  that  Pythagoras  and 
Xenophanes  are  already  familiar  names.  It  was  not  probably 
written  until  the  third  decade  of  the  fifth  century.  His  rude 
partisanship  upon  the  side  of  the  oppressed  aristocracy  is  all 
that  is  known  of  his  life,  by  which  is  explained  his  contempt 
for  mankind,  his  solitariness  and  bitterness,  and  his  ever 
emphatic  antagonism  toward  the  public  and  its  capricious 
sentiments. 

In  the  collection  and  attempt  at  a  systematic  ordering  of  the 
unfortunately  meagre  fragments  of  Heracleitus'  book,  and  in 
the  presentation  of  his  doctrine,  the  following  men  have  done 
eminent  service :  Fr.  Schleiermacher  (Her.  der  Duiikle  von 
Ephesusy  Ges.  Werke  HI.,  II.  1-146) ;  Jak.  Bernays  ( Ges. 
Abh.  herausgez.  von  Usener,  I.,  1885,  1-108,  and  in  addition 
especially  the  "Letters  of  Heracleitus,"  Berlin,  1869);  Ferd. 
Lassalle  (Die  Philos.  Her.  des  Dnnkehi  von  Ephesus,  2  vols., 
Berlin,  1858);  P.  Schuster  {Her.  v.  Ephesus,  Leipzig,  1873, 
in  the  Acta  soc.  phlL,  Lips,  ed.,  Ritschl,  III.  1-394)  ;  Teich- 
mtlller  (Neue  Studien  zu  Gesch.  der  Begriffe,  Parts  1  and  2) ; 

shown  in  Fragment  123,  ^vvov  ttrri,  iraai  to  (fipovtlv.  ^vv  voco  Xtyomas 
t(TxvpiCf(T6ai  xph  """^  iv^  ndvToiv.  Sxnrfp  vopto  ttoXi?  kui  ttoKv  l(T)(vpoTfpa)s ' 
rpf(l>ovTai  yap  narrfi  ol  avdoinjivoi  yojun  vnb  ivos  rov  ddov. 


THE   METAPHYSICAL  CONFLICT  59 

J.  Bywater  {Her.  reliquice,  Oxford),  1877,  a  collection  which 
includes,  to  be  sure,  the  counterfeited  letters,  but  those,  how- 
ever, that  presumably  came  from  ancient  sources ;  Th.  Gom- 
perz  (Zii  II.'s  LeJire  und  den  Ueberresten  seines  Werke,  Vienna, 
1887) ;  Edm.  Pfleiderer,  Die  Philos.  der  Her.  v.  Eph.  im  Lichte 
der  Mysterienideen  (Berlin,  1886). 

Ill  the  theory  of  Heracleitus,  scientific  reflection  as  the 
sole  true  method  already  so  far  strengthened  itself  in  the 
abstract  development  of  his  concepts  that  it  set  itself  over 
against  customary  opinion  and  sense  appearance  with 
a  rugged  self-consciousness.  To  a  still  higher  degree  the 
same  attitude  appears  in  the  antagonistic  theory  of  the 
Eleatic  School. 

19.  The  scientific  founder  of  the  Eleatic  school  was 
Parmenides.  What  had  been  set  forth  by  Xenophanes  in 
religious  assertions  about  the  unity  and  singleness  of  the 
Godhead  and  its  identity  with  the  world,  was  developed 
entirely  conceptually  by  Parmenides  as  a  metaphysical 
theory.  That  concept,  however,  which  was  placed  as  central 
and  drew  all  the  others  entirely  into  its  circle,  was  Being. 
The  great  Eleatic  was  led  up  to  his  theory  through  reflec- 
tions of  a  purely  formal  logical  nature.  In  a  still  obscure 
and  undeveloped  form  the  correlation  of  consciousness  and 
Being  hovered  before  his  mind.  All  thinking  is  referred 
to  something  thought,  and  therefore  has  Being  for  its  con- 
tent. Thinking  that  refers  to  Nothing  and  is  therefore 
contentless,  cannot  be.  Therefore  not-Being  cannot  be 
thought,  and  much  the  less  can  it  be.^  It  is  the  greatest  of 
all  follies  to  discuss  not-Being  at  all,  for  we  must  speak  of 
it  as  a  thought  content,  that  is,  as  something  being,  and 
must  contradict  ourselves.^    If  all  thinking  refers,  however, 

^  Verses  35-40  (MuUach)  :  ovre  yap  av  yvcirjs  to  ye  ^fj  iov  •  ov  yap 
awoTov.     ovre  (jtpdaait,  to  yap  avro  votiv  (ot'lv  re  ku)  eivai. 

2  vv.  43-51.  Steinhart  and  Bernays  have  rightly  called  attention  to 
the  fact  that  Heracleitus  is  antagonized  heie.  for  he  ascribes  Being  and 
not-Being   alike  to  the  things  conceived  in    the  process  of  Becoming. 


60  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

to  something  being,  then  is  Being  everywhere  the  same. 
For  whatsoever  also  may  be  thought  as  in  the  particular 
thing,  nevertheless  the  quality  of  Being  (^das  *SWn)  is  in  all 
the  same.  Being  is  the  last  product  of  an  abstraction  that 
has  compared  the  particular  thought  contents.  Being 
alone  remains  when  all  difference  has  been  abstracted  from 
the  content  determinations  of  actuality.^  From  this  fol- 
lows the  fundamental  doctrine  of  the  Elcatics,  that  only 
the  one  abstract  Being  is. 

The  philosophy  of  Parmenides  would  be  complete  in  this 
brief  sentence  ea-rcv  elvai,  if  on  the  one  hand  there  did 
not  follow  from  this  conceptual  definition  a  number  of 
predicates  of  Being, —  predicates  primarily  negative  and 
susceptible  only  disjunctively  of  positive  formulation  ;  and 
if  on  the  other  hand  the  philosopher  did  not  deviate  from 
the  strict  logic  of  his  own  postulates. 

In  respect  to  the  first,  all  time  and  qualitative  distinc- 
tions must  be  denied  to  Being.  Being  is  unoriginated  and 
imperishable.  It  was  not  and  will  not  be,  but  only  is  in 
timeless  eternity .^  For  time,  wherein  perhaps  any  thing 
that  is,  first  was  and  suffered  change,^  is  in  no  wise  different 
from  a  thing  that  is.  Being  is  also  unchangeable,  entirely 
homogeneous  and  unitary  in  quality.  It  is  also  not  plural, 
but  is  the  one  unique,  indivisible,*  absolute  cosmic  Being. 

Compare  Zeller,  I*.  670.  The  same  dialectic  in  reference  to  Being 
and  not-Being  is  repeated  in  the  dialogue,  The  Sophist  (SB'S),  in  seeking 
for  the  possibility  of  error. 

1  This  line  of  thought  is  repeated  by  the  Neo-Platonists,  by  Spinoza 
et  al.,  and  is  unavoidable  if  Being  is  valid  as  the  criterion  of  "  things 
being."     Compare  Kant,  Kr.  d.  v.  Vern.^  Kelirb.,  471  f. 

2  V.  59  ff.,  especially  61  :  olb't  ttot  ^p  ovb'  tarai  trrel  vvv  eaTiv  ofxov  nav 

3  V.  96  :  ovbe  \p6vos  ecrnv  fj  forai  oXXo  iraptK  tov  iovros.  This  is  di- 
rected perhaps  against  the  cosmogonies,  perhaps  against  the  chrono- 
logical measure  of  cosmic  development  in  Heracleitus. 

*  v.  78. 


THE   METAPHYSICAL   CONFLICT  61 

Ml  plurality,  all  qualitative  difference,  all  origination,  all 
change  or  destruction  are  shut  out  by  true  Being.  In  this 
respect  Parmenides  has  constructed  the  concept  in  perfect 
clearness  and  sharpness. 

But  this  abstract  ontology  among  the  Eleatics  nevertheless 
took  another  turn  through  some  content  definitions  obtained 
from  the  inner  and  outer  world  of  experience.  This  oc- 
curred in  the  two  directions  resulting  from  the  way  in 
Avhich  Parmenides  gained  the  concept  of  Being  from  the 
identity  of  thinking  and  the  thing  thought.  That  Being, 
to  which  thought  refers  in  its  naive  conception  as  if  it 
were  its  own  necessary  content,  is  corporeal  actuality. 
Therefore  the  Being  of  Parmenides  was  identified  with  the 
absolutely  corporeal.  The  polemic  against  the  acceptance 
of  not-Being  got  a  new  aspect  in  this  way.  The  ov  coin- 
cides with  the  ifKeov,  the  ixrj  6u  with  the  kgvov  ;  and  the 
Eleatics  taught  that  there  is  no  empty  space.  There- 
fore Being  is  indivisible,  immovable,^  and  excludes  not 
only  qualitative  change,  but  also  all  change  of  place. 
This  absolute  corporeality  is  therefore  not  boundless 
{arekevTifjrov),  but  is  Being  ^  that  is  complete  in  itself, 
unchangeably  determined,  self-bounded,  like  a  perfectly 
rounded,  changeless  and  homogeneous  sphere.^ 

^  vv.   80,  85 ;  TUivrov  t'  fv  twvtco  re  fievov  kqO    ((ovto  re  Kelrac. 

2  V.  88  f.  Doubtless  Parmenidt  s  antagonized  the  Milesian  teaching 
of  the  anfipov  in  all  its  possible  affiliations.  But  it  is  utterly  unnecessary 
to  think  that  the  opposition  of  nepas  and  aireipop  presupposes  the  num- 
ber investigations  of  the  Pythagoreans.  There  is  not  the  slightest 
trace  of  this  in  Parmenides.  Inversely  it  is  not  impossible  that  the 
opposition  of  the  Eleatics  against  all  predecessors  made  the  dual  con- 
cept so  important  that  the  Pythagoreans  inserted  this  among  their 
fundamental  antitheses.  Doubtless  the  purely  Greek  representation 
influenced  Parmenides,  in  which  the  measurable  and  self-determined 
and  never  the  measureless  and  undetermined  was  regarded  as  perfect. 
Melissus  seems  (§  20)  to  have  neglected  this  point,  and  thus  to  have 
approached  the  theory  of  Anaximander. 

8  v.  102  f. 


62  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

On  the  other  hand,  however,  there  was  aj^ain  for  Par- 
menides  no  Being  which  was  not  either  consciousness  or 
something  thought :  tcovtov  8'  earl  voelv  re  Kal  ovveicev  iari 
ifOTjfia  (v.  94).  As  for  Xenophanes,  so  also  for  Parmenides, 
corporeality  and  thought  perfectly  coincide  in  this  cosmic 
god,  this  abstract  Being  :  to  <yap  irXeov  iar\  voij/jua  (v.  149), 

We  can  designate,  therefore,  the  Eleatic  system  neither  as 
materialistic  nor  idealistic,  because  these  terms  liave  mean- 
ing only  when  corporealit}'  and  thought  have  been  previously 
considered  as  different  fundamental  forms  of  actuality.  Ihe 
Eleatic  theory  is  rather  an  ontology  which  in  regard  to  its  con- 
tent so  completely  took  its  stand  at  the  naive  point  of  view  of 
the  identification  of  corporeality  and  thought,  as  really  to  exalt 
it  to  the  dignity  of  a  principle. 

More  prominently  in  the  teaching  of  Parmenides  than  in 
that  of  Xenophanes  does  the  peculiar  result  appear :  that  the 
principle,  gained  by  conceptual  reflection  out  of  the  need 
of  knowing  the  real  world,  proves  itself  entirely  unsuitable 
for  the  purpose.  This  Eleatic  concept  of  Being  could 
explain  so  little  of  the  empirical  world  that  Parmenides 
had  to  deny  the  existence  of  that  world.  All  plurality  and 
diversity,  all  coming  into  existence,  existing  and  passing  out 
of  existence,  are  only  illusory  appearance,  — false  names  that 
mortals  have  given  to  true  Being.'^  The  Eleatic  found  the 
origin  of  this  appearance  in  sense-perception,  of  whose  illu- 
sory 2  character  he  gave  warning.  He  did  not  seem,  however, 
to  realize  the  circle  involved  in  his  reasoning.  Although 
from  an  entirely  opposite  principle,  he  explained  in  a 
sharper  epigrammatic  way  than  Heracleitus,  how  the  truth 
can  be  sought  only  in  conceptual  thought  but  never  in  the 

^  V.  98  f.  The  conjecture  ovap  instead  of  oj/o/x'  (v.  98,  Gladisch)  is 
invalidated  by,  among  other  things,  the  circumstance  that  Sophistry  and 
Eristic,  which  were  developed  from  Eleaticism,  frequently  spoke  of  the 
pluraHty  of  names  for  the  one  thing  that  is  (§  28). 

2  V.  54  f. 


THE  METAPHYSICAL  CONFLICT  63 

senses.     His  ontology  is  a  perfectly  conscious  rationalism 
that  shut  out  all  experience  and  denied  all  content. 

Nevertheless  Parmenides  believed  that  he  could  not  do 
without  a  physical  theory,  possibly  because  he  felt  the  de- 
mands of  his  scientific  society  in  Elea.  So  the  second 
part  ^  of  his  didactic  poem  gave  a  kind  of  hypothetical  and 
problematical  physics  which  stands  out  of  logical  connec- 
tion with  the  ontology  of  the  first  ])art.  But  on  the  other 
hand  the  "  Human  Opinions  "  about  the  many  changeable 
things  offered  to  sensation  were  not  simply  reproduced, 
but  were  transformed,  as  they  would  necessarily  have  to  be, 
according  to  his  presupposition,  if  in  general  plurality 
motion  and  change  were  to  be  recognized  as  real.  To  this 
belonged  first  of  all  the  statement  that  that  which  is  not,  is 
thought  2  as  actual  side  by  side  that  which  is  ;  and  that  out 
of  the  reciprocal  action  of  the  two  are  derived  multiplicity 
and  the  process  of  individual  Becoming.  The  physical  '/ 
theory  of  Parmenides  was  a  dualism,  a  theory  of  opposites. 
Although  in  this  respect  it  reminds  us  strongly  of 
Heracleitus,  the  agreement  with  him  is  still  more  apparent 
in  the  making  whatever  really  is  as  the  equivalent  of  the 
light,  and  whatever  really  is  not  as  the  equivalent  of  the 
darkness.^  When  therefore  this  pair  of  opposites  w^as 
identified  with  the  thin  and  thick,  the  light  and  the  heavy, 
the  fire  and  the  earth,  the  reference  was  to  Anaximander. 
Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  there  was  full  recognition  of  the 
Heracleitan  teaching,  which  liad  set  fire  over  against  all 
the  other  elements  as  the  forming  and  determining  ele- 
ment. If  Parmenides  did  not  herein  also  point  out  the 
relation  between  these  two  opposites  as  that  of  an  active 

1  V.  18-30;  33-7;  110  f. 

2  On  this  point  later  Atomism,  which  was  more  logical  than  even 
Parmenides  himself  in  physics,  regarded  not-Being,  i.  e.,  empty  space, 
as  actual.  "  ,    , 

8  V.  122  f. 


64  HISTORY   OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

and  a  passive  principle,  nevertheless  Aristotle  was  justified 
{Met,  I.  3,  984  b,  1),  inasmuch  as  for  Parmenides  the  fire, 
which  possesses  Being,  certainly  had  the  value  of  an  ani- 
mating, moving  principle  over  against  the  darkness  as  a 
thing  not  possessing  it. 

Of  the  particular  theories  of  Parmenides  which  have  been 
handed  down  in  a  very  fragmentary  condition,  there  is  not 
much  to  remark.  With  him  also  the  principal  stress  was 
laid  upon  metaphysics.  The  little  information  that  exists 
proves  that  he  tried  with  considerable  art  to  develop  the 
dualism  which  he  derived  from  his  general  ontology,  and 
that  he  even  descended  to  details  which  he  made  it  his  duty  ^ 
to  explain  in  all  their  bearings.  In  some  particulars  he 
subjoined  existing  theories  to  his  own  without  making  any 
actual  advance  in  physics.  His  astronomical  ideas  agree 
so  thoroughly  with  those  of  the  Pythagoreans,  with  wliom 
he  doubtless  came  in  contact,  that  one  must  admit  the 
dependence  of  the  Eleatics  upon  the  Pythagoreans  in 
astronomy .2  As  to  the  origin  of  man,  he  lield  the  same 
view  that  Anaximander  held  before  him  and  that  Empe- 
docles  held  after  him.  Otherwise,  excepting  some  remarks 
about  procreation,  etc.,  only  his  theory  of  sensation  has 
come  down  to  us.  In  this  he  taught,  like  Heracleitus,  that 
of  the  two  fundamental  elements  contained  in  man,  each  is 
susceptible  to  that  which  is  related  to  it  in  the  external 
world.  The  Warm  in  a  living  man  senses  the  fiery  connec- 
tion-in-things  (^Lebenszusammenhang^,  but  even  also  in 
the  corpse,  the  cold,  stiff  body  feels  what  is  like  it  in  its 
surroundings.     He  expressed  the  opinion  that  every  man's 

1  V.  120  f. 

2  Compare,  for  details,  Zeller,  I.  525  f .  That  Parmenides  here  showed 
not  the  least  knowledge  of  the  so-called  number-theory,  is  another  proof 
of  the  later  origin  of  this  philosophical  teaching  of  the  Pythagoreans, 
whose  mathematical  and  astronomical  investigations  obviously  preceded 
their  metaphysical.     See  §  24. 


THE  METAPHYSICAL   CONFLICT  65 

ideas  and  intuitions   are  determined   by  ^  the  mixture  of 
these  two  elements  in  him. 

There  is  no  ground  for  doubting  the  genuineness  of  the  report 
of  Plato  ■^  that  Parmenides  in  his  old  age  went  to  Athens,  where 
the  young  Socrates  saw  him.  The  statements  of  the  dialogue 
Parmenides^  which  presents  the  fiction  **  of  a  conversation  be- 
tween Parmenides  and  Socrates,  are  not  wanting  in  probability. 
According  to  this,  Parmenides  was  born  about  ol5.  He  came 
from  a  distinguished  family,  and  his  intercourse  with  the 
Pythagoreans  is  well  attested.''  On  the  other  hand,  however, 
his  acquaintance  with  Xenophanes  ^  is  also  well  proved,  together 
with  whom  he  directed  the  activity  of  the  scientific  association 
in  his  native  city,  Elea.  Parmenides  exercised  a  decided  in- 
fluence on  the  political  life  also  of  this  newl}'  founded  city,^  and 
is  in  general  represented  as  a  serious,  influential,  and  morally 
high  character.''  His  work  was  written  about  470  or  somewhat 
later.  It  was  in  answer  to  that  of  Heracleitus,  and  at  the  same 
time  it  inspired  the  theories  developed  somewhat  later  and 
almost  contemporaneously  by  Empedocles,  Anaxagoras,  Leu- 
cippus,  and  Philolaus  (Chap.  III.).  It  is  in  verse,  and  shows 
a  peculiar  amalgamation  of  abstract  thought  and  plastic  poetic 
fancy.  The  greater  portion  of  the  preserved  fragments  came 
from  the  first  and  ontological  section  of  the  poem,  which  was 
perhaps  also  called  Trept  e^i'o-co)?.  Besides  Karsten  and  Mullach, 
Am.  Peyron  {Parmenidis  et  Empedoklis  fragmenta,  Leipzig, 
1810)  and  Heinr.  Stein  (Si/mh.  ]}Ju'loIogoruni  Bonnensium  in 
honorem  F.  Ritschleii,  Leipzig,  1864,  p.  768  f.)  have  collected 
and  discussed  the  fragments.  Compare  Vatke,  Parmenidis 
Veliensis  doctrina,  Berlin,  1844;  A.  Baumker,  Die  Einheit  des 
P'schen  Seins  (Jahrb.  f.  kl.  klass.  PhiloL,  1886,  541  f.). 

20.  Whereas  Parmenides  made  a  no  inconsiderable  con- 
cession to  the  customary  idea  of  the  phirality  and  change 
of  tilings,  at  least  in  his  construction  of  an  hypothetical 

1  V.  14G  f. 

2  Thecetetus,  183  e. 

8  Parmenides,  127  b  ;  Sophist,  217  c. 

*  Diog.  Laert.,  IX.  25;  Strabo,  27,  1,  1. 

°  Arist.  Met.,  I.  5,  98G  b,  22. 

^  Diog.  Laert.,  IX.  23,  according  to  Speusippus. 

T  Plato,  Thecet,  183  e:  compare  Snph.,  237  a;  Parm.,  127  b. 


66       ^  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

physics  his  friend  and  pupil  Zeno  of  Elea  proceeded  to 
refute  even  this  customary  point  of  view,  and  thereby  to 
establish  directly  the  teaching  of  his  master  concerning 
the  unity  and  unchangeableness  of  Being.  The  habit  of 
abstract  thinking,  which  was  raised  to  a  pre-eminence  by 
Parmenides,  manifested  itself  here  in  the  way  in  which  his 
pupil  turned  entirely  from  the  earlier  physical  tendency  of 
science.  Zeno  was  no  longer  concerned  in  apprehending 
or  understanding  empirical  reality.^  He  was  interested  only 
in  the  conceptual  defence  of  the  paradoxes  of  his  teacher. 
In  seeking  to  discover,  therefore,  the  contradictions  which 
inhere  in  ordinary  opinions  regarding  the  plurality  and 
mutability  of  things,  ho  employed  in  a  more  partisan  spirit 
than  Parmenides  arguments  not  based  on  subject  matter 
or  empirical  fact,  but  only  those  of  formal  logic. 

This  appeared  primarily  in  the  form  of  the  proof,  —  first 
systematically  and  expertly  used,  as  it  seems,  by  Zeno. 
By  the  continuous  repetition  of  contradictory  disjunc- 
tives, he  souglit  to  deny  exhaustively  all  the  possibilities 
of  comprehension  and  defence  of  the  assailed  thought, 
uutil  it  was  at  last  brought  into  obvious  contradictions. 
On  account  of  this  keen  application  of  the  apparatus 
of  logic,  which  lets  the  entire  proof  seem  to  be  controlled 
by  the  law  of  contradiction,  we  may  suppose  that  Zeno  first 
had  a  clear  consciousness  of  formal  logical  relations. 
Aristotle  even  called  him  the  inventor  of  dialectic.^ 

All  the  difficulties  that  Zeno  by  this  method  found  in 
the  ideas  of  multiplicity  and  movement  refer  to  the  infinity 
of  space  and  time,  and  indeed  partly  to  the  infinitely  large, 
partly  to  the  infinitely  small.  These  difficulties  simply 
prove  in  the  last  instance  the  impossibility  of  thinking 
exclusively  of  continuous  spatial  and  temporal  quantities 

1  Zeller,  TI*.  538,  for  unimportant  and  even  trivial  notes  which  seem 
to  controvert  this,  and  for  tlie  most  part  rest  upon  misconceptions. 

2  Diog.  Laert.,  VIII.  57. 


THE   METAPHYSICAL  CONFLICT  .  67 

as  analyzed  into  discrete  parts,  —  of  thinking  of  the  in- 
finity of  the  perceptive  process.  Upon  this  ground  the 
difficulties  of  Zeno  could  find  no  conclusive  solution  until  the 
very  real  and  difficult  problems  resting  on  them  were  consid- 
ered from  the  point  of  view  of  the  infinitesimal  calculus. 

Compare  Aristotle,  Physics,  in  many  places  witli  the  comments 
by  Simplicius.  Bayle,  Diet,  hist,  et  crit.,  article  Zenon  ;  Ilerbart, 
Einleitang  in  die  Philos.,  §  139  ;  Metaph.,  §  284  f. ;  Hegel,  Gesch. 
d.  Phil,  Complete  Works,  Vol.  XIII.  312  f.  ;  Wellmann,  Zenon's 
Beiveise  gegen  die  Bewegung  uud  ihre  Widedegungen,  Frankfort 
a.  O.,  1870  ;  C.  Dunan,  Les  arguments  de  Zenon  d'EUe  contre 
le  mouvement,  Nantes,  1884. 

The  proofs  advanced  by  Zeno  against  the  multiplicity 
of  what  really  is,  were  two,  and  they  were  concerned  in 
part  with  magnitude,  in  part  with  number.  As  regards 
magnitude,  whatever  possesses  Being  must,  if  it  be  many, 
be  on  the  one  hand  infinitely  small  and  on  the  other 
infinitely  great  :  infinitely  small  because  the  aggregation 
of  ever  so  many  parts,  of  wdiich  every  one,  being  indivisible, 
has  no  magnitude,  can  result  also  in  no  magnitude ; 
infinitely  great  because  the  juxtaposition  of  two  parts  pre- 
supposes a  boundary  between  the  two,  which,  as  something 
real,  must  itself  likewise  have  spatial  magnitude,  but  on 
this  account  must  again  be  parted  by  boundaries  from  the 
two  minor  portions  of  wiiich  the  same  is  true,  etc.,  etc. 
Again,  as  regards  number,  whatever  possesses  Being  must,  if 
it  be  supposed  to  be  many,  be  thought  as  both  limited  and 
unlimited.  It  must  be  limited  because  it  is  just  as 
many  as  it  is,  no  more  nor  less.  It  must  be  unlimited 
because  two  different  things  possessing  Being  must  be 
separated  by  a  boundary  which  as  a  third  must  itself  be 
different  from  these,  and  must  be  separated  from  them  both 
by  a  fourth  and  fifth,  and  so  ad  infinitum.''''  ^ 

1  The  second  part  of  the  argument  is  essentially  the  same  in  both 
proofs,  and  was  called  by  the  ancients  the  argument  ck  8i\0T0fiias,  in 


68  HISTORY   OF   ANCIKNT  PHILOSOPHY 

It  is  probable,  and  also  chronologically  quite  possible,  that 
these  proofs  were  even  at  that  time  directed  against  the  begin- 
nings of  Atomism  (§  23).  They  are  intended  to  show  that  the 
•world  cannot  be  thought  as  an  aggregation  of  atoms.  Consist- 
ent with  this  view  is  the  further  circumstance  tiiat  Zeno's 
polemic  was  made  against  the  idea  of  mutability  of  what  pos- 
sesses Being  only  in  the  sense  of  Kivrjat<;,  not  in  the  sense  of  aAAotw- 
o-is  (qualitative  change).  Atomism  affirmed  KtVr^o-i?,  and  denied 
qualitative  change.  There  is,  in  addition,  a  tiiird  argument 
against  the  plurality  of  Being,  which  Zeno  seemed  rather  to  indi- 
cate than  to  develop.  This  is  the  so-called  Sorites,  according  to 
which  it  is  inconceivable  how  a  bushel  of  corn  could  make  a 
noise  when  the  single  kernels  make  none.  This  argument 
became  effective  in  the  polemic  against  the  atomists,  who 
sought  to  derive  qualitative  determinations  from  the  joint  motion 
of  atoms.  Presumably  against  atomism  there  was  directed 
another  argument  of  Zeno,  which  dealt  neither  with  the  plural- 
ity nor  the  motion  of  what  possesses  Being,  but  with  the 
reality  of  empty  space,  which  was  the  presupposition  of  move- 
ment to  the  atomists.  Zeno  showed  that  if  what  possesses 
Being  should  be  thought  as  in  space,  this  space  as  an  actuality 
must  be  thought  to  be  in  anotlier  space,  etc.,  ad  ivjlnitnm. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  application  which  Zeno  made  of  the 
categories  of  infinity  and  finiteness,  of  the  unlimited  and 
limited,  appears  to  suggest  a  relationship  to  the  Pythagoreans, 
in  whose  investigations  these  ideas  played  a  great  r61e.  §  19; 
§  24. 

The  contradiction  involved  in  the  conception  of  motion 
Zeno  tried  to  prove  in  four  ways :  (1)  Bi/  the  impossibility 
of  going  through  a  fixed  space.  This  means  that  the  infinite 
divisibility  of  the  space  to  be  passed  through  will  not  allow 
the  beginning  of  motion  to  appear  thinkable.  (2)  By  the 
impossibility  of  passing  through  a  space  that  has  movable 
limits.  This  supposes  the  goal,  which  is  to  be  reached  in 
any  finite  time,  to  be  pushed  away,  thougli  perhaps  ever  so 
little.  An  example  of  this  i^  Achilles,  who  cannot  catch 
the  tortoise.  (3)  By  the  infinitely  small  amount  of  motion 
at  any  instant  of  time,  since  th^  body  in  motion  during  any 

which  dichotomy  is  used  not  in  the  logical  but  in  the  original  physical 
sense. 


THE   METAPHYSICAL   CONFLICT  69 

individual  instant  of  time  is  at  some  definite  point,  i.  e.  at 
rest.  He  used  the  resting  arrow  as  an  example.  (4)  Bi/ 
the  relativity/  of  the  amount  of  motion.  A  motion  of  a 
carriage  appears  to  differ  in  amount  according  as  it  is 
measured  in  its  process  of  separation  by  a  stationary 
carriage  or  by  one  in  motion  in  the  opposite  direction. 

Little  is  known  about  the  life  of  Zeno.  If  one  holds  that 
the  exact  chronological  reports  in  the  dialogue  of  Parmenides 
are  fictitious  and  the  statements  of  the  ancients  about  the 
aK/xr/  are  doubtful,  nevertheless  it  is  certain  Zeno  can  have 
been  scarcely  a  generation  younger  than  Parmenides.  One 
will  not  make  a  mistake  if  one  places  the  length  of  his  life  at 
sixty  years,  between  490  and  430.  He  was,  then,  the  contempo- 
rary of  Empedocles,  Anaxagoras,  Leucippus,  and  Philolaus,  and 
it  is  easily  possible  that  he  held  fast  to  Parmenides'  doctrine 
of  Being  in  its  conceptual  abstractness  in  direct  contrast  to 
the  remodellings  of  it  by  these  men.  His  well-attested  ivy- 
ypa/i/xa  was  composed  in  prose,  and,  to  suit  his  formal  schema- 
tism, was  divided  into  chapters.  In  these  the  single  vTroBian^ 
found  their  redudio  ad  abnurdum.^  If  the  presentation  of 
these  in  accordance  with  their  polemic  nature  had  tlie  form 
of  question  and  answer,^  then  this  is  probably  the  beginning 
of  the  philosophic  dialogue-literatifi-e  which  later  developed 
so  richly.^ 

Of  lesser  significance*  was  Mclissus  of  Samos.  Not  a 
native  Eleatic,  he  was  also  not  a  complete  and  consistent 
supporter  of  Parmenidcs's  doctrine  of  Being.  He  was 
somewhat  the  junior  of  the  Eleatic,  and  lived  on  into  tlic 
time  of  the  eclectic  tendency  in  which  tlie  opposing  the- 
ories began  to  fade  out  (§  25).  In  the  main,  to  be  sure, 
he  thoroughly  defended  the  Eleatic  fundamental  princii)le, 
and  in  a  manner  obviously  antagonistic  to  Empedocles, 
Anaxagoras,  Leucippus,  and  in  part  to  the  Milesian  physics. 

1  Plato,  Farm.,  127  o  ff. ;  Siinpl.  Phijs.,  30  v,  139,  5. 

2  Arist.  Trepi  crofj).  e'Ke'yx  ,  10,  170  b,  22. 

3  Diof^.  Lacrt.,  III.  4S. 

<  Arist.  Met.,  I.  5,  98G  b,  27  ;  Phys.,  I.  3,  18G  a,  8.  nfju  (To(f).  iXtyx 
5,  167  b,  13. 


70  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Yet  he  stood  with  his  doctrine  of  the  infinity  of  the  One  in 
so  striking  a  contrast  to  Parmenides,  and  in  such  obvious 
harmony  with  Anaximander,  that  he  appears  as  a  real 
intermediary  between  the  two.  The  form  of  his  arguments 
shows  the  influence  of  the  dialectic  schematism  of  Zeno. 
Melissus  tried  to  prove  in  these  that  (1)  what  really  is, 
is  eternal  because  it  can  arise  out  of  neither  what  is.  nor 
what  is  not;  (2)  that  what  really  is,  is  without  beginning 
and  end,  temporally  and  spatially,  i.  e.  infinite  (aVetpoi/)  ; 
(3)  that  what  really  is,  is  single,  since  several  things-  that 
really  are,  would  limit  one  another  in  space  and  time  ;  (4) 
that  what  really  is,  is  unchangeable,  motionless,  and  condi- 
tionless,  because  every  change  involves  a  kind  of  origina- 
tion and  ending,  and  every  movement  presupposes  empty 
space  which  cannot  be  thought  as  possessing  Being,  j  It  is 
thus  clear  that  Aristotle  correctly  found  the  conception  of 
the  ev  in  Melissus  to  be  more  materialistic  than  in  Parmen- 
ides. What  Melissus  won  by  such  an  approximation  to 
the  Milesian  physics,  when  he  still  denied  every  change 
to  Being,  is  not  clear.  His  theory  appears,  therefore,  to  be 
a  compromise  without  any  strong  principle. 

Melissus,  sou  of  Ithagenes,  was  a  navarch,  under  whom  the 
Samian  fleet  conquered  the  Athenians  in  442.  His  personal 
relation  to  the  Eleatics  has  not  been  explained.  His  ^vyypaixixa 
{■rrepl  ^vcrcws  or  rrepl  tou  oito?,  Simplicius  and  Suidas)  was  writ- 
ten in  prose.  Compare  F.  Kern,  Zur  Wurdigung  des  M.,  (Stet- 
tin, 1880)  ;  A.  Pabst,  De  M.  P.  fragmentis  (Bonn,  1889)  ;  M. 
Oflfner,  Zur  Beurtheilung  des  M.  {Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos.,  IV. 
12  f.). 

The  polemic  of  Zeno  gave  clearest  expression  to  the 
fundamental  principle  of  the  Eleatic  philosophy.  He 
thought  out  logically  and  consistently  the  conceptually 
necessary  concept  of  Being,  which  in  itself  alone  did  not 
suffice  for  the  apprehension  and  explanation  of  the  empiri- 
cally actual.     The  Heracleitan  thesis  that  the  essence  of 


I 


EFFORTS   TOWARD   RECONCILIATION  7I 

things  is  to  be  sought  in  an  orderly  process  of  perpetual 
change,  stood  opposed  to  it.  Zeno's  argument  was  purely 
ontological.  It  recognized  only  the  one  increate  and  un- 
changeable Being,  and  denied  the  reality  of  multiplicity 
and  Becoming  without  also  explaining  their  appearance. 
The  argument  of  Heracleitus  was  entirely  genetic.  It 
seized  upon  the  process  itself  and  its  permanent  modes  with- 
out satisfying  the  need  of  connecting  this  process  with  an 
ultimate  and  continuous  actuality-  The  concept  of  Being 
is,  however,  a  necessary  postulate  of  thought,  and  the  pro- 
cess of  occurrence  is  a  fact  not  to  be  denied.  Consequently, 
from  the  opposition  of  these  two  doctrines,  Hellenic  philos- 
ophy gained  a  clear  Tiew  of  the  task  which  in  an  indefinite 
way  underlay  the  very  initial  conception  of  the  a/3%»7.  This 
task  was  from  Being  to  explain  the  process  of  phenomenal 
change. 

3.   Efforts  toward  Reconciliation. 

The  above  problem  gave  rise  to  a  number  of  philosophi- 
cal theories  which  are  best  designated  as  efforts  toward 
reconciliation  between  the  thought  motifs  of  the  Eleatic  and 
Heracleitan  schools.  Since  all  the  arguments  aim  at  so 
modifying  the  Eleatic  idea  of  Being  that  from  it  the  or- 
derly process  of  occurrence  in  the  Heracleitan  sense  may 
seem  conceivable,  they  are  at  once  of  a  metaphysical  and 
physical  character. 

Two  ways  were  open  for  the  solution  of  this  problem : 
one  led  from  Parmenides,  the  other  from  Heracleitus. 
The  inadequacy  of  the  Eleatic  concept  of  Being  to  explain 
empirical  plurality  and  change  was  due  essentially  to  its 
qualities  of  singleness  and  spatial  immobility.  If  these 
characteristics,  however,  were  given  up,  those  of  non- 
Becoming,  indestructibility,  and  qualitative  permanence 
could  be  more  strongly  maintained  in  order  to  explain  pro- 


72  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

cess  and  change  by  means  of  a  plurality  of  objects  pos- 
sessing Being  {Seienden),  with  the  help  of  spatial  motion. 
The  theories  of  Empedocles,  Anaxagoras,  and  the  Atomists 
moved  in  this  direction.  Common  to  them  all  was  the 
/-pluralism  of  substances,  and  the  mechanistic  method  of 
explanation,  in  virtue  of  which  origin,  cliange,  and  destruc- 
tion were  supposed  to  be  derived  merely  from  the  motions 
of  these  substances  unchangeable  in  tliemselves.  These 
theories  were  in  extreme  antithesis  to  tlie  hylozoistic 
monism  of  the  Milesians  in  particular.  On  tlie  other 
band,  these  three  systems  were  distinguishable  from  one 
o  another  partly  as  to  the  number  and  quality  of  the  sub- 
stances that  each  assumed  to  exist,  partly  as  to  the  rela- 
tionships of  substances  to  motion  and  moving  force.  The 
insufficiency  of  the  Heracleitan  theory  consisted,  however, 
not  in  establishing  the  concept  of  the  rhythm  of  the  pro- 
cess of  occurrence,  but  in  retaining  nothing  else  of  what 
really  is,  as  entering  into  these  changes.  Heracleitiis  had 
recognized  no  one  of  the  empirical  materials,  and  no 
abstract  noumenon,  and  consequently  nothing  as  Being. 
If  now  Parmenides  showed  that  thinking  undeniably  pre- 
supposes something  that  really  is,  one  would  be  forced  to 
try  to  vindicate  the  character  of  Being  for  the  relations 
and  connections  which  Heracleitus  liad  retained  as  the 
sole  permanence.  This  the  Pythagoreans  attempted  to  do 
with  their  peculiar  number  theory. 

These  four  efforts  toward  reconciliation  sprang  accordingly 
simultaneously  out  of  one  and  the  same  need.  Their  represen- 
tatives were  nearly  contemporaneous.  From  this  fact  are 
explained  not  only  a  number  of  the  similarities  and  affinities  in 
their  doctrines,  but  also  the  circumstance  that  the}'  frequently, 
particularly  in  polemics,  seem  to  have  referred  directly  to  one 
another.  This  is  at  the  same  time  a  proof  of  the  lively  scien- 
tific interest  and  interchange  of  ideas  in  the  middle  of  the  fifth 
century  through  the  entire  circle  of  Greek  civilization. 

The  "efforts  toward  a  reconciliation"  used  as  a  basis  for 
associating  these  philosophers  here  is  fairly  generally  recognized 


EFFORTS  TOWARD   RECONCILIATION  73 

for  the  first  three,  although  on  the  one  hand  Anaxagoras  is 
usually  set  apart  by  himself  (Hegel,  Zeller,  Ueberweg),  be- 
cause we  have  overestimated  his  doctrine  of  the  uov<i.  Ou  the 
other  hand,  Atomism  (Schleiermacher,  Ritter)  has  naturally  been 
classified  with  Sophistry.  Compare,  respectively,  §  22  and  §  23, 
Yet,  from  tlie  time  of  the  Pythagoreans  until  now,  Striimpell 
alone  has  preceded  me  in  this  proposed  view.  Brandis  treats 
indeed  the  Pythagoreans  for  the  first  time  before  the  Sophists, 
but  as  a  tendency  independent  of  the  others. 

21.  The  first  and  most  imperfect  of  these  attempts  at 
reconciliation  was  that  of  Empedocles.  He  proceeded 
expressly  from  the  thesis  of  Parmenides  that  there  can 
be  no  origination  and  destruction  as  such.  In  his  effort 
to  explain  apparent  origination  and  destruction,  he  said 
that  every  origination  should  be  regarded  as  a  combi- 
nation, and  every  destruction  a  separation  of  the  original 
elements.^  He  called  the  original  materials  the  pii^wfxara 
irdvToyu,  and  he  does  not  seem  to  have  employed  the  later 
customary  expression,  aroLx^eta.  The  predicates  of  "  unori- 
ginated,"  "  imperishable,"  "  unchangeable,"  belong  to  the 
elements.  They  are  eternal  Being;  and  the  manifold  and 
change  of  single  tilings  are  supposed  to  be  explained  by 
spatial  motion,  by  virtue  of  which  they  are  mixed  in  differ- 
ing relations  to  one  another. 

Accordingly,  Empedocles  should  apparently  be  accredited 
with  the  priority  of  forming  this  conception  of  the  element 
that  has  been  so  powerful  in  the  development  of  our  science 
of  nature.  It  is  the  conception  of  a  material,  homoge- 
neous in  content,  qualitatively  unchangeable,  and  liable  to 
changing  states  of  motion  and  to  mechanical  division. 
He  got  this  conception,  nevertheless,  in  the  attempt  to  make 
the  concept  of  Being  of  Parmenides  useful  in  the  explana- 
tion   of   nature.     Much    less    happy,  although  historically 

^  Plutarch,  Plac,  T.  30  (Dor.,  3-26)  (^vctk:  ovhevni  ia-riv  cmavTutv  durjTOiv 
oi'Se  Tty  ovkofifvov  davdroio  TfXf utiJ.  dXXo  fxiwuv  fMi^is  T€  8idX\a^is  re  fiiy(irrii>u 
(cTTi.  ffjvai.s  8  (n\  ToTs  0"Ofj.d^fTai  avdfjbHTTOiaiv. 


74  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

quite  as  effective,  was  the  point  of  view  which  Empedocles 
formed  of  the  number  and  essence  of  these  elements.  He 
adduced  the  well-known  four;  earth,  air,  fire,  and  water. 

The  choice  of  four  fundamental  elements  was  the  result 
of  no  systematic  conception  on  the  part  of  Empedocles,  in  the 
way  that  Aristotle,  by  whom  this  theory  was  established  and 
made  the  common  property  of  all  literature,  later  made  tiiem  a 
fundamental  part  of  his  system.  As  it  appears,  it  was  the  result 
of  an  impartial  consideration  of  the  previous  philosophic  theories 
of  nature :  water,  air,  fire  are  to  be  found  as  elements  among 
the  lonians ;  and  earth  in  the  hypothetical  physics  of  the  Ele- 
atics.  That  Empedocles  ^  placed  fire  over  against  the  three  other 
elements,  and  thus  returned  to  the  two  divisions  of  Heracleitus 
(§  19),  reminds  us  of  this  latter.  Nevertheless  the  number 
of  elements  as  four  has  in  it  something  arbitrary  and  immature, 
as  likewise  appears  from  the  superficial  characterization  that 
Empedocles  gave  to  each  singly.^ 

Empedocles  to  all  appearances  was  not  able  to  say  how 
the  different  qualities  of  particular  things  were  derived 
from  their  combining.  Quantitative  relationships  and 
states  of  aggregation  might  appear  to  be  thus  derived, 
but  not  particular  qualities.  Consequently  Empedocles 
seems  to  have  had  only  the  former  in  mind  when  he  so 
described  the  process  of  combination  and  separation,  that 
therein  the  protruding  parts  of  one  body  were  supposed  to 
press  into  the  pores,  i.  e.  into  the  interstices,^  of  another  body. 
Empedocles  seems  to  be  referring  to  the  former  also  in 
his  defining  the  relationship  and  the  strength  of  the  recip- 
rocal attraction  of  empirical  things  by  the  stereometrical 
similarity  between  the  emanations  of  one  substance  and 
the   pores   of  another.     As  to  the   qualitative   difference 

1  Arist.  Met.,  I.  4,  985  a,  32  ;  De  gen.  et  con:,  U.  3,  330  b,  19. 

2  Zeller,  I*.  690. 

'  That  this  acceptation  presupposed  a  discotitinuity  of  the  original 
matter,  and  hardly  was  to  be  thought  without  the  presupposition  of  empty 
space,  which  he  with  the  Eleatics  denied  (fr.  v.  91,  Arist.  De  ccelo,  IV. 
2,  809  a,  19),  appears  to  have  furnished  no  difficulty  to  Empedocles. 


EFFORTS  TOWARD   RECONCILIATION  75 

between  individual  things,  lie  taught  only  in  very  general 
terms  that  this  difference  depends  on  the  different  masses 
in  which  all  or  only  some  of  the  elements  exist  in 
combination. 

But  the  more  that  Empedocles  claimed  the  character  of 
the  Parmenidean  Being  for  his  four  elements,  the  less  could 
he  find  in  them  an  explanation  of  the  motion  in  which  they 
must  exist  according  to  his  theory  of  union  and  separation. 
As  pure  changeless  Being,  the  elements  could  not  move  them- 
selves, but  only  he  moved.  To  explain  the  world,  the  theory 
needed  further,  then,  beside  the  four  elements,  a  cause  of 
motion  or  a  moving  force.  Here,  in  the  statement  of  this 
problem,  appears  first  completely  Empedoclcs's  opposition  to 
the  hylozoism  of  the  Milesians.  He  was  the  first  in  whose 
theory /orce  and  matter  arc  differentiated  as  separate  cosmic 
powers.  Under  the  influence  of  Parmenidcs  he  had  accord- 
ingly so  conceived  the  world-stuff  that  the  ground  of  motion 
could  not  be  found  in  it  itself.  So,  in  order  to  explain  the 
cosmic  process,  he  had  to  find  a  force  different  from  the 
stuff  and  moving  it.  Although  Empedocles  introduced  this 
dualism  into  tlic  scientific  thought  of  the  Greeks,  it  appeared 
not  in  sharp  conceptual,  but  in  mytliical-poctic  form;  for 
he  designated  the  two  cosmic  forces  which  caused  the  com- 
bination and  separation  of  the  primitive  substances,  as  Love 
and  Hate. 

The  personification,  which  Empedocles  moreover,  as  like- 
wise Parmenides  in  his  didactic  poem,  extended  to  the  ele- 
ments, was  mytliical  and  poetic;  so  also  the  representation 
inadequate  because  stated  in  terms  of  sense  and  not  developed 
to  conceptual  clearness,  was  of  the  same  character.  Indeed,  it 
is  not  certain  from  the  passages  in  which  his  principles  {apx^il) 
were  enumerated  as  six  in  all,  whether  or  not  he  thought  of 
the  two  forces  incidentally  as  bodies  (Arist.  ]>e  gen.  et  corr., 
I.  1,  314  a,  16;  Simpl.  Fluis.  6  v,  2.3,  21),  which  as  such  were 
mingled  with  the  other  substances.  Obviously  he  formed 
no  sharp  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  actuality  and  the  efli- 
ciency  that  belong  to  Love  ar.d  Hate.     There  is  the  additional 


76  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHY 

fact  that  the  duality  of  forces  not  only  was  called  forth  by  the 
theoretic  need  of  representing  the  diflferent  causes  in  the  opposed 
processes  of  cosmic  union  and  separation ;  but  it  was  also 
occasioned  by  considerations  of  worth,  in  which  Love  is  the 
cause  of  Goodness  and  Hate  of  Evil  (compare  Aristotle,  Met.^  I. 
4,  984  b,  32).  The  view  of  Aristotle  is  supported  by  the  predi- 
cates which  Empedocles  (fragment  v.  106  f.)  attributes  to 
(^ikoTTji  and  i/£iKos. 

From  these  presuppositions  Empedocles  derived  an  ex- 
planation of  the  cosmic  process,  not  indeed  conceiving  each 
individual  occurrence  as  ever  and  always  arising  from  a 
universal  law  of  combination  and  separation,  but  yet  satis- 
fying the  demands  of  the  Heracleitan  philosophy  by  the 
assumption  of  a  perpetual  cyclic  process  of  development. 
He  taught,  namely,  that  the  four  elements,  that  he  assumed 
as  alike  in  their  mass,  change  out  of  a  state  of  perfect 
mingling  and  equality,  separate  by  the  action  of  the  j/et/co?, 
and  become  completely  sundered ;  that  then  from  this  state 
of  separation  they  pass  back  through  the  influence  of  the 
<f)i\6Tr}<i  to  their  original  absolute  intermixture.  There  re- 
sults from  this  a  cycle  of  four  continuously  dissolving  cosmic 
states  :  (1)  that  of  the  unlimited  supremacy  of  Love  and 
of  the  perfect  unification  of  all  the  elements,  which  is  called 
by  Empedocles  a(f>alpo's  and  also  designated  as  to  ev  or  6e6<; ; 
(2)  that  of  the  process  of  successive  separation  through 
the  constantly  growing  preponderance  of  veiKO'i ;  (3)  that 
of  the  absolute  separation  of  the  four  elements  through  the 
sole  supremacy  of  Hate  ;  (4)  that  of  the  process  of  succes- 
sive recombination  through  the  increased  predominance  of 
(f>t\6Tij<;. 

Compare  Arist.  Phys.,  VIIT.  1,  250  b,  26. 

It  is  clear  that  a  world  of  individual  things  can  appear  only 
in  the  second  and  fourth  stages  of  the  cosmic  process,  and  that 
such  a  world  is  characterized  every  time  by  the  opposition  and 
conflict  between  the  combining  and  separating  principles. 
Here  is  the  place  of  the  Heracleitan  fundamental  principle  in 
the   Empedoclean  conception   of   the   cosmos.      On  the  other 


EFFORTS  TOWARD   RECONCILIATION  77 

hand,  it  can  be  said  that  the  two  parts  of  the  Parmenidean 
didactic  poem  appear  no  longer  in  the  opposition  of  Being  and 
Appearance,  bnt  in  the  relationship  of  changing  cosmic  states. 
The  first  and  third  phases  are  acosmic  in  the  Eleatic  sense  ;  the 
second  and  fourth  are,  on  the  contrary,  full  of  the  Heracleitau 

TToAcytiOS. 

All  that  we  have  of  the  particulars  of  the  theory  of  Empe- 
docles  seems  to  teach  that  he  regarded  the  present  state  of 
the  world  as  the  fourth  phase,  hi  which  the  elements  that 
have  been  separated  by  Hate  are  reuniting  through  Love 
into  the  Sphairos.  At  least  in  reference  to  the  formation 
of  the  world  he  taught  that  the  separated  elements  have 
been  brought  tlirough  Love  into  the  whirling  motion  that 
is  in  the  process  of  uniting  them.  Originally  the  air  en- 
compassed the  whole  like  a  sphere,  and  by  virtue  of  this 
motion  fire  broke  out  from  below.  The  air  was  pressed 
below  and  into  the  middle,  was  mixed  with  the  water  into 
mud,  and  then  formed  into  the  earth.  The  two  hemi- 
spheres originated  in  this  way :  one  was  light  and  fiery ; 
the  other  dark,  airy,  and  interspersed  with  masses  of  fire, 
which  on  account  of  the  rushing  of  the  air  in  rotatory 
motion  around  the  earth  created  day  and  night. 

In  particular,  Enipedocles  showed  —  not  without  dependence 
on  the  Pythagoreans  —  highly  developed  astronomical  ideas 
concerning  the  illumination  of  the  moon  from  the  sun,  concern- 
ing eclipses,  the  inclination  of  the  ecliptic,  etc.,  and  also  many 
interesting  meteorological  hypotheses. 

Empedocles  had  an  especial  interest  in  the  organic 
world.  lie  regarded  plants  as  primary  organisms  and  as 
having  souls  like  animals.  lie  compared  in  isolated 
remarks  the  formation  of  fruit  with  the  procreation  of 
animals,  their  leaves  with  hair,  feathers,  and  scales  ;  and  so 
one  finds  in  him  the  beginnings  of  a  comparative  mor- 
phology. Also  numerous  physiological  observations  of  his 
are  preserved.     But  especially  are  there  biological  reflec- 


78  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

tions,  ill  which  he  in  some  measure  in  the  spirit  of  the 
present  theory  of  adaptation  explained,  although  with  fanci- 
ful naivete,  the  existence  of  the  present  vital  organisms 
by  the  survival  of  purposeful  forms  from  things  that  on 
the  whole  were  aimlessly  created.^ 

Empedocles  did  not  except  man^  from  this  purely  me- 
chanical origination,  and  he  constructed  a  large  number  of 
interesting  single  hypotheses  in  respect  to  his  physiological 
functions.  The  blood  plays  an  important  role  in  this 
theory.  It  was  to  him  the  real  carrier  of  life,  and  in  it  he 
believed  he  could  see  the  most  perfect  combination  of  the 
four  elements.  It  is  of  especial  interest  that  he  conceived 
the  process  of  perception  and  sensation  as  analogous  to  his 
universal  theory  of  the  interaction  of  elements.  He  ex- 
plained this  process  as  contact  of  the  small  parts  of  the 
perceived  things  with  the  similar  parts  of  the  perceiving 
organs,  wherein  the  former  were  supposed  to  press  upon 
the  latter,  as  in  hearing ;  or  the  latter  upon  the  former,  as 
in  sight.  Since  then,  in  general,  such  interaction  was  to 
his  mind  the  more  close,  the  more  nearly  similar  were  the 
emanations  and  pores,  he  established  the  principle,  there- 
fore, that  all  external  things  are  known  by  that  in  us 
which  is  similar  to  them.  Herein  was  involved  to  some 
degree  the  idea  that  man  is  a  microcosm,  the  finest  admix- 
ture of  all  the  elements. 

Hence  it  followed  for  Empedocles  that  all  perceptual 
knowledge  depends  upon  the  combination  of  elements  in 
the  body  and  especially  in  the  blood,  and  that  the  spiritual 
nature   depends   on   the   physical    nature.     Just   on   this 

1  Aristotle  has  brought  this  thought  into  abstract  expression,  and  it 
contains  the  whole  modern  development  theory  in  nuce.  Phys.,  II.  8, 
198  b,  29;  onov  fitv  ovv  anavra  awtfir]  axnrfp  kclv  el  iVfKO.  tov  (yeuero, 
ravra  fitv  iaatdr),  ano  tov  avTO/xaTOV  (TVOTavra  einTrjdficot,  ocra  Be  fifj  ovTas, 
dn-&)XfTO  Kill  dnoWvTai  Kaddirtp  'EixntSoKXrjs  Xeyet,  etc. 

^  He  appears  to  have  made  good  use  of  the  tales  about  the  centaurs. 


EFFORTS  TOWARD  RECONCILIATION  79 

account,  moreover  he  could  deplore  incidentally,  as  Xeno- 
plianes  deplored,  the  limitation  of  human  knowledge  ;  and 
could  assert,  on  the  other  hand,  with  Heracleitus  and  Par- 
menides,  that  true  knowledge  does  not  grow  out  of  sense 
perception,  but   only   out  of  reflection  (voelv)  and  reason 

Einpedocles  of  Agrigentum,  the  first  Dorian  in  the  history  of 
philosoph}^,  lived  probably  from  490-430.  He  came  from  a 
rich  and  respectable  family  which  had  been  partisans  for  the 
democracy  in  the  municipal  struggles.  Like  his  father,  Meton, 
Empedocles  distinguished  himself  as  a  citizen  and  statesman, 
but  later  he  fell  into  the  disfavor  of  the  other  citizens.  In  his 
vocation  of  physician  and  priest,  and  with  the  paraphernalia  of 
a  magician,^  he  then  travelled  about  through  Sicily  and  Magna 
Graecia.  Many  stories  circulated  into  later  time  concerning  his 
death,  like  that  well-known  one  of  his  leap  into  ^tna.  In  this 
religious  role  he  taught  the  doctrine  of  transmigration  and  of  an 
apparently  purer  intuition  of  God,  like  that  of  the  Apollo  cult. 
These  teachings,  which  were  not  consistent  in  content  with  his 
metaphysico-physical  tlieories,  show,  however,  much  the  greater 
similarity  to  the  teaching  of  Pythagoras  (§  12).  Pythagorean- 
ism  he  certainly  knew,  and  indeed  his  entire  career  suggests  a 
copy  of  that  of  Pythagoras.  When  we  consider  his  political 
affiliations,  it  is  improbable  that  he  had  any  close  connection 
with  the  Pythagorean  society.  Empedocles  stood  comparatively 
isolated,  —  save  his  acquaintance  with  the  teachings  of  Hera- 
cleitus and  Parmenides,  the  latter  of  whom  he  presumably 
knew  personally.  Nevertheless  he  seems  to  have  been  affili- 
ated with  a  yet  larger  body  in  that  he  is  characterized  as  one 
of  the  first  representatives  of  rhetoric.^  He  had  even  con- 
nections with  the  so-called  Sicilian  school  of  rhetoric  (or  ora- 
tory), in  which  are  preserved  the  names  of  Tisias  and  Korax  as 
well  as  that  of  Gorgias,  whom  they  antedate.^  Only  vrept  (^iWojs 
and  KaOap/jLoi  are  the  writings  of  Empedocles  that  can  be 
authenticated.  The  preserved  small  fragments  are  especially 
collated  by  Sturz  (Leipzig,  1805),  Karsten  (Amsterdam,  1838), 
and  Stein  (Bonn,  1852).    Compare  Bergk,  De j^rooemio, 'E.Berl., 

1  Fr.  V.  24;  81. 

'^  Thus  he  pictured  himself  in  the  beginning  of  the  Songs  of  Purifica- 
cation  (icaBapnoi). 

3  Diog.  Laert.,  VIIL  57  ;  Sext.  Emp.  Adv.  math.,  VII.  6. 

4  See  below,  §  26. 


80  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

1839  ;  Panzerbieter,  Beitrdge  zur  Kritik  und  Erlduterung  des  E. 
(Meiningen,  1844) ;  Schlager,  E.  quatenus  Ileraclitum  secutus 
sit  (Eisenach,  1878).  — O.  Kern,  E.  und  d.  Orphiker  (Arch.  f. 
Gesch.  d.  Ph.,  I.  498  f.). 

22.  "  Older  in  years,  younger  in  works  than  Empedo- 
cles,"  ^  Anaxagoras  brought  the  movement  of  thought, 
which  had  been  begun  by  Empedocles,  to  an  end  in  one 
direction.  He,  like  Empedocles,  was  convinced  that  we  do 
not  use  language  correctly  when  we  speak  of  origination 
and  destruction,  since  the  mass  of  the  world  must  remain 
unchangeably  the  same.^  On  this  account  apparent  origi- 
nation and  destruction  are  better  designated  as  combina- 
tion and  separation  (avyKpiai^  sive  a-v/Mfii^i'i).  Whatever 
enters  into  combination  or  whatever  suffers  separation  was 
to  him,  also,  a  plurality  of  original  substances  which  he 
called  -x^pij/xara  or  avep/xaTa.  Thus  far  he  agreed  with  his 
predecessor.  But  he  took  decided  exception  to  the  arbi- 
trary assumption  of  Empedocles  that  there  are  only  four 
elements,  since  it  is  impossible  to  explain  the  qualita- 
tive distinctions  of  empirical  things  by  the  union  of  these 
four  elements.  Since  the  Parmenidean  idea  of  Being 
excludes  the  new  creation  and  destruction  of  qualitative 
determinations,  and  demands  qualitative  unchangeable- 
ness  for  the  totality  of  primitive  materials,  Anaxago- 
ras argued  that  there  are  as  many  qualitative  'x^prj/xaTa, 
different  from  one  another,  as  there  are  qualitative  deter- 
minations in  empirical  things.  The  things  of  which  we 
are  sensible  are  composite,  and  they  are  named  according  to 
the  primitive  material  that  prevails  in  them  at  any  par- 
ticular instant.^  Their  qualitative  change  (aXXot'wcrt?) 
consists  in  the  fact  that  other  primitive  materials  enter 
into  the  combination  or  some  are  excluded  from  it. 

1  Arist.  3fet.,J.  3,  984  a,  11. 

2  Fr.  14. 

8  Arist.  Phys.,  P.  187  b. 


EFFORTS  TOWARD   RECONCILIATION  81 

The  XPW'^'^"'  niust,  according  to  this,  be  thought  as  divis- 
ible ;  ^  and  in  antithesis  to  the  perceived  things,  which  con- 
sist of  heterogeneous  components,  we  must  designate  as 
-X^pij/jLaTa  all  those  substances  which  fall  into  homogeneous 
parts,  however  far  they  be  divided.  Therefore  Aristotle 
designated  the  airepixara  of  Anaxagoras  as  o/xoio/xepi], 
and  in  later  literature  they  go  under  the  name  of  homoio- 
meriai.  Consequently,  what  Anaxagoras  had  here  in  mind 
was  nothing  other  than  the  chemist's  idea  of  the  element. 
The  utter  inadequacy  of  data  on  which  Anaxagoras  could 
depend  appears  in  the  development  of  his  theory.  For 
since  observation  had  as  yet  not  been  directed  to  chemical, 
but  only  to  mechanical  analysis,  the  constituents  of  ani- 
mals, such  as  bones,  flesh,  and  marrow,  as  well  as  metals, 
were  enumerated  as  elements.  Further,  because  tlie 
philosoplier  possessed  no  means  of  fixing  upon  a  deter- 
mined number  of  elements,  he  declared  them  to  be  num- 
berless and  differing  in  form  (ISea),  color,  and  taste. 

"When  Aristotle  iu  several  places  (see  Zeller,  I^.  875  f.)  cites 
only  organic  substances  in  Anaxagoras  as  examples  of  the  ele- 
ments, he  is  speaking  more  out  of  his  preference  for  this  field 
than  of  an  inclination  on  the  part  of  Anaxagoras  to  refer 
inorganic  matter  to  the  organic.  There  is  not  the  slightest 
trace  to  be  discovered  in  Anaxagoras'  cosmogony  of  a  qualita- 
tive distinction  between  the  organic  and  the  inoigai)ic.  In 
particular,  what  we  may  call  his  teleology  is  not  by  an}'  means 
confined  to  the  organic. 

As  regards  the  motion  of  these  substances,  Anaxagoras 
also  separated  the  principle  of  Being  from  that  of  Becom- 
ing, but  in  an  entirely  different  way  from  wliat  we  find 
in  Erapedocles.  The  poetical  and  mythical  form  of  this 
thought  he  stripped    off ;  but   at  the  same    time,  instead 

1  In  remarkable  dependence  on  Parnienidcs,  Anaxagoras  neverthe- 
less makes  a  polemic,  like  Empedocles,  against  the  acceptance  of  empty 
space  (Arist.  P//ys.,  IV.,  6,  213  a,  22),  and  at  the  same  time  also  against 
the  finite  divisibility  of  matter  ])ostul.itcd  in  the  conce])t  of  atoms. 

C 


82  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

of  reflecting  like  Heracleitus  upon  the  antagonistic  pro- 
cesses of   motion,  he  emphasized  again  the  unity  of   the 

1/  cosmic  process.  Since  Anaxagoras,  as  is  the  case  with 
all  naive  conception,  could  think  of  the  actual  only  as 
material  stuff,  he  had  to  seek  among  the  numberless 
yprffiara  for  one  which  is  the  common  cause  of  motion 
for  all  the  others.  This  primitive  dynamic  material  or 
motion-stuff  was  conceived  by  him  as  having  life  within 

l/itself,  after  the  analogy  of  the  Ionian  cosmic  matter.  It 
moves  the  others  from  within  itself.^  Its  nature,  however, 
was  inferred  by  Anaxagoras  from  the  character  of  the 
world   of   perception    that   it   brought   into   being.     This 

.  world  presents  itself  as  an  ordered,  purposeful  whole, 
and  the  forming  force  must  also  be  orderly  and  purposeful. 
Therefore  after  an  analogy  ^  to  the  principle  actively 
working  in  living  beings,  Anaxagoras  called  it  the  vov<i, 
the  reason,  or,  as  it  may  best  be  translated,  the  thought- 
stuff  (Denkstoff).     Far  from  being  an  immaterial  princi- 

]/  pie,  the  "  spirit "  is  to  Anaxagoras  corporeal  matter,  but 
indeed  in  a  state  of  exceeding  refinement.  It  is  the 
"lightest,"  the  most  mobile,  the  only  matter  that  moves 
itself.  It  represents  the  X6yo<i^  both  in  the  macrocosm 
and  in  the  microcosm.  As  regards  the  form  and  move- 
ment of  the  cosmic  process,  it  has  all  the  functions  of 
the  Heracleitan  fire. 

The  order  (koo-)u.os)  and  purposefulness  of  the  empirical 
world,  on  which  Anaxagoras  depended  in  his  assertion  of  the 
vous  8iaKoo-jutov  Toi  iravTa,  was  not  noted  by  him  so  much  in  single 
terrestrial  things  as  in  the  great  relationships  of  the  universe,  in 

1  Aristotle  in  Physics,  VIII.  5,  25G  b,  24,  proved  only  that  Anaxagoras 
has  called  the  vovs  the  dnad^s  and  dfny^s-  The  predicate  aKivrjTos  is  only 
an  inference  of  Aristotle.  The  mobility  of  the  povs  and  its  implications 
in  single  things  is  clearly  set  forth  in  passages  like  Stob.  Eel.,  I.  ''90 
(Doa;.,  392),  and  Sinipl.  P?iys.,  35  recto,  164,  23. 

2  Arist.  Mel  ,  I.  3,  1)84  1),  15,  KaBdrrep  iv  toIs  (aois. 


EFFORTS  TOWARD  RECONCILIATION  83 

the  regular  revolutions  of  the  heavenly  bodies.^  His  monism 
and  the  teleological  method  of  his  presentation  rested  on  astro- 
nomical considerations.  Compare  W.  Dilthey,  Einleituny  in  d. 
Geisteswissenschaften,  V.  201  f.  He  sought  in  a  purely  natu- 
ralistic way  a  physical  explanation,  and  was  not  in  the  smallest 
degree  concerned  with  religious  matters.  If  he,  as  is  very 
doubtful,  called  ^  the  vois  God,  yet  this  would  only  have  been  a 
metaphysical  expression,  as  it  had  been  among  the  Milesians, 
The  doctrine  of  the  vots  was  taken  by  Aristotle  very  much  in 
the  sense  of  an  immaterial  spirituality,  when  in  the  well-known 
passage  {Met.,  I.  3,  984  b,  17)  Aristotle  placed  the  doctrine  of 
Anaxagoras  as  that  of  the  only  sober  philosopher  among  them 
all.  In  the  Hegelian  interpretation,  which  even  to-day  is  not 
outgrown,  Anaxagoras  is  placed  at  the  close  of  the  pre-Sophis- 
tic  development  on  account  of  his  alleged  discovery  of  the 
"  Spirit."  It  sounds  so  fine  wlien  in  this  philosophy  of  nature 
the  world  principle  becomes  ever  more  "  spiritual "  in  passing 
from  water  through  air  and  fire  until  finally  the  "pure  Spirit" 
has  been  as  it  w^ere  distilled  from  matter.  But  this  "  Spirit  "  is 
likewise  only  living  corporeality',  i.  c,  that  which  moves  itself. 
Anaxagoras  with  his  vors  is  scarcely  a  step  nearer  the  immate- 
rial than  Anaximenes  with  air,  or  Heracleitus  wath  fire.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  must  net  fail  to  recognize  that  in  this  character- 
ization of  the  moving  principle  Anaxagoras,  in  a  still  more  em- 
phatic manner  than  I^mpedocles,  had  taken  up  the  factor  of  a 
judgment  of  value  into  his  theoretic  explanation.  Admiration 
of  the  beauty  and  harmony  of  the  world  dictated  to  him  the 
acceptance  of  a  thought-stuff  arranging  the  universe  according 
to  a  principle  of  order. 

This  uov<i,  therefore,  stands  over  against  the  other  ele- 
ments. It  alone  is  in  itself  pure  and  unmixed.  It  is  sim- 
ple, and  possesses  through  its  "knowledge"  a  ])owcr  over 
all  other  material  stuff.^  It  plays  somehow  as  a  stimulus 
upon  the  other  substances,  which  are  mixed  by  it.  It 
participates  temporarily  to  a  greater  or  less  degree  in  the 
particular  things  thus  originating.     For,  like  all  matter,  it 

^  Simpl.  33  verso,  156,  13  ;  ttuvtci  huKocr^r^ae  voos  Ka\  ti)v  Trepix^o>pi]a-iv 
TavTTfv,  fjV  vvv  Trepi^aptl  to.  re  aarpa,  kui  6  ijXios  kul  tj  a-fXijur]  Kai  6  afjp  Kctl 
6  aWrjp  ol  dnoKpivofievoi. 

2  Cicero,  Acad.  II.  37,  118  ;  Sext.  Emp.  Ath.  malh.,  IX.  C. 

3  Fr.  7  and  8. 


84         HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

also  is  quantitatively  divisible  and  qualitatively  unchange- 
able. Remaining  essentially  identical  with  itself,  it  is  dis- 
tributed in  different  proportions  in  single  things.^ 

Anaxagoras  used  this  thought-stuff  only  to  explain  on 
the  one  hand  the  beginnings  of  motion,  and  on  the  other 
such  single  processes  which  he  could  not  derive  from  the 
mechanism  of  the  once  for  all  awakened  cosmic  motion. 
What  these  processes  in  particular  are,  we  cannot  ^  ascer- 
tain from  the  reproaches  made  against  Anaxagoras.^  So 
far  as  our  knowledge  goes,  the  application  that  Anaxagoras 
has  made  of  his  vovi  theory  to  explain  the  cosmic  process 
is  limited  simply  to  this,  — that  he  ascribed  to  the  "order- 
iug "  thought-stuff  the  beginning  of  motion,  and  that  he 
then  conceived  the  motion  to  go  on  mechanically  by  impact 
and  pressure  between  the  other  primitive  materials  in  a 
manner  planned  by  the  vov<i.  Connected  with  this  is  the 
fact  that  Anaxagoras  denied  a  plurality  both  of  coexisting 
and  successive  worlds,  and  that  he  aimed  to  describe  only 
the  origin  of  our  present  world.  Consequently  in  distinc- 
tion from  his  predecessors  he  spoke  therefore  of  a  temporal 
beginning  of  the  world. 

Preceding  this  beginning  is  a  state  of  the  most  perfect 
mingling  of  all  substances,  reminding  us  of  the  Sphairos  of 
Empedocles.  In  tbis  mingling  all  ^pj^/iara,  with  the  exeoj>- 
tion  of  the  vov^,  are  so  minutely  distributed  that  the  whole 
possesses  no  particular  character. 

This  idea  reminds  us  on  the  one  hand  of  Chaos,  on  the  otlier 
of  the  aTTeipov  of  Anaximander.  In  his  delineation  of  tliis 
idea,  we  have  the  fact  that  he  taught  that  the  mixtures  of  dif- 
fering )(pT/]ixaTa  let  only  those  qualities  come  into  perception  in 

^  How  misjudged  the  meaning  is,  is  clear,  for  Anaxagoras  conceived 
his  vovi  as  a  divine  being. 

2  It  is  highly  improbable,  according  to  Theoph.  Hist,  plant.,  III.  1,  4, 
that  it  concerns  the  genesis  of  the  organism. 

8  Plato,  Phcedo,  97  b;  Arist.  Met..  T.  4,  985  a,  18. 


EFFORTS  TOWARD   RECONCILIATION  85 

which  the  components  are  all  harmonized.  He  also  in  this 
way  conceived  the  four  elements  of  Empedocles  as  such  mix- 
tures of  primitive  matter.^  Absolute  mixture  lias  no  quality ; 
ofiov  TrdvTa  xp-jfjiara  i/u  is  the  beginning  of  the  writing  of 
Anaxagoras. 

In  this  Chaos  the  primitive  thought-material  first  created 
at  one  point  ^  a  rotatory  motion  of  great  velocity.  This,  l)c- 
ing  extended  in  broadening  circles,  led  to  the  formation  of  the 
orderly  world,  and  is  further  being  continued  on  account  of 
the  infinity  of  matter.  By  this  rotation  two  great  masses  arc 
first  differentiated  which  w'cre  characterized  by  the  opposi- 
tion of  Bright,  Warm,  Pure-light,  and  Dry,  as  against  Dark, 
Cold,  Dense-heavy,  and  Moist,  and  are  designated  by  Anaxa- 
goras as  atdi]p  and  a7]p.^  The  latter  is  pressed  into  the  centre, 
and  condensed  into  water,  earth,  and  stones.  His  ideas  of 
the  earth  show  him  to  have  been  essentially  influenced 
by  the  lonians.  He  regarded  the  stars  as  dissipated  frag- 
ments of  earth  and  stone  that  have  become  glowing  in  the 
fiery  circle.  He  saw  in  the  great  meteor  of  Aegospotamoi 
a  confirmation  of  this  theory  and  at  the  same  time  a  proof 
of  the  substantial  homogeneity  of  the  world.  Anaxagoras's 
astronomical  view  shows  highly  developed,  many-sided  ideas 
and  inferences,  which  rest  in  part  upon  his  own  studies. 
He  explained  eclipses  correctly  ;  and  while  he  allowed  to 
the  sun  and  moon  altogether  too  small  dimensions,  they 
were  nevertheless  very  great  compared  to  their  perceptual 
size. 

Accordingly  Anaxagoras  was  convinced  that,  as  in  Chaos, 
so  in  all  individual  things  developed  from  it,  the  combina- 

1  Arist.  De  gen.  et  corr.,  I.  1,  314  a,  24;  Zeller,  I*.  87G. 

2  Presumably  Anaxagoras  assumed  this  point  to  be  the  pole  star:  see 
H.  Martin,  Memoires  de  Plnslitut,  29,  176  f.  ;  see  Dilthey,  op.  cil. 

'  These  antitheses  remind  us  more  of  the  lonians  than  of  Parmenides. 
In  respect  to  the  manifold  of  tlie  mixture  and  the  determination  of  tlie 
qualities,  they  stand  in  Anaxagoras  obviously  between  the  filyjia  and  tlie 
Empedoclean  elements. 


86  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENl   j-HILOSOPHY 

tioii  of  the  cosmic  elements  is  so  fine  and  intimate  that 
something  at  least  of  each  one  is  everywhere.  Thus  the 
organic  (nrepfiara  develop  as  plants  and  animals  on  the 
separation  of  the  water  and  earth,  which  separation  was 
caused  by  the  heavenly  fire.  But  the  i/oO?,  as  the  vitalizing 
principle,  stands  in  intimate  relations  with  these,  and  its  in- 
dependent power  of  motion  was  doubtless  introduced  hei'e  by 
Anaxagoras  as  the  cause  of  functions  that  are  not  mechani- 
cally explicable.^  He,  too,  seems  to  have  given  especial 
attention  to  sense  perception,  which,  however,  he  derived,  in 
entire  opposition  to  Empedocles,  from  the  reciprocal  action 
of  opposites  influenced  by  the  feeling  of  aversion.  Accord- 
ingly perceptual  knowledge  acquired  in  this  way  is  jQuly 
relative.^  In  contrast  to  it,  the  truth  is  found  solely  through 
the  X670?,  through  the  participation  of  the  individual  in  the 
world  reason. 

Anaxagoras  originated  in  Clazomenae  in  the  circle  of  Ionian 
culture,  from  which  apparentl}'  he  got  his  rich  scientific  knowl- 
edge and  his  pronounced  positive  and  physical  interest.  His 
birth  is  (Zeller,  V.  865  f.,  against  Hermann)  to  be  placed  at 
about  500.  We  do  not  know  about  his  education,  particularly 
how  he  could  have  been  so  powerfully  influenced  by  the  Eleat- 
ics.  He  was  of  wealthy  antecedents,  and  was  regarded  as  an 
honorable  gentleman,  who,  far  away  from  all  practical  and  polit- 
ical interests,  "declared  the  heaven  to  be  his  fatherland,  and 
the  study  of  the  heavenly  bodies  his  life's  task,"  —  a  statement 
in  which,  side  by  side  with  the  presentation  of  a  purely  theo- 
retical ideal  of  life,  is  to  be  noted  the  astronomical  tendency 
which  also  characterized  his  philosophy.  About  the  middle  of 
the  century  Anaxagoras,  then  the  first  among  philosophers  of 
renown,  removed  to  Athens,  where  he  formed  a  centre  of  scien- 
tific activity,  and  appears  to  have  drawn  about  him  the  most 
notable  men.     He  was  the  friend  of  Pericles,  and  became  in- 

^  To  this  the  objection  of  Aristotle  applies,  that  Anaxagoras  did 
not  distinguish  the  principle  of  thought  (i/oOf)  from  the  animating  (be- 
seelenden)  principle  (^vxr/)-  (De  an.,  I  2,  404  b.)  This  objection 
certainly-did  not  arise  from  immanent  criticism. 

2  Arist.  Met.,  IV.  5,  1009  b,  25;  Sext.  Emp.,  VII.  91. 


EFFORTS   TOWARD   RECONCILIATION.  87 

volved  under  the  charge  of  impiety  in  the  political  suit  brought 
against  Pericles  in  434.  He  was  obliged  in  consequence  of  this 
to  leave  Athens  and  go  to  Lampsacus.  Here  he  founded  a 
scientific  association,  and  while  high  in  honor  he  died  a  few 
years  later  (about  428).  The  fragments  of  the  onl}-  writing 
preserved  of  his  (as  it  appears)  Trtpl  ^t'o-ews  (in  prose)  have 
been  collected  by  Schaubach  (Leipzig,  1827)  and  Schorn  (with 
those  of  Diogenes  of  Apollonia,  Bonn,  1820)  ;  Panzerbieter,  De 
fragmentorum  Anax.  ordine  (Meiningen,  1836) ;  Breier,  Die 
Philosophie  des  An.  nach  Aristotles  (Berlin,  1840)  ;  Zuvort, 
Dissert,  de  la  vie  et  la  doctrine  d' A.  (Paris,  1843) ;  Alexi,  A.  u. 
seine  Philosophie  (Neu-Ruppin,  1867) ;  M.  Heinze,  Veher  den 
vov<i  des  A.  {Berichte  d.  Sachs.  Ges.  d.  W.,  1890). 

Archelaus  is  called  a  pupil  of  Anaxagoras,  but  appears, 
nevertheless,  to  be  so  much  influenced  also  hy  other  theories 
that  he  will  be  mentioned  in  a  later  place.  The  allegorical 
interpretation  of  the  Homeric  poem,  which  in  part  is  ascribed  to 
Anaxagoras  himself  (Diog.  Laert.,  11.  11),  in  part  to  his  pupil, 
Metrodorus,  has  only  the  slightest  relation  to  his  philosophy. 

23.  The  philosopher  who  desired  to  abandon  the  arbitrary 
theory  of  the  four  elements  of  Empedocles,  was  obliged,  in 
order  to  oppose  to  it  a  consistent  theory,  to  assert  either 
that  the  qualitative  determinations  of  things  are  all  pri- 
mary, or  that  no  one  of  them  is.  The  first  way  Anaxagoras 
chose ;  the  Atomists  the  second.  "While  in  their  explana- 
tion of  empirical  occurrence  they  also  postulated  a  plurality 
of  unchangeable  things  having  Being,  they  had  the  boldness 
to  deduce  all  qualitative  distinctions  of  the  phenomenal 
world  from  purely  quantitative  differentiations  of  the  true 
essence  of  things.  This  is  their  especial  significance  in 
the  history  of  European  science. 

It  has  been  customary  in  the  history  of  philosophy  to  treat 
the  theory  of  the  Atomists  in  inseparable  connection  with  the 
pre-Sophistic  systems.  This  is  explained  from  the  fact  that  all 
direct  knowledge  fails  concerning  the  founder  of  this  theory, 
Leucippus  and  his  doctrine,  and  that  the  teaching  of  the 
Atomists  lies  before  us  relatively  complete  only  in  the  form 
that  Democritus  developed  it.  But  between  Leucippus  and 
Democritus  is  an  interval  of  certainly  forty  years,  and  this  lies 
in  that  epoch  of  most  strenuous  mental  labor,  —  which  epoch 


88  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

witnessed  in  Greece  the  beginnings  of  Sophism.  Leucippus  is 
the  contemporary  of  Zeno,  P^rapedocles,  and  Anaxagoras,  bnt 
Democritiis  is  the  contemporary  of  Socrates,  and,  in  the  works 
of  his  old  age,  of  Plato.  It  is  also  consonant  with  this  differ- 
ence of  years  that  the  fundamental  thought  of  the  Atomists 
in  the  form  of  the  metaphysical  postulate  of  Leucippus  arose 
from  the  Heracleitan-Parmenidean  problems  ;  but  also  that  the 
development  of  that  postulate,  which  Democritus  gave  to  these 
problems,  was  for  the  first  time  possible  upon  the  Sophistic 
theories  as  a  basis,  especially  those  of  Protagoras  (§  32).  To 
these  changed  temporal  conditions  there  is  the  further  corre- 
spondence in  the  fact  that  those  theories  of  the  Atomists,  which 
we  can  refer  to  Leucippus,  remained  entirely  in  the  compass  of 
the  problems  confronting  his  contemporaries,  Empedocles  and 
Anaxagoras.  On  the  other  hand,  the  theory  of  Democritus 
gives  the  impression  of  being  a  comprehensive  system,  like  that 
of  Plato.  Therefore  the  reasons  from  the  point  of  chronology 
and  from  that  of  the  subject  matter  require  the  beginnings  of 
Atomism  in  Leucippus  to  be  separated  from  the  S3"stem  of 
Democritus,  which  was  conditioned  by  the  subjective  turn  given 
to  Greek  thought.  We  must  make  this  discrimination,  however 
diflEicult  it  may  be  in  details.  Accordingly  in  this  place  is  to  be 
developed  only  the  general  metaphysical  basis  of  Atomism, 
which  has  grown  out  of  Eleaticism.^ 

It  was  therefore  on  the  one  hand  a  complete  misconception 
of  the  primal  motives,  but  on  the  other  a  legitimate  feeling  — 
although  defended  entirely  falsely  in  connection  with  precon- 
ceived notions  —  with  which  Schleiermacher  (Gesch.  d.  Philos., 
Complete  Works,  III.  4  a,  73)  and  Ritter  after  him  ( Gesch.  d. 
Philos.,  1. 589  f.)  sought  to  classify  the  Atomists  with  the  Sophists. 
In  Leucippus  Atomism  arose  as  an  offshoot  of  Eleaticism.  The 
theory  of  Democritus,  however,  far  from  being  itself  Sophistic, 
presupposed  the  theory  of  Protagoras.  The  suggestion  of  this 
relation  may  be  found  in  Dilthey,  Einleitung  in  die  Geistes- 
wissenschafien,  1.  200. 

Leucippus,  the  first  representative  of  this  theory,  stands 
in  tlie  most  marked  dependence  on  the  Eleatic  teaching. 
To  his  mind  also,  Being  excluded  not  only  all  origination 
and  destruction,  but  all  qualitative  change.  Likewise 
Being  coincides  with  the  corporeal,  that  is,  the  ov  with  the 

1  As  to  the  perfect  certainty  of  ascribing  this  to  Leucippus,  see  Zeller, 
I*.  843,  n.  1. 


EFFORTS  TOWARD  RECONCILIATION.  89 

TrXeov.  By  virtue  of  this  coincidence  Parmenides  had  felt 
compelled  to  deny  the  reality  of  empty  space,  and  therefore 
also  that  of  plurality  and  motion.  Should  now,  however, 
as  the  interest  of  physics  demanded,  plurality  and  motion 
he  recognized  as  real,  and  a  scientific  apprehension  of  the 
actual  again  be  rendered  possible,  then  the  simplest  and  j 
most  logical  method  was  to  declare  ^  that  "  Non-Being," 
the  Void  {to  k6vov),  did  nevertheless  exist.  The  aim  of 
this  assumption,  however,  is  simply  this :  to  make  possible 
plurality  and  mobility  for  that  which  really  is.  Thereby 
it  becomes  possible  to  create  a  world  of  experience  from 
the  "  Void "  and  the  multiform  "  Full  "  moving  in  the 
"  Void,"  to  construct  that  world  from  that  which  has  no 
Being  and  from  a  multiplicity  of  those  things  that  have 
Being.  A  categorical  physics  thus  appears  in  place  of  the 
hypothetical  physics  of  Parmenides,  and  in  place  of  a 
problematical  appears  an  assertorical  and  an  apodeictic 
physics. 

But  while  Leucippus  departed  from  the  Parmenidean 
concept  of  Being  only  so  far  as  seemed  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  explain  plurality  and  motion,  he  still  clung  not  only 
to  the  characteristic  of  unchangeableness  (un-Becoming 
and  indestructibility),  but  also  to  the  thoroughgoing 
qualitative  liomogeneity  of  what  possess  Being.  In  opj)0- 
sition  to  Empedocles  and  Anaxagoras,  Leucij>j)us  therefore 
taught  that  all  these  varieties  of  what  possess  Being  are 
homogeneous  in  quality.  He  agreed  entirely  with  Par- 
menides that  this  quality  is  abstract  corporeality  (to  TrXeov) 
devoid  of  all  specific  qualities.  According  to  the  Eleatics,. 
all  distinctions  are  due  only  to  the  permeation  of  that 
which  really  is  not,  by  that  which  really  is.  So,  on  the 
one   hand,  to  Leucippus   distinctions  between  individuals 

^  Democritus  seems  to  be  the  first  to  have  made  the  pointed  remark  : 
[if]  fiaXXou  TO  dev  ^  to  fiijSfv  fivai,  "  (lax  Iclits  sei  um  nichts  mehr  real  ah  dai^ 
Nichts."     Plut.  Adv.  col.  4,  2  (1109). 


90  HISTORY  OF  AJsClENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

that  really  possess  Being  exist  only  in  those  qualities  due 
to  their  limitation  through  that  which  really  is  not ;  viz., 
empty  space.  These  are  the  distinctions  of  form  and 
motion.  On  the  other  hand,  each  of  the  changeless  sub- 
stances possessing  Being  must  be  thought  as  a  corporeality, 
homogeneous  in  itself,  a  continuum  and  therefore  indivisi- 
ble. Being,  which  is  moved  in  empty  space,  therefore  con- 
sists of  innumerable,  exceedingly  small  bodies.  Leucippus 
called  these  Atoms  (aro^ioi),  every  one  of  which  is,  like 
the  Being  of  Parmenides,  unoriginated,  indestructible,  un- 
changeable, indivisible,  and  homogeneous  in  itself  and  with 
all  other  Being.  The  single  cosmic-Being  of  Parmenides 
was  broken  up  into  an  infinite  number  of  small  primitive 
elements  which,  were  they  not  separated  by  empty  space, 
would  constitute  a  single  element  in  the  sense  of  Empe- 
docles,  and  indeed  would  be  the  absolute  qualitativeless  ev 
of  Parmenides. 

Of  all  the  transformations  of  the  Eleatic  teaching,  that  of 
Leucippus  is  characterized  by  a  striking  simplicity,  and  by  keen 
logical  limitation  to  that  which  is  indispensable  to  a  professed 
explanation  of  the  phenomenal  world.  At  the  same  time  it  is 
clear  that  the  Atomism  which  became  later  so  important  in  the 
development  of  scientific  theories  did  not  grow  out  of  experi- 
ence, or  obser^'ations  and  the  conclusions  built  upon  them,  but 
directly  out  of  the  abstractest  metaphysical  concepts  and 
absolutely  universal  needs  for  the  explanation  of  actuality. 

Up  to  this  point  the  Atomistic  theory  has  been  regarded 
as  a  variant  of  the  Eleatic  metaphysic,  arising  from  an 
interest  in  physics.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  Leucippus  is  so 
far  under  the  influence  of  Ionian  monism  that  he  ddes 
not  seek  the  cause  of  motion  in  a  force  different  from 
the  stuff,  but  he  regards  spatial  motion  itself  as  a  quality, 
immanent  in  the  stuff.  The  corporeality  that  is  homoge- 
neous in  all  atoms  did  not,  in  his  mind,  possess  the  power 
to  change  itself  qualitatively,  that  is  to  say,  a\\o/&)o-t9 ;  but 
it  did  possess  Kivrjat^ij  aft  original  underivable  motion  that 


EFFORTS   TOWARD   RECONCILIATION.  91 

is  given  in  its  own  essence.  In  fact,  Leucippus  seems  to 
have  understood  by  this  term  not  so  much  that  of  heavi- 
ness,—  fall  from  above  downward,  —  but  rather  a  chaotic 
primal  condition  of  bodies  moving,  disorderly,  among  each 
other  in  all  directions  (§  32).  At  all  events,  the  Atom- 
ists  held  this  original  state  of  motion  as  uncaused  and 
self-evident.  So  we  can  see  in  their  view  the  perfect 
synthesis  of  the  Heracleitan  and  Eleatic  thought :  all  homo- 
geneous elements  of  Being  are  thought  as  unchangeable, 
but  at  the  same  time  as  in  a  state  of  motion  that  is  self- 
originated. 

This  is  the  extent  to  which  the  beginnings  of  Atomism 
may  with  certainty  be  ascribed  to  Leucippus.  It  is  an 
attempt  to  explain  the  world  by  atoms  in  original  motion 
in  empty  space.  The  purely  mechanical  part  of  the 
theory,  that  the  world  was  formed  by  collision,  lateral  and 
rotatory  motion,  likewise  presented  itself  to  the  founder  of 
Atomism  in  the  same  form  in  which  Democritus  later 
developed  it.  It  is  not  so  easy  to  explain,  however,  how 
Leucippus  solved  the  more  difficult  and  delicate  question 
regarding  the  manner  in  which  the  various  empirical 
qualities  arose  from  these  complexes  of  atoms ;  that  is  to 
say,  the  transformation  of  quantitative  into  qualitative 
differences.  Of  his  answer  we  know  nothing.  The  sub- 
jective method  which  Democritus  applied  to  it  was  not  as 
yet  available  to  the  founder  of  Atomism,  since  this  method 
grew  out  of  the  investigations  of  Protagoras.  Whether 
Leucippus^  was  content  with  setting  up  this   origination 

1  To  my  mind,  there  is  no  foundation  for  the  beUef  that  Leucippus  in 
his  doctrine  of  the  ata-drjTd  employed  the  antithesis  of  cfjva-fi  —  vofia ; 
from  its  significance  and  following  all  tradition,  this  antithesis  is  So- 
phistic. The  inference  rests  upon  the  obviously  late  and  inaccurate  note 
in  Stobaeus,  EcL,  I.  1104  (Dox.,  397  b,  9)  from  which  it  might  also  be 
adduced  that  Diogenes  of  Apollonia  was  an  Atomist.  It  is  certain  that 
Leucippus,  as  an  Eleatic,  denied  sense  qualities  as  real.     For  some  later 


92  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  qualities  out  of  the  quantitative  relationships  only 
as  a  metaphysical  postulate;  whether  he  explained  these 
qualities,  like  Parmenides,  simply  as  vain  show  and  illu- 
sion ;  or  whether  he  in  an  uncertain  manner,  like  Empedo- 
cles,  derived  all  other  material  from  the  four  elements 
aud  their  mixtures,  so  that  he  too  sought  to  refer  empirical 
things  back  to  tiie  different  form  and  size  of  the  combining 
atoms, — how  far,  in  fact,  he  in  general  passed  from  the 
metaphysical  principles  to  the  specific  development  of  the 
physical  theory,  —  concerning  all  this  it  is  doubtless  too 
late  to  determine. 

From  the  allusions  in  his  theory,  and  from  the  very  uncertain 
reports  from  the  extant  hteratiu'e,  it  is  only  safe  to  say  that 
probably  Leucippus  was  younger  than  Parmenides,  considerably 
older  than  Democritus  and  contemporary  with  Empedocles  and 
Anaxagoras.  It  is  hardly  possible  to  decide  between  tlie  differ- 
ent reports,  whether  his  residence  was  in  Miletus,  Elea,  or 
Abdera.  Since  however  his  pupil  (craipos)  Democritus  doubt- 
less was  an  Abderite,  and  came  from  a  scientifically  active  circle 
which  we  cannot*  possibly  suppose  to  be  that  of  the  Magi, 
alleged  to  have  been  left  behind  by  Xerxes,  we  may  assume 
that  a  scientific  activity  was  developed  in  Abdera  in  the  second 
half  of  the  sixth  century,  which  city  attained  its  highest  glory 
under  the  influence  of  the  colonists  from  Teos.  Leucippus  was 
its  first  representative  of  any  significance.^  Protagoras  appears 
to  have  originated  in  the  school  of  Abdera  at  a  time  between 
the  two  great  Atomists  (§  26).  That  Leucippus  put  his  thougiit 
in  writing  is  not  entirely  certain,  but  is  probable.  Nothing  of 
his  work  remains,  however.  In  any  event,  even  early  in  anti- 
quity, there  was  uncertainty  about  the  authorship  of  what  had 
been  ascribed  to  him.^  Theophrastus  ascribed  *  to  him  the  /Acyri? 
SiotKocr/Aos  which  went   under  tlie  name  of  Democritus.     It  is 

reporter  this  denial  is  identical  with  the  assertion  of  their  subjectivity 
(vona).  Parmenides  himself  best  teaches  us  how  little  this  equivalence 
was  possible  for  a  pre-Sophistic  thinker. 

1  Zeller,  I*.  763. 

'•^  Diels.  A  ufsdtze  Zetler's  Jubiltdum,  p.  258  f . 

^  De  Xen.,  Zen.,  Gorg.,  fi,  980  a,  7;  tV  toIs  AevKinirov  Kakovfievois 
\6yois- 

*  Diog.  Laert.,  IX.  4G 


EFFORTS  TOWARD  RECONCILIATION.  93 

strange  that  in  the  memory  of  succeeding  times  and  indeed  iu 
modern  time  (Bacon,  Alb.  Lange),  even  as  in  antiquity  (Epicu- 
rus), he  has  been  entirely  overshadowed  by  Democritus.^ 

24.  "  Between  these  and  in  part  already  before  them,"  ^ 
the  Pythagoreans  sought  finally  to  apply  their  mathematical 
studies  to  the  solution  of  the  Hcracleitan-Eleatic  problem 
(§  12). 

However  in  this  respect  the  Pythagoreans  form  no  perfectl}' 
homogeneous  whole.  It  appears  rather  that  within  the  societ}', 
corresponding  to  its  geographical  extension  and  its  gradual 
disintegration,  the  scientific  work  divided  on  different  lines. 
Some  Pythagoreans  clung  to  the  development  of  mathematics 
and  astronomy ;  others  busied  themselves  partly  with  medicine, 
partly  with  the  investigation  of  different  i)hysical  theories  (con- 
cerning both  see  §  2;"))  ;  others  finally  espoused  the  metaph^'sical 
theory,  which  so  far  as  we  know  was  constructed  first  by 
Philolaus  and  is  usually  designated  as  the  number  theory. 

Philolaus,  if  not  the  creator,  at  least  the  first  literary  repre- 
sentative of  the  "  Pythagorean  philosophy,"  was  an  older  con- 
temporary of  Socrates  and  Democritus,  and  cannot,  at  anj'  rate, 
be  set  farther  back  than  Anaxagoras  and  En)pedocles.  Indeed 
he  is  presumably  somewhat  younger  than  the  latter  two.  Of  his 
life  we  know  nearly  nothing,  and  we  are  even  not  sure  whether 
he  was  a  native  of  Tarentum  or  Crotona.  Also  that  he,  like 
other  Pythagoreans  about  the  end  of  the  fifth  century,  lived  for 
a  time  in  Thebes,  is  inferred  with  uncertainty  from  the  passage 
in  Plato,  Ph(P(lo,  (U.  Nearly  as  doubtful  Js  his  supposed 
authorship  of  the  fragments  that  are  preserved  under  his  name. 
They  have  been  collated  and  discussed  first  by  Bdckh  (Berlin, 
1819).  From  the  investigations  of  Fr.  Preller  (article  PJu'IoIaos 
in  Ersch  vnd  Gruher  EncykL,  III.  23,  370  f.),  V.  Rose  {De 
Aristotelis  lihrornm  ordine  et  anctoritate,  Berlin,  1854),  C  Schaar- 
schmklt  (Bonn,  1864),  Zeller  {Hermes,  1875,  p.  175  f.),  they  may 
be  assumed  in  part  to  be  genuine,  but  they  must  be  very  cau- 
tiously introduced  into  the  discussion  of  the  original  number 
theory. 

1  Zeller,  P.  761,  843.  Compare  E.  Rhode,  Verhandl.  der  Trierer 
Philol.-Versuchungen,  1879,  and  Jahrbiicher  fiir  PhUologie  u.  Padagocjik; 
1881,  741  f.-    Diels,  Verhandlungen  der  Stettiner  Philolngic  Vers.  1880. 

2  Arist.  Met.,  I.  5  :  tv  Se  tovtois  kciI  npo  tovtcov  ol  KoKov^ievoi  YlvOayd- 


94  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

Along  with  Philolaus  are  mentioned,  in  Italy  Clinias  of  Taren- 
tum,^  in  Thebes  Lycis  the  teacher  of  Epaminondas,  and  Eurytus 
the  pupil  of  Philolaus,  a  citizen  of  Crotona  or  Tarentuin.  Eury- 
tus in  turn  had  as  pupils  Xenophilua  of  Thracian  Chalcis,  the 
Phliasians  Phanto,  Echecrates,  Diodes,  Polymastus.^  From 
Cyrene  Prorus  is  mentioned.  In  Athens  Plato  brought  forward 
the  two  Pythagoreans,  Simmias  and  Cebes,  as  witnesses  of  the 
death  of  Socrates.  Almost  mythical  are  the  Locrian  Timaeus® 
and  the  Lucanian  Ocellus.  The  philosophic  teaching  of  any  of 
these  men  is  not  in  any  way  certainly  known.  With  the  disso- 
lution of  the  Pythagorean  League  in  the  fourth  century  the 
school  became  extinct.  The  doctrines  of  the  last  significant 
personality  in  it,  Archytus  of  Tarentum,  merged,  so  far  as  our 
knowledge  goes,  into  those  of  the  older  Academy  (§  38). 

A  collection  of  all  the  Pythagorean  fragments  is  in  MuUach  ; 
Ritter,  Gesch.  der  pyth.  Philos.  (Hamburg,  1826) ;  Rothen- 
bi'icher,  Das  System  der  Pythagoreen  nach  den  Angaben  des 
Aristoteles  (Berlin,  1867)  ;  Alb.  Heinze,  Die  meta.  Grundlehren 
der  dlteren  P.  (Leipzig,  1871),  Chaignet,  Pythagore  et  la  philos. 
Pythagorienne,  2  vols.  (Paris,  1873)  ;  Sobczyk,  Das  pyth.  Sys- 
tem (Leipzig,  1878)  ;  A  Doering,  Wandhingen  in  der  pyth.  Lehre 
(Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos.,  v.  503  f.). 

As  to  the  Pythagorean  teaching,  only  that  can  be  regarded 
as  genuine  which  Plato  and  Aristotle  report,  together  with  the 
concurrent  portions  of  the  fragments  transmitted  in  such  ques- 
tionable shape. 

In  the  Pythagorean  society  mathematical  investigations 
were  pursued  for  the  first  time  quite  independently,  and 
were  brought  to  a  high  degree  of  perfection.  Detailed 
views  concerning  the  number  system,  concerning  the  series 
of  odd  and  even  numbers,  of  prime  numbers,  of  squares,  etc., 
were  early  instituted.  It  is  not  improbable  that  they, 
applying  arithmetic  to  geometry,  came  to  the  conception 
embodied  in  the  so-called  Pythagorean  theorem.  Herein 
must  they  have  had  a  premonition  of  the  real  value  of 
number-relations  in  that  they  represent  number  as  the  ruling 

1  Jambl.  De  vita  Pyth.,  266. 

2  Diog.  Laert.,  VIII.  46. 

'  The  writing  bearing  this  name  and  concerned  with  the  soul  of  the 
world,  usually  published  in  Plato's  works,  is  certainly  a  later  compendium 
of  Plato's  Timceus. 


EFFORTS  TOWARD  RECONCILIATION.  95 

principle  in  space.  Their  number  theory  was  strengthened 
by  the  results  attained  by  them  in  music.  Although  later 
reports  include  ^  much  that  is  fabulous  and  physically 
impossible,  there  can  nevertheless  be  no  doubt  that  the 
Pythagorean  harmonic  shows  an  exact  knowledge  of  those 
simple  arithmetical  relations  (first  of  all,  the  string-lengths) 
out  of  which  musical  melody  arises.  To  this  may  be  added 
that  the  regular  revolution  of  the  stars,  —  of  which  they 
made  especially  careful  observations,  and  which  are  indeed 
the  standard  for  all  time  measurements, —  made  the  world- 
order  {Koafio^i)  likewise  appear  to  them  to  be  numerically 
determined.  From  these  premises  it  can  be  understood 
how  some  Pythagoreans  came  therefore  to  find  in  numbers 
the  permanent  essence  of  things,  concerning  which  essence 
the  battle  between  philosophic  theories  had  taken  place. 
On  the  one  hand,  numbers  might  be  substituted  —  since 
they  we^'e  supposed  to  be  self-existent,  unchangeable,  and 
self-unitary  —  for  the  abstract  Being  of  the  Eleatics  as  a 
principle  at  least  equally  available  in  the  explanation  of  the 
phenomenal  world.  On  the  other  hand,  since  Heracleitus 
had  found  that  the  only  permanent  in  change  was  in  the  or- 
derly forms  of  the  nature  process,  the  relationships  of  num- 
ber ruling  the  process  of  change  gave  an  exacter  form  to 
this  idea.  The  Pythagorean  number-theory  attempted  to 
determine  numerically  the  permanent  relations  of  cosmic 
life.  The  Pythagoreans  said  therefore  :  All  is  number,  and 
they  meant  by  this  that  numbers  are  the  determining  essence 
of  all  things.  Since  now  these  same  abstract  numbers  and 
number-relationships  are  found  in  many  different  things 
and  processes,  they  said  also  that  the  numbers  are  the 
original  forms  which  are  copied  by  the  things. 

1  Zeller,  T*.  317.  The  observations  of  the  Pythagoreans  in  the  har- 
monic or,  as  it  is  called,  canonic,  were  apparently  empirically  made  upon 
the  heptachord  with  strings  of  different  length.  That  they  liad  no 
theory  of  oscillation,  goes  witliout  saying. 


96  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

It  is  scarcely  conceivable  that  the  Pythagoreans  came  to  their 
predilection  for  mathematics,  music,  and  astronomy  through 
metaphysics.  The  inverse  is  rather  true,  that  they  came  from 
such  concrete  studies,  in  undertaking  to  enter  upon  the  solution 
of  universal  problems,- — as  Aristotle  (Met.y  I.  5)  also  suffi- 
ciently indicated  by  the  aij/dixeuoi.  For  their  treatment  of  geom- 
etry and  stereometry,  and  their  prevailing  arithmetical  fondness, 
see  Roth  (Gesch.  unserer  abendl.  Philos.^  II.  2),  although  he  on 
this  territory  accredits  indeed  too  much  to  the  old  Pythagoreans. 
Cantor,  Varies,  iiber  d.  Gesch.  d.  Math.,  I.  124. 

In  order  to  derive,  however,  at  one  and  the  same  time 
the  manifoldness  and  changeableness  of  individual  things 
from  number  relations,  the  Pythagoreans  gave  metaphysical 
meaning  to  the  fundamental  opposition  which  they  found 
in  the  number  theory.  They  declared  that  the  odd  and 
the  even  are  respectively  identical  with  the  limited  and  the 
unlimited.^  As  all  numbers  are  composed  of  the  even  and  the 
odd,  all  things  also  combine  in  themselves  fundamental  an- 
titheses, and  .especially  that  of  the  limited  and  the  unlim- 
ited. To  this  Ileracleitan  fundamental  principle  there  is 
bound  this  logical  consequence,  that  everything  is  the  rec- 
onciliation of  opposites,  or  a  "  harmony,"  —  an  expression 
which  in  the  mouth  of  the  Pythagoreans  has  always  the 
suggestion  of  musical  investigations. 

The  antithesis,  however,  acquired  among  the  Pythagore- 
ans in  conformity  to  their  later  attitude  a  still  more  pro- 
nounced value  than  with  Heracleitus.  The  limited  was  the 
better,  the  more  valuable  to  them,  as  it  was  to  Parmenides, 
Odd  numbers  are  more  nearly  perfect  than  even.  Tn  this 
way  the  Pythagorean  system  got  a  dualistic  cast,  which  is 
noticeable  in  all  its  parts ;  but  this  was  theoretically  over- 
come by  the  fact  that  since  the  One,  the  odd-even  primi- 
tive number,  creates  both  series  from  itself,  so  also  all  the 

1  The  ground  of  this  identification  (Simpl.  Phys.,  105  r.  ;  compare 
Zeller,  I*.  322)  is  artificial  in  that  it  was  obviously  made  ad  hoc,  and  is 
no  natural  product  of  the  number  theory. 


EFFOKTS   TOWARD   RECONCILIATION.  97 

antitheses  of  the  cosmic  life  are  in  a  grand  harmonious 
unity. 

The  later  Stoic  neo-Platonists,  i.  e.  neo-Pythagoreans,  tried  to 
find  in  this  antithesis  that  of  force  and  stuff,  spirit  and  matter, 
and  they  deduced  tlie  dyads  from  the  divine  monads.  Neverthe- 
less, not  the  sUghtest  suggestion  of  such  a  conception  can  he 
found  in  the  Plato-Aristotelian  reports,  which  would  certainly 
have  been  particularly  observant  of  this  point. 

All  that  we  know  with  any  certainty  respecting  the 
special  doctrine  of  the  Pythagoreans  as  contrasted  with 
these  general  principles  reveals  their  effort  to  construct,  in 
accordance  with  a  scheme  of  numbers,  an  harmonic  order 
of  things  in  the  various  fields.  For  this  there  served  first 
the  decimal  system,  in  which  every  one  of  the  first  ten  num- 
bers is  accorded  a  special  significance,^  derived  from  arith- 
metical considerations.  The  arithmetical  mysticism  or 
symbolism  of  the  Pythagoreans  seems  to  have  consisted  in 
bringing  into  relation  with  numbers  the  fundamental  ideas 
of  various  departments  of  knowledge,  and  thereby  giving 
expression  to  the  relative  rank,  value,  and  significance  of 
these  ideas. 

There  is  here  the  suggestion  of  the  ideal  thought  of  an  order 
of  things  permanently  determined  by  the  number  series;  but 
much  caprice  in  oracular  symbohzing  and  parallelizing  was 
obviously  developed  in  details.  Beside  the  number  ten  of  cos- 
mic bodies,  the  series  of  elements  is  about  as  follows  (Jambli- 
chus)  :  (1)  point,  (2)  line,  (3)  surface,  (4)  solid,  (5)  quality, 
(6)  soul,  (7)  reason,  etc. ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  (1)  reason  as 
located  in  the  brain,  (2)  sensation  in  the  heart,  (3)  germination  in 
the  navel,  (4)  procreation  in  r/enf(ah'bus,  etc.  Then  the  virtues, 
like  justice,  were  also  designated  by  numbers.  At  the  same 
time  these  concepts,  which  are  symbolized  by  the  same  number 
in  different  series,  also  suggest  and  are  related  to  one  another. 
Thus  it  came  about  that  the  soul  Avas  called  a  square  or  a 
sphere.     Doubtless  with  this  the  thought  was  connected  that 

^  Tn  a  certain  sense  the  Pythagoreans  appear  to  have  regarded  the 
development  from  the  One  to  the  Ten  as  gradual.  Arist.  Met.,  XI.  7, 
1072  b.     See  Zeller,  P.  348. 


08  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPttY. 

diiferent  things  should  be  assigned  among  a  decade  of  gods.  If 
one  adds  that  these  determinations  were  given  by  different 
Pythagoreans  differently,  it  is  easily  understood  why  this  first 
scheme  of  a  mathematical  order  of  the  world  ended  in  an 
unfruitful  confusion. 

All  approximate  representation  of  the  division  of  the 
different  domains  to  which  the  Pythagoreans  applied,  or 
wished  to  apply,  this  number  theory  shows  a  collection  of 
pairs  of  opposites  which  were  arranged  in  a  parallelism, 
like  the  original  pair.  Even  here  is  the  sacred  number 
ten  completed  :  (1)  limited  and  unlimited  ;  (2)  odd  and 
even  ;  (3)  one  and  many  ;  (4)  right  and  left ;  (5)  male 
and  female ;  (6)  rest  and  motion ;  (7)  straight  and 
crooked  ;  (8)  light  and  darkness ;  (9)  good  and  evil  ; 
(10)  square  and  rectangle.  This  eccentric  and  in  itself 
principleless  arrangement  ^  shows  that  the  Pythagoreans 
attempted  at  least  an  all-round  application  of  their  fun- 
damental principle.  Alongside  their  mathematical,  meta- 
physical, and  physical  conceptions,  tlie  ethical  conceptions 
theoretically  find  their  place  ;  ^  but  in  the  development, 
nevertlieless,  the  physical  interest  everywhere  outweighs 
the  others. 

While  now  this  completely  ontologlcal  number  system 
of  concepts  satisfied  the  Eleatic  motifs  yet  the  physics  of 
the  Pythagoreans  was  very  greatly  under  the  influence  of 
Heracleltus,  as  was  also  the  physics  of  Parmenides.  In  the 
theory  of  the  formation  of  the  world,^  the  Pythagoreans 
placed  fire  in  the  middle  as  the  original  condition  of  things, 

^  In  which  always  the  first-named  number  is  the  more  nearly  perfect. 

2  This  beginning  of  scientific  consideration  of  ethical  ideas,  of  which 
intimations  are  at  hand  in  the  special  doctrines,  likewise  bespeaks  a 
later  position  for  the  Pythagorean  philosophy. 

*  It  must  remain  uncertain  whether  they  also  accepted  the  theory  of 
periodic  world-formation  and  destruction.  They  taught  "  the  great  year  " 
in  the  sense  that,  with  the  return  of  the  original  arrangement  of  the  stars, 
all  individual  appearances,  persons,  and  experiences  would  return. 


EFFORTS  TOWARD   RECONCILIATION.  99 

as  the  self-determining  One,  the  animating  and  impelling 
force.  Fire  drew  around  itself,  however,  the  unlimited 
(i.  e.,  empty)  space,^  and  limited  (i.  e.,  formed)  it  in  ever- 
growing dimensions, —  a  conception  ^rhich  vividly  reminds 
us  of  the  hlv-q  of  Anaxagoras  and  Leucippus. 

The  most  brilliant  achievement  of  the  Pythagoreans  was 
their  astronomy,  and  in  this  respect  they  are  far  in  advance 
of  all  their  contemporaries.  They  regarded  not  only  the 
world-all  as  globular,  but  also  the  single  stars  as  luminous 
globes,  which  move  around  the  central  fire  in  transparent 
globular  shells,  the  spheres.  Their  most  im[)ortant  advance 
here  is  in  the  fact  that  the  earth  likewise  was  regarded  as  a 
globe,  moving  around  this  same  central  fire.  The  older 
Pythagoreans  believed  that  the  earth  presents  always  the 
same  side  to  the  central  fire,  so  that  mankind  on  the  oppo- 
site side  never  gets  sight  of  the  central  fire,  nor  yet  of  the 
counter-earth  (^avri^doiiv)  that  is  between  the  earth  and  the 
central  fire.  The  counter-earth  was  conceived,  presumably 
in  order  to  complete  the  number  ten.  However,  mankind 
does  get  sight  of  the  changing  aspects  of  the  moon  circling 
outside  the  earth,  as  well  as  of  the  sun,  five  planets,  and 
heaven  of  fixed  stars.  The  distance  of  the  spheres  from 
the  central  fire  was  determined  by  the  Pythngorcans  accord- 
ing to  simple  number  relationships.  Corres[)onding  to  this, 
they  assumed  that  from  the  revolution  of  the  spheres  there 
resulted  a  melodious  musical  sound,  the  so-called  harmony 
of  the  spheres.  In  this  way  the  orderly  revolution  of  the 
stars  became  for  them  the  perfect  and  divine,  while  the 
terrestrial  world,  the  world  under  the  moon,  was  repre- 
sented as  the  changing,  changeable,  and  imperfect.  Thus 
the  Eleatic  static  world  and  the  ITeracleitan  changing 
world  appear  to  have  been  apportioned  to  different  regions 
of  the  actual  world. 

1  The  assumption  of  the  Kevov  is  expressly  confirmed  by  Aristotle, 
Phys.,  TV.  6,  213  b,  22. 


100  HISTORY  OF  ANCIEN'l    PHILOSOPHY. 

Compare  Bockh,  De,  Platonis  systemate  ccelestium  globorum 
et  de  vera  indole  astronomice  Philolaicce  (Berlin,  1810) ;  Gruppe, 
Die  Kosmischen  Systeme  der  Griechen  (Berlin,  1852) ;  M. 
Satorius,  Die  Entwickelung  der  Astronomie  bei  den  Griechen  his 
Anaxagoras  und  EmpedoMes  (Breslau,  1883). 

Furthermore,  the  shape  of  the  elements  among  the  Pythag- 
oreans is  worthy  of  note.  Just  as  they  reduced  the  space 
forms  to  number  relationships,  so  they  referred  the  different 
corporeal  elements  to  space  forms,  by  ascribing  simple 
stereometric  forms  to  the  ultimate  constituents  of  matter : 
the  tetrahedron  to  fire,  the  cube  to  earth,  the  octahedron  to 
air,  the  icosahedron  to  water,  and,  finally,  the  dodecahedron 
to  the  aether,  which  was  added  by  them  to  the  four  Empedo- 
clean  elements  and  conceived  as  surrounding  all  the  others. 
If  one  is  able  to  see  in  this  the  result  of  an  interest  in  crys- 
tallography, nevertheless,  on  the  other  hand,  also  here  a  fan- 
tastic caprice  is  only  too  apparent. 

Although  consequently  the  augury  of  a  mathematical  state- 
ment of  natural  law  is  the  permanent  service  of  the  Pythag- 
orean philosophy,  yet  the  form  of  the  statement  that  was 
advanced  by  them  was  little  suited  to  further  scientific  investi- 
gations. Apart  from  astronomy,  this  knowledge  of  the  Pythag- 
oreans, to  which  some  value  in  empirical  investigations  may 
be  ascribed,  stands  in  no  connection  with  the  metaphysical 
number  theory,  and  has  come  from  such  Pythagoreans,  who 
were  little,  if  at  all,  interested  in  the  number  theory  (§  25). 


4.  The  Greek  Enlightenment. 

the  sophists  and  socrates. 

25.  After  the  rapid  development  in  which  Greek  science 
at  the  first  onset  defined  a  number  of  valuable  and  funda- 
mental concepts  concerning  nature,  a  kind  of  reaction  began 
about  the  middle  of  the  fifth  century.  The  metaphysical 
tendency  of  thought  declined.     Of  hypotheses  there  were 


THE   GREEK   ENLIGHTENMENT.  10 1 

already  many  enough,  and  it  seemed  more  important  to  test 
and  verify  them  in  application  to  special  kinds  of  knowledge. 

The  lively  exchange  between  the  different  schools  led 
easily  to  a  blending  of  principles,  which  thereby  lost  their 
harshness,  but  unfortunately  their  force  as  well.  The 
more  the  circles  of  scientific  activity  increased,  the  more  the 
interest  turned  to  the  single  problems  of  science.  There 
began  an  epoch  of  eclecticism  and  detailed  investigation. 

The  after-effects  of  the  Milesian  researches  are  met  not 
only  among  the  younger  physicists,  who  regarded  the  cos- 
mic matter  as  a  compromise  between  air  and  water  or 
between  fire  and  air,  but  also,  in  a  man  like  Idoeiis  of 
Himera,  who  agreed  with  Anaximenes  in  maintaining  that 
the  air  was  the  apx?;.^  A  full  adaptation,  however,  of  the 
Milesian  teaching  to  the  position  of  science,  in  its  attempts 
at  compromise,  appears  in  by  far  the  most  important  of 
these  eclectics,  Diogenes  of  Apollonia.  * 

Nothing  is  known  about  his  life.  It  is  even  doubtful,  on 
account  of  the  Ionian  dialect  of  his  writing,  vrcpi  ^u'o-etos  (see 
G.  Geil,  Philos.  Monatsheften,  XXVI.  257  f.),  if  the  place  of  his 
birth  was  the  Apollonia  in  Crete.  Schorn  and  Panzerbieter  have 
collected  the  fragments, — Schorn  (Bonn,  1829,  with  those  of 
Anaxagoras)  and  Panzerbieter  (Leipzig,  1830,  Dlog.  Apollonia). 
See  Steinhart's  article  in  the  Encyklopadie  of  Erseh  and  G  ruber. 
Schleierniacher,  who  in  his  treatise  concerning  Diogenes  (Com- 
plete Works,  III.  2,  149  fif. )  at  first  placed  him  very  high 
and  chronologically  early,  came  later  (  Vorhs.  iiher  Gesch.  der 
Philos.,  Complete  Works,  III.  4  a,  77)  to  view  him  as  a  prin- 
cipleless  eclectic.  Zeller  agrees  with  this  last  conception 
(I*.  248  f.).  D.  AVeygoklt  (Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos.,  I.  IGl  f.) 
has  identified  some  teachings  of  Diogenes  in  some  pseudo 
writings  of  Hippocrates. 

Diogenes  anticipated  his  later  point  of  view  in  the  desire, 
expressed  in  the  beginning  of  his  writing,  for  an  unambigu- 
ous starting-point  and  a  sim[)le  and  worthy  investigation. 
The  hylozoistic  monism  of  the  Milesians  formed  for  him 
1  Sext.  Emp.  Adc.  math.,  IX.  360. 


102  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

tliis  starting-point,  which  he  defended  ^  against  pluralistic 
theories  (Anaxagoras  and  Empedocles)  by  the  subtle  con- 
ception that  the  process  of  Becoming,  the  change  of  things 
into  one  another  and  their  reciprocal  influence,  are  expli- 
cable only  by  the  presupposition  of  a  common  fundamental 
essence,  of  wliich  all  particular  things  are  shifting  transfor- 
mations  {krepoLaxrea).      The    constitutive    characteristics, 
however,  of  the  ap^iq  he  regarded  on  the  one  hand,  like  the 
lonians,  as  motion  and  animation,  and  on  the  other,  in  ap- 
parent agreement  with  Anaxagoras,  as  reasonableness  and 
purposiveness  which  are  manifested  in  the   proportionate 
distribution  of  matter  in  the  universe.     So  he  accepted  in 
the  list  of  predicates  of  the  Air  of  Anaximenes  those  also 
of  the  Anaxagorean  j^oO?,  and  called  ^  this  air-spirit  a  a-wfia 
fie'ya  koX  la'^^upov  koX  athiov  re  koI  addvarov  koX  iroWa  elh6<i. 
The  air,  likewise  called  irvevfia,  as  being  the  medium  of  life 
and  of  thought,  is  the  uniform  and  universal  reality,  both  in 
the  microcosm  and  in  the  macrocosm.     Through  condensa- 
tion and  rarefaction,   which   were  respectively  (compare 
§  16)  identified    with    cooling   and  warming,  the   cosmic 
matter  changed  into  individual  things.    Through  the  effect 
of  weight,  which  drove  the  rarer  above  and  tlie  more  con- 
densed below,  there  were  completed  the  order  and  motion  of 
the  world-all,  which  was  conceived  to  be  in  a  periodic  alter- 
nation of  origination  and  destruction.    In  the  organism  the 
air  serves  as  the  soul.     The  soul  is  denied  to  plants,  and  in 
animals  it  is  found  in  the  blood  (after  Empedocles).     Life 
depends  upon  the  blood  receiving  the  air,  upon  the  mixing 
of  which  the  mental  condition  of  tlie  organism  depends. 
With  a  just  presentiment  Diogenes  pointed  out  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  arterial  and  venous  blood.     Moreover,  his 
valuable  knowledge  of  the  arterial  system,  his  idea  of  the 
brain  as  the  seat  of  thought,  his  theories  of  the  origin  of 
sense  perception,  as  well  as  his  numerous  other  pliysiologi- 
1  Simpl.  Phys.,  32  verso,  161,  30.  2  ji^i^i^^  33  j-g^to,  153,  17. 


THE   GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT.  103 

cal  and  biological  observations,  show  a  fine,  accurate  sense 
fox*  detailed  research  in  the  organic  world. 

Inversely,  there  is  an  approximation  to  Ionian  hylozoisni 
■ —  as  it  presented  itself  among  the  Eleatics  to  Melissus  — 
in  the  only  pupil  of  Anaxagoras  of  wliom  anything  definite 
is  known.  This  is  Archelaus  of  Athens  or  Miletus,  who 
identified  with  the  air  the  original  mixture  of  all  the 
XprjfMura  of  Anaxagoras,  and  associated  the  i/oO?  essentially 
with  the  air  (§  26),  similarly  to  Diogenes,  only  in  a  more 
mechanical  way. 

In  Ephesus,  on  the  other  hand,  a  school  continued  to  exist 
which  actively  held  to  the  teaching  of  Heracleitus.  It  did 
not  lessen  the  paradoxes  of  Heracleitus,  but  appears  to  have 
exaggerated  them  in  so  enthusiastic  and  unmethodical  a 
manner  that  Plato  made  s])ort  ^  of  them.  At  least  it  is 
reported^  that  Cratylus,  the  most  im|)ortant  of  these  Hcra- 
cleitans  and  a  younger  contemporary  of  Socrates,  the  teacher 
of  Plato,  so  subtilized  the  Heracleitan  proposition  concern- 
ing the  inability  of  stepping  into  the  same  river  twice,  as  to 
postulate  the  impossibility  of  stepping  in  even  once. 

Antiquity  ^  associated  with  Heracleitus  a  movement  de- 
veloped within  the  Pythagorean  circle,  whose  leader  was 
Hippasus  of  Metapontum,  approximately  a  contemporary  of 
Philolaus.  He  emphasized  the  Heracleitan  moment  in  the 
Pythagorean  physics  so  exclusively  that  fire  was  for  him 
entirely  the  dpxn  in  the  Ionian  sense.  The  old  tradition  * 
designated  him  as  the  head  of  the  exoteric  Acousmatics, 
who  were  not  initiated  into  the  secrets  of  the  number 
theory. 

On  the  other  hand,  Ecphantus,  and   similarly  perhaps 

1  Thecet.,  179  e.  In  the  same  feeling  is  the  entire  dialogue  of 
Cratylus  written. 

2  Arist.  Met.,  Ill   5,  1010  a,  12. 

3  Ibid.,  I.  3,  984  a,  7. 

*  Jamblichus,  De  vit.  Pyth.,  81. 


104  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

Xuthus/  joined  the  Pythagorean  teaching  to  atomism,  to 
which  the  transition  appears  to  have  been  made  in  the  ste- 
reometrical  construction  of  the  elements  as  attempted  by 
the  Pythagoreans.  Likewise  in  Ecphantus  we  find  simi- 
larities to  the  vov<i  theory  of  Anaxagoras.^  The  atoms, 
differing  in  size,  form,  and  force,  are  so  moved  by  the  vov^ 
that  out  of  them  the  unitary  spherical  shape  of  the  world 
is  perfectly  formed  and  maintained. 

While  such  adjustments  and  compromises  between  the 
metaphysical  theories  were  being  attempted,  the  special  in- 
terest of  this  period  was  in  detailed  investigation.  This 
developed  vigorously  in  all  domains,  and  in  its  progress  spe- 
cial departments  of  science  even  then  were  differentiating 
themselves  from  general  philosophy.  Mathematics  ^  was 
the  first  to  proceed  independently ;  not  only  in  the  Pythag- 
orean school,  but  among  other  thinkers  (Anaxagoras,  and 
later  Plato  and  Democritus),  it  found  recognition  and  pro- 
motion. The  trisection  of  an  angle,  the  squaring  of  the 
circle,  the  doubling  of  the  cube,  were  the  pet  problems  of 
the  time.  A  certain  Hippocrates  of  Chios  wrote  the  first 
manual  of  mathematics,  and  introduced  the  method  of  des- 
ignating figures  by  letters.  There  was  wanting,  it  is  true, 
a  logical  development  of  the  art  of  demonstration.  How- 
ever, a  considerable  amount  of  knowledge  was  accumulated, 
which  was  obtained  in  an  empirical  way,  partly  experi- 
mental and  partly  tentative. 

Brilliant  progress  in  astronomy  *  was  made  in  the  fifth 
and  in  the  beginning  of  the  fourth  century,  particularly  by 
the  Pythagoreans.  Whether  it  were  experience  (the  cir- 
cumnavigating of  Africa  ?)  or  theoretic  reflection  upon  the 

1  Compare  Zeller,  K  405,  1. 

2  Details  by  Zeller,  1*.  458  f. 

"  Cantor,  Varies.  Uher  d.  Gesch.  d.  Math.,  I.  160  f.,  171  f. 
*  Compare  O.  Gruppe,  Die  kosmbch'"%  Systeme  d.  Griechen,  Berlin, 
1851. 


THE   GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT.  105 

problems  that  led  to  the  hypotheses  of  the  central  fire  and 
the  counter-earth,  gradually  the  theory  of  the  diurnal 
movement  of  tlie  earth  around  the  central  fire,  which  alone 
could  explain  the  apparent  rotation  of  the  heavens,  was 
superseded  by  the  theory  of  the  revolution  of  the  earth 
upon  its  axis.  Hicetas  of  Syracuse  appears  to  have  been 
the  founder  of  this  theory.  Ho  was  certainly  younger 
than  Philqjaus,  and  perhaps  a  participant  in  that  last 
phase  of  Pythagoreanism,  as  it  merged  in  the  Academy  ^ 
(§  38). 

About  this  time,  in  other  departments  of  natural  science, 
a  richer,  more  exact  treatment  of  individual  facts  took  the 
place  of  ultimate  hypotheses.  Here  appeared  a  wonderful 
revolution,  when  interest  in  meteorological  observations  be- 
gan to  give  place  to  interest  in  the  investigation  of  the 
organic  world,  and  of  man   in  particular. 

Typical  in  this  respect  appears  Hippo  ^  (of  Samos  ?),  a 
naturalist  of  the  time  of  Pericles,  who,  inasmuch  as  he 
postulated  the  moist  as  ap-^r]^^  is  usually  mentioned  in 
connection    with   Thales;    so   also    Cleidemus,*   in    whose 

^  Here,  as  for  the  following,  we  may  refer  once  for  all  to  the  Geschichte 
der  Mathematik,  Nalurwissenschafl  und  Medizin  in  Altertum,  appearing 
in  this  same  volume  of  the  German  edition.  This  special  treatment 
allows  us  to  make  only  a  brief  sketch  of  these  subjects,  and  to  lay  the 
emphasis  upon  the  distinctively  philosojjhical  movement. 

2  Compare  Schleiermacher,  Ueber  den  Philosophen  Ilippon,  Complete 
Works,  \o\.  III.  p.  408  f. ;   Uhrig,  De  Hlppone  atheo  (Giessen,  1848). 

3  With  special  emphasis  upon  the  moist  character  of  animal  seed, 
Arist.  De  an.,  I.  2.  This  explains  the  one  supposition  of  Aristotle  con- 
cerning the  origin  of  the  teaching  of  Thales  (see  §  14).  If  the  charge  of 
Atheism  which  was  made  against  Hippo  refers  to  the  fact  that  he  did 
not  recognize  anything  as  imperishable,  and  declared  that  nothing  exists 
except  phenomena  (schol.  in  Arist.,  534  a,  22),  he  was,  in  spite  of  his 
moist  dpxr],  a  purely  positive  anti-metaphysician.  This  explains  Aris- 
totle's prejudice  against  him  {(PopTiK^Tfooi,  De  an.,  I.  2;  evTf\fia  t^j 
Stavoiay,  I\fel.,  I.  3), 

*.Zeller,  1^.  927. 


■    o 

106  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

researches  into  the  physiology  of  sensation  we  find  sug- 
gestions of  Anaxagoras. 

Medicine  also  could  not  hold  itself  apart  from  the  influ- 
ence of  the  general  body  of  science,  and  it  appeared  for  a 
time  as  if  it  would  be  entirely  absorbed  into  the  speculations 
of  natural  philosophy.  The  impulse  thereto  arose  from  the 
Pythagorean  circles,  and  is  principally  traced  back  to 
Alcmaeon,^  a  physician  in  Crotona,  and  perhaps  a  some- 
what older  contemporary  of  Philolaus.  He  stood  aloof 
from  the  number  theory,  but  in  common  with  its  adher- 
ents held  to  the  doctrine  of  antitheses.^  He  also  believed 
in  tiie  fundamental  opposition  of  the  terrestrial  imper- 
fection and  the  celestial  perfection,  which  dualism  he, 
like  Philolaus,  appears  to  have  developed  astronomically. 
His  medical  views  depended  upon  the  universal  Pythago- 
rean-Heracleitan  presuppositions,  since  he  defined  health 
as  the  harmony  of  opposing  forces.  Specifically,  there 
were  supposed  to  be  fundamental  humors  whose  homo- 
geneous mixing  indicated  health,  while  an  excess  or  defi- 
ciency of  any  one  of  them  led  to  pathological  conditions. 
Such  aetiological  theories  did  not,  however,  prevent  Alc- 
maeon  from  making  careful  and  valuable  investigations. 
He  is  said  to  be  the  first  to  make  sections ;  he  appears 
to  have  been  the  first  to  locate  thought  in  the  brain,  and 
to  designate  the  nerves  as  canals  leading  tliither  from 
the  sense-organs.  Connected  with  this^ — for  him  as  well 
as  later  for  Democritus  and  Plato  —  was  the  fact  that 
he  in  an  Eleatic-Heracleitan  fashion  opposed  thought  to 
perception. 

As  a  type  of  the  temporary  amalgamation  of  medicine 
and  natural  philosophy,  we  may  take  ^  the  pseudo-Hippo- 

1  Unna,  De  Alcmceone  Crotoniata  ej usque  fragnuintis,  found  in  Peter- 
sen's Phil.  hist.  Stud.  1832;  R.  Hirzel,  Hermes,  187G,  p.  240  f. 

2  Arist.  Met.,  T.  5,  986  a,  27. 

8  Compare  Siebeck,  Gesch.  der  Psychol.,  I.  1,  94  f, 


THE   GREEK   ENLIGHTENMENT.  107 

cratic  work  irepX  BiaLT7]<i,  which  has  been  proved  ^  by  Zcller 
(1. 663 f.,  against  Schuster,  IIeraclitus,ddi.,  andTeichmiiller, 
Neue  Studien,  I.  249  f.,  II.  G  f.)  to  belong  to  the  time  after 
Empedocles  and  Anaxagoras  and  before  Plato.  This  writ- 
ing pictures  in  the  microcosm  of  the  human  body,  as  well 
as  in  the  universe,  now  a  constructive  and  now  a  destruc- 
tive battle  between  lire  and  water,  and  it  ascribes  motion 
to  lire  and  nourishing  power  to  water.  The  theory  is  then 
carried  out  in  detail,  and  deviates  into  a  medical  psychology 
which  regards  the  soul  as  a  mixed  essence  corresponding 
in  miniature  to  the  body. 

The  merit  of  Hippocrates  (460-377)  ^  was  that  he  de- 
fended the  independence  of  medicine  against  such  nature- 
philosophical  tendencies,  which  he  contested  principally 
■rrepl  up)(^air]i;  lr]TpiKf]<;.  He  separated  medicine  as  a  tc^ui] 
from  philosophy  in  a  purely  Greek  fashion  as  the  art  of 
restoring  to  the  body  its  beauty  lost  through  disease.  On 
the  other  hand,  Hippocrates  {-rrepl  BiacTrj'i  o^ewv)  also  I'C- 
jected  the  purely  symptomatic  method  that  was  in  vogue 
in  the  Ciiidian  school.  He  urged  that  the  determination 
of  the  empirical  causes  of  disease  was  to  be  attained  by  a 
comprehensive  and  careful  observation  of  the  alriai;^  and 
in  this  he  found  a  successor  in  Diodes  of  CaiTstus.  He 
distinguished  causes  dependent  on  external  events,  like  cli- 
mate, seasons,  etc.,  from  those  subject  to  the  human  will, 
like  the  diet.  Remoter  causes  are  distinguished  from  the 
more  immediate,  but  always  investigation  is  limited  to 
experience,  and  only  immanent,  not  transcendent,  aetiolo- 

1  Compare  Weygoldt,  Jrt/i/-6. /.  kl.  PliiloL,  1882,  IGl  f. 

'  The  mass  of  writings  passing  under  the  name  of  Hippocrates 
are  published  by  Kiihn  and  by  Littre,  and  tlie  latter  liars  made  a  French 
translation.  Only  a  small  portion  of  these  writings  belongs  to  Ilij)- 
pocrates,  and  this  portion  contains  several  very  difficult  problems  of 
detail.     J.  Ilberg,  Stiulid  Pgewlippocrd/ea  (Lei))zig,  1883). 

8  See  C.  Goring,  Ucber  den  Beyriff  d.  Ursache  in  d.  (jrtech.  Philos. 
(Leipzig,  1874). 


108  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

gies  are  sought.  As  with  Alcmaeon,  the  mixture  of  the 
four  fundamental  humors  —  the  blood,  phlegm,  yellow  gall, 
and  black  gall  —  formed  likewise  the  central  point  of  this 
medical  theory.  Besides  this  the  school  of  Hippocrates  de- 
veloped an  accurate  knowledge  of  anatomy  and  physiology. 
In  the  former  branch  the  knowledge  of  the  brain  and  ner- 
vous system,  and  especially,  even  thus  early,  of  the  particu- 
lar sense  nerves,  is  to  be  particularly  noted  ;  and  concerning 
the  latter  is  the  theory  of  the  e^i^vTov  Oepfioif,  wherein  the 
cause  of  life  was  sought.  The  bearer  of  life,  however,  was 
held  to  be  the  irvevfia,  which  is  a  material  wafted  like  air 
through  the  veins. ^  This  is  an  hypothesis  which,  like 
similar  teachings  of  Diogenes  of  Apollonia,  seemed  to  rest 
upon  a  presentiment  of  the  importance  of  oxygen. 

Historical  research  also,  like  tliat  of  natural  science, 
acquired  at  the  end  of  the  fifth  century  not  only  greater 
extent  and  more  manifold  form,''  but  also  a  positive  and 
scientific  method.  While  in  Herodotus  the  naturalistic 
narrative  was  still  interwoven  with  myth  and  saga,  and 
the  realistic  conception  was  still  permeated  with  elements 
of  the  old  faith,  the  stripping  off  of  the  mythical  appears 
to  have  been  perfected  in  Thucydides,  whose  mastery  of 
psycliological  motivation  was  determined  entirely  by  the 
spirit  of  his  time,  the  Attic  Enlightenment. 

26.  But  with  this  internal  process  of  transformation 
there  went  on  also  in  the  second  half  of  the  fifth  century  a 
great  change  in  the  external  relations  of  Greek  science. 
There  was  here,  too,  a  powerful  influence  in  the  mighty 
development  of  the  national  life  which  had  dawned  upon 

1  See  H.  Siebcck,  Die  Entivickelung  der  Lrhre  rom  Geist  {nvfvfm)  in 
der  antiken  Wiiisenschq/i :  Zeifsckri/l  fur  Volkerspsychologie,  1881,  p. 
364  f.     Compare  with  his  Gesch.  der  Psychologie,  I.  2,  p.  730  f. 

^  Logography  developed  into  histories  of  localities  (Xanthus  of 
Sardis  and  Hippasus  of  Rheginni,  the  I^ydian  and  Sicilian  histories); 
then  (§  11),  into  fuller  expositions  by  Charo  of  Lampsacus,  Uellanicus 
of  Mitylene,  Damastes,  etc. 


THE   GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT  109 

Greece  during  the  Persian  wars.  The  glorious  struggle 
for  existence  which  the  Greeks  made  against  the  Asiatic 
ascendancy  had  strained  the  powers  of  the  people  to  the 
utmost,  and  had  brought  all  their  possibilities  to  their 
richest  unfolding.  The  most  valuable  prize  of  the  victory 
was  that  impulse  for  a  national  unity  of  mental  life,  out  of 
which  the  great  creations  of  Hellenic  culture  proceeded. 
Science  was  involved  in  this  movement.  Science  was 
drawn  out  of  the  silent  circles  of  the  select  societies  in 
which  it  had  until  then  been  nurtured.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
entered  with  its  discoveries  and  inventioiw  into  the  service 
of  practical  life  ;^  on  the  other  hand,  its  doctrines,  and  par- 
ticularly its  transformation  of  religious  views,  were  brought 
through  poetry  to  the  apprehension  of  the  common  mind. 

The  view  of  nature  in  ^-Eschylus,  Sophocles,  Pindar,  and 
Simonides  appears  on  the  whole  in  a  similar  setting  as  in  the 
Gnomic  poets.  Direct  allusions  to  philosophy  are  found  first  in 
Euripides  (compare  especially  E.  Kohlcr,  Die  Philoso2)hie  des 
Euripides^  1. ;  Anaxagoras  und  E.^  Bl'iekeburg.  1873),  and  in 
Epicharmus,  who  stood  near  to  the  Pythagoreans,  but  also  seeras 
to  have  been  familiar  with  the  other  philosophic  teachings  of 
his  time.  (Compare  Leop.  Schmidt,  Qua^.^tionf-s  EpicJtarmcce, 
Bonn,  1S4G  ;  Zeller,  P.  460  f.)  "The  divestiture  of  nature  of 
its  gods  by  science  "  pressed  always  further  to  an  ethical  alle- 
gorizing of  the  gods  (Metrodorus  of  Lampsacus  ;  compare  §  11). 
This  permitted,  on  the  other  hand,  the  comedy  (of  Epichar- 
mus, Cratinus,  Eupolis)  to  outdo  the  anthropomorphism,  which 
had  been  for  good  and  all  outgrown,  even  to  the  extent  of  witt}' 
persiflage  of  their  divinities.  'The  weaker  faith  appeared,  the 
greater  seemed  the  need  of  supplying  its  place  b}-  knowledge. 

Amid  such  increased  intellectual  activity  there  arose  in 
all  Greece  in  the  fifth  century  an  impulse  for  education,  aris- 

1  An  example  may  be  found  in  the  architecture  of  Ilippodamus  of 
Miletus,  whose  connection  with  the  Pythagoreans  is  indeed  very  doubt- 
ful. His  magnificent  buildings,  however,  in  the  Piranis,  Thurii,  and 
Rhodes,  and  the  entire  development  of  architecture,  presuppose  a  high 
desrree  of  development  in  mechanics  and  technology.  Compare  K.  r . 
Hermann,  D.  H.  Milesio  (Marburg,  1841). 


110  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

ing  out  of  need,  curiosity,  and  wonder.  Everybody  desired 
to  know  what  the  schools  had  developed  through  research 
and  reflection  concerning  the  nature  of  things.  To  such 
questioning  a  ready  answer  was  speedily  forthcoming. 
There  were  men  who  engaged  to  reveal  the  results  of 
science  to  the  people.  Philosophy  stepped  out  of  th^ 
school  and  forth  upon  the  mart.^  These  public  teachers 
of  science  were  the  Sophists. 

That  the  Sophists  converted  science  into  a  trade  is  one  of  the 
chief  and  heaviest  charges  which  Socrates,^  Plato, ^  and  Aris- 
totle* raised  against  them;  these  three  thonglit  the  dignity  of 
science  as  a  disinterested  research  was  impaired  in  tliis  way  by 
the  Sophists.  If  we  cannot  agree  ^  with  this  judgment  from  a 
modern  point  of  view,  yet  the  ftxet  is  nevertheless  to  be  recog- 
nized that  when  science  was  taught  for  pay,  it  assumed  an  en- 
tirel}'  new  social  position  ;  and  this  is  the  essential  fact  in  the 
whole  matter. 

This  movement  showed  itself  first  of  all  in  Athens. 
Here,  in  the  middle  of  the  fifth  century,  the  intellectual  life 
of  Greece  was  concentrated,  had  attained  its  highest  efflo- 
rescence, and  had  gained  its  political  power  and  commer- 
cial supremacy.  Science,  lii<e  art,  crowded  into  this  r?;? 
'EX\dBo<i  TO  irpvravelov  TTj<i  a-o<f)[a<i.  Here  the  need  of  cul- 
ture developed  most  actively  among  the  lesser  citizens,  here 
learning  began  to  have  political  and  social  power,  and 
here  the  supremacy  of  culture  was  personified  in  Pericles. 
Thus  in  science  also  Athens  absorbed  into  itself  the  scat- 
tered beginnings  of  Greek  civilization. 

Anaxagoi'as  had  lived  for  a  long  time  in  Athens.  Par- 
menides  and  Zeno  probably  visited  Athens,  and  Heracleitanism 
was  represented  there   by   Cratylus.     All  important   Sophists 

^  See  Windelband,  Praeludien,  p.  56  f. 
^  2  Xen.  Mem.,  I.  6. 
8  Gorg.,  420  c. 

<  Eth.  Nik.,  IX.  1,  1164  a,  24. 
«  See  Grote,  Hist.  o/Gr.,  VIIT.  493  f. ;  Zeller,  P.  971  f. 


TSE  GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT.  Ill 

sought  and  found  here  honor  and  glor}'.  Witli  them  began 
the  Attic  period  of  ancient  philosophy,  its  most  magnificent 
period. 

The  Sophists  are,  accordingly,  first  and  foremost  the 
bearers  of  the  Greek  Enlightenment.  The  period  of  their 
%\activity  is  that  of  the  expansion  of  scientific  culture.  With 
less  ability  in  independent  creation,  the  Sophists  devoted 
their  energies  to  revising  and  popularizing  existing  theories. 
Their  work  was  first  directed,  with  an  eye  to  the  people's 
needs,  to  imparting  to  the  mass  of  people  the  results  of 
science.  Therein  lay,  along  with  their  justification,  also 
the  danger  to  which  the  Sophists  succumbed. 

2o<^io-r^9  meant  originally  "a  man  of  science"  in  general. 
Then,  as  Protagoras^  claimed  for  himself,  it  meant  "a  teacher 
of  science "  and  of  political  virtue  ;  later,  expressly,  a  paid 
teacher  of  rhetoric  (see  below).  The  opprobriujn  attached  to 
the  word  Sophist  at  present  is  due  to  the  polemics  of  Socrates, 
Plato,  and  Aristotle,  which  have  unfavorabl}'  dominated  history  in 
its  judgment  of  the  Sophists,  until  Hegel  (Complete  Works,  Vol. 
XIV.  5  f.)  made  prominent  the  legitimate  moment  of  their  work. 
Since  then,  this  has  attained  a  complete  recognition  (Rrandis, 
Hermann,^  Zt^Uer,  Ueberweg-Heinze),  but  on  the  other  hand 
has  been  exaggeratedly  emphasized  by  Grote  (History  of  Greece, 
VIII.  474  f .).  Compare  Jac.  Geel,  Historia  critica  sophistarum 
(Utrecht,  1823) ;  M.  Schanz,  Die  Sojyhisten  (Gottingen,  1867) ; 
A.  Chiapelli,  Per  la  storia  della  sopJiistica  greca  (Arch.  f. 
Gesch.  d.  Ph.,  III.  )  ;  the  fragments  in  Mullach,  II.  130  f. 

The  difference  between  the  earlier  and  later  Sophists  (Ueber- 
weg)  is  well  founded,  since  in  the  nature  of  the  case  at  the  be- 
ginning the  serious  and  legitimate  aspects  of  the  movement 
were  more  prominent,  while  later  on  appeared  the  vagaries  of 
the  members  and  the  menace  of  their  doctrines  to  society. 
This  development  was  so  necessary,  the  consequences  were  so 
certainly  determined  by  the  precedents,  and  this  distinction  is 
on  that  account  only  so  relative,  that  it,  particularly  for  a  brief 
presentation,  will  not  be  adopted  as  a  basis  of  subdivision. 

Plato's  dialogue  Protagoras  gives  in  its  clear  characteriza- 
tion of   the  principal    personages    an  exceptionally  vivid,pic- 

1  Plato,  Protag.,  318  d. 

2  Hermann,  Gesch.  u.  Syst.  d.  plat.  PMlos.,  I.  179f.,  296  f. 


112  HISTORY   OF   ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHY. 

ture  of  the  entire  movement  of  the  Sophists.  In  spite  of  the 
general  polemic  character  of  this  work,  the  better  aspects 
of  Sopliism  are  not  entirely  obscured.  The  most  derogatory 
characterization  of  the  Sophists  is  given  in  the  dialogue  Sophist 
transmitted  under  Plato's  name.  The  Aristotelian  conclusions 
agree  with  this  dialogue  in  the  main  (Met.,  III.  5  ;  VII.  3). 
The  worst  is  the  definition  T-epl  a-ocjy.  i^^yx-  I-  165  a,  21  ;  eo-n 
yap  rj  crocfiLaTLKr]  <^aivop.ivq  o"0</)ta  ovo-a  8  ov  •  koX  6  (TO(fiUTTr}<; 
)(pTi}fiaTLaTr]'i  airo  ^atvo/xeinj?  croc^ias  aXA.'  ovk  ovo-t/?. 

The  popularizing  tendency  of  Sophistry  found  an  emi- 
nent representative  in  Hippias  of  Elis.  A  brilliant  poly- 
liistor,  he  dazzled  his  contemporaries  in  all  sorts  of 
mathematical,  zoological,  historical,  and  grammatical  learn- 
ing. At  the  same  time,  however,  as  the  dialogue  Jlipjnas 
Major  shows,  he  aimed  by  his  somewhat  colorless  moral 
teaching  to  achieve  a  cheap  success  with  the  masses.  It 
was  very  much  tlie  same  with  Prodicus  of  lulis  on  the 
island  of  Ceos,  of  whose  shallow  ethics  an  example  is 
preserved  in  the  well-known  Heracles  at  the  Cross  Ways.^ 
The  strength  of  Prodicus  lay  in  synonymy. 

See  L.  Spengel,  Swaywy^  rexvojv  (Stuttgart,  1828)  ;  J.  Miihly, 
Die  Sophist  Hipj^ias  von  Elis  {likeinisches  Museum,  1860  f.)  ; 
F.  G.  Welcker,  Prodikas  der  Vorgdnger  des  Socrates  (in  a 
smaller  work,  II.  393  f.).  Both  were  about  of  an  age,  and 
somewliat  younger  than  Protagoras.  Nothing  further  is  known 
concerning  their  lives.  Hippias,  who  prided  himself  on  his 
memory  and  his  great  learning,  was  pictured  as  one  of  the 
most  conceited  Sophists.  Prodicus  was  treated  by  Plato  with 
playful  irony  on  account  of  his  pedantic  pains  in  word-splitting. 
For  Socrates'  relation  to  him,  see  §  27. 

The  instruction  that  the  Sophists  were  called  upon  to 
give  had  to  adapt  itself  to  a  specific  purpose.  Democracy 
had  gained  ascendency  in  Athens  and  most  other  cities,  and 
the  citizen  was  brought  by  duty  and  inclination  into  active 
participation  in  public  affairs.  This  evinced  itself  particu- 
larly in  oratory.     With  the  higlier  culture  of  the  masses, 

1  Hermann,  Gesch.  u.  St/st.  d.  plat.  Philos.,  I.  179  f.,  296  f. 


THE   GREEK   ENLIGHTENMENT.  113 

the  greater  were  the  demands  upon  those  who  by  the 
power  of  the  spoken  word  wished  to  win  influence  in  the 
state.  The  youth  who  attended  upon  the  teaching  of 
the  Sophist  desired  to  be  trained  by  liim  into  a  cultured 
and  eloquent  citizen  of  the  state.  So  the  Sophists  found 
their  chief  task  in  scientific  and  rhetorical  instruction  for 
public  life.  The  instruction  consisted  on  the  one  hand  in 
technical  and  formal  oratory,  and  on  the  other  in  that 
learning  which  appeared  especially  important  foi**any  par- 
ticular end  they  had  in  view.  Therein  lay  not  only  the 
social-historical  significance  of  the  Sophists,  but  also  the 
tendency  of  all  the  independent  investigations  through 
which  the  Sophists  have  furthered  science,  Gorgias  of 
Leontini  and  Protagoras  of  Abdera  may  be  regarded  the 
most  eminent  representatives  of  this  phase  of  Sophism. 

For  the  characterization  and  criticism  of  Sophism  as  a  tech- 
nique of  education  in  statecraft,,  one  ought  to  consult  especially 
Plato's  dialogue,  Gor;/ias.  Concerning  the  relation  of  the 
Sophists  to  rhetoric,  see  Fr.  Blass,  Die  attische  Beredsamkeit 
von  Gorgias  his  Lysias  (Leipzig,  18G8).  As  a  tj'pieal  express 
sion  of  these  attempts  of  the  Sophists  which  embraced  also 
legal  oratory,  may  be  taken  the  utterance  of  Protagoras  that 
be  would  pledge  himself  to  ^  rw  tjttu)  \6yov  KpctTTia  ttouIv, —  an 
expression,  to  be  sure,  which  called  forth  the  crushing  criticism 
of  Aristophanes,  who  iu  the  Clouds  imputed  it  to  Socrates. 

A  more  reliable  fact  about  the  life  of  Gorgias  is  that  he  was 
in  Athens  in  427  as  head  of  the  embassy  from  his  native  city 
(Thucyd.,  III.  -sG).  His  life  has  been  set  by  Frei  (7^//.  Mas., 
1850,  1851)  in  the  time  from  483  to  375.  He  made  a  great 
impression  in  Athens  by  his  eloquence,  and  exercised  a 
distinct  influence  upon  the  development  of  rhetorical  style. 
He  spent  his  protracted  old  age  in  Larissa  in  Thessal}'.  The 
genuineness  of  both  of  his  preserved  declamations  (ed.  Blass, 
Leipzig,  1881)  is  doubtful.  His  philosophical  treatise  bore 
the  title  Trepi  ^I'o-ews  17  TTcpi  rov  /xr]  ovto?  (See  below).  His  con- 
nection with  the  Sicilian  school  of  oratory  (Corax  and  Tisias), 
and  therefore  also  with  Empedocles,  is  undoubted.  His  con- 
nection with  the  Eleatics  appears  equally  certain,  from  the  argif^ 

1  Arist.  PJiet.,  IT.  24;   1402  a,  23. 


114  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHY. 

mentation  in  his  writings.  Compare  H.  E.  Foss,  De  O.  L. 
(Halle,  1828) ;  H.  Diels,  Gorgias  und  Empedodes  (Berichte  der 
Berliner  AJcademie). 

Alcidamus  of  Elea,  Polus  ^  of  Agrigentum,  Lycophron,  and 
Protarchus  '^  are  named  as  pupils  of  Gorgias. 

Protagoras,  doubtless  the  most  important  of  the  Sophists, 
was  born  in  Abdera  in  480  or  somewhat  earlier.  It  can  be 
assumed  that  he  was  not  distant  in  his  views  from  the  school  of 
Atomists  in  that  city.  Considerably  younger  than  Leucippus, 
and  about  twenty  years  older  than  Democritus,  he  formed  the 
natural  connection  between  the  two  (see  §§  23,  31).  With 
keen  insight  into  the  needs  of  the  time,  and  much  admired  as  a 
teacher  of  wisdom,  he  was  one  of  the  first  to  make  an  extended 
tour  of  the  Grecian  cities.  He  was  in  Athens  many  times. 
In  411,  and  during  the  rule  of  the  four  hundred,  he  was  there 
for  the  last  time,  and  was  accused  of  atheism.  He  was  con- 
demned, and  upon  his  flight  to  Sicily  was  drowned.  The  titles 
(Diog.  Laert.,  IX.  55)  of  his  numerous  writings,  only  a  very 
few  of  which  are  preserved,  prove  that  he  dealt  with  the  most 
varied  subjects  in  the  domain  of  theory  and  practice.  Com- 
pare J.  Frei,  QucBstiones  Protagorece  (Bonn,  1845) ;  A.  J.  Vi- 
tringa,  De  Prot.  vita  et  philos.  (Grciningen,  1851).  Lately 
Th.  Gompertz  (Vienna  Session  Reports,  1890)  has  identified  a 
Sophistic  speech  with  the  Apology  of  Medicine  in  the  pseudo- 
Hippocratic  writing,  Trept  tc^vt/c,  and  has  noted  its  not  fully 
undoubted  connection  with  the  teaching  of  Protagoras. 

Antima^rus  of  Mende,  Archagoras,  P^uathlus,*  Theodorus  the 
mathematician,  and  in  a  wider  sense  Xeniades  of  Corinth  also 
are  to  be  regarded  as  pupils  of  Protagoras.  Eminent  citizens  of 
Athens,  like  Critias,  probably  Callicles,  or  poets  like  Evenus 
of  Paros,  etc.,  stood  in  a  less  intimate  connection  with  the 
Sophists. 

The  practical  and  political  aim  of  their  instruction  com- 
pelled the  Sophists  to  turn  aside  from  independent  nature 
study  and  metaphysical  speculation,  and  to  content  them- 
selves with  the  presentation,  in  popular  form,  of  such  the- 
ories only  when  they  were  called  for  or  appeared  effective.^ 

1  Plato,  Gorg.  2  pi^to,  Phileh. 

8  Plato,  Thecetetm. 

*  Many,  like  Gorgias,  rejected  this  as  perfectly  worthless.  See  Plato, 
Meno,  95  c. 


THE  GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT.  116 

The  peculiar  task  in  teaching  men  how  to  persuade  drove 
them,  on  the  other  hand,  to  interest  themselves  more  thor- 
oughly in  man,  especially  on  liis  psychological  side.  Who- 
ever endeavors  to  influence  man  by  speech  must  know 
something  of  the  genesis  and  development  of  his  ideas  and 
volitions.  While  earlier  science  with  naive  devotion  to 
the  outer  world  had  coined  fundamental  concepts  for  its 
knowledge  of  nature,  Soj)histry,  so  far  as  it  adopted  the 
methods  of  science,  turned  to  inner  experience,  and  com- 
pleted the  incomplete  earlier  philosophy  by  studying  the 
mental  life  of  man.  In  this  essentially  anthropological 
tendency,  sophistry  turned  philosophy  on  the  road  to 
subjectivism. 1 

This  new  kind  of  work  began  first  with  language.  The 
efforts  of  Prodicus  in  synonymy,  those  of  Hippias  in 
grammar,  were  in  this  direction.  Protagoras  was  especially 
fruitful  in  this  respect.  Persuaded  that  theory  without 
practice  was  as  little  useful  as  practice  ^  without  theory,  he 
connected  the  practical  teaching,  to  wliich  Gorgias  seems 
to  have  limited  himself,  with  ])hilological  investigations. 
He  concerned  himself  with  the  right  use  of  words,^  in  their 
genders,  tenses,  modes,^  etc. 

Compare  Lersch,  Die  Sprac/iphiJos.  deraltm.  I.  15  f. ;  Alberti, 
Die  SpracJiphilos.  vor  Platon  (Philol.,  1856) ;  Prantl,  Gesch.  tier 
Logik,  I.  14  f. 

Similar  small  beginnings  in  logic  appeared,  in  addition 
to  those  in   grammar.      That  teachers  of  oratory  should 

1  What  Cicoro  (Tusc,  V.  4,  10)  said  of  Socrates,  that  he  called 
philosophy  down  from  heaven  into  the  cities  and  houses,  is  ecjually 
true  for  the  entire  Greek  Enlightenment,  for  the  Sophists  as  well  as  for 
him. 

2  Stobseus   Florilegium,  29,  80. 
8  Plato,  PhcEdr.,  267  c. 

*  Diog.  Laert.,  IX.  53,  in  which  he  distinguished  fi^'^Xij,  epwrrjcTij, 
iiTr6xpT](Tis,  and  ivrokr]. 


116  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

reflect  how  a  thing  was  to  be  proved  and  controverted,  is 
obvious.  It  is  also  easily  credible  (Diog.  Laert.,  IX.  51  f.) 
that  Protagoras  had  his  attention  drawn  to  the  nature  of 
contradictory  propositions,  and  was  the  first  to  teach  the 
method  of  proof  (tu'^  Trpo?  raq  Oiarei'i  eTrt^eiprjaeis:).  Appar- 
ently formal  logic  sprang  up  here  as  an  art  of  argumen- 
tation, proof,  and  contradiction.  Of  how  far  it  was 
developed  in  details  by  the  Sophists,  we  unfortunately 
know  absolutely  nothing.^ 

We  are  better  informed  concerning  their  general  view 
of  human  knowledge.  The  less  the  Sophist  championed 
earlier  metaphysical  and  physical  learning,  and  the  more 
he  entertained  his  hearers  by  his  clever  opposition  to  it, 
and  the  more  vividly  again  instruction  presented  to  the 
consciousness  of  the  rhetorician  the  possibility  of  proving 
different  things  of  the  same  object,  so  much  the  more  con- 
ceivable is  it  that  these  men  lost  faith  in  any  universally 
valid  truth  or  in  the  possibility  of  any  certain  knowledge. 
Their  preoccupation  with  the  theory  of  knowledge  led,  as 
things  were,  by  a  psychological  necessity  to  skepticism. 

This  skepticism  is  the  theoretical  centre  of  Sophistry.  That 
this  degenerated  among  the  younger  Sophists  into  frivolous 
argumentation  should  not  lead  to  the  misconception  of  the 
scientific  seriousness  with  which  the  negative  epistemology  was 
developed,  especially  by  Protagoras.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
was  an  unhistoric  interpretation  for  those  in  modern  time,  fol- 
lowing Grote's  example,  to  celebrate  Protagoras  as  the  founder 
of  Positivism :  E.  Laas,  Idealismus  xmd  Po.siticismiis,  I. 
(Berlin,  1880)  var.  loe.  ;  W,  Halbfass,  Die  Berichte  des  Platon 
u.  Aristoteles  iiber  Protagoras  (Strassburg,  1882).     Opposed  to 

^  That  the  Aristotelian  logic  was  not  without  precedents,  literary  or 
in  the  form  of  practical  exercise,  may  be  taken  a  priori  as  extremely 
probable.  How  far  these  precedents  reached  cannot  be  determined 
from  the  very  few  indications  from  extant  literature  (see  particularly 
Plato's  (?)  dialogue  Sophist).  This  lack  of  evidence  is  one  of  the  most 
regrettable  deficiencies  in  the  history  of  Greek  science.  Compare 
Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Log.,  I.  11  f. 


THE   GREEK   ENLIGHTENMENT.  117 

this  is  P.  Natorp,  Forschungen  zu  Gesch.  des  Erknintnissprob- 
lems,  p.  1  f.,  149  f.  Compare  Fr.  Sattig,  Der  Protagoreische 
Seiisiialismus  in  Zeitschr.  f.  Philos.  (1885  f.).  Tlie  chief 
source  for  the  episteniology  of  Protagoras  is  Plato's  dialogue, 
ThecBtetus.  Yet  it  is  a  question  how  far  the  presentation 
developed  in  this  may  be  referred  to  Protagoras  himself.  The 
teaching  of  Gorgias  is  in  part  preserved  in  the  pseudo-Aristo- 
telian De  Jlelisso,  Zenone,  Gorgia,  c.  5  and  6  (§  17)  ;  and 
in  part  in  Sext.  Emp.  Adv.  math.,  VII.  65. 


In  order  to  establish  his  skeptical  belief  about  human 
knowledge,  Protagoras  made  the  eternal  flux  of  Hera- 
cleitus  his  point  of  departure.  But  he  emphasized  still 
more  than  Heracleitus  the  correlation,  in  which  every 
single  thing  does  not  so  much  exist,  as  momentarily  come 
into  existence,  through  its  relation  to  other  things.  From 
the  disavowal  of  absolute  Being  it  followed  that  qualities 
of  things  arise  only  out  of  the  temporary  effect  of  things  on 
one  another.  Quality  is  the  product  of  motion, ^  and  in- 
deed, as  Protagoras  in  a  purely  Heracleitan  manner  set 
forth,  always  of  two  corresponding  motions  but  in  opposite 
directions.  One  of  these  was  designated  as  activity,  the 
other  as  passivity .^  It  follows  that  in  general  it  can  never 
be  said  what  a  thing  is,  but  at  most  what  it  becomes  in  its 
changing  relation  to  other  things,'^  and  the  Protagorean  cor- 
relativeness  contained  a  still  greater  significance  in  apply- 
ing this  general  theory  of  motion  to  the  theory  of  human 
perception.      Whenever  a  thing  affects  one  of  our  senses, 

^  It  is  not  clear  from  the  TJiecctetutf  whether  and  how  Protagoras 
discussed  the  substratum  of  the  Kimjans.  Even  if  he  did  not  with 
Heracleitus  deny  it,  yet  he  regarded  it  at  any  rate  as  incognizable.  It 
is  conceivable  that  the  Abderite  Protagoras  developed  this  theory  in 
compliance  to  the  demands  of  Atomism,  in  which  shape  Democritus 
later  received  it  (§  32). 

2  Thecet.,  15G  f. 

8  Similarly  the  skeptical  statements  of  Xeniades  appear  to  have  been 
conceived.     Compare  Zeller,  I*.  988. 


118  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

in  which  the  motion  proceeding  ^  from  the  object  meets  a 
reacting  motion  of  the  organ,  there  then  arises  in  the  sense 
organ  the  perceptual  image,^  and  simultaneously  in  the 
thing,  the  quality  corresponding  ^  to  the  image.  Therefore 
every  perception  teaches  only  how  the  thing  appears  in  the 
moment  of  perception  for  the  perceiver,  and  indeed  for  him 
alone.  Now  for  Protagoras,  sense  perception  was  regarded 
as  the  only  source  of  knowledge  and  of  the  entire  mental 
life.*  Therefore  there  was  for  him  no  insight  into  the  Being 
of  things  over  and  above  those  relations ;  no  idea  of  what 
things  might  be  in  themselves  abstracted  from  perceptual 
relations.  Rather  is  everything  for  each  individual  ^  just 
what  it  appears  to  him  ;  but  it  is  such  only  to  that  indi- 
vidual, and,  more  exactly,  only  for  his  momentary  state  of 
perception.  The  well-known  statement*^' has  this  meaning: 
irdvTwv  y^prjfidrayv  fierpov  dvdpwTTO^,  twv  fiev  ovrcov  ft)?  ecrrt, 
roi)v  Be  ixrj  ovrcov  co?  ovk  ecniv. 

^  The  ability  of  the  different  objects  to  influence  the  different  sense 
organs  appears  already  to  have  led  Protagoras  to  his  theory  of  the 
different  velocities  of  movemofits  of  the  objects.  See  Thecet.,  156  c. 
With  this  reduction  of  the  quaHtatiye  to  the  quantitative,  Protagoras 
stood  entirely  in  the  school  ot-the  Ajtoinists  (§§  23  and  32). 

^  Under  this  term  the  sensations  ahd  also  the  feelings  are  classified  in 
the  Thecetetus  (156). 

3  That  the  aiadrjTOP  in  reality  arises  with  the  ala-Brfa-is,  is  an  addition 
presumably  of  those  who  had  extended  and  applied  the  theory  of  the 
Abderite  (according  to  the  Thecetetus).  For  such  an  assertion  carries 
one  far  beyond  the  bounds  of  skepticism.  This  cannot  apply  to 
Democritus. 

*  Whether  and  how  Protagoras  has  proved  and  explained  this  view 
{fxTjSev  (ivai  TTjv  yj^vxTju  napa  ras  aladrjads,  Diog.  Laert.,  IX.  51)  is  not 
known.  In  the  light  of  the  earlier  Rationalism  (§§  18-23)  this  sensa- 
tionalism seems  somewhat  unwarranted.  It  is  presaged  in  the  physio- 
logical psychology  of  the  later  nature  philosophy  (§  25). 

5  The  explanation  of  Thecetetus  (152  a)  does  not  permit  the  avBpamos 
in  this  well-known  sentence  to  refer  to  the  genus.  See  Arist.  Met.,  X.  6, 
1062  b,  13. 

6  Thecetetus,  152  a;  Sext.  Emp.  Adv.  math.,  VII.  60. 


THE   GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT.  119 

As  Protagoras  based  his  philosophy  upon  that  of  Hera- 
cleitus,  so  Gorgias  founded  his  upon  that  of  the  Eleatics. 
The  former  had  coucluded  that  to  all  opinion  there  is 
attached  a  relative,  but  to  none  an  absolute,  truth ;  the 
latter  sought  to  demonstrate  in  general  the  impossibility 
of  knowledge.  While,  however,  the  practical  investiga- 
tions of  Protagoras  enriched  philosophy  in  the  succeeding 
systems  of  Plato  and  Democritus,  the  argumentation  of 
Gorgias  was  developed  in  a  captious  and  sterile  dialectic. 
Gorgias  showed  :  (1)  Nothing  is.  That  which  is  not,  can- 
not be,  and  even  as  little  can  that  which  is.  For  that  which 
is,  cannot  be  thought  either  as  unoriginatcd  and  imperish- 
able or  as  originated  and  perishable  ;  neither  can  it  be 
thought  as  one  or  as  many,  nor  indeed  finally  as  moved, 
without  being  involved  in  obvious  contradictions.  The 
arguments  of  Zcno  are  everywhere  re-employed  here 
(§  20).  Moreover,  that  which  is  and  that  which  is  not  to 
exist  simultaneously,  is  impossible  (against  Heracleitns  ?). 
(2)  Were  there  something,  it  would  not  be  knowable  ;  for 
that  which  is  and  that  which  is  thought  must  be  differ- 
ent, —  otherwise  error  would  be  impossible.^  (3)  If  there 
were  knowledge,  it  could  not  be  communicated,  because 
communication  is  possible  only  by  means  of  signs,  which 
are  different  from  the  thing  itself.  There  is  no  warrant 
that  there  is  a  like  apprehension  of  these  signs  by  different 
individuals.^ 

Howsoever  seriously  and  scientifically  the  theories  of 
Skepticism  were  held,  even  by  Protagoras,  they  neverthe- 
less led  to  the  demoralization  of  science,  and  resulted  finally 
in  a  frivolous  diversion  in  daily  life.     Gorgias  had  found 

1  This  dialectic  is  more  finely  spun  out  in  the  dialogue  of  the  Sophist. 

2  One  is  almost  inclined  to  regard  these  paradoxes  of  this  anti-phdo- 
sophical  rhetorician  as  a  grotesque  persiflage  of  the  Eleatic  dialec^tic. 
At  all  events,  this  last  is  inevitably  and  fatally  involved  m  its  own 
toils. 


120  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

that  every  predication  of  a  subject  is  doubtful,^  if  indeed 
there  is  any  difference  whatever  between  subject  and  pred- 
icate. He  therefore  called  in  question  synthetic  judgments. 
Protagoras  himself  doubted  the  reality  of  mathematical 
knowledge.^  Euthydemus,  in  the  spirit  of  this  relativism,^ 
said  that  anything  is  suitable  to  everything ;  one  cannot 
err,  for  what  is  spoken  exists  also  as  a  something  thought.* 
One  cannot  contradict  himself ;  if  he  appears  to,  it  is  only 
because  he  is  speaking  of  a  different  thing,  and  so  on. 
Since  the  majority  of  the  Sophists  did  not  take  truth  seri- 
ously from  the  beginning,  their  entire  art  amounted  to  a 
dispute  with  formal  adroitness  pro  et  contra  over  anything 
whatsoever,  and  to  equipping  their  pupils  in  this  facility. 
Their  principal  aim  was  accordingly  to  be  able  to  confuse 
the  listener,  to  drive  him  into  making  absurd  answers,  and 
to  refute  one's  opponent. 

Protagoras  also  wrote  dvrtXoyiat  and  Kara^aX\ovT€<i ;  ^ 
and  the  practice  of  the  Sophists,  especially  in  later  time, 
in  trying  to  be  sensational,  consisted  simply  in  that  art, 
which  is  called  Eristic. 

Plato's  Euthydemus  describes  with  many  playful  witticisms 
the  method  of  Eristic  by  the  example  of  the  two  brothers 
Euthydemus  and  Dion3'sidoriis,  and  Aristotle  has  taken  the 
pains  to  arrange  s^'stematically  these  witticisms  in  the  last  book 
of  the  Topics  (yrepl  a-o<f)i(rTLKC)v  t'Acyxwv).  The  greater  number  of 
these  witticisms  are  puns.  The  ambiguit}'  of  the  words,  of  the 
endings,  of  tlie  s^'ntactical  forms,  etc.,  are  in  the  main  the  basis 
of  the  witticisms  (Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Ziog.,  I.  20  f.).  The  great 
favor  with  which  these  jokes  were  received  in  Greece,  and  espe- 

1  Sophist,  251  b. 

2  Arist.  Met.,  II.  2,  998  a,  3. 

'  Tcov  npos  Ti  flvai  rfiv  aXfjdfiav.     Sext.  Erap.  Adv.  math.,  VII.  60. 

*  Here  the  ambiguity  of  the  copula  also  plays  a  part.  Lycophron 
proposed  to  omit  the  copula. 

^  The  proposition  that  "  man  is  the  measure  of  all  things  "  is  cited  as 
the  beofinning  of  this  work,  and  at  the  same  time  as  the  beginning  of  a 
work,  called  a\f]d(ia,  which  perhaps  formed  the  first  part  of  it. 


THE   GREEK   ENLIGHTENMENT.  121 

cially  in  Athens,  is  explained  by  the  youthful  inclination  to 
quibble,  bj'  the  southron's  fondness  for  talking,  and  by  the 
awakening  of  reflective  criticism  upon  familiar  things  of  daily 
life. 

However,  this  facetious  method  was  unpromising  for  tlie 
serious  progress  of  science.  On  the  other  hand,  the  con- 
victionless  attitude  of  mind  that  the  Sophists  designedly  or 
undesignedly  encouraged  became  a  direct  menace  in  its 
application  upon  that  domain  in  which,  as  their  entire 
effort  showed,  they  were  alone  deeply  interested,  —  the 
ethico-political.  Since  the  time  of  the  Seven  Wise  Men 
(§  9),  the  content  of  moral  and  civil  laws  and  obedience  to 
them  had  been  a  common  subject  for  reflection.  But  the 
growing  individualism,  the  inspired  activity  of  the  Periclean 
age,  and  the  anarchy  of  the  Athenian  democracy  for  the 
first  time  brought  into  question  through  the  Sophists  the 
justification  of  these  norms.  Since  here  also  the  individual 
man  with  his  temporary  desires  and  needs  was  declared  to 
be  the  measure  of  all  things,  the  binding  power  of  the  law 
became  as  relatively  valid  as  theoretical  truth  had  been. 

See  H.  Sidgwick,  The  Sophists  (Journal  of  Philology,  1872, 
1873)  ;  A.  Harpf,  Die  Ethxk  des  Protayoras  (Heidelberg,  1884)  ; 
and  the  general  literature  concerning  the  Sophists  and  particu- 
larly that  concerning  Socrates.  Of  the  profounder  investigations 
in  which  the  more  important  Sophists  were  largely  engaged,  almost 
nothing  is  preserved  save  individual  remarks  and  striking  asser- 
tions. At  most  there  is  the  m3-th  of  Protagoras  in  the  dialogue 
of  that  name  (320  f.).  Perhaps  the  first  half  of  the  second  book 
of  the  Hepuhlic  refers  also  to  something  of  the  same  sort.  Per- 
haps the  Sophists  suffer  in  this  domain,  as  in  theory,  from  tlio 
fact  that  we  are  instructed  concerning  them  only  from  their 
opponents.^ 

The  most  important  point  of  view  which  the  Sophists  in 
this  respect  set  up  appeared  in  their  contrast  of  the  natural 

^  There  is  also  a  fragment  found  by  Fr.  Blass  (Univera.  Schrijt.  Kiel., 
1889)  in  Jamblichus,  Protreptiax  orationes  a  1  philosophiam,  ch.  20,  who 
attributed  it  to  the  Sophist  Antiphon^  


122  HISTORY   OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  social  condition  of  man.  From  reflection  upon  the 
difference  and  change  not  only  of  legal  prescriptions  but 
also  of  social  rules,^  the  Sophists  concluded  that  at  least  a 
greater  part  of  these  had  been  established  by  convention 
through  human  statute  (deaei,  sive  vofxw)  ;  and  that  only 
such  laws  were  universally  binding  as  were  established  in 
all  men  equally  by  nature  ((^yo-et).  The  natural  therefore 
appeared  to  be  of  the  greater  worth,  —  more  nearly  per- 
manent and  more  binding  than  the  social.  Natural  law 
seemed  higher  than  historic  positive  law.  The  more  se- 
rious Sophists  endeavored  then  further  to  strip  off  from 
natural  morality  and  natural  laws  the  mass  of  convention- 
alities: Protagoras''^  taught  that  justice  and  conscience 
(hiKT)  and  alBm')  are  the  gifts  of  the  gods,  and  are  common 
to  all  men ;  but  neither  this  nor  the  assertion  of  Hippias, 
that  "law"  violently  drives^  man  to  many  things  that  are 
contrary  to  "  nature,"  sets  up  any  thoroughgoing  and  neces- 
sary opposition  between  the  two  legislations.  But  the 
more  the  theory  of  the  Sophists  conceived  of  "nature"  as 
"  human  nature,"  and  as  "  human  nature "  limited  to  its 
physical,  impulsive,  and  individual  aspect,  so  much  the  more 
did  "law"  appear  a  detriment  and  a  limitation  of  the  nat- 
ural man.  Archelaus,  the  pupil  of  Anaxagoras,  declared 
that  social  differences  do  not  arise  from  "  Nature."  They 
are  conventional  determinations  (ou  (^vaet,  aWa  v6fia))A 
Plato  ^  has  Callicles  develop  the  theory  that  all  laws  are 
created  by  the  stronger,  and  these  laws,  on  account  of  need 
of  protection,  the  weaker  accept.    He  ^  puts  into  the  mouth 

^  Compare  Hippias  in  Xen.  Mem.,  IV.  4,  14  f. 
^  In  his  myth  reproduced  by  Plato. 

'  Plato,  Prot.,  337  c.     Similarly,  but  somewhat  more  brusquely,  Cat 
licles  expresses  himself  in  Plato^  Gorgias,  482  f. 

*  Diog.  Laert.,  II.  16. 

*  Lqc.  cit. 

«  Republic,  1,  338f, 


THE   GREEK   ENLIGHTENMENT.  123 

of  Thrasymachus  of  Chalcedon  a  naturalistic  psychology  of 
legislation,  according  to  which  the  ruler  in  a  natural  body 
politic  would  establish  laws  for  his  own  advantage.  In 
this  spirit  Sophistry  contended,  in  part  from  the  point  of 
view  of  "  natural  right,"  in  part  from  that  of  absolute 
anarchy,  against  many  existing  institutions:^  not  only  as 
the  democratic  Lycophron  against  every  privilege  of  the 
nobility,  or  as  Alcidamus  against  so  fundamental  a  prin- 
ciple of  ancient  society  as  was  slavery,  but  finally  even 
against  all  custom  and  all  tradition.^  The  independence 
of  individual  judgment,  which  the  Enlightenment  pro- 
claimed, shattered  the  rule  of  all  authority  and  dissipated 
the  content  of  social  consciousness. 

In  the  attacks  which  already  science  in  its  more  serious 
aspects  had  directed  against  religious  ideas,  it  is  obvious 
that  religious  authority  also  would  be  swept  away  with  the 
flood  of  the  Sophistic  movement.  All  shades  of  religious 
freethinking  are  met  with  in  Sophistic  literature:  — every- 
thing, from  the  cautious  skepticism  of  Protagoras,  who 
claimed'^  to  know  nothing  of  the  gods,  to  the  naturalistic 
and  anthropological  explanations  of  Critias^  and  Prodicus^ 
as  to  belief  in  the  gods,  and  even  to  the  outspoken  atheism 
of  a  certain  Diagoras  ^  of  Melos. 

27.  Against  the  destructive  activity  of  the  Sophists  ap- 
peared the  powerful  personality  of  Socrates,  who  stood 
indeed  with  his  opponents  upon  the  common  ground  of  the 
Enlightenment,  and  like  them  raised  to  a  principle  the  inde- 

1  To  some  extent  with  positive  propositions  whose  authors,  according 
to  Aristotle  {Pol.,  II.  8  &  7),  were  Hippodamus  and  a  certain  Phaleas, 

2  Compare  Arist.  Pol,  I.  3,  12.73  b,  20. 

8  By  reason  of  the  vagueness  of  tlie  object  and  the  brevity  of  human 
hfe;  compare  Diog.  Laert.,  IX.  51. 

*  Compare  the  verse  in  Sext.  Emp.,  IX.  54. 
^  Cic.  De  natura  deorum,  I.  42,  118. 
6  Compare  Zeller,  I*.  864,  1. 


124  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

pendent  reflection  concerning  everything  given  by  tradition 
and  custom.  But  at  the  same  time  he  was  unshaken  in 
the  conviction  that  through  reflection  a  universally  valid 
truth  could  certainly  be  found. 

The  reports  of  Xenophon/  Plato,  and  Aristotle  are  the  chief 
sources  of  our  knowledge  concerning  Socrates.  The  remarkably 
different  light  that  is  cast  from  such  different  men  upon  this 
great  personality  makes  him  stand  out  in  plastic  distinctness. 
Xenophon  saw  more  of  the  sober,  practical,  and  popular  side  of 
the  life  aud  character  of  the  man.  Plato,  on  the  contrary,  beheld 
the  height  of  his  imagination,  the  depth  of  his  spiritual  being, 
his  elevating  influence  on  youthful  and  highly  gifted  minds.  See 
S.  Ribbing,  Ueher  das  Verhiiltniss  zwischen  d.  xenophontischen 
u.  d.  platonischen  Berichten  iiber  d.  PersonUchkeit  %i.  d.  Lehre 
d.  Sokrates  (Upsala,  1870).  Xenophon's  representation,  so  far 
as  the  author's  knowledge  goes,  is  one  of  historic  fidelity,  but 
it  was  strongly  under  the  iuflueuce  of  Cynic  party  prejudice. 
Plato's  writings,  however,  place  iu  the  mouth  of  Socrates  less 
often  Socrates'  teachings  (only  in  the  Apology  and  the  earliest 
dialogues)  than  the  consequences  that  Plato  has  drawn  out  of 
them.  Aristotle's  teaching  is  everywhere  authoritative  as  re- 
gards the  teachings  of  Socrates ;  for,  following  Socrates  by  some- 
what of  an  interval,  and  uninfluenced  by  personal  relationship, 
he  was  able  to  set  iu  clear  light  the  essential  features  of  Socrates' 
scientific  work. 

H.  Kochly,  Sokrates  n.  sein  Volk  (in  Acad.  Vortr.  n.  Red.,  I. 
219  f.);  E.  V.  Lasaulx,  Des  Sokrates  Leben,  Lehre  vnd  Tod 
(Muuchen,  1857)  ;  M.  Carriere,  Sokrates  u.  seine  Stelhmg  in 
der  Gesch.  des  menschUchen  Geistes  (in  Westermann's  Monats- 
hejfen,  1864)  ;  E.  Alberti,  SokrcUes,  ein  VersucJi  ilber  ihn  nach 
den  Quellen  (Gottingen,  1869);  E.  Chaignet,  Vie  de  Sokrate 
(Paris,  1868)  ;  A.  Labriola,  La  doctrina  di  Sokrate  (Neapel, 
1871)  ;  A.FomWee, La philos.  de  Sokrate  (Paris,  1873)  ;  A.Krohn, 
Sokrate  doctrina  e  Platonis  repuhlica  iUustrata  (Halle,  1875); 
Windelband,  Sokrates  (in  Praeludien,  p.  54  f.)  ;  K.  Joel,  Der 
echte  u.  der  xenophontische  Sokrates,  I.  (Leipzig,  1892). 

1  The  Memorabilia  are  essential  for  our  consideration  of  this  (see  A. 
Krohn,  Soc.  u.  Xen.,  Halle,  1874).  So  is  the  Symposium.  The  question 
as  to  the  priority  of  the  Symposium  of  Xenophon  or  the  Symposittm  of 
Plato  is  not  yet  fully  decided  in  favor  of  the  former,  but  is  of  late 
accepted.  Compare  Ch.  V.  Compare  Sander,  Bemerkungen  zu  Xeno- 
phon's Berichten,  etc.  (Magdeburg,  1884). 


THE   GREEK   ENLIGHTENMENT.  125 

Socrates  was  born  in  Athens  a  little  before  469,^  the  son 
of  Sophroniscus,  a  sculptor,  and  Phaenarete.  He  learned 
the  trade  2  of  his  father,  and  discriminatingly  absorbed  the 
various  elements  of  culture  of  his  time,  without  a])plying 
himself  to  properly  erudite  studies.  Acquaintance  with  the 
methods  of  instruction  of  the  Sopliists  awoke  in  him  the  con- 
viction of  the  dangerousness  of  their  tendencies.  Against 
them  he  felt  himself  called  by  divine  direction^to  a  serious 
examination*  of  himself  and  his  fellow-citizens,  and  to  un- 
remitting labor  in  the  direction  of  moral  perfection.  He 
was  moved  by  a  deep  religious  spirit  and  an  exalted  moral 
sense  in  his  investigations.  He  shared  with  his  contem- 
poraries an  immediate  interest  in  those  investigations;  and 
his  own  peculiar  activity,  whicli  began  in  Athens  as  early 
as  the  commencement  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,^  rests 
upon  these.  He  belonged  to  no  school,  and  it  was  foreign 
to  his  purpose  to  found  one.  AVith  spontaneous  feeling, 
he  sought  on  the  broad  public  field,  which  Athenian  life 
offered,  intellectual  intercourse  with  every  one.  His  extra- 
ordinary exterior,^  his  dry  humor,  his  ready  and  trium- 
phant repartee  brought  him  into  universal  notice.  His 
geniality,  however,  and  the  fine  spiritual  nature  which  lay 
hidden  in  his  astonisliing  sliell,'  the  unselfishness  which 
he  manifested  unstintedly  toward  his  friends,  exei'cised  an 
irresistible  charm  upon  all  the  remarkable  personalities  of 
the  time,  especially  upon  the  better  elements  of  the  Athe- 

^  He  was  at  his  death  (39!))  over  seventy  years  ohl. 

2  Concerning  a  piece,  later  on  pointed  out  as  one  upon  which  tlie 
young  Socrates  was  said  to  have  wrought,  see  P.  Schuster,  Ueber  die 
Portrats  (ler  griech.  Philos.  (Leipzig,  1877). 

3  Plato.  Apol,  33  c. 

*  e^era^dv  efxavrov  Koi  rovi  aXKovs  '•  ibid.,  28  e. 

^  The  production  of  the  Clouds,  423,  attests  his  popularity. 

*  The  humorous  characterization  of  his  own  Silcnus  shape  is  in  Xeno- 
phon's  Symposium,  4,  19  f. 

'  Compare  the  beautiful  speech  of  Alcibiades  in  Plato,  Sytnposium, 
215  f. 


126  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

niaii  youth.  While  he  in  this  way  obeyed  higher  duty  to 
the  neglect  ^  of  home  cares,  in  free  fellowship  a  circle  of 
admirers  formed  itself  around  him  in  which  especially  the 
aristocratic  youth  were  represented  in  men  like  Alcibiades. 
He  held  himself  as  far  away  from  political  activity  as  pos- 
sible, but  the  unavoidable  duties  of  the  citizen  of  a  state  he 
performed  with  simple  integrity .^ 

At  the  age  of  seventy  Socrates  was  accused  of  "  cor- 
rupting the  youth  and  introducing  new  gods."  The  charges 
arose  originally  from  low  personal  motives,^  but  became 
serious  through  political  complications,*  in  that  the  aristo- 
cratically inclined  philosopher,  as  the  most  popular  and 
active  "  Sophist,"  was  to  be  made  answerable  for  moral 
degeneration  by  the  democratic  reactionary  party.  Not- 
withstanding he  would  have  been  freed  with  a  small  pen- 
alty ^  if  he  himself  had  not  offended  ^  the  Heliasts  by  his 
caudid  pride  in  his  yirtue.  The  execution  of  the  sentence 
of  death  was  delayted  thirty  days  by  the  Oeotpia  to  Delos, 
and  Socrates  disdained  in  his  loyalty  '  to  law  the  flight  so 
easily  possible  to  him.  He  drank  the  cup  of  hemlock  in 
May ,8  399. 

^  Concerning  Xantippe,  whose  name  has  become  proverbial,  see 
E.  Zeller,  Zur  Ehrenrettung  tier  Xan.  (in  Vorlrag  uml  Ahhandhmg, 
I.  p.  51   f). 

2  He  made  three  campaigns,  and  showed  himself,  as  prvtanis,  just  and 
fearless  against  the  excited  minds  of  the  masses  (see  Plato,  ApnL,  32  f.). 

8  The  accusers  Meletus,  Anytus,  and  Lycon  acted  out  of  personal 
animosity,  unless  they  Avere  men  of  straw  (K.  F.  Hermann,  De  Soc.  accu- 
satoribus,  Gottingen,  1854). 

*  See  Grote,  History  of  Greece,  VIIT.  551  f. 

5  The  verdict  of  "  guilty  "  was  carried  only  by  a  majority  of  three  or 
thirty  ;  the  sentence  of  death  had  a  much  larger  majority  (more  than 
eighty). 

*  The  Apology  of  Plato  may  be  taken  as  authentic  in  its  essentials. 
'  Compare  Plato's  dialogue,  the  Crito. 

*  In  respect  to  the  external  circumstances  of  the  day  of  his  death, 
Plato's  dialogue,  the  PhcBffo,  is  certainly  historical,  although  Plato  in  it 


THE  GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT.  127 

An  instructor  in  philosophy,  in  the  strict  sense  of  tlie  term, 
Socrates  did  not  have.  He  called  himself  (Xen.  Symposium^ 
1,  5)  avTorpyds.  But  apparently  he  had  become  familiar  with 
many  of  the  scientific  theories,  especially  with  those  of  Hera- 
cieitus  and  Anaxagoras,  not  only  through  tlie  discourses  of  the 
Sophists  but  through  his  own  readings.  (Compare  K.  F.  Her- 
mann, De  S.  7?i(u/istris  et  disciplina  Jnreriili,  Marburg,  1837.) 
Tlie  process  of  development  portra3ed  in  the  Pficedo  is  scarcely 
historical,  but  can  be  looked  upon  as  a  sketch  of  the  Platonic 
theory  of  ideas.      (Compare  Zeller,  II*.  51.) 

Xenophon,  as  well  as  Plato,  makes  Socrates  meet  persons  of 
ever}'  position,  caUing,  and  political  complexion  in  his  conver- 
sations. His  relation  to  young  men  was  an  ethically  pedagogical 
and  morally  spiritual  ennoblement  of  tlie  Grecian  love  for  boys. 
Among  the  men  who  made  his  popular  philosophical  method 
their  own  are  to  be  named  :  Xenophon,  who  stood  very  near  to 
the  Cynics  (compare  F.  Dlimmler,  Autisthenica,  Berl.,  1882,  and 
Academica,  Giessen,  1889)  ;  also  ^schines  (not  the  orator), 
who  wrote  dialogues  in  the  same  spirit  (K.  F.  Hermann,  De 
^sch.  Socratici  reliquiis  (Gottingen,  1850)  :  and  the  almost 
mythical  shoemaker  Simon  (see  Biickh,  Simonis  Socraticis 
dialogic  Heidelberg,  1810,  and  E.  Heitz  in  O.  Mliller's  Lit- 
teraturgeschichte,  IP.  2,  25,  note  2). 

The  legal  measures  against  Socrates  are  open  to  the  most 
different  constructions.  The  old  view  that  the  philosopher  was 
ruined  through  intrigues  of  the  Sophists  may  be  regarded  as 
given  up, and  also  the  conception  originated  by  Hegel  {Ccmiplete 
Works,  II.  560  f.,XIV.  81  f),  according  to  which,  as  in  a  tragedy, 
Socrates  was  the  champion  of  the  higher  Idea,  and  was  ruined 
by  his  unavoidable  crime  of  offending  the  establislied  laws.  These 
great  antitheses  play  no  part  in  the  trial.  It  appears,  rather,  that 
through  personal  and  political  intrigues  Socrates  became  a 
sacrifice  for  the  discontent  which  the  democratic  reaction  fostered 
against  the  entire  Enlightenment.  Although  presumably  unin- 
tentionally, nevertheless  Aristophanes  did  a  decided  injury  to 
the  philosopher  in  his  caricature  of  him  in  the  Clouds,^  in  that 
he  stamped  him  in  the  public  mind  as  a  type  of  precisely  those 
Sophistic  excesses  which  Socrates  fought  most  vigorously. 
(Compare  H.  Th.  Rotscher,  Aristophanes  und  seine  Zeitalter, 

goes  far  beyond  Socrates  in  his  theory  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul 
(compare  ApoL,  40  c)  not  only  in  his  presentation  of  evidence,  but  as  to 
his  personal  conviction. 

1  Compare  especially  H.  Diels,  Verh.  d.  Stett.  Phil.  Vers.,  1880, 
iOGf. 


128  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

Berlin,  1817;  Brandis,  in  the  Rh,  Mas.,  1828;  P.  W.  Foreh- 
hammer,  Die  Athener  und  /Soc,  Berlin,  1837;  Bendixen,  Ueber 
den  tieferen  Schriftsinn^  etc.  (Husiim,  1838.) 

The  theory  of  knowledge  of  the  Sophists  had  led  in  all 
its  parts  to  a  relativism  of  individual  opinions.  The  effort, 
on  the  other  hand,  for  a  stable  and  universally  valid  knowl- 
edge formed  the  central  point  of  the  activity  of  Socrates. 
The  i7n(TT7Jfir}  was  set  in  antithesis  to  the  86^at  by  him ; 
yet  the  iTna-njfir)  is  not  a  complete,  erudite  possession  to  be 
handed  down,  but  an  ideal  to  be  striven  for  in  work  in  com- 
mon with  other  men. 

Fr.  Schleierraacher.  Uebtr  d.  Wert  des  Sokrates  als  Philos.  in 
Ges.  JVerk,  III.  2,  287  ff. 

Socrates  did  not  try,  therefore,  to  impart  knowledge  or 
to  give  purely  formal  instruction,  but  to  engage  in  a  mutual 
seeking  for  truth.  The  basis  of  this  was  the  conviction 
that  such  a  norm  of  truth  existed  paramount  to  individual 
opinion.  Therefore  his  activity  found  its  necessary  form 
in  the  dialogue,  the  conversation  in  which,  through  the 
exchange  of  opinions  and  through  mutual  criticism  of  these, 
that  should  be  found  which  is  recognizable  by  all.  While 
the  Sophists  studied  the  psychological  mechanism  by  which 
opinions  come  to  be,  Socrates  had  faith  in  a  law  of  reason 
that  determines  the  truth.  His  whole  endeavor  was  only 
a  continuous  invitation  to  his  fellow-citizens  to  help  him  in 
this  search.  His  confession  of  his  ignorance  ^  signified  this, 
while  he  also  at  the  same  time  herein  intimated-  his 
failure  to  attain  his  ideal  of  aoipia.  Yot  he  demanded  the 
same  measure  of  self-knowledge^  also  from  others.      For 

1  Plato,  ApoL,  21  f. ;  Si/mp.,  216  d. 

2  Compare  Plato,  Symp.,  203  f.  In  this  connection  the  term  (^tXoa-tx^i'a 
wins,  as  contrasted  with  the  more  pretentious  aofjila  (aocfmrrfis),  its  pecu- 
liar meaning,  "  striving  for  knowledge."     See  Ueberweg,  p.  2. 

'  Compare  the  oracular  yvS>di  atavrov,  Xen.  Mem..  IV.  24  f. ;  Plato, 
Apol.,  21  f. 


THE   GREEK  EXLIGHTENME^T.  129 

nothing  more  dangerous  blocked  the  way  of  wisdom  than 
that  conceited  affectation  of  wisdom  which  the  Sophistic 
half-education  developed  in  the  majority  of  minds.  There- 
fore his  conversation  analyzed  with  exasperating  logic  the 
opinion  which  at  the  outset  he  elicited  from  others,  and  in 
this  superior  manipulation  of  the  dialectic  consisted  the 
Socratic  irony.^  But  after  removing  this  impediment 
Socrates,  in  leading  the  conversation,  sought  to  draw  out 
gradually  what  was  common  to  the  participants.  In  the 
persuasion  that  serious  reflection  could  find  such  a  common 
thought,  he  "  delivered"  the  slumbering  thought  from  the 
mind  ;  and  this  art  he  called  his  maieutic.^ 

The  method  of  the  Socratic  investigation  corresponded, 
in  point  of  content  also,  to  this  external  schema.  He  set 
the  concept  as  the  goal  ^  of  scientific  work  over  against 
the  single  ideas  given  by  individual  perception.  When 
therefore  Socrates  in  general  aimed  at  definition,  he 
came  into  contact  with  the  efforts  of  the  Sophists  *  who  had 
busied  themselves  in  fixing  the  meanings  of  words.  But 
lie  on  his  part  went  much  deeper,  in  the  hope  of  grasping 
the  essence  of  fact  and  the  law  governing  single  cases  and 
relationships  by  the  application  of  this  universal  principle. 
In  making  the  answer  to  the  particular  question  from  which 
the  conversation  proceeded  depend  ^  on  the  general  defini- 
tion to  be  sought,  he  was  making  man  conscious  of  the  law 
of  logical  dependence  of  the  particulars  upon  the  universal, 
and  exalting  that  law  to  the  principle  of  the  scientific 
method.     In  the  search  for  universal  concepts  Socrates  still 

1  Plato,  Rep.,  I.  337  a. 

2  With  reference  to  the  profession  of  his  motlier;  Plato,  Thecet.,  149  f. 

3  Arist.  Met.,  XII.  4,  1078  b,  17  :  ro  oplCffrBai  Ka66\ov.  The  tech- 
nical expression  for  the  concept  is,  in  this  connection.  Xo'yos. 

*  Particulai  ly  -with  Prodicus,  with  -whom  his  relations  were  uniformly 
friendly. 

5  Xen.  Mem.,  IV.  13. 

9 


130  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

remained  strongly  fixed  in  the  habits  of  naive  reflection. 
For  the  inductive  procedure,  the  introduction  of  which  is 
accredited  to  him,^  consisted  in  the  comparison  of  arbitra- 
rily collated  particular  cases,  by  means  of  which,  however, 
a  complete  induction  could  not  be  guaranteed.  But,  never- 
theless, the  Socj-atic  method  was  a  distinct  advance  over  the 
entirely  unmethodical  generalizations,  which  earlier  think- 
ers had  drawn  from  single  observations  or  thought  motifs. 
It  began,  moreover,  to  set  a  methodical  treatment  in  the 
place  of  ingenious  fancies. 

P.  J.  Ditges,  Die  epagogische  Methode  des  S.  (Cologne, 
1864)  ;  J.  J.  Guttiiiann,  Ueber  den  wissenschaftlichen  Stand- 
pmikt  des  S.  (Brieg,  1881).  Examples  of  the  Soeratic  method 
are  to  be  found  in  the  Memorabilia  of  Xenophon  and  in  most 
of  the  dialogues  of  Plato.  Socrates  did  not  advance  to  a  defi- 
nite formulation  of  methodical  principles,  but  his  entire  activity 
has  given  them  distinctly  the  character  of  an  inspired  insight. 

The  realm  to  which  Socrates  applied  this  method  of  the 
inductive  definition  of  concepts  included  —  as  in  the  case 
of  the  Sophists — essentially  the  problems  of  human  life. 
For,  as  his  search  for  conceptual  truth  was  rooted  in  the 
strength  of  his  moral  conviction,  science  and  moral  self- 
culture  were  to  him  in  the  last  instance  identical.  The 
universally  valid  truth,  which  he  said  was  to  be  found  by 
means  of  conversation,  is  the  clearness  and  certainty  of 
moral  consciousness. 

The  limitation  of  philosoph}'  to  ethics,  and  on  the  other  hand 
the  establishment  of  scientific  ethics,  passed  even  in  antiquity 
as  the  essential  characteristic  of  the  Socratic  teaching.  (See 
Zeller,  II*.  132  f. ).  Neither  the  poetic  license,  with  which 
Aristophanes  (in  the  Clouds)  made  of  him  a  star-gazer,  nor  the 
passages  in  the  later  Platonic  dialogues  (Phcedo  and  Philebus), 
in  which  a  teleological  nature-philosophy  is  put  into  his  mouth, 
nor,  finally,  the  very  homely  utilitarian  theory,  presumably  after- 
ward revised  ^  by  the  Stoics,  which  the  Memorabilia  makes  him 

1  Arist.  Met.,  1.  c.         ^  gge  a.  Krohn,  Xen.  u.  Soc.  (Halle,  1874}, 


THE  GREEK  ENLIGHTENxMENT.  131 

develop,  — none  of  these  can  have  weight  against  the  very  defi- 
nite expressions  of  Xenophon  {Mem.,  I.  1,  11)  and  Aristotle 
{Met.,  J.  6,  987  b,  2).  On  the  other  liand,  his  aversion  to 
natural  science  was  not  in  the  spirit  of  Skepticism,  but  due  to 
the  deficienc}'  of  science  in  ethical  value.  A  universal  faith  in 
the  teleological  arrangement  of  the  world  and  in  a  J*rovidence 
over  mankind  remained  side  by  side  with  this  aversion.  See  con- 
clusion in  Plato's  Apology,  in  Euthyphro,  etc. 

In  this  specific  ethical  turn,  Socrates  followed,  liowever, 
a  psychological  principle,  which  expresses  the  rationalistic 
character  of  the  Enlightenment  in  its  purity.  It  is  the 
formula  of  the  identity  of  virtue  and  knowledge.^  In  the 
complicated  relationships  of  civilized  life  the  habitual  ol> 
servance  of  national  conventions  had  become  insufficient. 
In  the  confusion  of  public  life,  where  one  thing  was  com- 
mended here,  another  there,  every  one  felt  that  he  needed 
knowledge  and  judgment  for  making  correct  decisions. 
In  the  increasing  competition  in  civilization  tlie  well-in- 
formed ^  man  proved  himself  to  be  the  abler  in  all  depart- 
ments of  life.  Socrates  expressed  himself  most  clearly  as 
to  this  condition,  when  he,  applying  the  case  to  morals, 
declared  that  true  virtue  consists  in  knowing,  and  that  right 
knowing  leads  always  of  itself  to  right  acting.  Thereby 
to  know  the  Good  was  elevated  to  the  essence  of  morality 
and  reflection  to  the  principle  of  living.  Philosophy,  as 
Socrates  understood  it,  was  the  independent  meditation  of 
reasoning  man  upon  that  law  of  goodness  valid  for  all 
alike.  Knowledge  is  a  moral  possession,  and  the  common 
striving  for  it  he  designated  as  a  process  of  mutual  help- 
fulness^ under  the  name  e'/oo)?.     On  the  other  hand,  this 

1  See  Xen.  Mem.,  Til.  9,  4. 

2  Ibid.,  9,  10  ff. 

2  This  is  the  Socratic  concept  of  tpcos,  whose  extreme  importance 
appears  in  the  fact  that  not  only  J'hito  and  Xenophon,  but  also  other 
friends  within  the  Socratic  circle,  have  written  ahout  it.  Compare 
Brandis,  Handbuch,  II.  1,  C4. 


132  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHY. 

point  of  view  involved  a  deterministic  and  intellectual  con- 
ception of  the  will,  which  makes  moral  excellence  depend- 
ent upon  intellectual  culture,  and  in  general  the  decision  of 
will  exclusively  dependent  on  the  clearness  and  ripeness 
of  the  insight.  When  he  asserted  that  all  evil  action  pro- 
ceeds only  out  of  a  deficient  insight,^  this  is  the  same  as 
proclaiming  entirely  in  the  spirit  of  the  Enlightenment  that 
knowledge  is  the  ethical  ideal.  For  Socrates  all  other 
virtues  accord  with  the  fundamental  virtue,  iiriar^/xT],^ 
and  possessing  this  all  the  others  are  attainable  and 
teachable.  The  process  begun  at  the  time  of  the  Seven 
Wise  Men  was  completed  in  these  definitions  of  Socrates  ; 
and  the  norms  of  universal  consciousness,  after  they  had  for 
a  time  been  imperilled  by  individual  criticism,  during  the 
wild  anarchy  of  opinions  were  again  found  by  rational  re- 
flection and  by  the  recognition  of  the  universal  validity 
therein  involved. 

The  question  of  the  teachableness  of  virtue  is  treated  in  a  most 
engaging  dialectic  in  the  dialogue  Protagonts^  while  the  other 
dialogues  of  Plato's  earliest  period  have  for  their  common  theme 
the  reduction  of  the  single  virtues  to  the  fundamental  virtue  of 
knowledge.  These  are  EiUhyphro^  Zidches,  Charrnidex^  and 
Lysis.  Compare  F.  Dittrich,  De  S.  sententid  virhitem  esse 
selentiani  (Braunsherg,  1868)  and  particuhirh-  T.  Wildauer, 
Die  Psycliolofjie  des  Willens  hex  Sokrates^  Platon  nnd  Aris- 
toteles,  Part  I.  (Innsbruck,  1877).  Besides,  the  determinism  of 
Socrates  stands  in  a  close  relation  to  his  eudaemonism  (see 
below).  For  the  proposition  that  no  one  will  freely  do  wrong 
is  founded  upon  the  same  basis  with  that  proposition  that  if 
one  has  recognized  what  is  good  for  him  it  would  be  impossible 
for  him  to  choose  tlie  opposite  against  his  own  interest.  Com- 
pare Xen.  Meui.,  IV.  G,  6;  Arist.  3Iagn.  Moral.,  I.  9,  1187  a, 
17. 

In  the  realm  of  ethics,  moreover,  Socrates  stopped  at 
this   most   general    suggestion  without   developing  syste- 

1  Xen.  Mem.,  III.  9. 

2  In  Xenophon  one  still  finds  the  word  <jo<^'ia  for  this  ;  see  Mem., 

in.  9. 


THE   GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT.  133 

inatically  that  kind  of  knowing  ( Wissen}  in  which  vir- 
tue was  said  to  consist.  For  the  distinctive  trait  of  tlie 
activity  of  Socrates  was  that  he  never  lost  sight  of  the 
given  conditions.  Therefore  the  question,  "  What  then  is 
the  Good  ? "  always  became  the  question  as  to  what  is 
the  Good  in  a  particular  respect  and  for  a  particular  indi- 
vidual ;  ^  and  the  answer  was  always  found  in  the  suitable, 
in  that  which  perfectly  satisfies  the  striving  of  man  and 
makes  him  happy.  According  to  the  grosser  ^  interpreta- 
tion of  Xenophon,  Socrates'  ethical  theory  was  utilitarian- 
ism, and  the  value  of  virtue  founded  on  knowing  sank  to 
the  prudential  cleverness  of  acting  in  every  case  according 
to  correct  knowledge  {Erkenntnis)  of  ex{)ediency.  The  finer 
presentation  of  Plato  refers,  liowever,  this  o}(f>e\ifjiovi  which 
is  assumed  as  identical  with  koXov  and  dya66v,  to  the 
health  of  the  soul,^  to  its  furtherance  toward  a  true  state 
of  perfection.  In  both  cases,  nevertheless,  intellectual 
virtue  is  identified  with  happiness."*  Right  action,  towaid 
which  insight  guides,  makes  man  happy.  The  fundamental 
conception  of  ethics  in  Socrates  is  thoroughly  eiida^monis- 
tic,  and  ancient  philosophy  did  not  pass  beyond  this  point. 

Compare  M.  Heinze,  Der  Eii(lanw)nsmiis  in  der  griech. 
Philos.  (Leipzig,  1883)  ;  Zellcr,  II*.  141)  f.  In  all  particulars 
the  Socratic  morals  i-emained  essentially  within  the  compass  of 
Greek  social-consciousness. ^     It  sought  to  Ihid  a  basis  in  the 

1  Mem.,  TIT.  8. 

2  In  whose  writinfis,  in  one  passage,  it  would  appear  that  Socrates 
afireed  in  morals  with  the  relativism  of  the  Soj)hists :  Mem.,  III.  8, 
■navra  dyada   Ka\  KaXci   (art  irpos  a  av  fv  '()(]],  koku  fie  Kai  alaxpa  Trpos  a  av 

KaKWS- 

^  Particularly  note  the  representation  of  the  PJuedo. 

4  Xen.  Mem.,  IV.  1,  2. 

^  To  be  excepted  is  only  the  prohibition  of  doing  evil  to  an  enemy. 
If  here  the  contradiction  between  Plato's  and  Xeno])hon's  representa- 
tions is  irreconcilable,  wc  arc  inclined  to  re-zard  Plato's  report  as  the 
true  one:  for  the  Crilo,  which  treats  this  prohibition  as  one  already  long 


134  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

reverent  recognition  of  divine  law  and  established  usage.  Par- 
ticularl}'  Socrates  himself,  tlie  model  of  noble  and  pure  morals, 
gave  high  place  to  civic  virtue,  to  submission  to  tlie  laws  of  the 
state.  In  the  state,  however,  he  would  have  not  tlie  masses,  but 
the  good  and  intelligent,  rule  (Xen.  Mem.,  III.  9,  10). 

Socrates  personally  supplemented  his  indifference  to 
metaphysical  and  physical  theories  by  a  deep  and  religious 
piety,  which  led  him  to  believe  in  the  rule  of  the  divine  es- 
sence in  nature  and  in  human  life.  He  likewise  supple- 
mented the  rationalistic  one-sidedness  of  his  ethics  by  his 
unswerving  faith  in  obedience  to  the  divine  voice,  which  he 
believed  he  heard  in  himself  as  Baifioviov. 

Likewise  in  the  development  of  this  thought,  Xenophon,  pro- 
vided the  extant  form  of  the  3Iemorabllia  comes  from  him, 
stood  at  the  point  of  view  of  commonplace  utility,  while  Plato's 
Apology  represents  faith  in  Providence  in  a  high  ethical  liglit. 
In  Socrates  tlie  rejection  of  nature  knowledge  comes  about  from 
the  fact  that  such  knowledge  contains  triHes  that  waste  our 
time.^  On  the  otlier  hand,  there  was  the  interest  of  piety,  which 
led  ^  him  to  require  a  Ideological  view  of  the  costnos.  It  is  im- 
probable that  he  gave  an  exhaustive  development  of  it,  because 
{Mem.,  I.  4,  and  IV.  3)  Socrates  usually  was  most  prudently 
reserved  on  such  questions.  Even  Monotheism  he  by  no  means 
emphasized  sharpl3-.  He  speaks  mostly  of  "  the  Gods,"  both  in 
Xenophon  and  Plato,  and  no  enem\-  ever  once  charged  him  with 
disavowing  "the  Gods."  ^  Concerning  the  hai^oviov,  compare 
Ueberweg,  1^.  107,  and  Zeller,  11^.  74. 

Regarded  on  the  whole,  the  activity  of  Socrates,  in  that 
he  set  up  the  ideal  of  reason  as  against  relativism,  was  an 
attempt  to  reform  the  life  morally  by  means  of  science. 
The  success  of  his  teaching  led  among  the  best  friends  of 

recognized  in  the  Socratic  circle,  though  indeed  at  variance  with  popu- 
lar opinion,  clearly  belongs  to  the  earliest  writings  of  Plato. 

1  Xen.  Mem.,  I.  1,  and  IV.  7. 

2  Ihid.,  I.  4,  and  IV.  3. 

*  He  was  reproached  with  introducing  a  new  divine  being,  and  his 
enemies  appeared  to  be  aiming  especially  at  the  baifioviov. 


THE   GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT.  135 

the  philosopher  to  the  highest  achievements  of  ancient 
cultnre.  The  principle  of  reflective  introspection,  however, 
which  was  thus  victoriously  awakened,  and  the  enthusiasm 
with  which  Socrates  turned  his  meditations  from  the  charm 
of  external  existence  to  the  value  of  the  intellectual  life, 
were  in  the  Grecian  world  a  new  and  strange  thing.  At 
this  point  of  view  the  philosopliy  embodied  by  him  detached 
itself  from  its  background  of  culture  and  took  other  shape. 
28.  Under  the  name  "  Socratics  "  a  number  of  schools 
are  usually  grouped,  which,  founded  by  men  of  more  or  less 
close  association  with  Socrates,  stepped  forth,  directly  after 
his  death,  with  opinions  that  belonged  in  their  direction  and 
content  entirely  to  the  Greek  Enlightenment.  If  we  look, 
nevertheless,  more  closely,  we  see  that  these  men  and  their 
teaching  have  a  much  nearer  relationship  to  the  Sophists  ^ 
than  to  Socrates ;  and  that,  especially  in  tlie  development 
of  these  schools,  the  "  Socratic  clement,"  which  to  some 
degree  was  still  present  in  Euclid,  Antisthencs,  and  Aris- 
tippus,  vanishes  more  and  more  from  sight.  These  so- 
called  "  Socratic  schools "  should  rather  be  viewed  as 
branches  of  Sophism  which  were  touched  by  the  Socratic 
spirit.  There  were  four  such  schools  :  the  Megarian  and 
the  Elean-Eretrian,  the  Cynic  and  the  Cyrenaic.  Among 
these  the  Cynics  stand  nearest  to  Socrates. 

K.  F.  Hermann,  Die  2)hilos.  Stellung  der  iilteren  SokratiJcer 
u.  ihrer  Schulen  (in  Gei^.  AhhandL,  Gottingen,  1849,  p.  227  f.)  ; 
Th.  Ziegler,  Gesch.  d.  Ethik,  I.  145. 

The  founder  of  the  Megarian  school,  Euclid,  believed  in 

I  his  ability  to  give  content  to  the  Eleatic  concept  of  Being, 

by  identifying  it  with  the  Socratic  concept  of  the  Good. 

Yet  no  victory  over  the  abstract  sterility  of  tlie  Parme- 

nidean  principle  was  won  by  this  method.     For  even    if 

*  Aristotle  calls  {^Tel.,  11.  2,  9'J6  a,  33),  for  example,  Aristippus  a 
Sophist,  and  with  justice. 


136  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

Euclid  defined  ^  the  Good  as  the  one  ever  immutable  ^ 
Being,  which  is  given  ^  different  names  by  men ;  even  if  he 
characterized  the  different  virtues  only  as  the  changing 
names  of  the  one  unchangeable  virtue,  that  is,  of  knowing, 
which  was  thus  identified  with  Being  as  among  the  Eleatics ; 
even  if  he  thereby  refused*  reality  to  all  concepts  other 
than  to  that  of  the  Good ;  —  nevertheless  all  this  led 
neither  to  the  construction  of  an  ethics  nor  to  an  enrich- 
ment of  theoretical  knowledge,  but  gave  evidence  of  a  con- 
tinuation of  unfruitful  dialectic  in  the  direction  of  Eleatic 
Sophistry.  The  Megarians,  therefore,  accomplished  noth- 
ing in  the  realm  of  ethics.  The  only  one  of  them  to  whom 
political  teachings  are  ascribed  was  Stelpo,  the  later  head 
of  the  school,  who,  however,  in  this  respect  had  entirely 
adopted  the  views  of  the  Cynics.  In  metaphysics  the 
Megarians  were  satisfied  with  the  assertion  of  the  unity  of 
that  which  possesses  Being,  and  with  an  indirect  proof  of 
that  assertion  resembling  the  Eleatic  argumentations.  In 
this  spirit  Diodorus  Cronus  added  ^  to  the  arguments  of 
Zeno  new  ones  which  were  indeed  less  significant  and  far 
more  captious.  In  these  the  impossibility  of  constructing 
a  continuum  out  of  a  sum  of  discrete  quantities  again 
played  the  chief  role.  There  was  a  similar  tendency  mani- 
fested in  the  investigations  of  the  Megarians  concerning  the 
categories  of  modality.  For  the  assertion  that  only  the 
actual  ^  is  possible,  and  the  famous  proof  (^Kvpievcov)  ^  of 
Diodorus  Cronus  —  that  the  unactual,  which  has  demon- 

1  Diog.  Laert.,  VII.  161. 

2  Cicero,  Acad.,  II.  42,  129. 
«  Diog.  Laert  ,  II.  106. 

*  Ibid.:  compare  Euseb.  Prcep.  er.,  XIV.  17. 

5  Preserved  in  Sext.  Enip.  A  dr.  math.,  X.  85  f. 

«  Arist.  Mel.,  VIII.  3,  1046  b,  29. 

'  Compare  Cicero,  De  fnto,  6,  12  f.  Later  philosopbers,  particularly 
Chrysippus,  have  definitely  declared  their  positions  with  reference  to 
this  arjrument. 


THE   GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT.  137 

stratcd  itself  through  its  iniactuality  to  be  impossible,  may 
not  be  called  possible  —  point  only  in  a  ratlier  abstract 
way  to  the  refutation  of  Becoming  and  change.^ 

Compare  F.  Deycks,  Die  Megaricorum  doctrina  (Bonn, 
1827)  ;  Henne,  ^cole  de  3Iegare  (Paris,  1848)  ;  Mallet,  His- 
toire  de  Vecole  de  Megare  et  des  ecoles  d^lis  et  d^ Eretrle 
(Paris,  1845). 

We  can  only  speak  in  general  of  the  dates  of  the  life  of 
Euclid  of  Megara,  one  of  the  oldest  and  truest  friends  that 
Socrates  had.  He  was  not  much  younger  than  Socrates,  yet  he 
considerably  outlived  him,  and  opened  after  the  death  of  the 
master  his  hospitable  house  to  his  fiiends.  About  this  time  a 
school  formed  itself  around  him,  and  it  appears  to  have  re- 
mained intact  through  the  fourth  century.  Of  the  most  of 
those  who  are  mentioned  as  adherents  of  this  school,  we  know 
only  the  names.  Particulars  are  reported  only  of  PLubulides  of 
Miletus,  the  teacher  of  Demostlienes,  of  Diodorus  Cronus,  of 
lasus  in  Caria  (d.  307),  and  especially  of  Stilpo,  who  was  a 
native  of  Megara  (Hiog.  Laert.,  II.  113  f.).  Stilpo  lived  from 
380  to  300,  and  aroused  universal  admiration  by  his  lectures. 
He  linked  the  IMcgarian  dialectics  to  the  Cynic  ethics,  and  deci- 
sively influenced  thereby  his  chief  pupil,  Zeno,  the  founder  of 
Stoicism.     His  younger  contemporary  was  Alexinus  of  Elis. 

The  most  imjjortant  controversial  question  arising  in  refer- 
ence to  the  Megarian  school  concerns  the  h3-pothesis  set  up  by 
Schleiermaclier  (in  his  translation  of  Plato,  V.  2,  140  f.)  and 
o|)i)osed  by  Ritter  ( Ueber  d.  Philos.  der  meg.  SclmU.,  Hhein. 
Jfiis.,  1828)  and  Mallet  (loc.  cit.  XXXIV.  f.),  accepted  by  most 
others,  including  Brandis  and  Prantl,  and  defended  by  Zeller 
(P.  215  f.).  Tliis  hypothesis  is  to  the  effect  that  the  represen- 
tation of  the  theory  of  Ideas  in  the  dialogue,  the  /Sophist  (246  b, 
248  f.),  refers  to  the  Megarians.  If  one  is  convinced  that 
this  dialogue  is  genuinely  Platonic,  it  is  difficult  to  provide  for 
this  theoiT  of  Ideas.  For  to  presuppose  any  kind  of  an  other- 
wise unknown  school  (Ritter)  as  the  author  of  so  significant  a 

^  Since  Aristotle  cites  the  proposition  as  iMegarian,  that  only  the 
actual  is  the  possible,  it  can  scarcely  have  arisen  from  the  polemic 
against  the  Aristotelian  categories  Svvafiis  and  tvepyeia.  But  possibly 
the  later  Megarians,  for  example  Diodorus,  developed  it  in  this  direction. 
Compare  Hartenstein,  l/eher  die  De.deutung  der  megarischen  Schule  fur 
die  GescMcTite  der  melaphyskchen  Probleme  (in  Hist,  philox  Abhand- 
lungen,  127  f.). 


138  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHY. 

system  as  that  of  the  ao-w/xara  ciSry,  is  forbidden  because  Aristotle 
{Mat.  ,1.6;  Nic.  Eth. ,  I.  4)  designated  Plato  distinctly  as  the 
inventor  of  the  same.  It  is  certainly  very  far  from  having  any 
place  in  the  Socratic  schools.  But  tlie  teaching  is  even  as  little 
consistent  with  what  has  been  at  other  times  confidently  ascribed 
to  the  Megarians  as  with  the  teaching  of  any  one  of  the  other 
schools.  In  no  place  is  there  a  single  indication  of  it.  It 
stands  in  so  abrupt  opposition  especiall}'  to  the  abstract  theory* 
of  Being  of  the  Megarians,  that  we  do  not  avoid  the  difficulty 
by  taking  for  granted  a  gradual  development  within  the  school.^ 
On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  shown  that  the  description  ^ 
which  the  dialogue,  the  Sophist,  gives  of  this  theory-  of  Ideas, 
agrees  completely'  and  even  verball}'  with  that  phase  of  the 
Platonic  philosoph}-  expressed  in  the  Symposium .^  There  is, 
accordingl\',  nothing  left  but  either  accept  Plato  as  opposed  to 
an  earlier  phase  of  his  own  teaching  and  its  <^tAot,  or  to  find 
the  author  of  this  criticism  of  the  Platonic  philoso[)hy  in  an 
P^leatic  contemporary  of  Plato.  (For  details,  see  Ch.  V.)  In 
neither  case  can  the  theory  of  Ideas  treated  in  the  passage  in 
the  Sophist,  nor  the  developed  theory  of  knowledge  connected 
closely  with  it  and  completely  Platonic  in  character,  be  ascribed 
to  the  Megarians.  This  theory  in  the  Sojyidst  amounts  to  a 
sensuous  knowledge  of  yeVeo-is,  or  a  knowledge  of  the  corporeal 
world  plus  a  conceptual  knowledge  of  ouo-ta,  which  is  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  non-corporeal  Ideas. 

The  only  remaining  feature  worthy  of  comment  in  regard 
to  the  Megarian  school  is  its  development  of  the  Sophistic 
art  of  Eristic.  Its  abstract  theory  of  unity  involved  a 
skepticism  regarding  all  concrete  knowledge  and  a  nega- 
tive trend  in  its  instruction.     The  prominent  fact  in  re- 

^  Zeller  seems  to  believe  (IK  261)  that  the  Euclidean  theory  of 
Ideas  was  given  up  in  the  course  of  the  development  of  the  school  to 
satisfy  the  theory  of  unity.  Since  the  latter  theory  had  been  given 
from  the  very  beginning  in  the  form  of  Eleaticism  there  must  then  be 
expected  conversely  a  gradual  division  of  the  Eleatic  One  into  a  plural- 
ity of  Ideas  and  this  is  precisely  what  Plato  accomplished. 

2  See  E.  Appel,  Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Ph.,  V.  55  f. 

3  In  this  connection  there  is  hardly  an  allusion  to  Ideas  as  causes  of 
the  phenomenal  world.  Zeller,  I*.  316.  The  oiaia  as  ahla  is  first  intro- 
duced in  the  Phcedo,  Philebus,  and  the  latter  parts  of  the  Republic. 
See  Ch.  V. 


THE   GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT.  139 

spect  to  Euclid  is  that  he  in  polemics  followed  the  method  ^ 
of  neglecting  proofs  and  even  premises,  and  leaped  directly 
to  the  conchision  by  means  of  reductio  ad  absurdum.  Stilpo 
accepted  the  Sophistic-Cynic  assertion,  that  according  to 
the  law  of  identity  a  predicate  different  from  the  subject 
cannot  be  ascribed  to  the  subject.  The  younger  members, 
Eubulides  and  Alexinus,^  got  their  notoriety  by  inventing 
the  so-called  "  catches,"  These  are  questions  put  in  such 
a  way  that  no  one  of  the  possible  disjunctive  answers  can 
be  given  without  involving  a  contradiction. 

See  Prantl,  Gesch.  der  Logik^  I.  33  f. ;  Diog.  Laert.,  II.  168, 
enumerates  seven  of  these  "catches,"  —  the  Liar,  then  three 
practically  identical  ones,  the  Concealed,  the  Disguised,  and 
the  J^lectra^  and  further  the  Horned  Man,  and  finally  the  Heap 
(Sorites)  and  the  Bald- head,  which  positively  and  negatively 
suggest  the  acerrus  of  Zeno  (§  20).  As  was  the  case  with  the 
Sophistic  witticisms,  these  were  in  the  main  reducible  to  verbal 
ambiguities.  The  lively  interest  that  antiquity  had  in  them  was 
almost  wholl}'  pathological. 

Still  less  significant  was  the  Elean-Eretrian  school,  which 
was  founded  by  Phasdo,  Socrates'  favorite  scholar,  in  his 
native  city  Elis.  Later  it  was  transferred  by  Menedenuis 
to  his  home,  Eretria,  where  it  died  out  about  the  beginning 
of  the  third  century.  It  appears  to  have  taken  a  similar 
line  of  development  as  the  Megarian  school  and  Pha^do 
agreed  with  Euclid  ^  in  all  essentials.  Mcnedemus,  who 
received  instruction  in  the  Academy  and  from  Stilpo,  co- 
operated with  Stilpo  in  turning  the  school  toward  Cynic 
ethics.  Both  schools  merged  finally,  like  the  Cynic,  in  the 
Stoa. 

1  Diog.  Laert..  IL  107. 

2  Whose  name  was  facetiously  perverted  into  'E^ey^ii/os:  t)iog. 
Laert.,  II.  109. 

^  Presumably  he  had  received  powerful  influence  from  Euclid  dur- 
ing las  stay  in  Megara. 


140  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  THILOSOPHY. 

Compare  Mallet  (see  above) ;  L.  Preller,  PhcedoJi's  JLebens- 
schicksale  und  Schriften  {Erschund  Gruber,  III.  21,  357  f.)  ;  v. 
Wilamowitz-MoUendorf  {Htr7nes,  1879). 

Phaedo,  when  very  young,  was  taken  into  captivity  h\  the  Athe- 
nians, and  not  long  before  Socrates'  death  he  was,  at  the  insti- 
gation of  Socrates,  freed  from  slavery  by  one  of  his  friends. 
The  genuineness  of  the  dialogues  ascribed  to  him  was  early  ver^ 
much  in  doubt.  At  anj-  rate,  as  little  from  the  literary  activity 
of  this  school  is  preserved  as  from  that  of  the  Megarians. 
Menedemus,  who  is  said  to  have  died  soon  after  271  at  the  age 
of  seventy-four,  had  (Diog.  Laert.,  II.  125  f.)  raised  himself 
from  a  ver}'  low  position  to  one  of  considerable  authority.  It  is 
now  impossible  to  determine  whether  his  apparentl}-  loose  and 
transitory  relation  to  the  Academy  was  a  fact.  Onl}-  the  names 
of  the  other  members  of  the  school  are  preserved. 

29.  Notably  more  important  are  the  two  schools  existing 
immediately  after  Socrates  and  not  uninfluenced  by  his 
ethical  doctrine.  In  these,  the  Cynic  and  Cyrenaic,  the 
opposition  as  to  both  moral  and  social  conceptions  of  life 
took  definite  form.  They  had  in  common  an  indifference 
for  theoretic  science  and  a  desire  to  concentrate  philosophy 
upon  the  art  of  living.  Common  also  was  the  origin  of 
their  philosophy  from  the  Sophistic  circle  ;  and  they  found 
partial  support  in  the  formulations  of  Socrates.  They 
were,  however,  diametrically  opposed  in  their  conception  of 
the  place  of  man  and  his  relation  to  society.  This  re- 
mained a  typical  opposition  for  the  whole  ancient  world. 
Both  theories  as  the  result  of  the  cultural  and  philosoph- 
ical impulse  given  by  the  Sophists  reveal  the  disposition 
of  the  Grecian  world  toward  the  value  which  civilization 
possesses  in  its  control  of  individual  impulses.  This  com- 
mon problem  put  the  same  limits  upon  their  endeavors  in 
spite  of  their  different  conclusions. 

The  Cynic  school  was  called  into  life  by  Antisthenes  of 
Athens,  and  maintained  its  popularity  on  account  of  the 
original  character,  Diogenes  of  Sinopc.  Among  its  more 
distant  followers  may  be  named  Crates  of  Thebes,  his  wife 
Hipparchia,  and  her  brother  Metrocles. 


THE   GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT.  141 

Antisthenes,  born  about  440,  was  not  a  full-blooded  Athenian. 
He  had  entered  the  Sophistic  profession  of  teaching  as  the  pu^nl 
of  Gorgias,  before  he  came  under  the  influence  of  Socrates. 
whose  active  admirer  he  became.  After  the  death  of  Socrates 
he  founde<i  a  school  in  the  gymnasium  Cynosarges,  which  he 
administered  for  quite  a  time.  Of  his  numerous  writings 
(X)iog.  Laert.,  VI.  15  f.)  only  a  few  fragments  are  preserved,  — 
collected  b}-  A.  W.  Winckelmann  (Zurich,  1842).  Compare 
Chappuis,  Antisthhie  (Paris,  1854)  ;  K.  Barlen,  Antisthenes  u. 
P/a^OM  (Xeuwied,  1891)  ;  K.  Urban,  Ueber  die  Enrahnungen 
der  Philos.  des  Antisthenes  in  den  phdonischen  Schriften 
(Konigsberg,  1882)  ;  F.  Diimmler,  Antisthenica  (Halle,  1882) 
and  ^4X-«demjX-a  (Giessen,  1889);  Vj.I^oy^qu,  Beitrdejez.  Gesch. 
d.gr.  Ph.,  1-4. 

Diogenes,  the  ScoKpar?;?  /xaLio/j.evo'i,  fled  as  a  counterfeiter  from 
his  home  to  Athens,  and  ornamented  his  proletariat  and  queer 
existence  with  the  wisdom  of  Antisthenes.  He  claimed  to  put 
the  theory  of  his  teacher  consistently  into  practice.  In  old  age 
he  lived  as  tutor  in  the  house  of  Xeniades  in  Corinth,  and  died 
there  in  323.  Compare  K.  W.  Gottling,  Diogenes  der  Kyniker 
oderd.  Phil,  des  gr.  Proletariats  (  Geschich.  Abhandl.,  I.  251  f )  ; 
K.  Steinhart  {Erseh  u.  Gniber,  I.  25,  301  f) 

Crates  of  Thebes,  nearly  contemporary  of  Stilpo,  is  said  to 
have  given  away  his  property  in  order  to  dedicate  himself  to 
the  Cynic  life.  His  rich  and  nobly  connected  wife  followed 
Itira  into  a  beggar's  existence.  Anecdotes  only  are  preserved 
concerning  his  brotlier-in-law,  Metrocles.  Cynicism  continued 
later  as  a  popular  moralizing  instruction  ;  for  example  in  Teles, 
whom  v.  Wilamowitz-]M(')llendorf  treats  {Philol.  UnttrsucJninfjen, 
IV.  292  f).  and  whose  fragments  have  been  published  by  O. 
Hense  (Freiburg,  1889).  Later  do  we  find  Cynicism  in  Bion  of 
Borysthenes,  whose  sermons  greatly  influenced  later  literature 
(Horace),^  as  upon  the  other  hand  the  satires  of  the  PliaMiician 
Menippus,  which  breathe  the  Cynic  spirit,  influenced  Varro. 
See  Zeller,  IP.  246,  3. 

As  only  the  Good  was  Being  for  the  Megarians,  for 
the  Cynics  virtue  appeared  to  be  the  only  legitimate  con- 
tent and  purpose  of  life.  With  similar  Eleatic  one-sided- 
ness  they  remained  averse  to  all  other  ideals  and  disdain- 
ful of  them.  Tliey  taught  indeed,  like  Socrates,  that  virtue 
consists  in  knowing,  and  yet  they  emphasized  the  practical 

^  Compare  R.  Heinze,  De  Horatio  Bionis  imitalore  (Bonn,  1889), 


142  HISTORY  or  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

side,  that  is,  right  action,  and  especially  the  consistent 
carrying  out  of  moral  principles  ^  in  life.  They  like- 
wise attributed  only  so  much  value,  therefore,  to  scien- 
tific investigations  as  those  investigations  serve  ethical 
purposes. 

It  is  to  be  added  that  in  its  epistemology  also  this  school 
stood  entirely  upon  the  ground  of  Sophistic  skepticism. 
It  indeed  sounds  to  some  degree  Socratic  for  Antisthenes 
to  demand  ^  the  explanation  of  the  permanent  essence  of 
things  by  definition.  Yet  in  his  development  of  this  pos- 
tulate he  fell  back  upon  the  opinion  of  Gorgias  that  of  no 
subject  can  an  attribute  differing  in  any  way  from  it  be 
predicated.  He  made  it  equivalent  to  the  statement  that 
only  identical  judgments  are  possible.^  Accordingly  only 
the  composite  are  definable  ;*  all  simple  things,  on  tlie  other 
hand,  can  be  indicated  ^  only  by  their  peculiar  individual 
names,  which,  however,  do  not  explain  the  essence  of  the 
fact  itself.  Thus  their  theory  of  knowledge  reduced  itself 
to  bare  skepticism  ;  and  it  also  manifested  itself  in  Antis- 
thenes adopting  the  Sophistic  teaching  that  a  contradic 
tion  is  wholly  impossible.^ 

*  Even  in  the  character  of  Antisthenes  this  consistency,  this  serious 
and  strict  adherence  to  principles,  was  the  central  point.  Diogenes 
intended  assuredly  to  outdo  him  in  this  respect. 

2  To  him  belongs  the  definition  "koyos  tarlv  6  to  tI  ^p  t)  tan  8t)\(ov. 

*  That  the  place  in  the  Sophist,  251  b,  rt-fers  to  Antisthenes,  Aristotle 
teaches  in  Metaphysics,  IV.  29,  1024  b,  32. 

*  Compare  Aristotle,  ibid.,  VII.  3,  1043  b,  24. 

*  The  logically  central  truth  of  the  Cynic  teaching  appears  in  the 
Platonic  statement  (Tkecet.,  201  f.).  This  truth  is  that  the  ultimate 
terms  (to.  Trpmra)  by  which  all  else  may  be  defined  are  themselves  not 
definable  or  reducible  to  something  else.  This  opinion  is  closely  joined 
with  that  whioh  looks  upon  these  last  elements  of  concepts  as  the 
(rroi\f2a,  by  which  all  things  are  really  constituted.  This  is  a  view 
which  in  a  certain  sense  sounds  like  the  homoiomeriai  of  Anaxagoras, 
and  also  like  the  Platonic  theory  of  Ideas. 

6  Arist.  Mel.,  IV.  29,  1024  b,  34. 


^HE  GiiEEK  ENLIGHTENMENT  143 

This  purely  Sophistic  limitation  of  knowledge  to  nomenclature 
had  taken  on  as  a  most  obvious  nominalism  a  distinct  polemical 
tendenc}'  against  the  theoi-y  of  Ideas.  The  old  tradition  placed 
in  the  moutiis  of  Antisthenes  and  Diogenes  rough  and  coarse 
ridicule  of  tlie  Platonic  theory  (rpdireO"^  opw,  rpaTreCorrp-a  8'otr;^ 
opS),  Diog.  Laert.,  VI.  53 ;  compare  Schol.  in  ArisL,  66  b,  45, 
etc. ;  Zeller,  IP.  255)  ;  for  these  leaders  of  the  Cynics  onl}^ 
single  things  existed  in  natura  rerum.  Tlie  class  concepts  are 
only  names  without  content.  At  the  same  time  it  is  evident 
that,  since  the  essence  of  a  thing  did  not  seem  to  them  logically 
determinable,  the}'  claimed  that  it  was  producible  only  in  sense 
perception.  Thus  they  fell  into  the  coarse  materialism  which 
regards  a  thing  as  actual  onl\'  as  the  thing  can  be  held  in  the 
hand.  Presumabl}'  this  fact  is  meant  in  the  Sophist,  246  a ; 
Themtetus,  155  e,  Phijedo,  79  f.  Compare  Natorp,  F'orschimgen, 
198  f. 

So  much  the  more  was  the  science  of  these  men  limited 
to  their  theoretically  meagre  doctrine  of  virtue.  Virtue, 
and  it  alone,  is  sufficient  to  satisfy  all  strivings  for  happi- 
ness. Virtue  is  not  only  the  highest,  but  the  only  good,  — 
the  only  certain  means  of  being  happy.  Over  against  this 
spiritual  and  therefore  sure  possession,  which  is  protected 
against  all  the  changes  of  the  fateful  world,  the  Cynics 
despised  all  that  men  otherwise  held  dear.  A'irtue  alone 
is  of  worth  ;  wickedness  alone  is  to  be  shunned  ;  all  else  is 
indifferent  {aBi.d(f>opov')}  From  this  principle  they  taught 
the  contempt  of  riches  and  luxury,  of  fame  and  honor,  of 
sense-pleasure  and  sense-pain.  But  with  this  radical  con- 
sistency, which  ever  grew  sharper  with  them,  they  also 
despised  all  the  joy  and  beauty  of  life,  all  shame  and  con- 
ventionality, family  and  country. 

The  obtrusive  raoralization  of  these  philosophical  beggars 
appears  mainly  in  their  coarse  witticisms  ;  and  ver}'  many  anec- 
dotes relate  to  Diogenes.  There  is  verj'  little  of  serious  inves- 
tigation in  their  moralizing.  Antisthenes  appears  to  assert  the 
worthlessness  of  pleasure,  perhaps  against  Aristippus,  and  to 
have  sought  to  demonstrate  that  man  with  such  a  conviction, 
even  if  it  be  not  entirely   right,    would  be  proof  against  the 

1  Diog.  Laert.,  VI.  105. 


144  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

slavery  of  sense  pleasure.^  In  Diogenes  this  disgust  of  all 
external  goods  grew  to  ihe  philosophicul  grim  humor  of  a  prole- 
tarian, who  has  staked  his  cause  on  nothing.  Irrespective  of 
the  mental  culture  to  which,  so  far  as  it  concerns  virtue,  he 
ascribed  some  worth, ^  he  contended  against  all  the  devices  of 
civilization  as  superfluous,  foolish,  and  dangerous  to  virtue. 
Most  dubious  in  all  tliis  was  tlie  shamelessness  of  which  the 
Cynics  were  guilty,  and  their  intentional  disregard  of  all  tiie  con- 
ventions of  sexual  relations  ;  similar  too  was  their  indifference 
to  the  family  life  and  to  the  state.^  For  the  cosmopolitanism  in 
which  Diogenes  took  pride  ■*  iiad  not  the  positive  content  of  a 
universal  human  ideal,  but  sought  only  to  free  the  individual 
from  every  limitation  imposed  upon  him  by  civilization.  In 
particular,  the  Cynics  fought  against  slaver}-  as  unnatural  and 
unjust,  just  as  alread}' tlie  Sophists  had  fought.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  must  not  remain  unnoticed  that  Antisthenes,^  in  defiance 
of  the  judgment  of  Greek  society,  declared  that  work  is  a  good. 
Cynicism  finally  reckoned  also  religion  among  the  dBidcf)opa.  All 
mythical  ideas  and  religious  ceremonies  fall  under  the  class  of 
tlic  conventionally  determined,  the  unnatural,  and  are  excusable 
only  because  they  ma}'  be  regarded  as  allegorical  expressions  of 
moral  concepts.  Positively  the  Cynics  represented  an  abstract 
monotheism  which  finds  in  virtue  the  true  worship  of  God. 

The  fundamental  purpose  of  Cynicism  in  all  these  deter- 
minations is  to  make  man  entirely  independent.  The  wise 
man  to  whom  virtue,  once  gained,^  is  a  permanent  pos- 
session, stands  in  his  complete  self-sufficiency  ^  over  against 

1  See  Arist.  Eth.  N^tc,  X.  1,  1172  a,  31  ;  on  the  contrary,  Plato 
(Phileb.,  44  b)  can  hardly  be  regarded  as  referring  to  Antisthenes 
(Zeller,  II*.  308,  1).  It  is  })robable  that  places  like  the  Republic,  583  f., 
refer  to  Democritus.     See  below,  §  33  and  §  31. 

^  Diog.  Laert.,  VI.  68,  and  elsewhere. 

^  From  Diogenes  on,  the  Cynics  had  wives  and  children  in  common. 
(Ibid.,  72.)  This  is  only  one  of  the  instances  that  they  manifested  of 
a  levelling  radicalism  (in  distinction  from  Plato). 

*  Loc.  ct7.  63:  see  ibid.,  11,  38,  72,  98. 

s  Ibid.,  2. 

®  It  can  also  be  teachable,  but  more  through  practice  than  through 
scientific  instruction.     Ibid.,  105  f.,  70. 

7  Xen.  Mem.,  1,  2,  19. 

«  Diog.  Laert.,  VI.  11  f. 


THE   GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT  145 

the  great  mass  of  fools.  His  reward  is  the  perfect  inde- 
pendence in  which  he  is  equaP  to  the  undesiring  gods. 
In  order  to  he  as  independent  of  external  goods  as  possible, 
he  reduces  his  needs  to  those  most  external.  The  less 
one  needs,  the  happier  2  one  is.  The  Cynic  Wise  Man  feels 
himself  free  from  society  also;  he  sees  through  its  preju- 
dices ;  he  despises  ^  its  talk  ;  its  laws  and  its  conventions 
do  not  bind  him.  The  independent  lordship  of  the  vir- 
tuous Wise  Man  does  not  need  civilization  and  casts  it 
aside.  The  Sophistic  opposition  of  cfivaa  and  v6/xo<:  is 
constructed  into  a  principle,  and  all  human  limitation  by 
statute  is  unnatural,  superfluous,  and  in  part  corrupting. 
From  the  midst  of  the  fulness  and  beauty  of  Greek  civiliza- 
tion, the  Cynic  preaches  the  return  to  a  state  of  nature 
which  would  avoid  all  the  dangers  of  civilization  indeed,  but 
would  forfeit  all  its  blessings. 

30.  The  joyous  wisdom  of  the  life  of  the  Cyrenaics  formed 
the  completest  antithesis  to  the  morose  seriousness  of  the 
virtue  of  the  Cynics.  The  leader  of  this  school  was 
Aristippus  of  Cyrene,  a  man  of  the  world,  who  once 
belonged  to  the  Socratic  circle,  but  at  other  times  led  a 
wandering  life  as  a  Sophist.  Through  his  daughter  Arete 
his  conception  of  life  passed  down  to  his  grandson,  the 
younger  Aristippus.  Soon  after  this  the  school  branched 
out  with  the  special  interpretations  which  men  like 
Theodorus  the  atheist,  Anniceris,  and  Hegesias  gave  to 
the  Aristippian  principle.  Among  later  representatives 
Euemerus  is  to  be  mentioned. 

1  Diog.  Laert.,  VI.  .51. 

2  Soe  the  self-<lescrij)tioii  of  Antisthenos  in  Xenophon's  Si/mposmm, 
4,  3 1  f.  In  this  respect  Cynicism  showed  tliat  En(la?nionisni  is  logically 
absence  of  need.  From  the  eii(la?monistic  point  of  view,  then,  the  goal  is 
the  renunciation  and  suppression  of  all  avoidable  desire. 

*  Thus  Diogenes  accejjted  the  designation  of  kvwv,  winch  was  origi- 
nally a  witticism  in  reference  to  the  seat  of  the  school,  the  gymnasium, 
Cynosargus. 

10 


146  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

The  j-ears  of  the  birth  and  death  of  Aristippus  cannot  be 
very  exactly  determined  ;  his  life  included  fiom  thirty  to  fori}' 
years  in  the  fifth  and  fourth  centuries  (435-360).  When  he  was 
young  he  was  influenced  to  come  to  Athens  by  the  fame  of 
Socrates,  and  often  during  the  course  of  his  life  did  he  return  to 
that  city.  That  he  for  some  time  lived  in  Syracuse  in  the  court 
of  the  older  and  younger  Dionysius,  that  he  probably  met  Plato 
there,  cannot  well  be  doubted.  The  founding  of  his  school  in 
his  native  cit}',  the  rich  and  luxurious  Cyrene,  occui-red  prob- 
ably at  the  end  of  his  life,  since  all  the  known  adherents  to 
the  school  were  considerably'  younger  than  he.  Compare  H.  v. 
Stein,  De  vita  Aristippi  (Gottingen,  1855),  also  his  Geschichte 
cles  Platonismus,  II.  60  f 

The  technical  development  of  the  theory  ^  seems  to  have  been 
completed  by  the  grandson  (fxrjTpoSiSaKTos),  of  whom  nothing 
further  is  known.  Tlieodorus  was  driven  out  of  his  home, 
Cyrene,  soon  after  the  death  of  Alexander  the  Great.  He  lived 
in  exile  for  some  time  in  Athens  and  at  the  court  of  Egypt,  but 
he  returned  finally  to  Cyrene.  Anniceris  and  Hegesias  {jua-i- 
OavaToi)  were  contemporaries  of  Ptolemaius  Lagi.  Hegesias 
wrote  a  treatise  the  title  of  which  Cicero  mentioned  as  ^AiroKap- 
T^puiv  (  Tusc,  I.  34,  84).  Eueraerus,  probably  of  Messene  (about 
300),  set  his  views  forth  in  what  were  well  known  to  antiquity 
as  the  i€pa  avaypaffyq.  Compare  O.  Sieroca,  De  EaeniGrus  (Konigs- 
berg,  1869). 

The  smaller  fragments  are  in  Mullach,  II.  397  f.  Compare  J. 
F.  Thrige,  Hes  Cyrencsium  (Copenhagen,  1878);  A.  Wendt, 
De  philos.  Cyrenaica  (Gottingen,  1841)  ;  VVieland  (Aristij)., 
4  vols.,  Leipzig,  1800  f.)  also  gives  a  graceful  and  expert 
exposition. 

In  his  theory  of  life,  Aristippus  followed  closely  the 
teaching  of  Protagoras,^  just  as  Antisthenes  followed  the 
direction  of  Gorgias.  Indeed  he  developed  the  relativism 
of  the  Protagorean  theory  of  perception  to  a  remarkably 
valuable  psychology  of  the  sense  feelings.  Sense  percep- 
tion instructs  us  only  as  to  our  own  states  (TrdOrj),^  and  is 

^  According  to  Eusebius,  Prcep.  ev.,  XIV.  18,  31.  Compare,  besides, 
Zeller,  II"  344. 

2  Which  was  communicated  to  him  perhaps  by  his  fellow-citizen,  the 
mathematician  Tlieodorus  (compare  Plato,  Thecetetus). 

8  Sext.  Em  p.  Ado.  math.,  VII.  191  f. 


THE   GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT  147 

not  concerned  with  the  causes  of  those  states  (^ra  TreTrocr}- 
Kora  ra  Trddr)').  The  causes  are  not  recognizable ;  our 
knowledge  directs  itself  only  to  the  changes  of  our  own 
essence,  and  these  alone  concern  us.  Sensations,  since 
they  are  a  consciousness  of  our  own  condition,  are  always 
true.^  In  this  spirit  the  Cyrcnaics  assumed  an  attitude  of 
skeptical  indifference  to  natural  science.  They  followed 
Protagoras  in  the  individualistic  turn  of  this  theory  \vhen 
they  asserted  that  the  individual  kno^vs  only  his  own 
sensations,  and  common  nomenclature  is  no  guarantee  of 
similarity  in  the  content  of  the  thought. 

That  these  epistemological  investigations  of  the  school  of 
Aristippus  were  used  for  a  basis  of  their  ethics  but  did  not  evoke 
their  ethics,  is  proved  for  the  most  part  by  the  subordinate  posi- 
tion which  they  received  in  tlie  later  systeniatizations  of  the 
school.  According  to  Sextus  Empirieus  (Adv.  mat/i.,  VII.  11), 
the  treatment  at  tliis  time  was  divided  into  five  parts:  concern- 
ing good  and  evil;  concerning  the  states  of  the  soul  {ivaOq)  ; 
concerning  actions ;  concerning  external  causes ;  and,  finall}', 
concerning  the  criteria  of  truth  (Trto-rets). 

However,  the  fundamental  problem  of  the  Cyrcnaics 
(as  of  the  Cynics)  was  that  concerning  the  real  happiness 
of  man,  and  they  emphasized  simply  the  included  moment 
of  pleasure  or  displeasure  in  those  states  of  mind  to  which 
knowledge  is  limited.  As,  however,  Protagoras  had  re- 
ferred the  theoretic  content  of  perception  to  differing  cor- 
poreal motions,  the  Cyrcnaics  sought  to  derive  also  the 
affective  tone  of  the  same  from  the  different  states  of 
motion  of  him  perceiving.^  Gentle  motion  (Xeia  KLvijac'^') 
corresponds  to  pleasure  (^rjSovr]),  violent  (rpax^'i-a)  to  dis- 

1  Sext.  Emp.  Adv.  math.,  VII.  191  f.  ;  farther,  Diog.  Laert.,  11.  92. 

2  Sext.  Emp.  op.  cit.  195. 

3  Eusebius,  loc.  cit.  ;  Diog.  Laert.,  II.  86  f.  Likewise  the  exposition 
in  the  PUlebus,  42  f.,  which  brings  this  teaching  directly  into  connection 
with  the  iravTa  pel,  presumably  refers  to  Aristippus.  Compare  Zeller, 
II*.  352  f. 


148  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

pleasure  (ttoVo?),  rest  from  motion  to  absence  of  pleasure 
and  pain  (arihovia  koX  airovia).  Since  now  these  three 
possibilities  include  the  whole  range  of  stimuli,  there  are 
only  two,  perhaps  three  irddt] :  pleasant  (^8ea),  unpleasant 
(^aXyeivd'),  and  the  states  of  indifference  between  them  {rd 
fiera^v).^  Since,  however,  among  these  three  possible 
states,  pleasure  alone  is  worth  sti'iving  for,  ijBoi^r,  is  tlie 
only  goal  of  the  will  (reX-o?),  and  accordingly  is  happiness 
or  the  Good  itself.  Whatever  gives  pleasure  is  good. 
Whatever  creates  displeasure  is  bad.  All  else  is  indif- 
ferent. 

The  question  concerning  the  content  of  the  concept  of 
the  Good,  which  was  not  really  answered  by  Socrates,  was 
answered  by  these  Hedonists,  in  that  they  declared  pleasure 
to  be  this  content,  and  indeed  all  pleasures,  whatever  their 
occasion,^  to  be  indistinguishable.  By  this  only  the  single 
momentary  state  of  pleasure  is  meant.  The  highest,  the 
only  good,  for  these  Hedonists  was  the  enjoyment  of  the 
moment.^ 

From  these  presuppositions  the  Hedonists  concluded,  with 
entire  correctness,  that  the  distinction  of  value  between  single 
fL'cIings  of  pleasure  is  determined  not  by  the  content  or  the 
cause,  but  only  hy  the  intensity  of  the  feelings.  They  asserted 
that  the  degree  of  intensity  of  "the  bodily  feelings  is  greater  than 
that  of  the  Sfjiritual  feelings.*  The  later  Cyrenaics,  particularly 
Theodorus.^  came  therefore  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Wise  Man 
need  not  regard  himself  restricted  by  law,  convention,  or  indeed 
religious  scruples,  but  he  should  so  use  things  as  to  serve  his 
pleasure  best.  Here,  again,  the  Sophistic  antithesis  between 
v6fj.o<i  and  ^I'o-is"  is  repeated,  and  the  natural  individual  pleasur- 
able feeling  is  taken  as  the  absolute  motive  of  action.  Still  more 
pronounced  than  in  the  degenerate  phases  of  Cynicism  appeared 
here  the  egoistic,  naturalistic,  and  individualistic  trait  which  is 
basal  in  the  common  problem  of  both  theories.     On  the  other 

I  Sext.  Emp.  op.  cit.  199.  2  Plato,  Philebus,  12  d. 

'  See  A.  Lange,  Gesch.  des  Mater.,  p.  37,  2  ed. 

<  Diog.  Laert.,  II.  90.  *  Ibid.,  99. 

6  See  ibid.,  93. 


THE  GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT  149 

hand,  Anniceris^  sought  later  to  temper  this  radicalism,  and  to 
ennoble  the  desire  for  pleasure  by  emphasizing  the  enjoyment  of 
friendship,  of  family  life,  and  of  social  organization  as  more 
valuable.  At  the  same  time  he  tlid  not  lose  sight  of  tlie  egoistic 
fundamental  principle,  but  onl}'  carefully  refined  it.  With  this 
turn  in  its  course,  however,  the  Cyrenaic  philosophy  merged  into 
Epicurean  hedonism. 

Virtue  was,  accordingly,  for  Aristippus  identical  with 
the  ability  to  enjoy.  The  utility  of  science  consists  in  di- 
recting men  to  the  proper  satisfaction.  Right  enjoyment 
is,  however,  only  possible  through  reasonable  self-control 
((j)p6vr]ai<;).^  Requisite  insight  for  this  frees  us  from  preju- 
dice, and  teaches  us  how  to  use  the  goods  of  life  in  the 
most  reasonable  way.  Above  all  else  it  gives  to  the  Wise 
Man  that  security  in  himself  by  which  he  remains  proof 
against  weakly  yielding  to  influences  of  the  outer  world. 
It  teaches  him,  while  in  enjoyment,  to  remain  master  of 
himself  and  his  surroundings.  The  problem  for  both  Cynic 
and  Cyrenaic  was  the  attainment  of  this  individual  inde- 
pendence of  the  course  of  the  world.  The  Cynic  school 
sought  independence  in  renunciation  ;  the  Cyrenaic  in  lord- 
ship over  enjoyment,  and  Aristippus  was  right  when  he 
said  that  the  latter  was  more  difficult  and  more  valuable 
than  the  former.^  In  opposition  to  the  Cynic  ideal  of  re- 
nunciation of  the  world,  the  Cyrenaic  drew,  as  his  picture 
of  the  Wise  Man,  that  of  the  perfected  man  of  the  world. 
He  is  susceptible  to  the  enjoyment  of  life,  lie  knows  what 
animal  satisfactions  are,  and  how  to  prize  spiritual  joy, 
riches,  and  honor.  In  elevated  spirit  he  scrupulously 
makes  use  of  men  and  things,  but  even  then  never  forgets 
himself  in  his  enjoyment.  He  remains  lord  of  his  appe- 
tites ;  he  never  wishes  the  impossible,  and  even  in  the  few 
happy  days  of  his  existence  he  knows  how  to  preserve  vic- 
toriously the  peace  and  serenity  of  his  soul. 

1  Diog.  Laert.,  IT.  9G  ;  see  Clemens  Alex.  Strom.,  II.  417. 

2  Diog.  Laert.,  II.  91.  3  Ibid.,  75. 


150  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

With  these  qualifications  (reminding  us  of  Socrates),  Aris- 
tippus  went  beyond  the  principle  of  momentary  enjoyment  of 
pleasure  when  he,  for  example,  explained  activity  as  repre- 
hensible if,  on  the  whole,  it  yields  more  unpleasurableness  than 
pleasure.  He  recommended  on  this  same  ground  that  there  be 
universal  subordination  to  custom  and  law.  Theodorus  then 
went  still  furtlier,  and  sought  ^  to  find  the  re'/W  of  mankind,  not 
in  individual  satisfaction,  but  in  serene  disposition  (xa-pa-)-  This 
is  also  already  a  transition  to  the  Epicurean  conception. 

If  the  principle  that  only  educated  men  know  how  to  enjo3' 
happily  verified  itself  in  the  temperament  and  circumstances  of 
Aristippus,  his  school  on  the  other  hand  drew  another  irresistible 
conse(iuence  from  the  hedonistic  principle,  viz.,  pessimism.  If 
pleasure  is  said  to  give  value  to  life,  the  greater  part  of  human- 
ity fails  of  its  purpose,  and  thus  life  becomes  worthless.  It  was 
Ilegesias  who  dissipated  the  theory  of  Aristippus  with  this  doc- 
trine. The  desire  for  happiness  cannot  be  satisfied,-^  he  taught. 
No  insight,  no  opulence,  protects  us  from  the  pain  which  nature 
imposes  on  the  bod}'.  The  highest  we  can  reach  and  even  as 
Tc'Aos  strive  for  is  painlessness,  of  which  death  most  certainly 
assures  us.^  The  particular  ethical  teachings  of  Hegesias  ap- 
pear more  nearly  like  the  precepts  of  the  Cynics  than  like  many 
of  the  expressions  of  Aristippus. 

The  isolation  of  the  individual  shows  itself  in  the  hedo- 
nistic philosophers  in  their  indifference  to  public  life. 
Aristippus  rejoiced  that  in  his  Sophistic  wanderings  no 
interest  in  politics  infringed  upon  his  personal  freedom.* 
Theodorus^  called  the  world  his  country,  and  said  that 
patriotic  sacrifice  Was  a  folly  which  the  Wise  Man  is  above. 
These  all  are  sentiments  in  which  the  Cynics  and  Cyre- 
naics  aerrce  almost  verballv,  and  in  these  tlic  decline  of 
Greek  civilization  was  most  characteristically  expressed. 

Religious  beliefs  are  among  the  things  which  the  Hedonists 
shoved  one  side  with  sceptical  indifference.  Freedom  from 
religious  prejudices  seemed  to  them  (Diog.  Laert..,  II.  91)  to 

1  Diog.  Laert.,  II.  98.  ^  /jj^/.^  94  f. 

8  The  lectures  of  Hegesias  TTfia-iOavaTos  are  said  to  have  been  for- 
bidden in  Alexandria  because  he  spoke  too  much  of  voluntary  death. 
Cicero,  Tusc,  I.  34,  83. 

*  Xen.  Mem.,  II.  1,  8  f.  ^  Diog.  Laert.,  IL  08. 


MATERIALISM  AND   IDEALISM  151 

be  indispensable  for  tlie  Wise  Man.  It  is  not  related,  however, 
that  the}'  set  up  in  an}-  way  in  opposition  to  positive  religion 
another  conception.  Theodorus  proclaimed  his  atheism  quite 
openly.  Eueraerus  devised  for  an  explanation  of  the  belief  in 
gods  the  theory  to-day  called  after  hiui,  and  often  accepted  in 
modern  anthropology  in  many  forms.  According  to  this  theory, 
the  worship  of  the  gods  and  heroes  is  developed  from  a  rever- 
ence of  rulers  and  otherwise  remarkable  nien.  (Cicero,  De  nat. 
deor.,  I.  42,  119  ;  Sext.  Emp.  Adc.  math.,  IX.  17.) 


5.   MATERIALISM   AND   IDEALISM. 

DEMOCRITUS    AND    PLATO. 

The  Greek  Enlightenment  had  impeded  the  progress  of 
natural  science  by  destroying  the  naive  confidence  of  the 
Greek  in  the  validity  of  human  knowledge.  Science  was 
being  utilized  for  practical  life,  and  was  in  danger  of  losing 
its  dignity  and  the  independence  which  it  had  just  achieved. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  prevailing  interest  of  the  period 
in  psychology  had  widened  the  circle  of  scientific  w^ork. 
Logic  and  ethics  had  thus  been  added  to  physics,  —  to 
use  the  classification  of  the  ancients.  Conceptions  of  the 
psychical  aspects  of  life  now  stood  side  by  side  with  those 
of  its  physical  aspects.  Man  had  becorpe  conscious  of  his 
share  in  the  construction  of  the  idea  of  the  world.  The 
essence  of  scientific  research  was  found  to  consist  in  the 
examination  of  concepts  and  the  fundamental  proposition 
of  science  had  its  formulation  in  the  law  of  the  domina- 
tion of  the  particular  by  the  universal.  At  the  same  time, 
however,  the  principle  was  seen  that  science  could  never 
give  satisfaction  if  it  disregarded  the  connection  between 
human  life,  as  teleologically  determined,  and  the  objective 
world. 

The  subjective  moment  had  been  sundered  in  its  devel- 
opment from  the  objective,  and  consequently  placed  in  a 


152  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

certain  opposition  to  it.  In  the  mutual  interpenetration  of 
the  two,  and  in  the  tendency  of  these  principles  to  coalesce, 
did  Greek  science  find  the  profoundest  deepening  of  its 
conceptual  life  and  the  greatest  broadening  of  its  practical 
life.  From  the  Peloponnesian  war  until  Philip  of  Mace- 
don,  when  the  political  life  of  Greece  was  already  approach- 
ing dissolution,  science  created  its  comprehensive  systems, 
and  perfected  itself  in  its  ripest  undertakings,  which  are 
associated  with  the  three  names  Democritus,  Plato,  and 
Aristotle. 

In  the  first  place,  as  preparation  for  the  final  synthetic 
statement  of  Aristotle,  appeared  the  two  metaphysical  sys- 
tems which  expressed  the  greatest  opposition  possible  within 
the  realm  of  (ireek  thought :  the  materialism  of  Democritus 
and  the  idealism  of  Plato. 

Both  appeared  at  that  culmination  point  of  Greek  culture 
when  the  flood  of  Greek  life  was  passing  over  to  its  ebb  ; 
the  Democritan  system  was  about  tliree  decades  before  the 
Platonic,  and  in  a  remarkable  degree  independent  of  it. 
Each  system  developed  its  doctrine  on  a  broad  episte- 
mological  basis,  and  each  is  related  both  positively  and 
negatively  to  the  Greek  Enlightenment.  Both  were  met- 
aphysical systems  of  outspoken  rationalism.  Each  in 
complete  exposition  compassed  the  entire  range  of  the 
scientific  interest  of  the  time.  Finally,  in  botli  became 
defined  those  opposed  philosophical  views  of  the  world 
which  have  not  been  reconciled   up  to  the  present  time. 

But  there  are  just  as  many  differences  as  there  are  simi- 
larities. Although  agreeing  with  Plato  as  to  the  Protago- 
rean  theory  of  perception,  Democritus  turned  back  to  the 
old  rationalism  of  the  Eleatics,  while  Plato  created  a  new 
ideal  Eleaticism  out  of  the  Socratic  theory  of  the  concept. 
Democritus  may  therefore  appear  less  progressive  and  less 
original  in  this  respect  than  Plato,  but  we  must  remember 
that  as  to  their  general  metaphysics  the  principle  of  phys- 


MATERIALISM  AND   IDEALISM  153 

ics  dominated  the  Democritan  system,  and  the  princi{)le  of 
ethics  tlie  Platonic  system.  Ethics  was  incidental  in  the 
former  system,  while  in  the  latter  physics  was  the  incident. 
In  every  direction  the  theory  of  Democritus  shows  itself 
to  be  an  attempt  to  perfect  the  philosophy  of  nature  by  the 
aid  of  the  anthropological  theories  of  the  Enlightenment, 
while  Platonism  was  developed  as  an  original  recreation 
out  of  the  same  problems.  The  historical  fate  of  both 
these  philosophies  was  also  determined  by  this  relationship, 
for  the  materialism  of  Democritus  was  pressed  into  \he 
background  from  the  beginning,  while  Plato  became  the 
determining  genius  of  future  philosophy. 

The  great  significance,  which  —  in  this  exposition  in  distinc- 
tion fronj  all  previous  ones  —  is  given  to  Democritus  by  making 
him  parallel  with  Plato,  is  required  solely  by  historical  acc,uracy. 
A  similar  view  was,  for  that  matter,  very  common  among  the 
writers  of  antiquity-.  As  a  matter  of  chronology  Democritus,  who 
lived  between  430  and  360  (§  31),  was  about  twenty  years 
younger  than  Protagoras  and  ten  years  younger  than  Socrates. 
Although  he  never  came  under  the  direct  personal  influence  of 
the  latter,  yet  it  must  be  taken  for  granted  that  a  n)an  to  whom 
in  all  antiquity  Aristotle  alone  was  comparable  in  learning,  had 
not  studied  the  scientific  work  of  the  Sophists  in  vain.  To  treat 
him  entirely  among  the  pre-Sophistic  thinkers,  as  is  customary,^ 
would  be  justified  only  if  no  traces  of  the  influence  of  the  En- 
lightenment are  seen  in  him.  We  hope  to  show  the  contrary  in 
the  following  exposition  of  his  theory.  But,  iiowever,  this  ex- 
position will  not  support  the  attempt  to  stamp  the  Democritan 
theory  as  a  kind  of  vSophistry.  as  Schleiermacher  and  Ritter  have 
made  it.  The  strong  bins  of  judgment  and  vagueness  of  treat- 
ment that  has  arisen  from  this  interpretation  is  suflicieutly 
repudiated  by  Zeller  (I*.  842  f.).  The  points  of  view  and  theo- 
ries in  Sophistic  literature  of  which  Democritus  certainly  did 
make  use.  were  arranged  by  him  synthetically  in  a  unified  met- 
aphvsic.  but  such  a  metaphysic  lay  far  outside  the  horizon  of 
the  Sophists.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  to  be  entirely  admitted 
that    even    this    materialistic    metaphysic   played   a   relatively 

^  Most  unfortunate  in  this  connection  is  the  arranirement  of  Schwegler- 
Kostlin.  where  the  Atomists  (as  also  Empedocles  and  Anaxagoras)  were 
treated  before  the  Eleatics.     3  ed.  p.  51  f. 


154  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

unfruitful  part  in  rejuvenating  ancient  thought.  For  ancient 
thought  took  a  Platonic  tendenc}',  and  therefore  we  have  lieen 
very  imperfecth*  tauglit  concerning  the  Democritan  theory. 
But  the  case  is  entirely  dififerent  when  we  consider  the  whole 
European  history  of  science.  Since  the  time  of  Galileo,  Bacon, 
and  Gassendi,  the  Democritan  teaching  has  become  the  funda- 
mental metaphysical  assumption  of  modern  natural  science,  and 
however  sharply  we  may  criticise  this  theory,  we  cannot  den}- 
its  significance  (Lange,  GeschicMe  des  Materialismus,  2  ed.,  I. 
9  f.).  Just  in  this,  however,  consisted  its  historical  equality 
with  Platonism. 

One  of  the  most  striking  facts  of  ancient  literature  is  the 
apparently  perfect  silence  that  Plato  maintained  concerning 
Democritus.^  This  was  discussed  many  times  in  antiquit}-.^  The 
neglect  is  not  possibly  explained  as  hate  or  contempt.®  Plato 
was  very  much  interested  in  men  like  the  Cynics  and  Cyrenaics 
whose  manner  of  thought  must  have  been  far  less  in  sympathy 
with  his  own  than  that  of  Democritus,  —  with  men  who  must 
have  appeared  to  him  far  less  significant  intellectually.  That 
Plato  knew  nothing  of  Democritus  is  chronologically  a  matter  of 
greatest  improbabilit}'.  If  we  also  admit  that  Democritus  on 
account  of  his  long  journeys  entered^  comparatively  late  upon  his 
literary  activit}',  yet  the  amount  of  his  literary  work  requires 
that  its  beginning  be  set  distinctly  before  Plato's  first  works,  and 
much  the  more  before  Plato's  later  works :  when  Plato  wrote 
the  Symposium,  Democritus  was  seventy-five  years  old.  The 
more  remarkable  is  it  that  Plato,  who  otherwise  refers  to,  or  at 
least  mentions,  all  the  other  early  philosophers,  ignores  not  only 
Democritus,  but  also  the  Atomic  teaching.^     It  must  therefore 

1  The  name  Democritus  occurs  nowhere  in  Plato's  writings,  and  there 
is  nowhere  a  mention  of  the  Atomic  doctrine.  When  Plato  speaks  of 
materialism  (compare  above),  he  cannot  possibly  have  Democritus  in 
mind. 

2  Diog.  Laert.,  IX.  40. 

*  As  early  as  Aristoxenus  there  appears  to  have  been  related  the 
foolish  story  of  the  designed  burning  of  the  Democritan  books  by  Plato. 
Diog.  Laert,  op.  cit. 

*  The  time  of  the  composition  of  his  fiiKpbt  StaKocr/iot,  Democritus 
himself  (Diog.  Laert.,  IX.  41)  places  at  730  years  after  the  destruction  of 
Troy  (see  Zeller,  I*.  762),  i.  e.  about  420. 

^  It  is  significant  that  both  the  Sophist  and  the  Parmenides  — 
whether  they  be  dialogues  written  by  Plato  or  originating  from  the  Pla- 
tonic circle  —  do  not  mention   Atomism,  although  there  were  present 


MATERIALISM   AND  IDEALISM  155 

be  concluded,  at  all  events,  that  Atomism  —  the  writing  of 
Leucippus  being  doubtful  —  had  found  no  favor  within  the  circle 
of  Attic  culture.  It  therelbre  appears  conceivable  that  the 
Athenians  were  ^  entirely  indifferent  to  the  essentially  scientific 
nature-investigations  of  Democritus  at  the  time  of  the  Sophists 
and  Socrates.  In  Athens  one  worked  at  other  things,  so  that 
Plato  even  later  also  made  no  mention  of  the  writings  of  the 
great  Atomist  in  developing  his  own  nature-theories.  That  he 
was  not  really  acquainted  with  them  appears  to  become  more 
and  more  doubtful.  R.  Hirzel  has  pointed  out  two  places  (^Phil., 
43  f.  ;  Rep.,  583  f.)  where  references  are  made  to  Democritan 
ethics  {Untersuchungen  zu  Cicero's  philos.  /Schriften,  I.  141  f.). 
P.  Natorp  has  assented  to  this  {Forschungen,  201  f.),  but  he  has 
few  results  in  following  up  "  the  traces  of  Democritus  in  Plato's 
writings"  {Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos.,  I.  515  f.).  It  would  be 
more  satisfactory  to  seek  negative  and  positive  relations  to 
Democritus  in  Plato's  later  metaphysic  {Philehus)  ^  and  in  his 
philosophy  of  nature  dependent  on  it  {Timceus).  Compare  be- 
low the  references  in  the  remarks  to  §  37. 

31.  Democritus  of  Abdera,  the  greatest  investigator  of 
nature  in  antiquity,  was  born  about  460.  He  was  first 
attracted  to  scientific  research  in  the  school  of  Leucippus, 
probably  about  the  time  when  Protagoras,  who  was  some 
twenty  years  his  elder,  also  belonged  to  that  circle.  Hav- 
ing the  liveliest  sense  for  individual  investigation  in  natu- 
ral sciences,  he  travelled  extensively  for  many  years.  This 
led  him  through  Greece,  for  a  longer  time  into  Egypt,  and 
over  a  greater  part  of  the  Orient.  The  exact  time  of  his 
return  and  the  beginning  of  his  literary  activity,  however, 
must  remain  a  subject  for  conjecture,  and  his  death  can 

important  occasions  for  it  in  the  Sophist  in  the  discussion  of  Being,  and 
equal  occasions  in  the  Parmsnides  in  the  dialectic  over  the  One  and  the 
Many. 

^  In  any  case  the  expression  of  Democritus  (Diog.  Laert.,  X.  36)  is 
characteristic  :  ^\6ov  th  'A$rivas  koi  ovtis  fif  eyvcuKfv.  At  the  time  of  the 
Sophists  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  no  one,  not  even  Socrates,  had  the 
spirit  for  serious  investigation  into  the  nature  studies  of  Democritus. 

2  H.  Usener  (Preussisches  JahrhucJi.  LIII.  p.  16)  has  already  given 
much  attention  to  this  (Philehiis,  28  f). 


156  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

only  be  approximately  set  at  360.  He  settled  in  his  home 
in  Abdera.  He  became  highly  honored  there,  and  he  lived 
surrounded  by  those  who  prosecuted  their  researches  under 
his  direction.  He  remained  distant  and  apart  from  the 
Attic  circle  of  culture,  in  which  little  notice  was  taken  of 
liim,  but  he  may  have  been  in  occasional  intercourse  with 
the  physician  Hippocrates,  who  spent  his  later  years  in 
Larissa. 

The  life  of  Democritus  is  fixed  by  approximately  safe  data, 
from  his  own  statement  (Diog.  Laert.,  IX.  41)  tluit  he  was 
forty  years  3'oiuiger  than  Anaxagoras,  and  from  the  statements 
he  made  concerning  the  time  of  the  composition  of  his  /xiKpos 
SittKcxr/ios  (§  30).  The  acquaintance  of  Democritus  with  the 
teaching  of  both  his  countrymen,  Leucippus  and  Protagoras,  is 
entirely  assured  b}-  the  testimony  of  antiquit3'  and  the  cliaracter 
of  his  philosophy.  He  doubtless  knew  the  Eleaties  as  well,  and 
one  possessed  of  his  great  erudition  could  hardlv  be  ignorant 
of  most  of  the  other  physicists.  Traces  here  and  there  in  his 
system  show  this.  He  did  not  accept  the  number  theor}'  of 
the  Pythagoreans.  The  friendly  relationship  to  the  Pythago- 
reans, attributed  to  him,^  can  liave  reference  only  to  his  mathe- 
matical^ researches,  and  perhaps  in  part  to  his  physiological 
and  ethical  undertakings.  He  also  appeared  to  be  very  familiar 
with  the  theories  of  the  younger  physicists.  But  more  impor- 
tant for  his  development  of  the  Atomic  theory  were,  on  the 
one  hand,  his  own  ver}'  extensive  and  painstaking  researches, 
and,  on  the  other,  the  theory  of  perception  that  he  obtained  from 
Protagoras.  Whether  he  gave  much  attention  to  the  theories  of 
the  other  Sophists,  is  still  doubtful.  They  were  entirely  alien 
to  his  metaphysical  and  scientific  tendency.  But  the  thorough- 
ness of  his  anthropology,  the  significance  that  he  laid  on  meta- 
phN'sical  and  ethical  questions,  and  the  single  points  which  he 
found  valid  in  them,  prove,  nevertheless,  that  he  was  not  unin- 
fluenced by  the  spirit  of  his  time  from  which  he  was  otherwise 
somewhat  isolated.  All  these  circumstances  assign  to  him  the 
place  of  one  who  through  the  subjective  period  of  Greek  science 
was  the  banner  bearer  of  the  cosmological  metaphysic ;  and  in 
consequence  of  his  partial  acceptance  of  the  new  elements  was 

1  Diog.  Laert ,  IX.  38. 

2  He  prided  himself  particularly  on  his  mathematical  knowledge 
(Clemens  Alex.  Strom.,  304  a). 


MATERIALISM   AXD   IDEALISM  157 

the  finisher  of  the  system.  He  did  not  receive  the  slightest 
influence  from  his  great  contemporary  Socrates. 

The  duration  of  his  travels  was  at  all  events  considerable, 
and  his  stay  in  Egypt  alone  is  given  as  about  five  years. ^  He 
certainly  came  to  know  tlie  greater  part  of  Asia.^  He  got 
nothing  philosopliical  from  his  travels,  esi)ecially  since  his 
thought  habitually  avoided  everything  mythical.  Nevertlieless, 
his  gain  in  breadth  of  experience  and  in  the  results  of  his  col- 
lections was  only  the  greater.  His  return  to  Abdcra  after  his 
journeys  was  the  beginning  of  his  teaching,  and  his  literary 
work  may  be  dated,  in  view  of  the  extent  of  these  travels,  not 
before  420.^  Presumably  he  contiuued  his  work  into  matura 
retustas  (Lucret  De  rer.  nat..  111.  1039).  His  fellow-citizens 
honored  him  with  the  name  a-of^ia.  He  seems  to  have  been 
little  interested  in  public  affairs,  and  he  reached  the  great  age  * 
of  ninety  or,  according  to  some,  of  one  hundred  and  nine  years. 
His  intimac}"  with  Hippocrates  (§  39),  which  is  not  improbable 
in  itself,  has  been  the  occasion  for  the  forger}'  of  letters  between 
the  two  (printed  in  tlie  works  of  Hippocrates). 

GelTers,  Qacestiones  democritece  (Gottingen,  1829)  ;  Papen- 
cordt,  De  atomicornm  doctrina  (Berlin,  1732)  ;  B.  ten  Brink, 
VerscJiiedene  Ahhandhoufen  in  the  PhUoiogus.  1851-53,  1870; 
L.  Liard,  De  Democrito  philosopho  (Paris,  1873);  A.  Lange, 
Geschichte  des  Materkdismus,  P.  (Iserl.,  1873)  p.  9  f. 

The  literary  activity  of  Democritus  was  certainly  very 
great.  Even  if  a  part  of  the  works  which  Thrasyllus  had 
arranged  in  fifteen  tetralogies,  w'hose  titles  are  preserved 
in  Diogenes  Laertiiis  (IX.  45  f.), —  even  if  this  part  was 
wrongfully  ascribed  to  him  (for  Diogenes  mentions  there 

1  Diodor.,  I.  98.  2  Strabo,  XV.  1.  38. 

^  It  is  little  probable  that  Democritus  appeared  publicly  with  his 
theory,  especially  with  his  discussion  of  definitions,  ]>efore  the  beginning 
of  the  activity  of  Socrates  (about  the  time  of  the  beginning  of  the 
Peloponnesian  war).  The  passage  in  Aristotle  {De  part,  anim.,  I.  1, 
G42  a,  26),  is  not  to  be  taken  to  mean  with  certainty  a  chronological  rela- 
tionship of  the  two  philosophies,  especially  when  compared  with  Meta- 
j>lil/sic!t,  XII.  4,  1078  b,  17.  It  signifies  only  that  among  physicists  and 
metaphysicians  Democritus  first  treated  definition,  although  only  ap 
proximately;  while  the  direction  of  the  scientific  thought  of  Socrates 
was  turned  to  ethics. 

*  In  reference  to  the  numerous  anecdotes  about  the  "  laughing  phil- 
osopher," see  Zeller,  P.  766. 


158  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

titles  of  spurious  writings),  yet  there  remains  a  magnificent 
number  besides.  In  the  genuine  works  all  departments  of 
philosophy,  mathematics,  medicine,  metaphysics,  physics, 
physiology,  psychology,  epistemology,  ethics,  aesthetics,  and 
technics  are  represented.  Since  the  writings  themselves 
do  not  lie  before  us,  the  question  of  their  genuineness  must 
be  decided  on  the  score  of  greatest  probability. 

The  ancients  were  proud  of  the  works  of  Democritus, — 
which  by  the  way  were  written  in  Ionian  dialect,  —  not  only 
for  the  wealth  of  their  contents,  out  of  which  Aristotle  took 
so  much  for  his  scientific  writings,  but  also  on  account  of 
their  highly  perfected  form.  They  placed  him  in  these 
respects  by  the  side  of  Plato  ^  and  other  great  litterateurs.^ 
They  admired  the  clearness  of  his  exposition^  and  the 
effective  power  *  of  his  buoyant  style. 

The  loss  of  these  writings,  which  appears  to  have  hap- 
pened at  some  time  from  the  third  to  the  fiftli  century  after 
Christ,  was  the  most  lamentable  that  has  happened  to 
the  original  documents  of  ancient  philosophy.  While  the 
work  of  Plato  has  been  preserved  in  its  complete  beauty, 
there  remains  of  that  of  his  great  antipode  only  a  torso  that 
can  never  be  completed. 

Compare  Fr.  Schleiermacher,  JJeher  das  Verzeichnis  der 
Schriften  des  I>em.  hex  Diog.Laert.^  (Jomplete  TFbrA-jj,  Division 
III.,  Vol.  TIL  p.  293  f. ;  Fr.  Nietsehe,  BeUrixge  zur  Qaellenkunde 
und  Kritik  des  Diog.  Laert. ,  p.  22. 

The  Fragments  with  annotations  by  Miillach,  I.  330  f.  (par- 
ticularly Berlin,  1843)  ;  W.  Burchard,  Democriti philosophice  de 
sensibus  fragmenta  (Minden,  1830),  Fragmente  der  Moral  des 
Abderiten  Democritus  (Minden,  1834)  ;  Lortzing,  Ueber  d.  ethi- 
schen  Frogmente  des  Democritus  (Berlin,  1873)  ;  W.  Karl, 
Democritus  in  Cicero's  philos.  Schriften  (Diedenhofen,  1889). 

The  insecurity  in  earlv  time  in  reference  to  the  writings  of  the 
Atomists  can  be  seen  in  the  fact  that  while  Epicurus  seems  to 
liave  called  in  question  the  existence  of  Leucippus  (Diog.  Laert., 
X.  13),  the  school  of  Theophrastus  ascribed  the  /j-eya?  Siaxocr/ios 

1  Cicero,  Orat.,  20,  67.  2  j^^j-j^  j)g  gj-at.,  I.  11,  49. 

8  Ibid.,  De  divin.,  II.  64,  133.        ■*  Plutarch,  Quces.  conv.,  V.  7,  6,  2. 


MATERIALISM  AND   IDEALISM  159 

to  Leucippus  (Diog.,  IX.  46).  Compare  E.  Rhode  and  IT.  Diels, 
in  Verhand.  der  Pldlologisclien  Versuchun<jen^  1879  and  1880, 
and  the  former  in  Jahrbuch  f  Philologie,  1881.  The  ethical 
writings,  which  V.  Rose  {De  Arist.  libr.  ord.^  p.  6  f.)  holds  as 
entirely  ungenuine,  can  be  taken  in  part  as  gennine  (Lortzing), 
especiall}'  irf.pl  evdvfMir]?.  Concerning  this  last  writing  and  the 
use  Seneca  made  of  it  (De  animi  trayiquillitate) ,  see  Hirzel 
(in  Hermes,  1879). 

32.  The  metaphysical  principles  of  the  Democritan 
teaching  w^ere  given  above  in  tlie  Atomism  of  Leucippus 
(§  23)  :  empty  space  and  numberless  self-moving,  qualita- 
tively similar  atoms.  These  atoms  differ  only  in  form  and 
size,  and  in  their  union  and  separation  all  events  are  to  be 
explained.  Their  motions  were  accepted  as  self-evident; 
but  the  aX\oioi)(TL<i,  the  qualitative  characteristics  of  the  per- 
ceived thing,  and  the  change  arising  from  its  motion  must 
remain  as  inexplicable  for  Leucippus  as  for  the  Eleatics. 
Here  Democritus  entered  armed  with  the  perception  theory 
of  Protagoras.  The  perceived  qualities  of  things  arise  as 
products  of  motion.  They  belong  not  to  things  as  such, 
but  are  only  the  manner  in  which  the  subject  perceiving  at 
the  time  carries  on  its  representation.  They  are,  therefore, 
necessary  signs  of  the  course  of  the  world,  but  they  do  not 
belong  to  the  true  essence  of  things.  In  contrast  to  abso- 
lute Being,  that  is,  atoms  and  space,  only  a  relative  reality 
belongs  to  the  sense  qualities.  But  this  relative  reality  of 
the  images  of  perception  was  supposed  by  Democritus  to  be 
derived  from  absolute  reality  —  the  Heracleitan  from  tlie 
Eleatic  world.  The  realm  of  the  relative  and  the  changing 
had  been  known  by  Protagoras  as  the  subjective,  as  only  the 
world  of  representation.  But  the  objective  world,  Avhich 
the  Sophist  with  skeptical  indifference  had  thrust  aside,  re- 
mained still  for  Democritus  the  corporeal  world  in  space. 
When  he  thus  tried  to  derive  the  subjective  process  from 
atomic  motions,  Atomism  became  in  his  hands  outspoken 
materialism. 


160  HISTORY   OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

The  peculiar  significance  of  Deniocritns  in  the  histoiy  of 
Atomism  seems  to  lie  more  in  this  materialism  than  in  his  com- 
prehensive detailed  investigations.  He  scarcely  changed  history 
in  an\'  way  in  its  fundamental  cosmological  principles ;  but 
the  careful  development  of  anthropology,  which  we  cannot  after 
all  ascribe  to  Leucippus,  is  clearl}'  his  chief  work. 

The  unifying  principle  of  Atomism,  as  it  has  been  devel- 
oped into  a  system  by  Democritus,  is  the  complete  develop- 
ment of  the  concept  of  mechanical  necessity  in  nature. 
Democritus,  as  well  as  Leucippus,  designated  this  as  avdyKr}, 
or  in  the  Heracleitan  manner  as  elfMap/iipT].  Every  actual 
event   is    a   mechanics  of  atoms ;  possessing  originally  a 

I-  motion  peculiar  to  themselves,  they  get  impact^  and  push 
by  contact  with  one  another.  Thus  processes  of  union  and 
separation  come  about  and  these  appear  as  the  origin  and 
destruction  of  things.  No  event  is  without  such  a  mechan- 
ical cause.2  This  is  the  only  ground  for  explaining  all 
phenomena.  Every  teleological  conception  is  removed  a 
limine,  and  however  much  Democritus  in  his  physiology 

L- referred  to  the  wonderful  teleology  in  the  structure  and 
functions  of  organisms,  nevertheless  he  apparently  saw 
therein  little  reason  or  cause  for  such  teleology  in  point 
of  fact. 

Outspoken  antiteleological  mechanism  is  obviously  the  prin- 
cipal reason  for  the  deep  chasm  which  continued  to  exist  be- 
tween Democritus  and  the  Attic  philosophy,  even  at  those  points 
concerning  which  Aristotle  recognized  the  value  of  the  investi- 
gations of  Democritus,  —  the  chasm  which  divided  the  teaching 
of  Democritus  from  that  of  Aristotle.  This  was  the  reason  that 
after  the  victor}-  of  the  Attic  philosophy,  Democritus  lapsed  into 
oblivion  until  modern  science  declared  in  favor  of  his  principle 
and  raised  him  to  recognition.     A  highly  significant  moment  in 

1  Since  empty  space  which  has  no  real  Being  cannot  be  the  bearer 
of  motion,  the  transit  of  motion  from  one  atom  to  anotlier  is  possible 
only  through  contact,  and  "actio  in  distans  "  is  excluded.  When  the 
latter  seems  to  occur,  it  is  explained  by  emanations,  as  in  the  working 
of  the  magnet  (as  in  Empedocles). 

2  Olidfv  vpijfia  fxart^v  yiyverai.  dXAu  ndvra  eK  \6yov  re  kiu  vtt  avdyicTjr. 


MATERIALISM  AND  IDEALISM  161 

the  human  apprehension  of  the  world,  and  one  never  to  be  left 
out  of  account,  came  hereby  to  clear  and  distinct  consciousness, 
and  ruled  all  Atomism  as  a  methodical  postulate.  The  charge 
raised  by  Aristotle  (Phys.,  II.  4,  196  a,  24)  and  before  him  by 
Plato  (Phileb.,  28  d)  and  lately  repeated  (Ritter),  that  Democri- 
tus  made  the  world  one  of  chance  {avTo/jLarov,  tv^^?)  rests  upon 
the  entirel}-  one-sided  teleological  use  of  this  expression.  Com- 
pare Windelbaud,  Die  Lehren  vom  Zufall,  p.  56  f. 

The  Atoms  are  to  be  primarily  distinguished  from  each 
other  by  their  form  (^a-)(^T}fia  or  ISea),^  and  there  are  an  in- 
finite number  of  forms.  The  difference  of  size^  is  referred 
in  part^  to  their  difference  of  form.*  Motion  dwells  within 
the  atoms,  as  a  necessary  irreducible  function  by  which 
each  atom,  lawless  in  itself,  and  each  one  for  itself,  is  in 
process  of  flight  in  empty  space.  Where,  however,  several 
of  them  meet,  there  arises  an  aggregation.  The  shock  of 
meeting  causes  a  vortex,^  which,  when  once  begun,  draws 
more  atoms  into  itself  from  the  space  surrounding  it.  In 
this  whirl  Like  find  Like.  The  coarse  heavy  atoms  collect 
in  the  centre,  while  the  finer  and  more  volatile  are  pressed 
to  the  periphery.  The  motion  of  the  whole  mass  has  a 
balanced  revolution  however.  With  reference  to  the  indi- 
vidual objects  constructed  ^  in  this  way,  the  order,  position, 

i  It  is  most  characteristic  that  the  18ta,  the  terra  that  appears  iu 
Anaxagoras,  equally  appears  in  Democritus  and  Plato  for  absolute  real- 
ity. Of  course  in  a  different  sense  Democritus  wrote  (Sext.  Emp.  Adv. 
math.,  YII.  137)  a  separate  work,  itepX  Ibeav. 

^  At  all  events,  the  atoms  were  tliouglit  of  as  so  small  that  they  were 
imperceptible. 

^  Yet  in  this  the  different  reports  do  not  fully  agree,  in  that  occasion- 
ally fieyfdos  and  (TxrjfJ-a  seem  co-ordinated,  and  atoms  of  similar  forms  are 
assumed  to  be  of  different  sizes.  See  Zeller,  P.  777.  It  is,  however,  not 
impossible  that  Democritus  had  in  mind  atom-complexes  for  such  cases. 

*  Which,  as  the  only  ground  of  difference,  is  often  quoted.  See  pas- 
sages in  Zeller,  I*.  77G,  1. 

5  Diog.  Laert.,  IX.  31  f. 

®  Arist.  Met.,  I.  4,  985  b,  13.  In  this  place  under  to  ov  is  to  be  under- 
stood the  thing  possessing  Being  constructed  out  of  atoms.    For  rd^is  and 

11 


162  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

^  and  form  of  the  atoms  wliicli  constitute  them,  are  the  de- 
termining factors.     The  real  qualities  of  a  perceived  thing 

/are  spatial  form,  weight,  solidity,  and  hardness.  Weight^ 
depends  on  the  mass  of  matter,  with  an  allowance  for 
the  interstices  of  empty  space.  Solidity  and  hardness  de- 
pend on  the  nature  of  the  distribution  of  matter  and  empty 
space. 

These  are  the  primary  ^  qualities  which  belong  to  the 
things  in  themselves.  All  others  belong  to  the  things  only 
so  far  as  they  affect  the  perceiving  subject.    The  secondary 

'^  qualities  are  not  therefore  signs  of  things,  but  of  subjective 
states.^  Democritus  considered  color,  taste,  and  temperature 
as  belonging  to  the  secondary  qualities,  and  he  based  their 
subjectivity  on  the  difference  of  the  impression  of  the  same 
object  upon  different  men.* 

In  this  theorj'  of  the  subjectivity  of  sense  qualities  (for  de- 
tails, see  below)  Democritus  carried  out  the  suggestions  of 
Protagoras.  His  principle  of  relativity  esix'cially  shows  tliis. 
His  polemic  against  Protagoras  was  prompted  by  tl\e  fact  that  he 
held,  like  Plato,  side  by  side  with  the  tlieory  of  tlie  relativit3-  of 
sense  perception,  the  possibility  of  a  knowledge  of  absolute  real- 
itv-  On  this  account,  even  as  Plato,  he  battled  against  the  Pro- 
tagorean  tlieory,  in  which  every  perception  in  this  relative  sense 

^eVir  could  not  be  marks  of  distinction  between  the  single  atoms,  but  only 
betv.-een  the  complexes.  Compare  De  generatione  et  corruptioiie.  P.,  314  a, 
24,  in  which  things  are  distinguished  by  the  atoms,  and  their  ra^is  and 
6((ns.  Finally,  both  of  the  latter  moments  (order  and  position)  deter- 
mine the  aXXoi'cixri?,  the  qualities  of  particular  things. 

^  Heaviness  (j3a/jo?)  in  Atomism  very  often  clearly  signifies  approxi- 
mately the  same  as  movableness,  i.  e.  the  degree  of  reaction  in  pressure 
and  impact.  The  direction  of  the  movement  in  fall  is  included  by  the 
term  in  Epicureanism. 

2  The  expressions  "  primary  and  secondary  qualities  "  have  been  in- 
troduced by  Locke.  The  Democritan  distinction  had  been  previously 
renewed  by  Galileo  and  Descartes.  Descartes  reckoned  solidity  among 
the  secondary  qualities,  but  Locke  placed  it  back  among  the  primary. 

^  TTudt]  Trjs  ala6rj(Tf(os  dWoiovixemji :   Theoph.  De  sens.,  63  f. 

*  Ibid. 


MATERIALISM  AND  IDEALISM  163 

must  be  called  true.  Compare  Sext.  P2mp.  Adr.  math.,  Vlll. 
56,-  VII.  139;  Plutarch,  Adr.  col.,  4,  2  (1109).  Democritus 
also  added  to  his  recognition  of  the  subjectively  relative  the 
assertion  of  the  objectively  absolute.  Reality,  however,  con-  • 
sists  of  space  and  geometrical  forms  of  matter,  and  herein  is  his 
relationship  to  the  Pythagoreans.  Compare  V.  Brochard,  Pro- 
tagoras  et  Democrit\A/'c/i.  f.  Gesch.  der  Philos.,  II.  ofjS  f.). 

Every  place  of  the  meeting  of  several  atoms  can  there- 
fore become  the  beginning  of  a  vortex  movement  that  is 
ever  increasing  in  its  dimensions,  and  proves  to  be  the  point 
of  the  crystallization  of  a  particular  world.  On  the  one 
side  it  is  possible  that  the  small  worlds  thus  formed  may 
be  drawn  into  the  vortices  of  a  larger  system  and  become 
component  parts  of  it,  or  on  the  other  hand  that  they  may 
shatter  and  destroy  each  other  in  some  unfavorable  col- 
lision. Thus  there  is  an  endless  manifold  of  worlds,  and  >- 
an  eternal  living-process  in  the  universe,  in  which  the 
single  worlds  arise  and  again  disappear  through  purely 
mechanical  necessity. 

As  to  the  form  of  our  own  world-system,  Atomism  taught 
that  the  whole  swings  in  empty  space  like  a  ball.  The  out- 
ermost shell  of  this  ball  consists  of  comjiactly  united  atoms, 
and  the  interior  is  filled  with  air,  while  in  the  middle,  like 
a  disc,  rests  the  earth.  The  process  of  separation  of  what 
is  stable  and  what  is  flowing,  is  taking  place  still  in  the 
earth.  The  stars  are  like  the  earth,  except  that  they  are 
nnich  smaller  bodies.  Their  fires  ai-e  kindled  by  the  rota- 
tion of  the  whole  world,  and  arc  nourished  by  the  vapors 
of  the  earth.  Democritus  said  that  the  sun  and  moon  are 
of  large  dimensions,  and  he  spoke  of  the  mountains  of  the 
moon.  Both  sun  and  moon  were  originally  independent 
atom-complexes.  They  have  been  drawn  into  the  terres- 
trial system  by  its  revolution,  and  they  were  in  that  way 
set  on  fire. 

We  cannot  here  go  into  the  detailed  description  which  the 
Atomists  made  of  this  division  of  the  elements,  as  brought  about 


164  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

by  the  vortex  movement ;  see  Zeller,  I*.  798  f.  Nevertheless, 
the  interpretation  still  championed  b}'  Zeller,  P.  874  f.,  and 
earlier  the  universal  interpretation,  has  been  shaken  by  A.  Brieger 
{^Die  Urbeiceyany  der  Atome,  etc.,  1884,  Halle;  compare  Z>d 
atoinortim  Ejiicurearum  motupri/icipali,  M.  Hertz,  p.  888),  and 
by  H.  C.  Liepmann  (2)ie  Mec/ianik  der  Detnocritischeii  Afovw, 
Leipzig,  1885) .  This  earlier  interpretation  was  that  the  Atomists 
regarded  the  original  motion  of  the  atom  in  the  direction  of  the 
fall,  i.  e.  downwards  as  perceived  bj'  the  senses.  Though  the 
ancient  commentators  thus  brought  the  motion  of  the  atoms  into 
connection  with  /?upos  (compare  above),  yet  the  movement  down- 
wards was  not  expressly  mentioned  as  absolute.  Democritus 
could  easily  designate  in  the  vortex  system  of  atoms  the  opposi- 
tion between  centripetal  and  centrifugal  directions  as  /carw  and 
a.'fo.  Accordingly'  he  could  have  investigated  the  effect  of  the 
"  heavy"  in  the  vortex  without  teaching  the  conception  of  the 
Epicureans  that  "  weight"  is  the  cause  of  motion. 

Atomism  has  been  apparently  very  much  confounded  with 
this  in  later  time.  How-ever  in  the  sources  (probabl}-  academic) 
which  Cicero  {JDefin.^  I.  6,  17)  uses,  there  is  the  express  state- 
ment that  Democritus  taught  an  original  movement  of  the  atoms 
in  injinito  inani,  in  quo  iiihil  nee  summum  nee  injimum  nee 
medium  nee  extrernum  sit.  Epicurus,  on  the  contrary,  degraded 
this  teaching  in  assuming  that  the  A\ll-motion  is  the  natiual  one 
for  bodies.  The  turbidenta  atomortim  coneursio,  on  the  other 
hand,  here  (20)  was  made  a  charge  against  Democritus.  Plato 
{Tim..,  30  a,  Kivovfxevov  7rA7//x/i€Aws  kol  dr(j.KTiit<i)  appears  to  me  to 
signify  this,  and  doubtless  .refers  here  to  Atomism.  Com- 
pare Aristotle,  De  coelo.,  III.  2,  300  b,  16.  In  his  matured  rep- 
resentation of  endless  space,  it  is  remarkable  that  Democritus 
took  a  point  of  view  in  astronomy  that  was  even  for  his  time 
very  antiquated.  He  did  not  think  of  the  shape  of  the  earth  as 
spherical.  He  affiliated  closely  throughout  with  Anaxagoras, 
never  with  the  P3thagoreans.  "With  this  exception  his  singh^ 
h3-potheses,  especiall}'  his  peculiar  meteorological  and  physical 
hypotheses,  make  us  recognize  in  him  the  thoughtful  man  of 
research  and  the  penetrating  observer.  "NVe  find  him  collecting 
man}'  kinds  of  particular  observations  and  explanations  even  in 
biology,  which  Aristotle  and  others  later  used.  He  agreed 
■with  Empedocles  as  to  the  origin  of  organisms  (§  21). 

The  most  important  of  the  elements  was  thought  by. 
Democritus  to  be  fire.  It  is  the  most  perfect  because  it  is 
the  most  mobile.     It  consists  of  the  finest  atoms,  which  are 


MATERIALISM   AND   IDEALISM  165 

smooth  and  round  ^  and  the  smallest  of  all.  Its  importance 
consisted  in  its  being  the  principle  of  motion  in  organisms,^ 
and  hence  it  is  the  soul-stuff,^  For  the  rnotion  of  fire  atoms 
is  psychical  activity.^  Upon  this  principle  Democritus  built 
an  elaborately  developed  materialistic  psychology,  which  in 
turn  formed  the  fundamental  principle  of  his  epistemology 
and  ethics. 

Fr.  Heinisoeth,  Democritus  de  anima  doctrina  (Bonn,  1835)  ; 
G.  Hart,  Zur  Seelen-  iind  ErkenntnisUhre  des  Democritus  (Leip- 
zig, 188C).  It  is  evident  that  the  theor\-  of  fire  in  Democritus 
goes  back  to  Ileracleitns.  Fire  plays,  however,  in  Atomism  the 
same  role  in  manv  respects  as  the  mind-stiiflfims  in  Anaxagoras. 
This  is  especially  true  in  his  explanation  of  the  organic  world. 
Fire  is  indeed  not  the  element  that  is  moved  b}'  itself  alone,  but  it 
is  the  most  movable  element,  and  it  imparts  its  motion  to  the 
more  inert  material.  It  must  be  understood,  from  these  refer- 
ences and  relationships,  that  Democritus  also  thought  that  the 
soul  and  reason  were  distributed  through  the  entire  world,  and 
tiiat  the\-  could  be  designated  as  the  divine.^  Yet  it  is  certainly 
a  later  explanation  which  attempts  to  find  in  his  theor}-  a  world- 
soul  like  the  Heracleitan-Stoic  world-soul.  The  isolation  b}-  the 
atomistsof  the  motion  of  the  separate  fire-atoms  has  no  reference 
to  a  unitar\'  function. 

In  phNsiology  Democritus  considered  the  soul  atoms  to  be 
disseminated  throughout  the  entire  body.  He  supposed  that 
between  every  two  atoms  of  the  material  of  the  human  body  is 
a  fire  atom.®  Thereby'  he  concluded  that  soul-atoms  of  differ- 
ent size  and  motion  are  associated  with  diflferent  parts  of  the 
body.  He  accordingly  located  the  diflferent  psjxhical  functions 
in  different  parts  of  the  body,  —  thought  in  the  brain,  percep- 
tions in  the  different  sense  organs,  the  violent  emotions  {opyrj) 
in  the  heart,  and  the  appetites  in  the  liver.  The  fire  atoms  were 
supposed  to  be  held  together  in  the  bod}-  b}-  the  breath,  so  that 
the  diminution  of  the  breath  in  sleep  and  death  leads  to  the 
diminution  or  nearly  entire  destruction  of  the  ps3chical  life. 
The  spiritual  individuality  of  man  is  also  destroyed  at  death. 

The  peculiarity  of  the  Dcmocritan  psychology  consisted 
in  the  fundamental  hypothesis  that  the  life  of  the  soul  and 

1  Arist.  De  ccelo.  III.  4.  303  a,  14.        2  lb;,j,  J)e  an.,  I.  2,  404  a,  27. 

^  Compare  Zoller,  K  814.  *  Arist.  he.  cit.  405  a,  8. 

6  Cicero,  De  mtl.  clear.,  I.  43,  120.        ®  Lucret.  De  rer.  nat.,111.  370. 


166  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

its  entire  qualitatively  determined  content  has  its  final 
explanation  in  the  quantitative  difference  of  the  motion  of 
atoms.  The  life  of  tlie  soul  is  really  also  only  an  atom- 
motion,  although  the  very  finest  and  most  nearly  perfect 
of  all  motions.^    This  doctrine  attempted  to  elaborate  the 

V-  different  kinds  of  atomic  motion  which  form  the  true 
essence  of  the  different  psychical  functions. 

This  shows  itself  in  the  first  place  in  his  theory  of  per- 
ception. Since,  for  example,  the  influence  of  external  things 
upon  us,  which  is  manifested  in  perception,  is  possible  only 
by  contact  according  to  a  mechanical  principle,^  sensation 
can  be  induced  only  by  emanations  of  these  things  pressing 
upon  our  organs.     The  sensitive  fire-atoms  found  in  these 

i>  organs,  are  tlius  set  in  a  motion,  which  precisely  is  the  sensa- 
tion.^ Indeed  Democritus,  with  support  from  the  theory  of 
Empedocles,  concludes  that  in  every  organ  the  stimulating 
motions  corresponding  to  its  atomic  constitution  become 
perception,  when  a  similar  motion  meets*  them  from  the  soul 
atoms  of  the  organ.  Democritus  developed  these  theories 
for  siglit  and  hearing  in  particular.  It  is  particularly  im- 
portant for  liis  entire  theory  that  he  called  the  influences 
emanating  from  objects  "small  images"  (etSwXa),  in  his  dis- 
cussion of  siglit. 

^  That  Democritus  did  not  actually  deduce  the  qualitative  from  the 
quantitative,  but  only  had  assertions  and  good  intentions  about  it,  is  quite 
obvious.  It  is  of  course  unattainable  ;  and  this  shows  the  impossibility  of 
a  logical  completion  of  the  materialistic  metaphysic.  That  he,  however, 
sought  to  work  it  out  systematically,  makes  him  the  father  of  materialism. 

^  Therefore  touch  is  the  fundamental  sense ;  compare  Arist.  De 
sens.,  4,  442  a,  29.  This  conception  reappears  in  the  "  new  psychology," 
—  an  interesting  fact  of  historical  development. 

*  Theoph.  De  sens.,  54  f. 

*  Ibid.  56.  Developed  in  respect  to  the  ear.  Here  is  also  the 
modern  conception  concerning  the  specific  energy  of  the  sense-organs,  as 
dependent  on  the  peripheral  end-organs  being  suited  to  the  reproduction 
of  different  motions.     This  is  approximately  the  thought  of  Democritus. 


MATERIALISM   AND   IDEALISM  167 

Democritiis  agreed  entirely  with  Protagoras  in  his  as- 
sessment of  the  epistemological  value  of  these  sensations. 
Since,  then,  the  motion  thus  called  forth  is  conditioned  not 
only  hy  the  transmitting  media  ^  but  also  by  the  indepen- 
dent action  of  the  fire  atoras,^  sensation  is  no  true  expres- 
sion for  the  nature  of  perceived  things.  Therein  consists 
the  subjectivity  of  sense  perception  and  its  inability  to  give 
true  knowledge,  and  sense  does  not  therefore  truly  repre- 
sent the  atoms  and  their  connection  in  empty  space.  Sense 
yields  only  qualitative  determinations,  like  color,  taste,  and 
temperature.  Democritus  associated  the  formulation  of 
this  thought  with  the  Sophistic  contrast  of  the  law  of  na- 
ture and  the  law  of  man  :  vofjuw  jXvkv  koX  vo/mo)  iriKpov,  vofio) 
Oepfiov,  v6/j,(p  ■^v)(^p6v,  vofjbw  %/oot77  .  eTefj  he  arofia  koX  Kevov.'^ 
Thereby  to  sense  experience  objective  truth  is  denied.* 
Sense  experience  yields  only  an  obscure  view  of  what  is 
actual.  True  knowledge^  —  viz.,  of  the  atoms,  which  are 
not  perceptible  to  our  senses,  and  of  likewise  imperceptible 
empty  space  —  can  be  attained  only  by  thought. 

This  rationalism,  which  in  a  typical  manner  stands  in  contrast 
to  the  natural  science  theory  of  sense  perception,  arose  ont  of 
the  metaphysical  need  of  the  Protagorean  tlieory  of  jjerception, 
and  went  beyond  it.     For  a  very  instructive  parallel  between 

^  Theoph.  De  sens.,  50, 

2  The  Heraeleitan-Protagorean  moment  of  this  theory  lay  in  this 
counter-motion  particularly. 

8  Sext.  Emp.,  VII.  135.  Compare  Theoph.  De  sens.,  63.  He  like- 
wise traced  the  human  nomenclature  for  things  back  to  deais.  See 
Zeller,  I\  824,  3. 

'  The  occasional  strictures  about  the  limitations  of  human  knowledge 
(Diog.  Laert.,  IX.  72  ;  see  Zeller,  I*.  823  f.)  are,  as  also  in  Empedocles, 
to  be  considered  only  in  this  relation.  It  seems  all  the  more  true, 
since  Democritus  expressly -taught  that  there  might  also  exist  for  other 
things  other  methods  of  perception  than  those  of  man.  This  was  con- 
sistent with  his  whole  theory.  See  Plutarch,  Plac,  IV.  10  (Dox.,  399). 
Compare  below. 

5  Sext.  Emp.  Adv.  math.,  VII.  139, 


168  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Plato  and  Democritus,  see  Sextus  Empiricus,  Adv.  math.,  VIII. 
56.  This  rationalism  of  Democritus  corresponds,  in  fact,  entirel3' 
to  that  of  the  old  metaphysic  and  the  nature  philosophy.  The 
onl}-  difference  is  that  liere  in  Democritus  it  is  not  onh-  asserted, 
but  it  is  also  based  upon  an  anthropological  doctrine.  It  is 
further  to  be  observed,  and  it  is  also  of  value  in  drawing  a 
parallel  with  Plato  (Natorp,  Forschungen,  207),  that  Democritus 
yvwfx.r]  yvrja-irj  refers  to  space  and  the  mathematical  relations  pos- 
sible in  space.  It  must  remain  undecided  how  far  connections 
with  the  Pythagoreans  are  to  be  supposed.  Democritus,  at  all 
events,  is  as  far  distant  as  the  Pythagoreans  and  the  Academy 
from  a  really  fruitful  application  of  mathematics  to  physics  in 
the  manner  of  Galileo. 

But,  finally,  thought  itself,  which  grasps  the  truth  of 
things,  is  nothing  else  than  a  motion  of  atoms,  and  in  so 
far  is  like  perception. ^  Furthermore,  since  thought,  as  all 
kinds  of  motion,  can  arise  only  from  mechanical  causes, 
Democritus  saw  himself  driven  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
v6r](Ti<i  as  well  as  the  aXcr6r](7t<;  presupposes'^  impressions  of 
eihoiXa  from  the  outer  world  upon  the  body.  In  view  of 
the  documents  that  lie  before  us,  it  is  only  supposititious  ^ 
how  Democritus  more  exactly  represented  to  himself  the 
process  of  thought.  It  is  certain  ^  that  he  traced  dreams, 
visions,  and  hallucinations  to  elhoika  as  their  causes. 
These  are  also  ideas  introduced  indeed  through  bodily  im- 
pressions, but   not  by  the  customary  path  of  perception 

^  Althoufrh  in  itself  not  equivalent  on  the  higher  planes.  It  is  like- 
wise dissimilar  to  all  the  functions  of  the  fire  atoms. 

2  Plutarch,  Plac,  IV.  8  {Box.,  395). 

8  Zeller  (P.  821,2)  thinks  that  Democritus  did  not  attempt  such  an  in- 
vestigation concerning  the  psychological  principle  in  order  to  establish  the 
preference  of  thought  to  perception.  Zeller's  view  seems  improbable,  in 
the  first  place,  on  account  of  Democritus'  elaboration  elsewhere  of  his 
epistemological  and  psychological  doctrine;  in  the  second  place,  on 
account  of  the  importance  of  the  matter  for  his  whole  system ;  finally, 
because  of  the  traces  of  such  undertakings  in  his  preserved  fragments. 
Compare  G.  Hart,  Zur  Seelen-  und  Erkenntnislehre  des  Dem.,  p.  19f. 

*  Plutarch,  Qnoest.  conv.,  VIII.  10,  2;  Cic.  De  div.,  II.  67,  137  £. 


MATERIALISM  AND  IDEALISM.  169 

tlirough  the  organs  of  sense.^  Democritus  is  so  far  from 
holding  these  images  as  purely  subjective  that  he  ascribes  to 
them  rather  a  kind  of  presentient  truth.^  He  looks  upon  the 
process  distinctly  after  the  analogy  of  the  sense  of  sight  as 
the  name  etSoXa  shows.  eiSwXa,  finer  than  those  influencing 
the  sense,  create  a  correspondingly  finer  motion  of  the 
soul  atoms,  and  thus  arises  our  dream  knowledge.  If  now 
Democritus  regarded  thought  as  the  finest  motion  of  the 
fire  atoms,  he  must  have  looked  upon  the  finest  etBwXa  also 
as  the  stimuli  of  that  motion,  viz.  those  eiSooXa  in  which 
the  true  atomistic  form  of  things  is  copied.  Thought  is 
accordingly  an  immediate  knowledge  ^  of  the  most  minute 
articulation  of  actuality,  —  the  theory  of  atoms.  These 
finest  eiSoiXa  remain  ineffectual  to  the  greater  portion  of 
humanity  compared  to  the  gross  and  violent  stimulations 
to  the  sense  organs.  The  Wise  Man,  however,  is  alone 
sensitive*  to  them,  biit  he  must  avert  his  attention  from 
the  senses^  in  order  to  conceive  them. 

Compare  E.  Johnson,  Der  Sensicalis))iHs  des  Demokrif,  etc. 
(Plaiien,  1868)  ;  Natorp,  Forschunr/en,  164  f.  To  designate  De- 
mocritus as  a  sensualist  is  only  justified  by  the  fact  that  he  thought 

1  It  does  not  a])pear  from  the  preserved  passages  exactly  clear 
■whether  Democritus  in  his  explanation  of  dreams  thought  that  the 
etStoXa  press  in  during  sleep  without  the  help  of  the  sense  organs  ;  or 
that  they  were  those  that  had  pressed  in  during  wakefulness,  but  on 
account  of  their  weakness  had  first  come  into  activity  during  a  state  of 
sleep.     Perhaps  he  had  both  conceptions. 

'■2  According  to  Plutarch  {op.  cit.),  the  dream  is  able  to  reveal  a 
strange  life  of  the  soul  to  the  dreamer. 

3  Thought  in  analogy  to  sense  of  sight ;  pointed  out  first  by  Brandis 
{Hnndbuch,  I.  333  f.)  and  abandoned  by  him  (Gesch.  d.  Enfw.,  T.  145); 
analogy  revived  by  Johnson.  This  analogy  is  to  the  effect  that  thought 
is  an  immediate  inner  perception  or  the  intuitive  conception  of  absolute 
reality. 

*  Compare  the  somewhat  dark  passage,  Plutarch,  Plac,  IV.  10: 
Arj^OKpiTOi  n\fiovs  fivai  aia6r](T(is  TTfpi  ra  aXoya  fwa   kul  iTfpi  tovs  (TO(f)ovs 

Kai  TTfpi  TOVi    dfOVQ. 

*  See  Hart,  op.  cit.  p.  ID  f. 


170  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

that  the  ground  of  the  stimulation  and  the  functioning  of  thought 
is  analogous  to  that  of  (sight)  perception.  The  distinguishing 
characteristic  of  Deraocritus  is,  however,  this,  that  thought 
(/ could  go  on  without  the  Iielp  and  therefore  to  the  exclusion  of 
sense-activit}'.  Therefore  he  is  an  outspoken  rationalist.^ 
These  passages  in  which  it  is  appaientl}'  ascribed  to  Dcmoc- 
ritus  that  he  drew  conclusions  from  (^aivd/xeva  concerning  the 
vorjTd  (Sext.  Emp.,  VII.  140;  Arist.  De  an.,  1.  2,  404  a,  27), 
prove  only  on  the  one  side  that  he  undertook  to  explain  phenom- 
ena from  atomic   movement :   tw  dWoLova-dai  iroiel    t6  ala-ddveaOai 

(Theoph.  De  se7is.,  49).  On  the  other  side  these  passages  show 
tliat  he  tried  to  have  tlie  theories  verify'  themselves  tlu'ough 
their  al)ilit3-  to  explain  phenomena,  and  to  derive  ap[)earance 
from  absolute  actualit}'.  Aoyoi  Trpos  ttjv  ala-Orjaiv  6fto\oyoifA€i'a 
Ac'yorres  (Aiist.  De  gen.  et  corr.^  I.  8,  325  a). 

33.  The  Ethics  of  Democritus,  like  his  epistemology,  has 
its  roots  in  his  psychology.  Feelingand  desire  are  Kivrjaei^y 
"  motions  of  the  fire  atoms.  As,  however,  he  established  in 
theory  this  difference  of  value, —  that  only  obscure  recog- 
nition of  phenomena  takes  place  in  the  gross  stimula- 
tions of  the  senses,  and  that  insight  into  the  true  form  of 
things  is  solicited  by  the  gentlest  movement  of  thought, —  so 
in  pj-actice  he  applied  the  same  distinction.  As  in  meta- 
physics knowledge  is  the  T€X.o<i,^  in  ethics  happiness  (evhat- 
fiovia)  is  the  reXo^;.  In  the  attainment  of  this  happiness 
there  is  also  here  the  fundamental  difference  between  ap- 
pearance and  trutli^     The  joys  of  sense  deceive,  and  only 

^  Just  as  all  pre-Sophistic  philosophers  (Heracleitus,  Parmenides) 
are  found  to  have  their  epistemological  rationalism  united  with  a  distinct- 
ively sensualistic  psychology  of  thought.  Compare  Windelbaud,  Gesch 
(I.  Philo!^..  §  6. 

2  Or  oupo9,  fr.  8  and  9.  With  this  establishment  of  a  unifying  prin- 
ciple for  the  ethical  determination  of  value,  Democritus  stood  uniquely 
by  the  side  of  Socrates.  Practically  he  differed  from  Socrates  but 
little.  Compare  Ziegler,  Gesch.  der  Ethik,  I.  34.  Fortunately,  ibid. 
36,  there  is  an  allusion  indicating  that  Democritus'  pupil,  Anaxarchus, 
was  called  Y.vbai.fxoviKoi. 

*  The  opposition  of  vofios  and  (f>v(rii  prevails  also  here.  Only  through 
human  convention  (vofim)  desires  are  of  value.  The  Wise  JNlan  livys 
here  (^vo-ct. 


MATERIALISM   AND   IDEALISM  171 

those  of  the  spirit  are  true.  This  fundamental  thought 
shows  itself  through  all  the  ethical  expressions  of  Demo- 
critus  as  a  priuciple  fully  parallel  to  his  epistemological 
principle.  Also  here  he  held  the  principle  as  authoritative 
that  violent  and  stormy  ^  motions  disturb  the  equilibrium  of 
the  soul,  i.  e.  disturb  the  fire  atoms.  Such  motions  bring 
with  them  a  state  of  agitation  of  the  senses.  Therefore,  in 
spite  of  their  apparent  momentary  pleasure,  such  motions 
lead  in  reality  to  lasting  dissatisfaction.  Fine  and  gentle 
motions  of  thought  have,  on  the  contrary,  true  pleasure  in 
themselves. 

Compare  Lortzing,  Ueher  die  ethischen  Fragmenta  Demo- 
crit's  (Berlin,  1873)  ;  R.  Hirzel  in  Hermes  (1879,  p.  354  f.)  ;  F. 
Kern,  in  Ztitschr.  fiir  Philos.  t(.  pldlos.  Ju-itik  (1880,  supple- 
mentary part)  ;  M.  lleinze.  I^er  Eml anion isvu(S  in  der  fjriech. 
Philos.  (Leipzig.  1873j.  'I'lie  attempt  to  reduce  all  qnalitalive 
to  quantitative  relations,  which  very  properly  gives  a  unique 
place  in  ancient  philoso[)hy  to  the  Denioeritan  atomism,  becomes 
the  capstone  of  his  ethics.  The  fxiKpaX  KLv^aci^  contain  true 
happiness  in  the  moral  as  well  as  in  the  intellectual  world,  and 
the  fieydXai  are  disturbing  and  deceptive.  For  particulars,  see 
especiall^y  G.  Hart,  op.  cif.,  p.  20  f.  If  then  the  value  of  the 
psychical  functions  is  made  dependent  in  both  directions  upon 
the  intensity  of  atomic  motion,  and  indeed  in  inverse  ratio, 
then  it  is  difficult  not  to  think  of  the  similar  purpose  in  the_ 
hedonism  of  Aiistippus,  who  made  the  same  distinction,  in  a 
coarser  way  to  be  sure,  in  estimating  the  value  of  the  delights 
of  the  senses.  It  nnist  remain  undecided  whether  Democritus 
directly  influenced  the  Cyrenaics,  or  whether  there  had  been  a 
common  source  for  the  two  in  the  doctrine  of  Pythagoras. 

The  pleasures  of  sense  are  relative.  They  have  a  phe- 
nomenal 2  but  not  an  actual  value,  viz.,  the  value  belonging 

1  Fr.  20  (Stob.  EcL,  I.  40). 

2  Plato,  Rep.  584  a.  The  above  representation  is  supported  prima- 
rily by  Plato's  Repuhllc,  .583  f.,  and  Pkilebux,  43  f.,  whose  references  to 
Democritus  appear  to  Hirzel  and  Xatorp  to  be  certain  (see  above ». 
In  both  instances  it  is  remarkable  to  see  the  exposition  colored  by 
medical  expressions  and  examples  which  probably  belong  to  the  writing 
of  Democritus  (ntpl  ev^ufii»;s). 


172  HISTORY   OF   AKCIENT   PHILOSOPHY 

to  (f)vat<;.  Sense  pleasures  differ  like  the  perceptions 
in  different  individuals,  and  depend  on  circumstances. 
Every  sense  pleasure  is  conditioned  ^  only  by  the  cessa- 
tion of  unpleasurable  feeling  in  the  desire  concerned,  and 
therefore  loses  its  apparently  positive  character.  True 
happiness  consists  in  peace  {rja-vx^a)  of  the  soul,  and 
Deraocritus  generally  uses  ev6vfxia  to  designate  it.  But 
he  also  uses  many  other  expressions,  as  a9a/j,^la,  drapa^ia, 
dOavfxaaia,  dpfjuovia,  ^vfifierpla^^  especially  eveard).  He  has 
for  it  a  very  happy  simile  of  a  calm  of  the  sea  {'^aXrjvri). 
By  every  excess'^  of  excitation  thought  is  aroused  to 
a\\oj>povelv^  and  feeling  to  stormy  unrest.  The  right 
condition  of  gentle  harmonious  motion  of  the  soul-atoms 
is  possible  only  through  intellectual  knowledge.  Out  of 
this  flows  the  true  happiness  of  man. 

In  these  definitions  the  content  of  the  ethics  of  Democ- 
ritus  is  fully  on  a  level  with  the  ethics  of  Socrates.  The 
ethics  of  Democritus  intimately  connected  the  social  worth 
of  man  with  his  intellectual  refinement.  The  ground  of 
evil  is  lack  of  cultivation.^  Happiness  therefore  con- 
sists not  in  worldly  goods,^  but  in  knowledge/  in  the  har- 
monious leading  of  the  life,  in  a  life  of  temperance  and 
self-limitation.^  The  social  worth  of  a  man  is  to  be  esti- 
mated ^  by  his  mental  calibre  and  not  by  his  actions ;  and 
he  who  acts  unjustly  is  more  unhappy  than  he  who  suffers 
unjustly."  Everywhere  he  regarded  the  peace  of  man  to 
be  within  himself  (euecrrw).  He  looked  upon  the  with- 
drawal from  the  sense-desires  and  upon  the  enjoyment  of 
the  intellectual  life  as  true  happiness." 

1  Fr.  Mor.  47. 

2  Both  the  last  terras  have  a  Pythagorean  sound. 

3  Fr.  25.  4  Theoph.  De  sens.,  58. 
6  Fr.  116.  6  Fr.  1. 

■^  Fr.  136.  8  Fr.  20 ;  compare  25. 

9  Fr.  109.  10  Fr.  224. 

Ji  It  must  remain  uncertain  to  what  extent  Democritus  distinguished 


MATERIALISM  AND   IDEALISM  173 

The  numerous  single  sentences  which  have  been  preserved 
from  Democritus  suit  entirely*  the  quality  of  this  noble  and  high 
view  of  life.  Since  they  all,  however,  have  been  transmitted  in 
a  disconnected  way,  it  can  no  longer  be  determined  whether 
and  how  they  have  a  systematic  derivation  from  tlie  developed 
fundamental  princi[)le.  In  particular  is  to  be  emphasized  the 
high  worth  that  Democriius  places  in  friendship,^  and  on  the 
other  hand  liis  full  understanding  of  the  importance  of  civil  life, 
from  whicli  he  seems  to  have  deviated  onh'  in  reference  to  the 
Wise  Man '  with  a  cosmopolitanism  analogous  to  that  of  the 
Sophists.     Yet  there  remains  here  much  that  is  doubtful. 

Democritus  maintained  an  attitude  of  indifference  to  religious 
belief,  which  was  consistent  with  his  philosoph}-.  He  ex- 
plained the  mythical  forms,  in  part  by  means  of  moral  alle- 
gories,^ in  part  by  nature-mytii  *  explanations.  He  accepted,  in 
connection  with  his  theory  of  perception,  essentially  higher  an- 
thropomorplious  beings  imperceptible  to  the  senses,  but  influential 
in  visions  and  dreams.  He  called  these  daemons  ctSwAa,  an  ex- 
pression employed  elsewhere  in  his  epistemology  for  the  emana- 
tions from  things.  Tliey  are  sometimes  benevolent,  sometimes 
malevolent.^ 

Tlie  school  at  Abdera  disappeared  quickly-  after  Democritus 
died.  Even  in  its  special  undertaking,  it  performed,''  after  the 
leader  fell,  scarcely  anything  worth  mentioning.  Its  philosophi- 
cal tendency,  however,  became  more  and  more  sophistic,'  and 
thereby  led  to  Skepticism.  Metrodorus  of  Chios  and  Anax- 
archus  of  Alxlera,  the  companion  of  Alexander  on  his  Asiatic 
campaign,  are  the  notable  names.  Tlu-ough  the  influence  of 
Pj'rrho,  a  pupil  of  Metrodorus,  the  Abderite  philosophy  became 
Skepticisni,  and  the  contemporaneous  Nausiphanes  formed  the 
connection  between  it  and  Epicureanism. 

between  the  perfect  happiness  of  the  Wise  ^lan  won  through  the  yvtjcrit] 
yvoifjiT},  and  the  peace  of  the  ordinary  man  obtained  by  temperance  and 
self-control.  Compare  Th.  Ziegler,  np.  rit.,  who  wishes  to  put  into  a 
similar  relationship  both  of  the  chief  ethical  writings,  nepl  fvdvfjiirfs 
and  vTTodfJKai. 

1  Fr.  162  f.  2  pr   225. 

3  Clemens,  Cohort.,  45  f. 

*  Sext.  Emp.  Adv.  math.,  IX.  24.  6  /j/</ 

^  The  astronomical  tenets  of  Metrodorus  seem  to  indicate  a  relapse 
into  Heracleitan  ideas.     Compare  Zeller,  I*.  859. 

''  For  the  theoretical  skepticism  of  Metrodorus,  compare  Eusebius, 
Prcep.  ev.,  XIV,  19,  5.  Whatever  is  reported  of  the  ethical  tendency  of 
Anaxarchus  reminds  one  of  Hedonism,  and  Cynicism  as  well. 


174  HISTORY  OP  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

84.  Democritns'  consummation  of  the  metaphysics  of 
science  by  means  of  materialistic  psychology  formed  in  the 
total  growth  of  ancient  thought  only  an  early  dying  branch. 
The  principal  tendency  of  Greek  thought  perfected  itself 
nearly  contemporaneously  in  the  ethical  immaterialism  of 
Plato  at  the  centre  of  Attic  civilization.  The  same  ele- 
ments of  the  earlier  science,  which  were  fundamental  to 
the  theory  of  Democritus,  were  combined  afresh  and  in  an 
entirely  different  manner  in  the  Platonic  system  under  the 
influence  of  the  Socratic  principle.  Heracleitus,  Parmeni- 
des,  Anaxagoras,  Philolaus,  and  Protagoras  furnished  the 
material  for  the  theory  of  Plato,  but  it  was  worked  over  in 
an  entirely  original  manner  from  the  point  of  view  of  con- 
ceptual knowledge. 

Plato,  the  son  of  Aristo  and  Perictione,  was  born  in 
Athens  in  427,  and  came  from  a  distinguished  and  pros- 
perous family.  Endowed  with  every  talent  physical  and 
mental,  he  received  a  careful  education,  and  he  was 
familiar  at  an  early  age  with  all  the  scientific  theories  that 
interested  Athens  at  that  time.  The  political  excitement 
of  the  time  made  the  youth  desire  a  political  career.  The 
Peloponnesian  war  was  raging,  and  during  its  progress  the 
internal  and  external  affairs  of  Athens  were  becoming 
more  and  more  precarious.  On  the  other  hand,  the  rich 
artistic  development  of  the  time  was  irresistibly  attractive, 
and  Plato  was  led  to  try  poetry  in  many  of  its  forms.  Both 
Plato's  political  and  poetic  longings  appear  to  follow  him 
in  his  entire  philosophy :  on  the  one  side  in  the  lively,  al- 
though changing  interest  that  his  scientific  work  always 
shows  in  the  problems  of  statecraft,  and  on  the  other  in 
the  artistically  perfected  form  of  his  dialogues.  But  both 
are  subordinate  to  his  entire  absorption  in  the  personality 
and  teaching  of  the  character  of  his  great  master  Socrates, 
whose  truest  and  most  discriminating  pupil  he  remained 
for  many  years. 


MATERIALISM  AND  IDEALISM  175 

Of  the  general  works  concerning  Plato  and  his  theory  there 
are  to  be  named  W.  G.  Tennemann,  System  der  />?a^.  Philos.^ 
4  vols.  (Leipzig,  1792-5)  ;  Fr.  Ast,  Flafon's  Lehen  xi.  Schriften 
(Leipzig,  1816)  ;  K.  F.  Hermann,  Gesch.  u.  Syst.  der  plat. 
Philos.  (Heidelberg,  1839)  ;  G.  Grote,  Plato  and  Other  Com- 
panions of  Socrates  (London,  1865)  ;  H.  v.  Stein,  Sieben  Biicher 
zarOesch.  des  Platonismus  (Gottingen,  1861  f.)  ;  A.  E.  Chaignet, 
La  vie  et  lesecrits  de  Plato  (Paris,  1871)  ;  A.  Fouillee,  Laphilo- 
sophie  de  Plato  (4  vols.,  2d  ed.,  Paris,  1890). 

The  nearest  pupils  of  Plato,  especially  Hermodorus,  dealt  with 
his  life  ;  also  the  Peripatetics,  Aristoxenus  and  others.  The 
expositions  of  Apuleius  and  Olympiodorus  (published  in  Cobet's 
edition  of  Diogenes  Laertius)  have  been  preserved.  Besides 
there  is  a  life  of  Plato  in  the  Prolegomena  (printed  in  Hermann's 
edition  of  the  Platonic  writings).  The  collection  of  spurious 
letters  printed  with  his  works  is  a  ver}'  untrustworthy  source. 
Onl}'  the  seventh  among  them  is  of  any  worth.  K.  Steinhait 
has  published  a  life  of  Plato  (Leipzig^  1873),  which  ranks  well 
among  the  new  works. 

On  his  father's  side,  Plato  had  the  blood  of  the  Codrus  family 
in  his  veins,  and  on  his  mother's  he  traced  his  lineage  back  to 
Solon. ^  He  himself  was  called  after  his  grandfather,  Aris- 
tocles,  and  is  said  to  have  been  called  Plato  for  the  first  time  b\' 
his  gymnasium  teacher  on  account  of  his  broad  frame.  For  tlie 
determination  of  the  year  of  his  birth,  the  statements  of  Her- 
modorus are  decisive  (Diog.  Laert.,  III.  6),  that  when  he  went  to 
Euclid  at  Megara  in  399,  immediateK  after  the  death  of  Socrates, 
he  was  twenty-eight  3ears  old.  That  his  birthda}'  was  celebiated 
in  the  Academy  on  the  seventh  Thargelion  emanates  possiljl}' 
from  the  Apollo  cult,  to  which  man}'  of  the  early  myths  about 
the  philosopher  seemingh'*are  referable. 

That  Plato  was  early  remarkable  in  every  physical  and  musi- 
cal art  is  entirely  in  agreement  with  every  part  of  the  picture 
of  his  personality.  The  particular  accounts  about  his  teachers 
(Zeller,  IP.  394)  throw  no  light  on  his  own  scientific  significance. 
His  early  acquaintance  with  the  Heracleitan  Cratylus  is  attested 
by  Aristotle.^  At  what  points  of  time  in  his  development  the 
teachings  of  the  other  philosophers  whose  influence  is  traceable 
in  his  works  were  known  to  him,  cannot  be  ascertained. 
Earh'  in  his  career  Heracleitus,  the  Eleatics,  Protagoras  and 
other  Sophists,  and  later  ^  Anaxagoras  and  the  Pythagoreans 
were  authorities  for  him. 

1  It  is  improbable  that  his  family  was  poor,  as  many  later  writers 
would  have  it.     His  style  of  life  indicates  the  contrary. 

2  Met,  I.  6,  987  a,  32.  ^  Indeed,  relatively  late:  see  below. 


176  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Plato  was  hostile  to  the  deraocrac}',  as  was  consistent  with 
the  traditions  of  his  famil}'  and  the  political  views  of  his  teacher, 
Socrates.  Yet  his  political  inclinations,  as  he  has  laid  them 
down  in  his  works,  diverge  so  far  from  historic  aristociac}'  that 
his  complete  abstinence  from  public  life  in  his  native  city  appears 
highly  conceivable.  That  he  concerned  himself  in  his  youth, 
as  was  the  custom,  witli  epic  and  dramatic  poetry,  is  not  to  be 
doubted,  notwithstanding  the  uncertainty  of  the  particular  tra- 
ditions about  it. 

Concerning  the  time  when  he  became  acquainted  with  Socrates, 
an  acquaintance  that  ccrtainl}'  eclipsed  all  the  early  interests  of 
tlie  youth,  there  is  notiiing  very  definite  to  be  said.  If  he  were 
then,  according  to  Herinodorus/  twent}'  years  old,  there  remained 
very  little  room  for  his  poetic  attempts,  which  ceased  when  he 
began  philosoph}'.  It  is  probable  that  Plato  had  formulated  the 
content  of  the  separate  conversations  in  the  earliest  dialogues 
during  Socrates'  life.- 

After  the  death  of  Socrates,  Plato  went  first,  with  other 
pupils  of  the  master,  to  Euclid  at  Megara.  He  soon  after 
began  a  journey  which  took  him  to  Cyrene^  and  to  Egypt, 
and  he  seems  to  have  returned  to  Athens  from  this  journey 
about  395.  Here  he  apparently  already  began,  if  not  liis 
teaching,  yet  the  part  of  his  literary  work  in  which  he 
opposed  the  different  tendencies  of  the  Sophists.  About 
the  end  of  the  first  decade  of  the  fourth  century,  he  began 
his  first  tour  to  Magna  Gra3cia  and  Sicily,  which  not  only 
brought  him  into  personal  touch  with  the  Pythagoreans,  but 
also  led  him  to  the  court  of  the  elder  Dionysius  of  Syracuse. 
Here  he  was  in  close  intimacy  with  Dion,  and  was  thereby 
drawn  into  the  strife  of  political  parties  which  ruled  the 
court.  Matters  became  dangerous  for  him,  for  the  tyrant 
grew  hostile  and  treated  him  as  a  prisoner  of  war.  He 
,  delivered  Plato  over  to  the  Spartan  ambassador,  and  the 

1  Diog.  Laert.,  III.  6. 

2  The  statement  concerning  the  Lysis,  ibid.  35,  is  in  itself  by  no 
means  improbable. 

3  His  intimate  relations  with  the  mathematician  Theodorus,  the  pupil 
of  Protagoras  (see  Thecetetus) ,  are  somehow  connected  with  his  stay  in 
Cyrene ;  possibly  also  his  essentially  polemic  relation  to  Aristippus, 


MATERIALISM  AND  IDEALISM  177 

latter  sent  the  philosopher  to  tlie  slave-market  of  J]]gina, 
where  a  man  from  Cyrene  boiiglit  his  freedom.  About  387 
Plato  returned  to  Athens,  and  founded  his  scientific  society 
soon  after  in  the  Academy,  a  gymnasium.  Here,  to  a  con- 
tinuously increasing  band  of  friends  and  youths,  he  imparted 
his  philosophic  theories,  sometimes  in  dialogues,  sometimes 
in  longer  discourses. 

The  only  data  for  this  part  of  his  life  which  are  not  reported 
alike  everywhere  in  the  sources  have  probably  been  given  their 
definitive  statement  b\'  Zeller,  II'*.  402.  It  is  probable  that 
Plato's  Wanderjahre^  from  the  death  of  Socrates  until  his  failin-e 
in  Syracuse,  were  not  without  interruption,  and  that  he  mean- 
while had  already  begun  his  instruction  at  Athens,  although  to 
a  small  circle,  and  not  yet  to  the  closed  and  organized  Academ}'. 
The  literar\-  activity  of  Plato  in  the  interim  (395-91)  was  essen- 
tiall}'  only  a  defence  of  the  Socratic  doctrine,  as  Plato  conceived 
it  and  had  begun  to  develop  it  against  Sophistry,  which  was 
flourishing  more  than  ever.  Whether  or  not  Plato  left  his  home 
a  second  time  for  political  reasons,  during  the  Corinthian  war, 
when  Athens  was  again  lulcd  by  the  democracy,^  is  uncertain. 
He  probably  at  that  time  attempted  in  Syracuse,  perhaps  in 
collusion  with  the  Pythagoreans,  to  bring  his  political  principles 
into  vogue  by  the  exercise  of  influence  upon  the  tyrant.  For 
the  treatment  which  he  experienced  at  the  hands  of  Dionysius, 
who  seems  to  have  threatened  his  life,  is  hardly  to  be  explained 
by  any  mere  unpopularity  of  his  ethical  parihesia,  but  is,  on  tlie 
contrary,  natural  enough  if  Plato  entered  politics. 

At  first  Plato  probably  taught  in  the  Socratic  manner  bv  con- 
versation, and  he  sought  to  construct  concepts  with  the  help  of 
his  pupils.  But  the  more  his  own  opinions  became  finished,  and 
the  snialler  the  organization  of  the  Academy  grew  in  numbers, 
the  more  didactic  became  his  work,  and  the  more  had  it  the  form 
of  the  lecture.  In  the  successive  dialogues  the  work  of  the  inter- 
locutor becomes  fainter  and  less  important.  Later  Aristotle  and 
the  other  pupils  published  lectures  of  Plato. 

The  philosopher  allowed  himself  only  twice  to  be  induced 
away  from  his  teaching  in  the  Academy,  which  teaching 

^  That  about  this  time  public  attention  tui-ned  again  to  Socrates,  is 
shown  by  the  circumstance  tliat  even  then  the  rhetorician  Polycrates 
published  an  attack  upon  Socrates.      See  Diog.  Laert.,  II.  39. 

12 


178  HISTORY  m  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

lasted  the  entire  second  half  of  his  life  ;  and  then  only 
through  the  hope  of  fulfilling  his  political  ideals.  After 
the  death  of  the  elder  Dionysius,  he  sought,  with  the  help 
of  Dion,  to  influence  the  younger  Dionysius.  He  had  no 
success  in  the  first  attempt  in  867,  and  the  third  Sicilian 
journey  in  361  brought  him  into  great  personal  danger 
again.  In  this  journey  his  special  effort  was  to  reconcile 
Dion  and  Dionysius  the  younger.  Only  the  energetic  effort 
of  the  Pythagoreans  who,  with  Archytas  at  their  head,  repre- 
senting the  power  of  Tarentum,  seems  to  have  saved  him. 

Plato  died  in  347,  in  his  eightieth  year.  He  was  revered 
by  his  contemporaries,  and  celebrated  as  a  hero  by  posterity. 
He  was  a  perfect  Greek  and  a  great  man,  —  one  who  united 
in  himself  all  the  excellences  of  bodily  beauty  with  intel- 
lectual and  moral  power.  He  also  ennobled  the  sesthetic 
life  of  the  Greeks  with  a  depth  of  spirituality  which  assured 
to  him  an  influence  for  a  thousand  years. 

The  political  cbai*acter  of  the  second  and  third  Sicilian  journeys 
is  be^'ond  doubt,  but  that  does  not  preclude  the  supposition  that 
Plato  at  that  time,  in  his  intercourse  with  the  Pythagoreans,  was 
pursuing  his  scientific  work.  At  an}-  rate,  the  number  theory 
exercised  an  increasing  but  scarcely  a  healthy  influence  on  part 
of  the  development  of  his  philosophical  thought.  On  the  other 
liand,  his  influence  on  the  Pythagoreans  was  very  fruitful. 

The  reports  of  the  ancients  as  to  the  length  of  life  and  the 
time  of  death  of  the  philosopher  differ  only  a  little.  The}'  are 
easil}'  reconciled  in  the  statement  that  Plato  died  in  the  middle 
of  the  year  347.  It  is  also  said  that  he  died  suddenly  in  the 
middle  of  a  marriage  feast.  The  report  of  Cicero —  scribe?is  est 
mortuus  —  signifies  onl}'  that  Plato  was  still  laboring  to  perfect 
his  works  at  the  time  of  his  death.  The  aspersions  upon  his 
character  in  later  literature  arose  from  the  animosities  of  the 
scholastic  controvers}-.  They  are  refuted,  however,  by  the 
respectful  tone  with  which  Aristotle  always  spoke  of  Plato, 
even  when  he  was  battling  against  his  theoi-y.  It  is  not  entirely 
impossible  that  in  later  time,  when  Aristotle  went  his  own  way 
and  Plato  became  more  Pythagorean  in  his  nnsticism,  that  tlie 
relations  between  the  two  became  less  close  and  somewhat  in- 
harmonious. 


MATERIALISM  AND  IDEALISM  179 

We  can  get  the  most  reliable  picture  of  Plato  from  his  own 
writings.  They  show  in  their  author  the  realization  of  the 
Socratic  ideal :  his  scientific  investigations  are  carried  on 
with  all  the  seriousness  of  a  moral  endeavor  seeking  its 
own  fulfilment.  The  serene  beauty  of  his  compositions 
and  the  perfect  purity  of  his  diction  reveal  the  artist  who 
from  the  heights  of  the  culture  of  his  time  gives  to  the 
thought  of  that  time  a  form  that  transcends  the  time. 
With  the  exception  of  the  Apology,  they  are  dialogues  in 
which  the  conversation  and  the  deciding  word,  if  a  decision 
is  reached,  fall  in  by  far  the  majority  of  cases  to  Socrates. 
In  reference  to  their  content,  only  a  few  of  the  dialogues 
have  a  fixed  plan  of  philosophical  research.  Rather,  almost 
always  threads  of  thought  were  spun  from  the  chief  prob- 
lem in  any  direction  and  followed  to  the  end.  On  that 
account  the  dialogues  are  not  scientific  treatises,  but  works 
of  art  in  which  scientific  "  experiences  "  are  reproduced  in 
an  idealized  form.  One  remarks  this  aesthetic  character  in 
Plato's  use  of  myths,  which  appear  usually  at  the  beginning 
or  end  of  an  investigation,  where  Plato  cannot  or  will  not 
develop  his  thought  conceptually.  The  story  form  of  the 
argument  enhances  its  poetic  power. 

By  the  term  "  experiences,"  which  are  elaborated  in  Plato's 
dialogues,  we  do  not  mean  so  much  the  conferences  which  the 
poet  philosopher  employed  or  devised  as  the  outer  scenery  of 
his  works,  but  the  discussions  in  which  he  himself  led  in  the 
circle  of  his  riper  friends.^  Such  a  dialogue  as  the  Pannenides 
bears  even  the  character  of  being  the  aesthetic  resume  of  actually 
fought  out  word-battles.  The  Platonic  authorship  of  these  is 
extremely  doubtful,  but  they  must  have  originated  in  the  Pla- 
tonic circle.  The  actually  occurring  conversation  is  idealized 
and  universalized  in  these  dialogues,  being  placed  in  the  mouth 
of  Socrates  and  other  persons,  some  of  whom  had  already 
died.     Plato  shows  here  his  imagination  b}-  his  selection  and 

^  This  certainly  happened  later  also,  when  scholastic  teaching  and 
practice  had  place  in  the  Academy,  in  which  teaching  the  preserved 
diaereses  and  definitions  may  have  been  used. 


180  HISTORY  OP  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

adornment  of  the  situations  under  requirements  of  fiction,  in 
whicli  situations  these  conversations  purport  to  have  taken 
place  ;  by  the  plastic  characterizations  of  the  champions  of 
various  theories,  in  which  he  uses  frequently  the  effectual  means 
of  persiflage  ;  and  also  by  the  delicate  structure  of  the  conver- 
sation, which  forms  itself  into  a  kind  of  dramatic  movement. 
Countless  allusions,  of  which  only  a  ver\'  few  are  understood 
b3-  us,  appl}'  to  the  historical  persons  figuring  in  the  dialogue, 
and  in  part  perhaps  to  the  companions  of  Plato. 

In  the  undoubtedly  genuine  Platonic  dialogues,  Socrates  is 
made  the  speaker  of  Plato's  own  views.  The  onl}'  excep- 
tions are  the  latest,  Tiinceus  and  Critias,  and  the  Laws.  In 
the  first  two  the  reason  for  this  exception  is  that  Plato  deals 
onl}'  with  the  mythical  and  not  with  sure  knowledge.  In  the 
Laws  the  head  of  the  school  has  become  an  authority  and 
speaks  as  such.  Usuallj-  the  dramatic  scener}-  in  the  first  dia- 
logues is  much  more  simple  and  less  ornate  ;  in  the  works  of 
his  a/c/i»j,  the  scenic  effect  is  fully  developed  ;  in  the  PJiilehxis, 
on  the  contrary,  and  in  the  other  later  works,  it  sinks  back 
again  to  a  schematic  investiture.  The  conversations  are  partly 
"give  and  take,"  partlj"  repetitions  whereby  sometimes  the  chief 
dialogue  is  introduced  into  the  discussion  of  another  dialogue. 
Although  the  earlier  dialogues  follow,  on  the  whole,  the  second 
[)rinciple,  and  the  later  the  first,  yet  these  principles  are  not  safe 
criteria  for  the  chronological  succession^  of  the  dialogues. 

The  reports  of  antiquitv  that  Plato  divided  ^  philosoph}'  into 
dialectics,  phjsics,  and  ethics  can  refer  only  to  his  method  in 
the  Academy.  This  division  in  the  dialogues  can  be  made 
neither  directly  nor  indirectly.  On  the  whole,  e])istemological, 
theoretical,  metaphysical,  ethical,  and  sometimes  physical  mo- 
tives are  so  interwoven  that  while  here  and  tliere  the  one  or  the 
other  interest  predominates  (in  Themtetus  the  ej)istemological 
and  theoretical ;  in  the  Republic  the  ethico-political),  never  does 
a  conscious  sundering  of  the  realms  of  the  problems  take  place. 
This  belongs  moreover  to  the  poetic  rather  than  the  scientific 
character  of  Plato's  literarj'  workmanship. 

Concerning  the  myths  of  Plato,  compare  especiall}'  Deuschle 
(Hanau,  1854)  and  Volquardsen  (Schleswig,  1871);  concerning 
the  general  character  of  Plato's  literary  activity,  see  E.  Heitz 
(O.  Miiller's  Literaturgeschichte.,  II.  2,  148-235). 

1  In  Thecetetus  this  innovation  is  made,  and  reason  is  given  for  it 
(143  b,  c).  The  Phedo  also,  which  was  certainly  a  late  dialogue,  and 
the  probably  later  Symposium  returned  to  tlie  older  method. 

'^  Cicero,  Acad.,I.  5,  19.     Compare  Sext.  Emp.  Adv.  math.,  VII.  16. 


MATERIALISM  AND   IDEALISM  181 

There  is  no  ground  for  supposing  that  any  one  of  the 
writings  of  Plato  has  been  lost.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
transmitted  collection  contains  many  that  arc  undoubtedly 
questionable  and  ungenuine.  We  may  take  the  following 
as  certainly  Platonic :  the  Apology^  Crito,  Fruta<joras^ 
GrO)r/ias,  Crafi/Ius,  Meno,  Thecetctus,  Phcedrus,  Symposium, 
Phcedo,  Republic,  Timceus ,  and  also  probably  Philebus  and 
the  Laws.  The  following  are  certainly  not  genuine  :  Alci- 
biades  II.,  Anterastoi,  Demodorus,  Axiochus,  Epinomis, 
Eryxias,  Hipparchus,  Clitophon,  3Iinos,  Sisyphus,  Theages, 
and  the  small  studies  irepl  SiKaiov  and  wepl  aperrj^.  Among 
the  doubtfid,  Parmenides,  Sophist,  and  Politicus  are  of 
special  importance.  The  criterion  of  their  genuineness  is 
chiefly  the  testimony  of  Aristotle,  who  mentions  many  of 
the  writings  with  the  name  of  Plato  and  title  of  the  book, 
many  only  with  either  name  or  title,  many  without  certain 
reference  to  Plato.  To  a  canon  established  in  this  way, 
there  are  to  be  added  writings  that  Plato  himself  cites,  or 
whose  form  and  content  make  them  Plato's. 

Just  as  important  as  the  question  of  the  gemiineness  of 
the  writings  of  Plato,  is  the  question  of  their  order  and  con- 
nection. The  chief  controversy  over  the  order  of  the  writ- 
ings is  between  the  Systematic  and  Historical  theories.  The 
Systematic  theory,  advocated  by  Schleiermacher  and  Munk, 
finds  a  plan  in  the  whole  of  Plato's  writings,  —  a  consistent 
system  organized  at  the  beginning.  Hermann  and  Grote 
advocate  the  Historical  theory,  which  makes  each  dialogue 
a  stage  in  the  development  of  Plato's  thought.  Beside  the 
general  reasons  for  the  Historical  theory,  there  are  the  nu- 
merous variations  in  the  establishment,  development,  and 
application  of  the  fundamental  thesis,  -  -  a  thesis  which  is 
clearly  present  although  undergoing  transformation.  In 
both  directions  the  body  of  the  Platonic  writings  presents 
one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  of  antiquity, — insolv- 
able  in  some  particulars ;   yet  time  has  brought  about  a 


182  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

pretty  complete  agreement  concerning  the  more  important 
ones. 

The  works  of  Plato  were  arranged  and  published  in  antiquity 
by  Aristophanes  of  Byzantium  partially  in  trilogies,  and  by 
Thrasylus  in  tetralogies.  Jn  the  Renaissance  they  were  excel- 
lently translated  into  Latin  b\-  Marsilius  Ficinus,  and  printed  in 
Greek  text  at  Venice  in  1513.  Further  publications  of  the 
works  are  those  by  Stephunus  (Paris,  1578)  which  has  been 
cited,  the  Zweibriicken  edition  (1781  f.),that  of  Imman.  Bekker 
(Berlin,  1816  f.),  Stallbaum  (Leipzig,  1821  f.,  1850),  Baiter, 
Orelli,  and  Winkelmann  (Zurich,  1839  f.),  K.  Fr.  llerniann 
(Leipzig,  Teubner,  1851  f.),  Schneider  and  Mirschig  (Paris, 
1846),  M.  Schanz  (Leipzig,  1875  f.). 

Translations  with  introductions :  Schlcierraacher  (Berlin, 
1804  f.),  Hieron.  Miiller  and  Steinhart  (Leipzig,  1850  f.),  V. 
Cousin  (Paris,  1825),  B.  Jowett  (Oxford,  1871),  R.  Bonghi 
and  E.  Ferrai  (Padua,  1873  ff.). 

The  most  nearl\-  complete  and  comprehensive  picture  of  the 
special  literature  which  is  not  to  be  reproduced  here  and  also 
concerning  the  single  dialogues,  is  given  l\v  Ueberweg-IIeinze,  P. 
138  f.  The  chief  writings  on  the  subject  are  as  follows :  Jos. 
Socher  (  Ueber  Platon's  Schriften  (Munich,  1820)  ;  Ed.  Zeller, 
Plat.  Stadien  (Tubingen,  1839)  ;  F.  Susemihl,  Prodromusplut. 
Forschiinf/en  (Gottingen,  1852) ;  Genetischen  Entxcickelungen 
der  plat.  Pliilos.  (Leipzig,  1855-60)  ;  F.  Suckow,  D.  wisseusch. 
u.  kunstlerllsche  Form  der  plat.  Schriften  (Berlin,  1855)  ;  E. 
Munk,  .Z>.  naturliche  Ordnxng  der  plat.  Schriften  (Berlin, 
1856)  ;  H.  Bonitz,  Platomsche  Studien  (3  ed.,  Berlin,  1886)  ; 
Fr.  Ueberweg,  XJiitersxichxoiqen  iiher  Echtlieit  und  Zeitfolf/eplat. 
Schr.  (1861,  Vienna)  ;  G.  Teichmiiller,  D.  plat.  Frage  (Gotha, 
1876);  Ueber  die  Reihenfolge  der  plat.  I>ialoge  (Leipzig,  1879)  ; 
Litterar.  Fehden  im  vierten  Jahrh.  ror  Chr.  Geb.  (Breslau, 
1881  f.);  A.  Krohn,  Pie  plat.  Frage  (Halle,  1878)  ;  W.  Ditten- 
berger  (in  Hermes.,  1881)  ;  H.  Siebeck,  in  J<dirbuch  f.  Mas. 
Phihlogie  (1885)  ;  M.  Schanz  {Hermes,  1886)  ;  Th.  Gomperz, 
Zur  Zktfolge  plat.  Schriften  (Wien,  1887)  ;  E.  Pfleiderer, 
Zur  Losnng  der  plat.  Frage  (Freiburg,  1888)  ;  Jackson, 
Plato's  Later  Theory  of  Ideas  {Jonr.  of  Philol.,  1881-86); 
F.  Dlxnimler,  Akademika  (Giessen,  1889)  ;  K.  Schaarschmidt, 
P.  Samm.  der  plat.  Schr.  (Bonn,  1866). 

With  reference  to  all  the  different  factors,  the  Pla- 
tonic writings  group  themselves  somewhat  as  follows  :  ^ 

1  To  which  there  have  been  added  lately,  but  with  little  success,  some 
philological  statistics. 


MATERIALISM   AND  IDEALISM  183 

(1)  The  Works  of  Plato^s  Youth.  These  were  written 
under  the  overpowering  influence  of  F^ocrates  ;  in  part  dur- 
ing Socrates'  life,  in  part  in  Megara  immediately  after  his 
death.  To  this  group  belong  Lysis  and  Laches,  and,  if  they 
be  genuine,  Charmides,  Hippias  Minor,  and  Alcihiades  I.  ; 
so,  also,  the  Apology  and  both  the  apologetic  dialogues, 
Crito  and  Euthyphro. 

Lysis  (conceruing  friendship)  and  Ladies  (concerning  cour- 
age) have  pureh'  Socratic  content.  Hippias  Minor  is  also 
Socratic,  and  for  its  genuineness  we  have  Aristotle's  authority  in 
Metaphysics,  IV.  29,  1025  a.  This  treats  the  parallel  between 
Achilles  and  Odysseus  from  the  point  of  self-conscious  virtue. 
Charmides  (concerning  moderation)  and  the  rather  unskilful  and 
incoherent  Alcihiades  I.  arc  doubtful.  The  A2yology  and  Crito 
(concerning  Socrates'  fidelity  to  law)  are  usually  i)lace(l  after  the 
death  of  Socrates.  Included  in  this  class  is  Eitthyphro  (con- 
cerning piety),  which  also  has  entirclv  the  character  of  an 
apology.  EuthypJiro  criticises  the  charges  of  impiety  made 
against  Socrates  by  proving  that  true  piet}'  is  the  Socratic  virtue. 
It  is  not  impossible  that  the  latter  three  were  written  about  395, 
during  Plato's  residence  at  Athens,  and  were  an  answer  to  the 
renewed  attacks  upon  the  memory  of  Socrates.^ 

(2)  The  Disputations  concerning  Sophistical  Theories. 
In  these  appear  now,  besides  his  criticisms  of  the  Sophists, 
indications  of  his  own  philosophy.  These  works  are  sup- 
posed to  have  been  written  or  begun  in  Athens  in  the  time 
between  the  Egyptian  and  Sicilian  journeys.  They  are  the 
Protagoras,  Gorgias,  Euthyde^nus,  Cratylus,  Meno,  and 
Thecetetus.  Presumably  there  belong  to  this  period  the  first 
book  of  the  Republic  and  the  dialogue  concerning  justice. 

These  dialogues,  with  the  exception  of  the  Moio,  are  entirely 
polemic  and  without  positive  result.  They  form  a  solid  phalanx 
against  Sophism,  and  show  tlie  falsity  and  insufficiency  of  its 
doctrines  one  after  another :  the  Protagoras,  by  the  investiga- 
tion concerning  the  teachableness  of  virtue,  which  Plato  shows 

1  Compare  above.  Further  evidence  of  this  is  the  manner  in  which  sev- 
eral dialogues  (Gorgias,  Meno,  and  Thece'elus),  which  for  otiier  reasons 
are  known  to  belong  to  that  time,  contain  allusions  to  the  trial  of  Socrates. 


^ 


184  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

to  be  presupposed  b}'  the  Sophists,  but  incompatible  with  their 
fundamental  principles  ;  the  Gorgias,  through  a  criticism  of  the 
Sophistic  rhetoric,  in  contrast  with  which  genuine  scientific  cul- 
ture is  celebrated  as  tlie  only  foundation  for  true  statecraft ; 
the  Euthi/demns  through  the  persiflage  of  eristic ;  the  Cratylus 
by  a  criticism  of  the  philologic  attempts  of  the  sophistic 
contemporaries ;  the  Thecetetns,  finally,  in  a  criticism  of  the 
epistemology  of  tlie  different  schools  of  Sophists. 

Protagoras,  dramatically  the  most  animated  of  Plato's  dia- 
logues, heads  this  series  as  a  masterpiece  of  fine  iron}'.  It  is 
doubtful  whether  Gorgias  followed  it  immediately,  for  there  is  a 
great  difference  in  the  fundamental  tone  of  tiie  two.  Yet  it  is 
entirely  natural  that  the  artist,  Plato,  in  the  second  dialogue,  in 
which  he  takes  a  much  more  positive  position,  should  adopt  a 
more  serious  tone,  and  should  give  a  more  intensely  spiritual 
expression  to  his  political  ideal  of  life.  The  Euthydemus  and 
Cratylus,  which  perliaps,  therefore,  are  to  be  placed  before  the 
Gorgias,  follow  the  Protagoras,  the  irony  mounting  to  the  most 
insolent  caricature. 

If  Hippias  Major  is  taken  as  genuine,  it  belongs  in  this  class, 
for  it  contains  Plato's  criticism  of  the  sophistic  art  of  Hippias. 
Yet  it  is  probable,  rather,  that  the  Hippias  Major  was  the  pro- 
duction of  a  member  of  the  Academy  who  was  fully  familiar 
with  the  Platonic  teachings. 

The  dialogue  concerning  justice  is  a  polemic  against  the  Soph- 
ists, and,  indeed,  against  their  naturalistic  theory  of  the  state. 
This  dialogue  forms  at  present  the  first  book  of  the  Republic,  and 
was  possibly  its  first  edition  (Gellius,  Noct.  Att.,  XIV.  3,  3).  It 
resembles  throughout  in  tone  the  writings  of  this  time,  which  fact 
does  not  obtain  as  to  the  chief  parts  of  the  Republic.  Also  the 
first  half  of  the  second  book  of  the  Republic  (until  367  c)  seems 
to  be  a  copy  of  a  Sophistic  speech  called  Praise  of  Injustice. 

In  the  Meno  the  Platonic  epistemology  had  its  first  positive 
expression,  even  if  it  is  only  an  exposition  developed  by  sugges- 
tions, and  stated  after  the  manner  of  the  mathematician.  The 
Pythagorean  influences,  which  are  also  found  in  the  Gorgias.  do 
not  oblige  us  to  put  the  Meno  in  the  time  after  the  first  Italian 
journey.  It  is  remarkable  that  the  Theo'.tetus,  so  soon  after  the 
youthful  enthusiasm  with  which  the  Gorgias  had  proclaimed 
(174  f.)  the  vocation  of  the  philosopher  to  be  statesmanship, 
advocated  ^  so  pessimistically  the  retirement  of  the  philosopher 

^  The  opinion  shared  by  Th.  Bergk  (Fiinf  Ahh.  z.  Gesch.  d.  gr.  Phil, 
ti.  Astron.,  Berlin,  1883),  that  this  dialogue  should  be  put  as  late  as  the 
fourth  decade  of  the  fourth  century,  cannot  be  reconciled  with  its  content. 


MATERIALISM  AND  IDEALISM  185 

from  public  life.  Yet  the  explanation  of  this  ma}'  be  that  Plato 
began  tiie  Theaitetus  in  Athens,  and  completed  it  after  or  upon 
his  journey  ;  for  the  dialogue  refers  to  a  wound  tliat  Theietetus 
received  in  an  encounter  during  the  Corinthian  war.  His  clash 
with  the  tyrant  and  his  wily  and  adroit  flatterer  (Aristippus?) 
is  consistent  with  his  experiences  at  this  time.  Tliere  is  per- 
haps a  connection  between  this  and  the  change  of  form,  which 
makes  it  necessary  to  place  the  dialogue  at  the  end  of  this  series. 

(3)  The  Works  of  the  Most  Fndtfid  Period  of  Plato's 
Activity.  These  are  the  Phcerlrus,  iS//)nposium,  and  the  chief 
part  of  the  Republic,  lii  the  same  period  were  probably 
written  the  Parmenides,  Sophist,  and  Politicus,  which  cer- 
tainly came  from  the  Platonic  circle. 

The  Pluednis  ma}'  be  viewed  as  Plato's  program  delivered 
upon  his  entrance  (386)  into  active  teaching  in  the  Academy. 
Philosopiiically  it  contains  the  fmidamental  thoughts  of  this 
period  in  mythical  dress  :  the  theor}'  of  the  two  worlds  (§  35) 
and  the  triple  division  of  the  soul  (§  36).  In  the  contention 
between  Lysias  and  Jsocrates  he  takes  the  latter's  part,  but  de- 
clares thereby  (276)  that  he  prefers  the  living  conversation  to  the 
written  word.  If  Plato  (;oncentrated  from  now  on  his  powers  in 
oral  instruction,  it  is  natural  that  he  should  appear  not  to  have 
published  any  work  in  the  two  following  decades. 

Not  until  immediately  after  the  Phcedrus  did  he  give  the  fullest 
expression  to  his  entire  teaching  in  the  "love  speeches  "  ^  of  the 
Sijmjwsiinn  (385  or  384).     The  most  superb  of  all  his  artistic 

1  The  exposition  of  these  thoughts  lies  so  essentially  in  the  direct 
line  of  the  Platonic  philosophy  that  it  does  not  seem  necessary  to 
seek  their  ins])iration  in  the  appearance  of  a  work  of  Xenophon.  Xeno- 
])hon  did  not  have  the  slightest  occasion  to  treat  the  "  love-speeches" 
by  the  side  of  the  MemorahiUn  as  a  separate  work,  as  he  manifestly 
did  treat  them.  Tt  is  rather  probable  that  after  Plato  idealized  the 
evening  feast  (for  there  is  undoubtedly  some  historical  ground  for 
the  description)  in  his  own  way,  Xenophon  felt  compelled  to  give  an  ac- 
count of  the  facts.  His  additions  were  especially  to  the  thoroughly  prac- 
tical conception,  which  Socrates  developed,  as  to  the  relations  of  the 
sexes.  In  addition  to  these  practical  reasons  there  are  also  verbal  and 
historical  grounds  for  placing  Plato's  accoinit  prior  to  that  of  Xeno- 
])lion's  rather  than  the  opposite.  Compare  A.  Ilug  (PhiloL,  1852),  and 
Rettig  (Xen.'fi  Gastmahl,  (rreek  and  German,  Leipzig,  1881). 


4 


186  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

products,  it  represents  in  every  respect  the  acme  of  his  intellect- 
ual power.  In  the  elegance  of  its  rhetoric  and  in  the  cliaracter- 
ization  of  single  individuals  carried  out  to  verbal  detail,  it  is 
surpassed  b}-  no  work.  Upon  the  background  of  the  cosmolog}, 
suggested  in  the  Phoedrns  and  clearly  developed  here,  it  pictures 
the  epun  as  the  living  bond  of  the  Platonic  society. 

The  Menexenns  lias  the  same  general  tendencies  as  the  Sym- 
posium and  the  Phijedrus,  but  it  was  probably  written  not  by 
I'lato,  but  by  one  of  his  pupils.  It  boasts  somewhat  proudly 
at  the  end  that  Aspasia  has  man}-  more  beautiful  speeches  like 
the  given  funeral-oration. 

During  the  time  of  literar\'  silence  that  immediateh"  followed, 
Plato  appears  to  have  been  going  on  with  his  great  lif«  work,  — 
that  one,  among  all  his  works,  which  presents  the  most  serious 
critical  and  historical  difficulties.  This  is  the  Jiepublic.  As  it 
lies  before  us,  it  is  wanting  in  an  intellectual  and  artistic  unity  in 
spite  of  its  subtile,  often  all  too  intricate,  references  and  cross- 
references.  All  attempts  to  establish  such  a  unity  fail.  Follow- 
ing the  fruitless  dialogue  concerning  justice,  which  forms  the 
first  part  of  the  work  (first,  according  to  the  present  divisions, 
which  were  indeed  traditional  earh-  in  antiquity),  there  comes, 
after  the  insertion  of  a  species  of  sophistic  discourse,  the  conver- 
sation with  entirely  new  persons  concerning  the  ideal  state,  and 
concerning  the  education  necessar}-  for  constructing  a  state  by 
which  the  ideal  justice  may  be  realized.  Thus  there  appear  two 
perfectly  unlike  parts  welded  together,  but  the  second  and  greater 
(Books  II.-X.)  is  by  no  means  a  decided  advance  in  thought. 
In  particular,  the  diatribe  taken  up  again  at  the  beginning  of  the 
tenth  book  against  the  poets,  stands  abruptly  in  the  way  between 
tile  proofs  that  the  just  man  in  the  Platonic  sense  is  the  happiest 
man  on  earth  (Book  IX.,  2d  half,  588  f.)  as  well  as  after  death 
(Book  X.,  2d  half,  608  c.)  It  is  particularly  striking  that 
whereas  the  teaching  about  the  ideal  state  and  the  education 
f  peculiar  to  it  restricts  itself  entirely  to  the  limits  set  forth  in 
#  the  Phcedrns  and  Symp^siinn,  we  find  an  intervening  section 
^  (487-587)  which  not  onh'  expresses  the  teaching  of  Ideas  as 
the  highest  content  of  this  education  in  the  sense  stated  in  the 
Phmdo  and  developed  in  the  Philebtis,  but  also  develops  in  a 
more  extended  way  the  different  metaphysical  teachings  of  the 
later  period.  These  and  other  single  references,  which  cannot 
he  followed  out  in  this  place,  show  that  there  are  three  strata  in 
the  Republic:  (1)  the  dialogue  of  early  origin  concerning  justice 
(Book  I.,  possibl}-  including  appendix.  357-67)  ;  (2)  the  outline 
of  an  ideal  state  as  the  realization  of  justice,  originating  at  the 
time  of  his  teaching,  that  followed  the  PhoBdrus  and  Symposium 


MATERIALISM   AND   IDEALISM  187 

(Books  II. -V.),  and  the  entire  conclusion  from  Ch.  XII.  (Book 
IX.)  ;  (3)  the  theory,  dating  from  the  time  of  tiie  Phmdo  and 
Philebus,  of  the  Idea  of  the  Good,  and  the  critique  of  the  consti- 
tutions of  the  state  (487-587).  As  Plato  grew  older,  he  sought 
to  weld  these  three  parts  into  one  another.  To  accomplish 
this,  he  now  and  then  worked  over  the  earlier  portions,  but  he 
did  not  succeed  in  bringing  them  into  a  perfect  organic  union. 
In  accepting  a  successive  genesis  of  the  whole,  the  simplest  ex- 
planation is  given  of  the  insertions,  which  appear  still  further 
within  the  different  parts  in  polemic  justification.  These  in- 
sertions are  attempts  to  meet  objections  that  had  in  the  mean 
time  been  raised  orall}*  or  in  writing. 

In  thefourse  of  the  discussion  of  the  theory  of  Ideas  in  the 
Academy,  there  appeared  difficulties  in  the  way  of  their  devel- 
opment. The  Parmenides  and  Sophist  .were  written  especially 
to  express  these  objections  and  to  discuss  them.  The  Panne- 
nides  with  a  dialectic  which  drew  its  formal  and  practical  argu- 
ments from  Eleaticism,  tears  the  theory  of  Ideas  to  pieces 
without  reaching  a  positive  result.  The  contemptuous  tone  and 
the  boyish  immature  role  which  is  clearly  given  to  the  Socrates- 
Plato,  stands  in  the  way  of  regarding  this  as  Plato's  criticism  of 
himself.  Probably  an  older  member  of  the  Platonic  circle, 
who  was  educated  in  Eleatic  sophistr}-,  is  the  author  of  this 
dialogue.  The  Parmenides  does  not  give  to  Socrates,  but  to 
Parmenides,  the  deciding  word,  and  it  bears  entirely  the  Eleatic 
character  of  sterile  dialectic.^ 

The  question  about  the  genuineness  of  the  Sophist  and  the 
Politicus  is  more  difficult.  That  both  have  the  same  author 
can  be  inferred  from  their  form.  On  the  one  hand,  in  both,  as 
in  Parmenides.  not  Socrates  but  a  friend  and  guest,  who  is  an 
Eleatic,  leads  the  conversation  ;  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  the 
pedantic  and  somewhat  absurd  schematism,  with  which,  by  a 
continuoush'  progressive  dichotomy,  the  concept  of  the  Sophist 
and  statesman  is  attained.  It  is  therefore  impossible  to  ascribe 
one  dialogue  to  Plato  and  the  other  not  to  him.  as  Suckow  has 
attempted.  The  two  stand  or  fall  together.  It  might  be  pos- 
sible to  divine  an  intended  caricature  of  the  philosopher  in 
certain  externals  that  are  in  other  respects  wholly  un-Platonic, 
but  the  contents  of  both  forbid  this.     The  criticism  of  the  tlieorj 

^  If  Philebus,  14  c,  refers  to  Parmenidcp,  the  notable  way  in  giving 
up  the  investigation  of  tv  and  ttoXXo  is  rather  a  reason  for  regarding 
the  Parmenides  as  a  polemic  that  had  been  rejected.  This  is  better 
than  to  let  both  these  dialogues  stand  or  fall  together,  as  Ueberweg 
prefers  (I.  151,  7th  ed.). 


188  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

of  Ideas  which  is  contained  in  the  jSophist  (compare  §  28) 
might  be  conceived,  perhaps,  as  Platonic  seH-criticisin,  although 
weighty  reasons  are  also  against  it.  But  the  manner  in  which 
it  solves  the  discovered  difflculties  is  not  Plalonic.^  So  the 
PoUtiais  contains  many  points  of  view  which  agree  with  Plato's 
political  convictions.  It  is,  however,  not  probable  that  the 
philosopher  tried  to  treat  the  same  prol^lem  in  a  book  other 
than  the  Republic^  especially  since  the  I^oliticus  sets  up  other 
teachings  wliich  differ  on  important  points  Convincing  reasons 
are  therefore  adduced  for  seeking  the  authorship  of  both  in  a 
member  of  the  Acadein}'  with  strong  Eleatic  SNinpathies.'^  It 
is  singular  enough  that  the  divergence  of  both  from  the  Platonic 
teaching  lies  exactly  in  the  direction  of  the  metaplnsics  and 
politics  of  Aristotle,^  who  entered  the  Academy  in  867. 

About  this  time  the  dialogue  lo  may  have  originated,  which 
indeed  makes  use  of  Platonic  thoughts  in  its  distinction  between 
poetry  and  philoso[)hy,  but  cannot  be  safely  attributed  to  the 
head  of  the  school. 

(4)  The  Chief  Works  on  Teleological  Idealism.  These 
were  written  in  the  time  before  and  after  the  third  Sicilian 
journey.  They  are  the  Phcedo,  Philehus,  the  correspond- 
ing parts  of  the  Republic  (487  f.),  and  in  connection  w'ith 
these  the  fragment  of  Critias  and  the  Ti7nceus. 

The  characteristic  of  this  period  is  the  introduction  of  Anaxa- 
gorean  and  Pythagorean  elements  into  tiie  theory  of  Ideas. 
The  central  concept  is  the  Idea  of  the  Good.  The  introduction 
of  these  elements  finds  its  full  perfection  in  the  Phwdo,  which 
was  written  presumably  shortl}'  before  the  third  Sicilian  journej-. 

1  In  the  passage  of  Phcedo  (101  d),  Plato  explains  the  problem  of 
the  Sophist  and  also  of  Parmenides  as  relatively  indifferent  problems, 
compared  to  the  importance  of  the  establishment  of  the  theory  of 
ideas. 

*  Who  perhaps  was  prevented  by  death  or  other  cause  from  the 
third  proposed  dialogue  ((f)i\6(ro(f)os) ■  That  the  trilogy  seems  to  be 
connected  as  to  its  external  framework  (which  is  moreover  very  much 
wanting  in  fancy)  with  the  conclusion  of  the  Thecetetus,  is  not  decisive 
for  the  Platonic  authorship. 

'  The  way  in  wliich  he  mentions  both  dialogues,  I  cannot  recognize 
as  proof  of  their  genuineness,  in  spite  of  the  conclusions  of  Zeller  (II<. 
457  f.). 


MATERIALISM  Al^D  IDEALISM  189 

As  if  conscious  of  the  dangers  to  be  met,  Plato  gives  to  this  dia- 
logue the  tone  of  a  last  will  and  testament  to  the  school.  As  a 
delightful  counterpart  to  the  Sijmposium,  he  pictures  the  dying 
Wise  Man  as  a  teacher  of  immortality. 

After  this  journey,  the  philosopher  ^  reached  the  zenith  of  his 
metaphysics  in  his  investigations  concerning  the  Idea  of  the 
Good,  which  are  embodied  in  the  dialogue  I^ldlehus.  All  the 
thougiits  -  tiiat  are  expressed  there,  are  to  be  found  again  in 
the  less  abstract  presentation  in  the  middle  part  of  the  liepuhlic,^ 
which  was  designated  above  as  its  third  stratum  (487-587).^ 
Plato  has  then,  as  an  afterthought,  brought  into  external  rela- 
tionship the  incomplete  sketches  of  his  philosopln*  of  history' 
{Cn'tias),  and  likewise  his  mythical  theory  of  nature  (Timceus) 
with  the  scenic  setting  of  the  Hepuhlic  (supposably  finished  at 
this  time). 

(5)    The  Laws.     This  is  the  work  of  his  old  age. 

This  sketch  of  a  second-best  state  originated  at  the  time  when 
Plato  in  his  Aoyot  aypaTrroL  entireh'  went  through  the  theory  of 
Ideas  with  the  Pythagorean  theory  of  numbers  in  mind.  The 
exposition  passes  over  here  into  senile  formality,  although  still 
worthy  our  admiration.  The  present  form  of  the  work  pro- 
ceeded from  Plato  even  in  its  details,  although  the  manuscript 
was  said  to  have  been  })ublished  first  by  Philip  of  Opus  after  the 
death  of  Plato.  Tlie  same  scholar  had  edited  the  epitome  of 
the  Laics,  which  under  the  title  of  Ejnuomis  was  received  in 
the  Platonic  circle. 

35.  The  epistemological,  metaphysical  doctrine,  known 
as   the   theory   of  Ideas,   forms    the   central  point  in  the 

1  The  new  course  that  Plato  certainly  takes,  shows  itself  in 
the  peculiar  fact  that  in  the,  Pliilehiis  expressions  like  fpcos  and 
ai/a/x»/7;o-ts  have  lost  the  specific  sense  whicli  the  earlier  dialogues  have 
given  them 

2  Among  others,  the  treatment  also  of  the  concept  of  pleasure  which 
might  be  claimed  to  helong  to  Democritus.     (See  above.) 

8  In  this  part  a  number  of  pedagogical  and  political  discussions 
appear  to  have  been  sprinkled,  which  already  could  have  belonged  to 
the  earlier  sketch  of  the  i  leal  state  and  supposably  did  belong  to  it. 
The  details  cannot  be  given  here. 

*  This  interpolated  ])iece  begins  with  a  discussion.  In  this  discus- 
sion the  e.xperiences,  which  the  philosopher  underwent  with  the  young 
tyrant  at  Syracuse,  are  made  use  of  detail  hy  detail. 


190  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Platonic  philosophy.  The  root  of  this  inspired  conception 
lies  in  Plato's  attempt  to  transcend  the  Protagorean  doc- 
trine of  relativity,  whose  validity  for  the  world  of  sense  and 
perception  he  recognized.  By  the  help  of  the  study  of 
concepts  after  the  Socratic  method  he  tried  to  attain  a  safe 
and  a  universally  valid  science  of  the  true  essence  of 
things.  The  4nal  motive  of  this  theory  was,  however,  the 
ethical  need  of  winning  true  virtue  by  true  knowledge. 
Jhe  subjective  point  of  departure  ^  was,  for  Plato  as  for 
Socrates,  the  conviction  of  the  inelhcieiicy  of  customaiy" 
^virtue.  The  virtue  of  custom,  resting  upon  convention  and 
prudential  considerations,  is  unconscious  of  its  fundamen- 
tal principle,  and  is  exposed  to  the  insecurity  of  change  and 
opinions.  Plato  showed  to  Sophistry  ^  that  it  with  its 
pleasure  theory  took  thn  popnlar  point  Qf  view  for  its  own, 
and  he  found  the  reason  for  this  in  the  fact  that  Sophis- 
try renounced  all  real  knowledge,  and  therefore  could  find 
no  fundamental  basis  for  virtue.  In  this  sense  Plato  ^ 
purposely  agreed  with  the  C£rotagorean  theory  about  the 
a  value   of   sense   perception   and   of  opinions  based  on  it. 

'  /y  He  was  vigorous  in  asserting  the  relativity  of  such  knowl- 

f        (^  edge,  and  its  inability  to  give  us  the  true  essence  of  things. 

1^^  But  precisely  for  that  reason  the  ethical  need  drove  Plato 

y  l^  beyond  Sophistry,  and  led  him  to  fight  Protagoras  the  more 

energetically  with  Protagoras'  own  relativism.     If  there  be 
virtue  of  any   sort,  it  must  rest  on  other   than  relative 
7\j  "      knowledge,  which  alone  the  Sophists  considered.        ^ 

But  Socrates  had,  to  the  mind  of  Plato,  shown  us  the 
way  through  conceptual  science  to  this  other  knowledge 
which  is  independent  of  all   accident  of   perception  and 

1  Especially  Meno,  96  f.  Compare  Phoedo,  82  a,  and  the  Republic  in 
different  places. 

2  Chiefly  in  the  Gorgias. 
*  All  the  points  of  view  of  the  Sophistic  epistemology  are  discussed 

thorouschlv  in  the  Thecetetus. 


MATERIALISM  AND   IDEALISM  191 

opinion.  The  methodical  development  of  this  postulate  was 
called  hj^  Plato  the  Dialectic.^  Itsiil4ectj&_on  the  one 
hiiiH  t"  fi"fl  in'l'vidual  concepts  {(rvva'ycoyr)),  and  then^  to 
establish  the  mutual  relations  of  these  concepts  by  division 
(Biaip€ai<;,  refiveiv).  Plato  used  the  Socratic  induction  in 
the  main  in  finding  the  concepts,  and  supplemented  this  by 
\i  hypothetical  discussions  in  testing  and  verifying  the  con- 
cepts. These  hypothetical  discussions  draw  out  all  the 
consequences  from  the  constructed  concept,  and  thus  bring 
it  to  the  touchstone  ^  of  fact.  The  dividing  of  these  class 
concepts  is  the  method  which  was  introduced  anew  ^  by 
Plato  with  the  intention  of  exposing  the  logical  relations 
between  concepts ;  and  therefore  connected  with  this  pro- 
cess of  dividing  there  are  investigations  concerning  the 
compatibility  and  incompatibility  of  concepts,  i.  e.,  concern- 
ing  the   principle  of  disjunction.*      As   the   last   goal  of 

dinlpf.fif^.,  thP''*^  nppQaVfid,  ^^Jth^'v)    4  JLOGICAL   SYSTEM  OF   CON- 
CEPTS,^ arranged  aeeordiug,  to  their  relations  of  co-ordina- 

tinn  nn^!?g>jnrflinrtfinn 

Herbart,  De  Plat,  systematis  fundamento.  Vol.  XII.  61  f. ; 
S.  Ribbing,  Genetische  Darstelhoig  von  Platans  Ideenlehre 
(Leipzig,  1863-64)  ;  H.  Cohen,  Die  plat.  Ideenlehre  (Zeitschr. 
f.  Volkerpsych.  u.  Sprachicissench.  1866)  ;  H.  v.  Stein,  Si'^hen 
Bilcher  zur  Geschichte  des  Plat.  (Gott,  1862-75,  3  vols.)  ; 
A.  Peipers.  Untersuchungen  iiber  das  System  Plat.,  \'ol.  I. 
(The  epistemology  of  Plato,  examined  with  especial  reference 

1  PhcEdr  ,  265  f.  ;  Rep.,  511  f;  ihiiL.  533.  :  Pkileh.,  16. 

2  Meno,  86;  PhceJ..  101;  Rep.,  534.  The  Pnrmeuide.t  similarly 
(135  f.)  ;  but  applies  the  Platonic  principle  In  the  spirit  of  the  fruitless 
antinomy  of  the  Eleatic  Sophists. 

3  Phileb.,  16. 

*  Particularly  Phced.,  102  f. 

5  In  their  method,  the  Parmen'tde>i,  Sophht,  and  Politicux  stand 
entirely  on  Platonic  ground  by  their  happy  and  logically  sharp  turns. 
The  application,  however,  that  they  make  of  the  method  seems  a  juve- 
nile attempt  at  independent  development  rather  than  an  ironical  auto- 
caricature  bv  Pluto. 


192  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

to  the  Thecetetus)  (Leipzig,  1874) ;  Onotologia  platonica 
(Leipzig,  1883). 

The  ProtagQiean  doctrine  of  relativity  is  for  Plato  not  only  an 
object  of  polemic,  hut,  as  in  the  case  of  Deinocritus,  is  an  nite- 
gial  part  of  his  system.  This  will  become  more  eyidcnt  as  we 
proceed!  Skepticism  of  the  senses  is  the  might}'  corner-stone 
of  both  these  systems  of  rationalism.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
ethical  point  of  view  of  Plato  carried  with  it  the  attitude  —  and 
herein  that  of  Democritus  was  also  one  with  it  —  liiat  it  could 
not  ascribe  to  the  Sopliistic  doctrine  of  pleasiiie  even  the  worth 
of  a  relatively  vahd  momehf.  This  w  as  at  least  the  doctrine  in 
the  first  draft  of  the  theory  of  the  Ideas,  although  later,  especially 
in  the  Philebus^  Plato's  conception  was  in  this  somew  hat  changed 
(§  36). 

Direct,  logical,  or  methodological  investigations  were  not  yet 
made  bj-  Plato,  at  least  not  in  his  writings.  On  tlie  contrary, 
one  finds  numerous  isolated  statements  scattered  through  his 
dialogues.  In  practical  treatment  the  synagogic  method  out- 
weighs b}'  far  the  dieretic.  Only  the  Sophist  and  Pollticns 
give  examples  of  the  dieretic  method,  and  these  are  indeed  very 
unfortunate  examples.  Hypothetical  discussions  of  concepts, 
however,  grew  to  a  fruitful  principle  in  the  scientific  theories  of 
the  Older  Academy  (§  37). 

These  concepts  include  a  kind  of  knowledge  that  is  very 
different  in  origin  and  content  from  that  founded  on  per- 
ception* In  perception  there  comes  into  consciousness  the 
world  of  change  and  appearance.  Conception  gives  us  the 
permanent  Essence  of  things  (^ovaia).  ThQ_ objectrve  con- 
bent  of  conceptual  knowlp<igf>  i>  t^pi  Tden,  If  true  knowl- 
edge —  thus  Plato  followed  the  Socratic  ideal  —  is  supposed 
to  be  given  in  the  concepts,  then  tliis  must  be  a  knowledge 
3f  what  really  is,^  As,  therefore,  tlie  relative  truth  of 
sense  perception  consists  in  its  translating  the  changing 
relations  that  spring  up  in  the  process  of  Becoming,  so 
the  absolute  truth  of  conceptual  knowledge  (that  of  Dia- 
lectic) consists  in  the  fact  that  it  conceives  in  the  Ideas 
the  true  Being,  independent  of  every  change.  So  t\vo  dif- 
ferent worlds  correspond  to  the  two  ways  of  knowing :  a 

1   Tkecel.,  188;  Hep.,  476  f. 


MATERIALISM  AND   IDEALISM  193 

world  of  true  reality,  the  Ideas,  the  object  of  conceptual 
knowledge ;  and  a  world  of  relative  actuality,  the  things 
that  come  and  go,  the  objects  of  sense  perception.^  The 
predicates  of  the  Eleatic  Being  belong  therefore  to  the 
Idea  as  the  object  of  true  knowledge,  avro  Kad'  avro  fieO' 
avTov  fiovoetSc'i  del  6v',^  it  is  unchangeable,  ouSe  ttot'  ov8afi>} 
ov8a/xco<i  ciWoioiaiv  ovSefxiav  ivBe'^^erai.^  The  perceivable 
individual  things,  on  the  contrary,  constitute  the  Heracleitan 
flux  of  continuous  origination,  change,  and  destruction. 
The  fundamental  principle  of  the  metaphysical  epistemol- 
ogy  of  Plato  is  this  :  two  wopj.ps  mnRf,  be  djstjriguished,* 
one  of  which  jg  and  never  becomes,  the  other  of  which  be- 
CQM&§.  and  i\£j:£r,is;  one  is  the  object  of  the  reason  {v6rjac<;)y 
the  other  is  the>j?bjecjL  of  sense  {aLa6r]ai<;').  Since,  now, 
the  objects  are  as  completely  separated  (j(a)pL<i)  as  the 
methods  of  knowing  are  distinct,  the  Ideas  stand  as  incor- 
poreal forms  (^daa)fjLara  ecSr])  in  contrast  to  material  things, 
which  are  perceived  by  the  senses.  The  Ideas,  which  are 
never  to  be  found  ^  in  space  or  in  matter,  which  indeed  exist 
purely  for  themselves  (etXi/cptw?),  which  are  to  be  grasped^ 
not  by  the  senses  but  only  by  thought,  form  an  intel- 
ligible world  in  themselves  (roiro'i  vorjTO'i).  A  rational 
theory  of  knowledge  requires  an  immaterialistic  meta- 
physics. 

This  immaterialism  was  the  peculiarly  original  creation  of 
Plato.  Where  in  the  earlier  systems,  not  excluding  that  of 
Auaxagoras,  the  discussion  turned  upon  the  spiritual  as  the 
distinctive  principle,  nevertheless  the  principle  always  appeared 
as  a  peculiar  kind  of  corporeal  actualit3'.  Plato,  on  the  other 
hand,  first  discovered  a  purely  spiritual  world. 

The  theory"  of  Ideas  is,  therefore,  an  entirely  new  mediation 
of  the  Eleatic  and  the  Heracleitan  metaph^'sic,  employing  the 

1  This  view  is  stated  most  clearly  in  Tbnceus,  27  f.,  57  f.  Compare 
Rep.,  509  f  ,  533.  2  Symp.,  211. 

»  PhcBdo,  78.  *  Tim.,  21  d. 

6  Symp.,  211.  6  Rep.,  507;  Tim.,  28. 

13 


194  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

opposition  between  the  Protagorean  and  Socratic  theories  of 
knowledge.  Precisely  for  this  reason,  in  the  Thecetetus,  Plato 
brought  the  Sophistic  theory  of  perception  into  closer  relation- 
ship to  the  Travra  pei  than  the  Sophist  liimself  had  brought  it. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  close  relationship  of  tlie  Socratic  episte- 
mology  to  the  Eleatic  doctrine  of  Being  had  already  been  recog- 
nized by  ""the  Megarians  (§  28).  The  positive  metaphysic  of 
Plato  may  be  characterized,  therefore,  as  immaterialistic  Eleati- 
cisra.^  Therein  consists  its  ontological  character  (Deuschle). 
It  cognizes  Being  in  Ideas,  and  relegates  Becoming  to  a  lower 
form  of  knowing. 

The  neo-Pytliagorean-neo-Platonic  conception  was  an  en- 
tire misunderstanding  of  Plato.  According  to  this  concep- 
tion, Ideas  possess  no  independent  actuality,  but  are  only 
thought- forms  supposed  to  exist  in  the  divine  mind.  Through 
the  neo-Platonism  of  the  Renaissance,  and  even  down  to  the 
beginning  of  this  century,  this  interpretation  of  Plato  obtained. 
Herbart  was  of  great  service  in  his  opposition  to  it  {Elnleit. 
in  d.  PMlos.,  §  144  f  ;  Vol.  I.  240  f.). 

Consistent  with  the  theory  of  two  worlds,  as  the  central 
point  in  Platonism,  is  the  manner  in  which  Plato  repre- 
sented our  cognition  of  Ideas  in  particular. 

The  primary  function  of  the  Ideas  is  to  set  forth  the 
logical  character  of  the  class  concepts,  to  reveal  the  com- 
mon qualities  (to  koivov)  of  the  particulars  which  the 
class  concepts  comprehend.  They  are,  in  the  Aristotelian 
phraseology,  the  ev  eirl  ttoWmv.^  But  Plato  regarded  the 
process  of  thought,  not  as  analysis,  nor  as  an  abstraction  by 
comparison,  but  as  rather  a  synoptic  intuition  ^  of  reality 
presented  in  single  examples.  The  Idea  cannot  be  con- 
tained in  its  perceived  phenomenon.  It  is  of  another  sort, 
and  cannot  be  found  in  appearance.  In  other  words,  ma- 
terial things  do   not  include  the  Idea,  but  are  only  the 

1  The  relative  pluralistic  character  of  the  theory  of  Ideas  is  in  con- 
trast to  original  Eleaticism.  It  did  not,  as  in  the  earlier  attempts  at 
mediation,  arise  from  the  need  of  an  explanation  of  Becoming,  but  from 
the  circumstance  that  conceptual  knowledge  can  and  must  refer  to  a 
manifold  of  in(le[)endent  content-determinations. 

2  Met.,  I.  9,  990  b,  6.  s  Plimlr.,  2G5 ;  liep.,  537. 


MATERIALISM  AND   IDEALISM  195 

copies  or  shadows^  of  it.  Therefore  the  perceptions  can- 
not include  the  Ideas  as  separable  integral  parts,  but  are, 
on  the  contrary,  only  the  occasions  for  the  apprehension  of 
that  Idea  that  is  similar  to  the  perceptions  but  not  identi- 
cal with  them.  Since  the  Idea  cannot  be  created  by  re- 
flection, it  must  be  regarded  as  an  original  possession  of 
the  soul  which  the  soul  remembers  when  it  sees  its  copy  in 
the   sense   world.      The  recognition  of   the  ideas  is  dvd- 

In  the  mythical  representation  in  the  Phcedrus,  Plato 
presupposes  that  the  human  soul  has  gazed  upon  the  Idea 
with  its  supersensible  faculties,  —  those  related  to  the 
world  of  Ideas,  — before  its  entrance  into  earthly  life,  but 
it  remembers  them  only  upon  the  perception  of  correspond- 
ing phenomena.  Thereby  out  of  the  painful  feeling  of 
astonishment  at  the  contrast  between  the  Idea  and  its 
phenomenon  is  created  the  philosophic  impulse,  the  long- 
ing love  for  the  supersensible  Idea.  This  love  is  the  epo)?,^ 
which  conducts  it  back  from  the  transitoriness  of  sense  to 
the  immortality  of  the  ideal  world.* 

There  is  an  intoresUng  i)arallel  between  the  intuitive  character, 
which  the  recognition  of  Ideas  in  Thito  possesses,  and  the 
yvo'fir]  yvqai-q  of  Deiiiocritus.  In  Plato  also  analogies  to  optical 
ini[)ressions  predominate.  Both  Deniocritus  and  Phito  have  in 
mind  immediate  knowledge  of  the  pure  forms  (t^tat),  the  abso- 
lutely actual  ^  w  hich  is  attained  wholl}-  apart  from  sense  percep- 

1  Rep.,  514  f. ;  Phmlo,  73. 

■^  Meno,  80  f. ;   Phmlr.,  249  f.  ;  Phmlo,  72  f. 

3  Pliceilr.,  250  f.,  and  especially  Sijmp.,  200  f. 

^  The  theory  of  the  epw?  takes  on  thereby  in  the  Sjimpoxium  a  more  uni- 
versal aspect  of  beholdinif  the  living  principle  of  all  Becoming  (yfi/fo-iy) 
in  the  desire  for  the  Idea  (ovala),  and  so  prepares  the  way  for  the  teleo- 
logical  interpretation  of  Ideas. 

^  One  has  the  same  right  to  speak  of  "  sensualism  "  in  Plato  as  in 
Deniocritus.  Both  explain  true  knowledge  of  the  ofrws  ov  as  the  recep- 
tion of  the  Ibiai  by  the  soul,  not  as  an  act  of  sense  perception,  although 
as  illustrated  by  the  analogy  to  optical  perception. 


196  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

tion.  The  exposition  of  this  teaching  appears  in  Plato  {Phcedrus 
and  Symposium)  in  mythical  form.  For  since  it  is  a  question  of 
the  time-process  of  the  knowledge  of  the  eternal,  of  the  genesis 
of  the  intuition  of  the  Absolute,  a  dialectic  presentation  is  not 
possible. 

Since  the  Ideas  are  hvpostasized  class-concepts,  in  their 
first  draft  there  are  for  Plato  as  many  Ideas  as  there  are 
class  concepts  or  general  names  for  different  perceptual 
things.  There  are,  therefore,  Ideas  of  all  that  is  in  any 
wise  thinkable,^  —  Ideas  of  things,  qualities  and  relations, 
of  products  of  art  and  nature,  of  the  good  and  of  the  bad, 
of  the  high  and  of  the  low.^  The  later  dialogues  (^Sympo- 
sium, PhcBdo,  TimcBus)  speak  only  of  such  Ideas  as  have 
an  inherent  value,  such  as  the  good  and  the  beautiful  ;  of 
such  as  correspond  to  nature  products,  like  fire,  snow,  etc. ; 
and,  finally,  of  mathematical  relations,  like  great  and  small, 
nnity  and  duality.  Aristotle  reports  that  Plato  in  later 
time  did  no  longer  recognize  Ideas  of  artifacts,  negations, 
and  relations,  and  that  he  held,  in  place  of  these,  essentially 
nature  class-conce))ts.^  An  exacter  determination  of  the 
circle  within  which  the  philosopher,  especially  in  different 
periods  of  his  development,  extended  or  wished  to  extend 
his  theory  of  Ideas,  cannot  be  made. 

In  general  the  chronological  order  of  the  dialogues  indicates 
that  Plato  originally  constructed  a  world  of  Ideas  according  to 
his  logical  an<l  epistemological  view  of  class  concepts.  In  the 
course  of  time,  however,  he  came  more  and  more  to  seek  in  this 
supersensible  world  the  highest  values  and  the  fundamental  onto- 
logical  forms,  according  to  which  the  sense  world  of  Becoming 
is  modelled.     From   the   world  of  Ideas   there   thus  arose  an 

1  Rep.,  596. 

2  For  particular  proofs,  consult  Zeller,  IP.  585  f.  The  dialogue 
Parmenides  proves  with  fine  irony  to  the  "  young  Socrates  "  that  he 
must  accept  also  the  Ideas  of  hair,  mud,  etc.  (130  f.).  In  as  late  a 
writing  as  the  middle  part  of  the  Republic,  Plato  used  the  Ideas  of  bed, 
etc  ,  to  illustrate  his  theory. 

»  Met.,  XI.  3,  1070  a,  18. 


MATERIALISM   AND  IDEALISM  197 

ideal  world.  The  norms  of  value  thus  took  the  place  of  class 
concepts.  The  ethical  motive  became  more  and  more  influen- 
tial in  his  philosophy,  as  appears  also  in  what  follows. 

The  more  thoroughly  the  theory  of  Ideas  in  their  first 
draft  distinguished  the  two  worlds  from  each  other,  the 
more  difficult  it  became  to  determine  the  relation  of  the 
things  of  sense  to  their  respective  Ideas.  The  characteristic 
of  this  relation  most  frequently  given  in  the  dialogues  3feno, 
Tkecetetus,  Phcednis,  and  Symposium,  and  likewise  in  tlie 
Phcedo,  is  similarity.  This  is  consistent  with  the  thought 
which  the  philosopher  developed  in  those  same  dialogues 
concerning  the  origin  of  concepts;  for  similai'ity  forms  the 
psycliological  ground  through  which,^  stimulated  by  percep- 
tion, the  recollection  of  the  Idea  is  said  to  come.  Similar- 
ity ,2  however,  is  not  equivalence.  The  Idea  never  appears 
fully  in  the  things,^  and  accordingly  Plato  designated  the 
relationship  of  the  two  as  fit'fxrjac^*.  The  Idea  is  thus 
regarded  ^  as  the  original  (  Urhild)  {7rapd8ei'yfj.a),thG  sensed 
object  as  the  copy  (Abbild)  (t-rSwXoi/).  Exactly  herein 
consists  the  small  amount  of  reality  which  the  corporeal 

1  Now  one  would  sav :  according  to  the  law  of  the  association  of 
Meas,  which  moreover  Plato  enunciated  expressly  in  this  respect  in  the 
Phcedo,  73  f. 

2  In  view  of  the  same  the  Parmenides  raises  the  dialectic  plea 
(131  f.),  that  it  presupposes  a  terlhim  comparationis  for  the  Idea  and  the 
phfenomenon  and  forms  an  infinite  regress.  It  is  the  objection  of  the 
jpiTos  avOpwnos.     Compare  Aristotle,  Met.,  VI.  113,  1039  a,  2. 

3  Plato  was  probably  prompted  to  emphasize  this  by  the  incongruity 
of  actual  life  with  the  ethical  norm  ;  primarily,  however,  fi'oni  the  theo- 
retical point  of  view  by:the  fact  that  the  mathematical  concepts  are 
factors  in  the  consideration,  and  that  these  are  never  the  result  of  per- 
ception. See  Phcedo,  73  a;  Mcno,S5  e.  The  hypothetical  discussion  of 
concepts  stands  furthermore  in  most  exact  connection  with  this. 

*  Whether  he  thus  early  adopted  this  expression  from  the  Pythago- 
rean number  theory  need  not  be  discussed. 

^  See  the  freely  accommodative  and  relatively  early  presentation  in 
the  Republic,  595  f. 


198  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

world  possesses  in  contrast  to  the  6Vt&)<?  6v.  On  the  other 
hand,  viewed  from  its  logical  side,  the  Idea  is  the  unitary, 
the  permanentji  in  which  the  things  of  sense  in  their  origi- 
nation, change,  and  destruction  have  onl}"  temporary  and 
occasional  part  {ixeTexeiv^-^  This  relationship  is,  again,  on- 
tologically  so  viewed  that  the  change  of  qualities  of  sensi- 
hle  things  is  reduced  ultimately  to  a  coming  and  going  of 
Ideas.  On  account  of  this  change  the  Idea  at  one  time 
participates  in  the  particular  thing  (jrapovaia)^  and  at 
another  leaves  it.* 

The  later  phase  {PJimdo)  of  the  theory  of  Ideas  has  a 
thought  that  seems  to  have  heen  absent  from  the  original 
statement,  viz.,  that  in  the  Ideas  the  causes  may  be  some- 
how found  for  the  things  of  sense  appearing  as  they  do 
appear.  The  purpose  of  Plato  was  originally  only  to  recog- 
nize permanent  true  Being.  The  theory  of  Ideas  in  the 
MenOj  Thecetetus,  Phcedrus,  and  Symposium  does  not  attempt 
to  be  an  explanation  of  the  world  of  phenomena.  The  sig- 
nificance of  the  Sophist  is  that  it  proposes  this  problem. 
Confronting  the  theory  of  Ideas  with  other  metaphysical 
theories,  the  Sophist  asks  how  this  lower  world  of  sense- 
appearance  and  its  Becoming  can  be  conceived  as  deduced 
from  supersensible  forms  which  are  removed  from  all  motion 

1  The  Parmenides  (130  f.)  makes  also  at  this  point  some  dialectic 
objections  of  the  Eleatic  sort.  Plato  (Philebus,  14  f.)  very  curtly  deals 
with  these. 

2  Symp.,  211  b.  ^  Phced.,  100  d. 

*  The  way  in  which  the  Phmdo  develops  this  (102  f.)  shows  a  re- 
markable analogy  to  the  teaching  of  Anaxagoras,  which  teaching  is  also 
significant  in  other  respects  in  this  dialogue  (see  below.)  As  in  Anax- 
agoras, the  individuals  are  said  to  owe  the  change  of  their  qujlities  to 
the  entrance  or  exit  of  the  qualitatively  unchangeable  xpwara  (§  22), 
so  here  the  Idea  is  added  as  giving  a  quality  and  as  augmenting  the  thing 
(npoa-yiyveadai).  Or  it  disappears  again  when,  of  mutually  exclusive 
Ideas,  the  one  already  inherent  in  the  thing  shuts  out  the  other.  This 
explanation  is  essentially  that  of  the  Herbartian  conception  of  Ideas  as 
absolute  Qualiiaten, 


MATERIALISM  AlO)  IDEALISM  199 

and  change.  It  shows  that  immaterial  Eleaticism  is  as  un- 
able as  early  Eleaticism  to  explain  this  problem.  For  in 
;order  to  explain  the  motion  of  the  sense-world,  Ideas  must 

/themselves  be  endowed  with  motion,  life,  soul,  and  reason. 
But  the  el^Mv  (f>i\oc  deny  ^  to  the  Ideas  all  these  qualities, 
especially  the  most  important  quality  of  motion. 

The  Platonic  philosophy  reaches  its  zenith  in  the  solution  >/ 
of  this  problem.  The  Fhcedo  declares  that  in  the  Ideas 
alone  is  the  cause  (alri'a)  of  the  phenomenal  world  to  be 
found,  and  however  this  relationship  is  to  be  conceived,  the 
sense  object  is  indebted  to  the  Idea  alone  for  its  qualities.^ 
This  is  the  strongest  of  Plato's  convictions,  and  to  prove 

^  it  is  the  greatest  problem  of  the  dialectic.  There  are  in- 
troduced in  the  same  dialogue,  however,  the  two  elements, 
Anaxagoreanism  and  Pythagoreanism,^  through  which  this 
new  phase  of  the  theory  of  Ideas  took  shape  in  his  mind. 

1  Soph.,  248  f.  The  author  of  the  Sophist  founds  this  criticism 
(247  d)  upon  the  definition  that  the  om-wsov  must  be  thought  as  dvpofus, 
and  whatever  possesses  Being  must  be  thought  as  power  in  order  to 
explain  Becoming  (das  Geschehen).  Although  this  expression  is  not 
to  be  explained  in  the  spirit  of  the  Aristotelian  terminology  (Zeller,  11^. 
575,  3),  still  this  view  lies  nowise  in  the  direction  in  which  Plato  later 
solved  the  problem,  dvpafjus  is  active  power  (sec  Republic,  477,  where 
hvvaiui  is  used  in  the  sense  of  a  faculty  of  the  soul).  Ideas  are,  how- 
ever, final  causes,  and  not  such  "  faculties "  as  are  definable  only 
through  their  effects  {Rep.,  loc.  cit.). 

2  Phcedo,  100  d,  where  reference  seems  to  be  made  to  the  dialogue 
Soph  ist. 

3  About  the  time  of  this  change  Aristotle  entered  the  Academy; 
hence  his  exposition  of  the  genesis  of  the  theory  of  Ideas  {Met.,  T.  6). 
The  great  significance  which  is  ascribed  in  the  Metaphysics  to  the  Pythago- 
rean theory  in  its  bearing  on  Plato  is  not  consistent  with  the  content 
of  any  of  the  foundation  dialogues,  Theatetus,  Phcedrus,  and  Sympo- 
sium. Practically  it  begins  first  with  the  Philehus.  But  even  the 
Phfedo  shows,  in  its  choice  of  persons  and  also  in  its  discussion  of  the 
problems,  that  account  is  taken  of  the  Pythagorean  philosophy.  Xever- 
theless  {Met.,  XIT.  4,   1078  b,  9)   Aristotle  himself  elsewhere  remarks 


200  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

If  the  Ideas  cannot  themselves  move  and  suffer  change, 
they  can  be  the  causes  of  phenomena  only  in  the  sense  that 
they  are  the  purposes  which  are  realized  in  phenomena. 
The  only  conception  which  therefore,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  theory  of  Ideas,  appears  to  be  possible  as  an 
explanation  of  phenomena,  is  the  teleological.* 

The  true  relation  between  the  Idea  (ovaia)  and  the 
phenomenon  {jeveai';')  is  that  of  purpose.  Plato  found  in 
the  i'oOf-theory  of  Anaxagoras  an  attempt  to  make  this 
point  of  view  valid.  But  while  he  subjected  the  insufficient 
development  of  this  theory  to  a  sharp  criticism,^  he  main- 
tained in  addition  that  the  establishment  as  well  as  the 
development  of  a  teleological  view  of  the  world  is  possible 
only  to  a  theory  of  Ideas.^ 

The  same  theory  is  further  developed  in  the  Philehus 
and  in  the  corresponding  part  of  the  Republic.  If  the 
Sophist^  from  a  formal  and  logical  point  of  view  called 
attention  to  the  fact  that  a  similar  Koivoyvia,  a  relationship 
of  co-ordination  and  subordination,  exists  between  Ideas  as 
well  as  between  phenomena  and  Ideas,  so  the  Republic^ 
and  the  Philebus^  emphasized  also  the  systematic  unity  of 
the  ova-ia,  and  found  it  in  the  Idea  of  the  Good,  as  including 
all  other  Ideas  within  itself.  Thus  the  pyramid  of  con- 
cepts reached  its  apex,  not  by  means  of  a  formally  logical 
process  of  abstraction,  but,  as  it  happens  in  the  entire  Pla- 
tonic dialectic,  by  means  of  an  ontological  intuition,  express- 
ing here  its  final  and  highest   vTroOeai'i.''     For   since   all 

that  the  original  conception  of  the  theory  of  Ideas  was  independent 
of  the  number  theory. 

^  Phileb.,  54  c.  :  ^vfinacrav  ykveaiv  ovcrias  fvtKu  yiyvtadai  ^vfnrd<n]s> 

2  Phcedo,  97  f. 

8  Ibid;  09  f.  He  called  this  the  Sevrtpos  irXovs  of  philosophy,  and 
the  development  of  philosophy  as  a  theoretical  explanation  of  phenom- 
ena he  sketched  in  95  c,  £E. 

*  Soph.,  251  f.  6  Rep.,  511  b. 

6  Phileb.,  16  f.  '  Phmlo,  101  b;  Rep.,  loc.  cit. 


MATERIALISM  AND   IDEALISM  201 

that  is,  is  for  some  good,  the  Idea  of  the  Good  or  of  the 
absolute  purpose  is  that  to  wliich  all  other  Ideas  are  subor- 
dinated, this  subordination  being  telcological  rather  than 
logical.  The  Idea  of  the  Good  stands,  therefore,  even  ahove 
Being  and  Knowing,  which  are  the  two  highest  disjunctives.^ 
It  is  the  sun  2  in  the  realm  of  Ideas  from  which  everything 
else  gets  its  value  as  well  as  its  actuality.  It  is  the 
World  Reason.  To  it  belong  the  name  of  vovs^  and  that  of 
Godhead. 

This  immiiterialistic  perfecting  of  the  Anaxagorean  thought  is 
set  b}'  Plato  in  the  Philebus  (28  f.)  and  stands  opposed  to  the 
system  of  irrational  necessity  of  Democritus.  In  this  connection, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  vov<;  and  the  Godhead  and  the  Idea  of  the 
Good,  so  far  as  it  included  all  the  others  under  it,  wore  identified 
with  the  total  world  of  Ideas  (ama ;  compare  Zeller,  IP.  577  ff., 
593  f.).  Neither  is  there  here  any  suggestion  of  a  personal  divine 
spirit.  Compare  G.  F.  Rettig,  Ama  im  Philebus  (Bern.  1866)  ; 
K.  Stnmpf,  Verhdltnis  des  plat.  Gottes  zur  Idee  des  Guten 
(Halle,  1869). 

The  telcological  cosmology  of  Plato  consisted  in  his 
regarding  Being  or  the  world  of  Ideas  as  both  purpose 
and  cause  ^  of  phenomena  or  the  world  of  matter,  and 
besides  these  telcological  causes  he  recognized  no  other 
causes  in  the  strict  meaning  of  the  term.  Likewise  in  the 
particular  relations  of  phenomena  those  things  which  pre- 
sent themselves  to  sense  perception  as  acting  and  having 
effect  are  valid  for  him  only  as  secondary*  causes  (^vvalria). 
The  true  cause  is  purpose. 

However,  the  Idea  never  realizes  itself  fully  in  corporeal 

1  Rep.,  508  f.  2  jf,i(i_ ;  compare  517  b. 

8  In  Philebux,  26  c,  the  search  for  the  fourth  j  rinciple  is  opened  with 
the  expressed  explanation  that  fj  rov  noiovvros  (f>v(Tii  (the  essence  of 
activity)  may  be  distinguished  only  in  name  from  the  cause  (alria).  If 
this  aiTia  in  the  purpose  is  found  in  the  Idea  of  the  Good,  then  is  the 
concept  of  the  telcological  cause  attained. 

*  Phcrdo,  99  b,  where  the  cause  is  distinguished  from  the  ov  avtv  to 
aiTiov  ovK  &v  noT  (irj  airiov. 


202  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

things.  This  thought  was  peculiar  to  the  first  draft  of  the 
theory  of  Ideas,  and  it  got  new  support  and  significance 
in  Plato's  tendency  toward  Pythagorean  ism  which  set 
the  perfect  and  imperfect  worlds  in  opposition  to  eacli 
other.  The  more,  however,  the  world  of  Ideas  became  the 
ideal  world,  the  perfect  Being  or  the  kingdom  of  Worth, 
the  less  could  it  be  viewed  as  the  cause  of  imperfection  in 
the  world  of  sense.  The  world  of  imperfection  could  rather 
only  be  sought  in  the  thing  that  has  no  Being.  For  the 
sense  world  as  eternally  "  becoming"  has  part  not  only 
in  that  which  has  Being  (the  Ideas),  but  also  in  that 
which  has  no  Being  (/xr/  6v)}  Empty  space  ^  was  re- 
garded as  having  no  Being  by  Plato  as  by  the  Eleatics. 
Plato  moreover  regarded  empty  space,  like  the  Pythago- 
reans, as  in  itself  formless  and  unfashioned,  and  precisely 
for  that  reason  as  pure^  negation  (crrepT/o-i?)  of  Being. 
But  the  formless  is  capable  of  all  possible  forms,  and  retains 
them  by  virtue  of  mathematical  determinations.  In  this 
sense  the  Philebus*  makes  the  Pythagorean  fundamental 
opposition  a  part  of  his  telcological  raetaphysic,  in  that 
he  defined  as  the  two  first  principles  of  the  world  of  experi- 
ence the  direipov  (endless  formless  sj^ace)  and  the  Trepan 
(the  mathematical  limitation  and  foi-mation  of  that  space). 
Out  of  the  union  of  the  two  the  world  of  the  individual 
things  of  sense  appears,  and  the  fourth  and  highest  prin- 
ciple forms  the  basis  of  this  "  mixing."  This  principle  is 
the  alrui,  the  Idea  of  the  Good,  or  the  cosmic  reason,  the 
voik. 

1  Rep.,  477  a. 

'•^  That  the  fir)  op  which  is  designated  in  the  Philebus  as  the  antipov 
and  in  the  Thmeus  (§  37)  as  dt^afievr),  iKfiaytiov,  etc.,  is  space,  Zeller 
has  proved  (IIP.  605  f. ;  see  also  H.  Siebeck,  Untersuchungen,  49  f.). 
On  this  account  the  word  "  matter  "  has  been  avoided,  lest  it  imply  its 
unavoidable  subordinate  meaning,  "  unformed  stuff."  "Unformed  stuff," 
the  v\t)  of  Aristotle,  had  not  yet  had  its  meaning  determined  by  Plato. 

3  Compare  Arist.  Phj/s.,  I.  9,  192  a,  6.  ■*  Phileb.,  23  f. 


MATERIALISM  AND  IDEALISM  203 

Mathematics,  whose  importance  for  the  dialectic  has  been 
emphasized  above,  had  an  ontological  importance  also  in  Plato's 
system.  Mathematical  forms  are  the  link  by  means  of  which 
the  Idea  shapes  space  teleologically  into  the  sense  world. ^  Here 
for  the  first  time  is  explained  the  position  which  the  philosopher 
assigns  this  science  in  connection  with  his  epistemology.  Mathe- 
matics is  a  knowledge  not  of  the  phenomenal  world  but  of  tlie 
permanent  world.  For  that  reason  in  the  earlier  dialogues  it 
seems  to  have  been  used  only  for  dialectic  '^  purposes.  Its  objects, 
iiowever,  especiall}-  geometrical  objects,  have  still  something  of 
sense  in  them,  which  distinguishes  them  from  the  Ideas  in  the 
later  evaluation  of  the  Ideas.  Therefore  mathematics  belongs, 
according  to  the  schema  of  the  Rejmblic  (509  f.,  523  f.)  not  to 
the  ho^a  [X,\\G  knowledge  of  yeVecns),  but  to  vorjcns  (the  knowledge 
of  or>(7t'a).  AVithin  ovo-m  it  is  to  be  distinguished  as  Stavota  from 
the  peculiar  tTrto-rv/iur;,  the  knowledge  of  the  Idea  of  the  Good. 
Mathematics  appears,  then,  in  the  education  of  the  ideal  state  as 
the  highest  preparation  for  philosophy,  but  only  as  preparation. 

Concerning  Plato  as  a  mathematician,  his  introduction  of 
definitions  and  the  analytic  method,  see  Cantor,  Geschichte  der 
Mathematik,  I.  183  f. 

In  his  latter  days  Plato  borrowed  from  the  Pythagorean 
number  theory  the  principle  by  which  he  hoped  for  a 
systematic  presentation  and  articulation  of  the  world  of 
Ideas.  Logical  investigations^  toward  this  end  were  given 
up  as  soon  as  from  the  teleological  principle  the  Idea  of 
the  Good  had  been  placed  at  tlie  head.  The  Pythagorean 
method  of  developing  concepts  according  to  the  number  series 
commended  itself  to  him.     In  adopting  this  method,  Plato 

1  A  good  parallel  exists  also  here  between  Plato  and  Democritus, 
although  in  the  latter's  theory  in  the  place  of  the  teleological  alria  of 
the  Philebu.f  stdod  the  dvayKr]  (  t]  tov  dXoyov  Km  flKrj  dvvafin  koi  ra 
uwj]  eTvxfv,  Phileb.,  28  d),  and  ahliough  the  Kivov  and  the  axwnra 
(the  tSeai  of  Plato)  produce  the  sense  world.  In  view  of  this,  one 
can  see  in  the  exposition  in  the  Phllehm,  23-2G,  a  reference  to  Demo- 
critus, whose  teaching  this  dialogue  appears  to  iiave  used  in  other 
places  (§  33). 

2  The  Me.nn  shows  how  we  can  know  Ideas  by  geometrical  examples 
(Pythagorean  doctrine). 

^  Sophist,  especially  254  f. 


204  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PUILOSOrHY 

also  symbolized  single  Ideas  by  ideal  numbers.  The  ele- 
ments of  the  Ideas  are  the  direipov  and  the  irepwi  in  analogy 
to  the  principles  laid  down  for  the  sense  world  in  the  Phile- 
bu8.  The  aireipov  has  here  the  significance  of  "  intelligible 
space."  ^  Out  of  the  ev  which  he  identified  ^  with  the  Idea 
of  the  Good,  he  derived  all  other  Ideas,  as  a  graded  series 
of  conditioning  and  conditioned  {irporepov  Kal  varepov). 

Traces  of  this  senile  attempt  are  to  be  found  in  the  Pliikhus 
and  the  Latcs.  In  other  respects  we  are  instructed  only  by 
Aristotle  concerning  these  ayiMma  Soy^ara :  Met.,  I.  6,  XI f. 
4  f. ;  compare  A.  Trendelenburg,  Plat,  deideis  ef  numeris  doc 
trina  ejc  Arist.  illustrata  (^Leipzig,  1826),  and  Zeller,  IP.  567  f. 

36.  Measured  by  its  first  motive,  Plato's  theory  of  Ideas 
is  an  outspoken  ethical  metaphysic.  Consequently  Ethics 
was  the  philosophical  science  which  he  chiefly  and  most 
fruitfully  built  upon.  Among  the  Ideas  that  the  dialectic 
undertook  to  develop,  social  norms  had  a  prominent  place. 
The  immaterialism  of  the  double-world  theory  necessarily 
involved  an  ascetic  morality  that  was  very  uncharacteristic 
of  Greek  thought.  The  Thccetetus,^  for  example,  sets  up 
an  ideal  of  retirement  from  the  world  for  the  philosopher 
who,  since  earthly  life  is  full  of  evil,  finds  refuge  as  quickly 
as  possible  in  the  divine  presence.  The  Phcedo  *  further 
develops  this  negative  ethics  in  all  its  details.  It  pictures 
the  whole  life  of  the  philosopher  as  already  a  dying,  a  puri- 
fication of  the  soul  from  the  dross  of  sense  existence.  The 
soul  in  the  body  is,  as  it  were,  in  prison,  and  it  can  free 
itself  only  by  knowledge  and  virtue. 

This  view,  which  is  particularly  like  that  of  the  Pythag-' 
oreans   among   the   ancient   moral   theories,  took  in   the 
metaphysical  theory  of   Ideas   a   special    form,  by  virtue 
of    which  the   psychological   basis  was  created   also   for 

^  Compare  H  Siebeck,  Unlersuchungen,  97  f. 

2  Aristox.  Elem.  harm.,  II.  30. 

»  172,  176  f.  *  64  1 


MATERIALISM  AND   IDEALISM  205 

the  positive  ethics  of  Plato.  In  the  theory  of  the  two 
worlds  the  soul  must  take  a  peculiar  intermediary  position, 
—  a  theory  that  could  be  developed  liot  without  difficulties 
and  contradictions.  On  account  of  its  ideal  character  the 
soul  must  be  capable  of  conceiving  the  Ideas,  and  on  this 
account  must  be  related  to  them.^  The  soul  belongs  to  the 
supersensible  world,  and  should  have  all  the  qualities  of 
that  world,  —  non-origination,  indestructibility,  unity,  and 
changelessness.  But  since  it  is  the  cari'ier  of  the  Idea  of 
life,'^  and  as  cause  of  motion  is  itself  eternally  movable,  it 
is  not  identical  to  the  Ideas,  but  very  similar  to  them.^ 
Therefore  for  Plato  it  had  pre-existence  and  lasted  beyond 
the  earthly  body.  Yet  in  that  changeless  timelessness  of 
Being  which  belongs  to  the  Ideas  it  has  likewise  only  a 
share,  since  it  also  belongs  to  <yeveat^  but  it  is  not  identi- 
cal with  the  Ideas.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Socratic  prin- 
ciple required  that  the  soul's  goodness  and  badness  must 
not  be  attributed  to  external  fate,  but  to  the  soul  itself.* 
Since  its  essence,  related  as  it  is  to  the  world  of  Ideas, 
cannot  be  answerable  for  a  bad  decision,  its  higJier  nature 
must  be  considered  as  deformed  by  the  temporary  incli- 
nations of  the  senses.^  Hence  the  theory  of  the  three 
"  parts  "  ^  of  the  soul.  This  theory,  although  represented 
mythically  in  the  Phcedrus  (consistent  with  its  subject 
matter),  became  in  the  Republic  an  entirely  dogmatic  basis 
of  ethics.  There  is  the  part  that  is  related  to  the  Ideas, 
the  directing,  reasoning  part  (j]ytfi,oviK6v,  XoyiaTiKuv). 
Then  there  are  the  two  passionate  {affektvolle')  parts.  One 
is  the  nobler:  it  is  the  strong  activity  of  will  (BvfMo^,  6vfj,o- 
etSe?).  The  othei',  less  noble,  consists  of  sensuous  appetites 
(e-mdvixriTiKov,  (f)i\o)(^pijfjiaroi^).  These  tliree  parts  appear 
in  the  Phcedrus  and  the  Republic  as  the  Forms  {et^j])  of 

1  Phcedo,  78  f.  ^  ThUL,  105  d. 

^  o^otoraroj/;  ibid.,  80  b.  *  Rep.,  617  f. 

5  Ibid.,  611  f.  «  Phcedrus,  246  f. 


206  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

activity  of  tlie  soul  in  its  unity.  Hence  in  the  Phcedrus, 
also,  the  soul  that  is  described  there  as  a  unity,  unites  in 
itself  in  the  next  life  all  the  functions  that  in  the  dialogues 
are  ascribed  to  its  three  parts/  The  myths  of  the  Timceus 
for  the  first  time  expressly  speak  of  the  fiept],  of  which  the 
soul  is  composed,  and  treat  the  parts  as  separable,  in 
such  a  way  that  one  part,  the  vov'i^  is  immortal,  the  otliers 
mortal. 

Jas.  Steger,  Plat.  Stiu7ie?i,  III.  ;  Pie  plat.  Psychologle 
(Innsbruck,  1872);  P.  Wildaner,  Die  Psy.  des  Willens,  II. 
(Innsbruck,  1879);  li.  Sieheek,  Gesch.der  Pst/.,  I.  1",  187  f. ; 
Schulthess,  Plat.  Forschungen  (Bonn,  1875). 

Plato's  psychology  was  by  no  means  only  a  result  of  his 
theor}-  of  nature,  but  was  a  metaphysical  presupposition  for  it, 
resting  upon  ethical  and  epistemological  motives.  This  is 
shown  in  the  beginning  of  the  myth  in  the  Timceus.  Pre- 
existence  is  supposed  to  explain  our  knowledge  about  Ideas 
(by  dvajUVT/o-ts),  and  on  the  other  hand  to  explain  our  guilt,  on 
account  of  which  the  supersensible  soul  is  bound  in  an  earthly 
body  (see  myth  in  Phcedrus).  The  post-existence  of  the  soul, 
on  the  other  hand,  makes  possible  not  onl}'  the  striving  of  the 
soul  to  reach  beyond  earthly  life  after  a  completer  identification 
with  the  world  of  Ideas,  but  above  all  it  makes  possible  moral 
recompense.  Thereupon  Plato  illuminated  this  teaching  everj'- 
where  by  mythical  representations  of  judgment  at  death,  of 
wanderingsof  souls,  etc.  (see  Gorcjias.,  Republic^  Phcedo).  Con- 
sequently, however  weak  the  proofs  ma}'  be  which  Plato  had  / 
adduced  for  individual  iinmortalitv,  yet  his  absolute  belief  in  it''^ 
is  one  of  the  chief  points  of  his  teaching.  Of  the  arguments 
on  which  he  founded  this  belief,  the  most  valuable  is  that 
wherein  he  (Phcedo,  86  f.)  contended  against  the  Pythagorean 
definition  of  the  soul  as  the  harmony  of  the  body  b^-  the  proof 
of  the  soul's  substantial  independence  through  its  control  over 
the  bod}'.^     His  weakest  argument  is  that  in  which  the  Phcedo 

1  Tn  the  Phcedrus  that  previous  determination  of  the  soul  is  ascribed 
to  the  sense  appetites,  which  cx])Iains  the  errors  of  eartlily  Hfe.  In  the 
Phcedo,  the  fortunes  of  the  soul  after  death  are  made  dependent  on  the 
adhei'ence  of  its  sensuality.  Pre-t;xistence  and  post-existence  are  ascribed 
in  both  cases  to  the  whole  soul.  ^  Tim.,  69  f. 

8  The  Mendelssohn  copy  of  the  Phcedo  (Berl.  1  7G4)  especially  raises 
this  point  in  the  spirit  of  the  philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment. 


MATERIALISM  AND  IDEALISM  207 

Sums  up  and  crowns  all  tlie  other  arguments :  a  dialectic  sub- 
reption from  the  double  meaning  of  the  word  d^amros,  in  which 
the  soul  is  explained  as  immortal  because  it  can  exist  in  no 
other  way  than  as  a  living  thing  (Phmdo,  105  f.).  Compare 
K.  F.  Hermann,  J)e  imrnortalitatis  7iotione  in  Plat.  Phcedone 
(Marburg,  1885) ;  id.  de  partibus  animce  immortaUbus  (Gott, 
1850)  ;  K.  Ph.  Fischer,  Plat,  de  immortalitate  anitnoi  doctrina 
(Erlangen,  1845)  ;  P.  Zimmermann,  Pie  Unsterhlichkeit  der 
Seelein  Plat.  Phved.  (Leipzig,  1869)  ;  G.  Teichmiiller,  Studien., 
I.  107  f. 

The  relationship  of  the  three  parts  to  the  essence  of  the  soul 
is  very  difficult,  and  is  not  made  perfectly  clear.  Plato  main- 
tains clearl},  on  the  whole,  the  unity  of  the  soul,  but  onl}-  in  a 
few  places  particularly  emphasizes  it.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
Phcedrus  makes  all  the  three  parts  belong  to  the  essence  of 
the  individual,  in  order  to  make  conceivable  the  fall  of  the  soul 
in  its  pre-existence.  On  the  other  hand,  it  appears  as  if  both 
the  lower  parts  originated  in  the  union  of  soul  and  bod}',  and  on 
that  account  again  were  stripped  off"  entirely  from  the  true  essence" 
of  the  soul  {vov<i)  after  a  virtuous  life  {Pep..,  611  ;  Plicedo, 
83).  The  abrupt  and  direct  opposition  of  the  two  worlds  made 
this  troublesome  point  in  his  system  {Rep.,  435  f.).  So  also 
the  specific  psychological  meaning  of  the  three  parts,  whose 
origin  is  made  clear  by  ethical  evaluation,  is  undetermined. 
In  spite  of  some  similarities,  this  division  is  in  no  wise  identical 
with  the  present-day  psychology  and  its  customary  triple  division 
into  ideas,  sensations,  and  desires.  For  the  ala9r,a€L<;  did  not, 
according  to  Plato,  belong  to  the  Aoyto-Tt/coV,  but  must,  although 
he  has  not  expressh*  stated  it,  be  ascribed  to  both  the  other 
parts.  On  the  other  hand,  there  belong  to  the  i/o?9  not  only  the 
knowledge  of  Ideas,  but  also  the  virtuous  determination  of  the 
will,  which,  according  to  Socrates,  corresponds  to  that  knowledge. 
We  come  nearest  to  the  Platonic  thought  when  we  think  of  the 
life  of  the  soul  as  ordered  into  three  different  degrees  of  worth. 
Each  degree  has  its  own  theoretic  and  practical  functions  in 
such  a  way  that  the  lower  functions  may  exist  without  the 
higher,  but  the  higher  appear  —  at  least  in  this  life  —  in  con- 
nection with  the  lower.  So  plants  have  iinGv^trjTLKov  (  Titn.,  77  ; 
Pep.,  441);  animals  have  ^v/xociSc's  in  addition  to  In l6v fxTyr lkov ', 
and  men  have,  besides  these  two  functions,  the  XoyuTTiKov-  The 
I'ors  is  localized  in  the  brain,  ^v/uto?  in  the  heart,  and  cTri^u/Ata  in 
the  liver. ^ 

In  the  application  of  this  to  ethnography,  he  claimed  for  the 

*  Agreeino;  with  Democritus. 


/ 


208  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Greeks  the  excellence  of  Aoyto-rtKoi/  {JRepuhlic,  435  e),  allowed 
to  the  warlike  barbarians  of  the  north  the'  predominance  of 
^w,uos,  and  to  the  weak  barbarians  of  the  south  that  of  iTziBv^iia. 

Upon  the  basis  of  this  psychological  theory,  Plato  went 
beyond  not  only  the  abstract  simplicity  of  the  Socratic 
theory  of  virtue,  but  also  the  ascetic  one-sided  ncss  of  his 
own  first  negative  statements.  That  moral  conduct  alone 
makes  man  truly  blessed  ^  in  this  or  the  other  life,^  is  his 
fundamental  conviction.  But  even  if  he  was  inclined  to 
find  this  true  happiness  only  in  the  most  complete  perfec- 
tion of  the  soul,  in  which  happiness  the  soul  is  a  sharer  in 
the  divine  world  of  Ideas ;  and  even  if  therefore  he  refused  ^ 
as  unworthy  of  the  soul  every  utilitarian  principle  of  con- 
ventional ethics,  yet  lie  recognized  other  kinds  of  happiness 
as  justifiable  moments  of  the  highest  Good.  These  kinds 
of  happiness  are  all  which,  in  the  entire  sweep  of  the  soul's 
activities,  appear  as  true  and  noble  joys.  The  Philebus  * 
develops  such  a  graded  series  of  goods.  Plato  contended 
also,  in  this  dialogue,  against  the  theory  that  would  find  the 
Te'Xo?^  only  in  sense  pleasure.  But  against  the  view  of 
those  who  explain  all  pleasure  as  only  illusory,  he  held  fast 
to  the  reality  of  a  pure  and  painless  sense-pleasure,^  and  he 
contended  against  the  one-sided  view  that  sought  true  hap- 
piness only  in  insight.^  But  while  he  on  the  other  hand 
recognized  the  legitimacy  of  intellectual  pleasure,  he  laid 
claim  to  it  not  only  for  rational  knowledge  (i/oOs"),  but  also 
for  correct  ideas  in  every  science  and  art.**  Above  all  this, 
however,  he  set  the  participation  in  ideal  evaluations  and 

»  Rep.,  353  f. 

2  Compare  entir3  conclusion  of  Rep.,  Books  IX.,  X. 

»  Rep.,  362  ;   Thecet.,  176  ;  Phcedo,  68  f. 

*  See  Laws,  717  f.,  728  f.  ^  As  already  seen  in  Gorgias. 

*  Supposably  Democritus. 

''  These  statements  could  be  aimed  just  as  well  against  Antisthenes, 
Euclid,  or  Democritus  (Phileb.,  21,  60). 
e  Phileb.,  62  f. 


MATERIALISM   AND  IDEALISM  209 

their  actualization  in  individual  activity.^  All  the  beauty 
and  vitality  of  Greece  was  amalgamated  here  in  the  tran- 
scendental ideal  of  the  philosopher,  and  a  similar  union 
of  the  two  sides  of  reality  was  already  suggested  in  the 
series  of  objects  which  the  Symposium  ^  develops  as  the 
working  of  the  epo)?. 

A.  Trendelenburg,  De  Plat.  Philebus  consilio  (Berlin,  1837)  ; 
Fr.  Susemihl,  Ueber  dit  Gutertafel  im  Philebus  (Pliilol,  1863)  ; 
R.  Hirzel,  De  bonis  i/ijine  Philebi  enumeratis  (Leipzig,  1868). 

However,  Plato  founded  the  development  of  his  theory 
of  virtue  in  a  still  more  systematic  way  upon  his  triple 
divisions  of  the  soul.  While  his  first  dialogues  took  pains 
to  reduce  the  single  virtues  to  the  Socratic  eZSo?  of  knowl- 
edge, the  later  dialogues  proceeded  upon  the  theory  of  the 
distinct  independence  and  the  respective  limitations  of  the 
particular  virtues.  In  so  far  as  the  one  or  the  other  part 
of  the  soul  preponderates  in  different  men  according  to 
their  dispositions,^  are  they  suited  to  developing  one  or 
another  virtue.  For  every  part  of  the  soul  has  its  own 
perfection,  which  is  called  its  virtue  and  is  grounded  in  its 
essence.*  Accordingly  Plato  constructed  a  group  of  four 
cardinal  virtues  which  at  that  time  wei'e  beginning  to  be 
frequently  mentioned  in  literature.  There  is  the  virtue 
of  wisdom  {aocpia')  corresponding  to  the  rjyefjioviKov  ;  that  of 
\vill-power  (avBpla),  corresponding  to  the  6v/xoei8e<i ;  that  of 
self-control  (a-cocfypoavurj),  corresponding  to  the  eTndu/xrjTiKov. 
Finally,  since  the  perfection  of  the  whole  soul  consists^  in 
the  right  relations  of  the  single  parts,  in  the  fulfilment  of 
the  soul's  particular  task  through  every  one  of  these  parts 
(^ra  eavTov  irpdrTeiv),    and    in    the    regulative    control    of 

1  Phileb.,  66  f.  2  Smnp.,  208  f. 

3  Eep.,  410  f.  *  Rep.,  441  f. 

^  In  the  entire  Republic  the  aseetie  thought  of  stripping  off  the  lower 
parts  of  the  soul  is  entirely  put  aside. 

14 


210  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

reason  over  the  two  other  parts,^  so  we  have  as  a  fourth 
virtue  that  of  an  equable  arrangement  of  the  whole.  This 
last  is  called  by  Plato  hiKacoavvr]? 

The  last  term,  which  is  scarcely  understandable  from 
the  point  of  view  of  individual  ethics,  arises  from  the 
peculiar  derivation  which  Plato  has  given  to  these  virtues 
in  the  Republic.  Loyal  to  the  motive  of  the  theory  of 
Ideas,  the  Platonic  ethics  sketched  not  so  much  the  ideal  of 
the  individual  as  that  of  the  species ;  it  pictured  less  the 
perfect  man  than  the  perfect  society.  The  Platonic  ethics 
is  primarily  social  ethics.  It  does  not  treat  of  the  happi- 
ness of  the  individuals,  but  that  of  the  whole,^  and  this 
happiness  can  be  reached  only  in  the  perfect  state.  The 
ethics  of  Plato  perfected  itself  in  his  teaching  of  the  ideal 
state. 

K.  F.  Hermann,  Die  historischen  Elemente  des  platonischen 
Idealstaates  (Gesch.  Ab/iaiidL,  132  f.);  Ed.  Zeller,  Der plat. 
Staat  in  seiner  Bedeutung  fur  die  F'olgezeit  ( Vortrdge  U7id 
Abhandl.,  I.  62  f.)  ;  C.  Nohle,  Die  Staatslehre  Plat.'s  in  Hirer 
geschichtlichen  Entwickelung  (Jena,  1880). 

Whatever  4  may  be  the  natural  and  historical  origin  of 
the  state,  its  task  is  the  same  everywhere,  according  to 
Plato:  viz.,  so  to  direct  the  common  life  of  man  that  all 
may  be   happy  through  virtue.     The  task  can  be  accom- 

1  Since  already  (rco(f>po(TvvT)  is  possible  only  through  the  right  rule  of 
the  appetites,  a-acppotrvvrf  and  diKaioavm)  are  not  mutually  exclusive. 
Compare  Zeller,  ll".  749  f. 

^  The  most  usual  verbal  translation,  justice,  concerns  only  the  politi- 
cal, not  the  moral  spirit  of  the  case.  Riykteou.wess  does  not  fully  state 
the  Platonic  meaning. 

^  Precisely  on  that  account  the  philosopher  must  share  in  public  life, 
even  if  he  would  find  his  happiness  only  in  his  turning  from  the  earthly 
and  in  his  devotion  to  the  divine.     See  above  ;  also  Rep.,  519  f. 

*  The  first  book  of  the  Republic  develops  critically  the  views  of  the 
Sophists  on  this  point.  How  far  in  the  representation  of  the  genesis  of 
the  state,  given  in  the  second  book  (3G9  f.),  positive  and  negative 
analogies  appear,  cannot  be  discussed  here. 


MATERIALISM   AND  IDEALISM  211 

plislied  only  by  ordering  all  the  relations  of  society  accord- 
ing to  the  principles  of  man's  moral  nature.  The  perfect 
state  is  divided  into  three  distinct  parts,  Yike  the  soul  of 
man.  There  are  the  producers,  the  warriors,  and  the  admin- ' 
istrators.  The  great  mass  of  citizens  (S/}yu,o9 ;  yeoopjol  Kal 
Sijfiiovpyol'),  corresponding  to  the  eTriOv/xTjriKov  or  (jaXo- 
'X^pi]fiaTov,  are  entrusted  with  providing  for  the  material 
foundation  of  the  life  of  the  state  by  caring  for  its  daily 
needs  ;  and  they  are  prompted  to  make  this  provision  by 
their  own  sensuous  appetites.  The  warriors  and  officials 
(iiriKovpoi),  corresponding  to  the  ^u/ioetSe?  in  the  unselfish 
fulfilment  of  duty,  have  to  guard  the  state  externally  by 
repelling  invasion,  internally  by  executing  the  laws.  The 
rulers,  finally  {dpxovTe<i),  corresponding  to  XojtartKov  or 
Tjye/jLoviKov,  determine,  according  to  their  insight,  the  legis- 
lation and  the  principles  of  administration.  Tlie  perfection 
however  of  the  entire  state  —  its  "  virtue  "  —  is  justice 
(BLKatoavvr)),^  that  every  one  may  get  his  right.  Justice 
consists  in  these  three  classes  having  their  proper  distribu- 
tion of  power,  while  at  the  same  time  every  one  fulfils  his 
own  peculiar  task.  Therefore  the  rulers  must  have  the 
highest  culture  and  wisdom  (croc/xa),  the  warriors  an 
undaunted  devotion  to  duty  (^avSpia'),  and  the  people  an 
obedience  which  curbs  the  appetites  (o-wc^pocrw?;). 

The  constitution  of  the  ideal  state  for  Plato  is  an  aristoc- 
racy in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  word.  It  is  a  rule  of  the 
best,  —  the  wise  and  virtuous.  It  places  all  legislation  and 
the  entire  direction  of  society  in  the  hand  of  the  class  of 
the  scientifically  cultured  (^(f)i\6ao(f)ot').'^     The  task  of  the 

1  Therefore  the  correspon(lin<i:  virtue  of  the  individual,  the  ethical 
equilibrium  of  the  parts  of  his  soul,  is  designated  by  the  same  name. 

2  Thus  must  the  celebrated  sentence  (Rep.,  473  d)  be  understood. 
There  will  be  no  end  to  the  sorrow  of  man  until  the  philosophers  (the 
scientifically  cultured)  rule  or  the  rulers  are  philosophers  (are  scientifi- 
cally cultured). 


212  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

second  class  is  to  execute  practically  the  orders  of  tlie 
liigliest  class,  and  to  maintain  the  state  and  preserve  its 
interests  both  internally  and  externally.  The  mass  of 
mankind  have  to  work  and  obey. 

Since,  however,  the  object  of  the  state  does  not  consist  in 
the  securing  of  any  merely  outward  benefit,  but  in  the 
virtue  of  all  its  citizens,  Plato  demanded  that  the  individ- 
ual should  merge  himself  entirely  in  the  state,  and  that  the 
state  should  embrace  and  determine  the  entire  life  of  its 
citizens.  Plato  thus  went  beyond  the  political  principle  of 
the  Greeks.  The  development  which  this  idea  found  in 
the  social  organization  of  the  TroXireia  was  restricted, 
nevertheless,  to  the  two  higher  classes,  which  were  taken 
together  under  the  name  of  "guardians"  {(f)v\aK€<i).  For 
the  mass  of  the  Br]fjLo<i  there  is  accessible  no  virtue  founded 
on  knowledge,  but  only  the  conventional  virtue  of  society, 
which  is  enforced  by  the  strict  execution  of  the  laws  and 
attained  through  utilitarian  considerations.  The  Platonic 
politics  leaves  therefore  the  third  class  to  itself.  In  its 
desire  for  acquisition,  this  class  is  moved  by  a  fundamen- 
tally sensuous  motive ;  and  it  performs  its  duty  when 
by  its  labor  it  furnishes  the  material  foundation  for  the  life 
of  the  state, and  yields  to  the  guidance  of  the  "  guardians." 
But  the  prenatal  and  present  life  of  the  "  guardians  "  are 
to  be  controlled  by  the  state.  Impressed  by  the  importance 
of  the  propagation  of  the  species,  Plato  would  not  leave 
marriage  to  the  voluntary  action  of  the  individual,  but  de- 
cided that  the  rulers  of  the  state  should  provide  for  the 
right  constitution  of  the  following  generation  by  a  fitting 
choice  of  parents.^  Education  of  the  youth  in  all  depart- 
ments belongs  to  the  state,  and  gives  equal  attention  to 
bodily  and  spiritual  development.  In  the  latter  it  pro- 
gresses from  folk-lore  and  myths  through  elementary 
instruction  to  poetry  and  music,  and  thence  through  math- 
»  Rep.,  416  b. 


MATERIALISM   AND  IDEALISM  213 

ematical  training  to  interest  in  philosophy,  and,  finally,  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  Idea  of  the  Good.  In  the  different 
steps  of  this  education,  which  is  the  same  for  all  the  chil- 
dren of  the  two  higher  classes,  those  children  are  pruned 
out  by  the  state  officials  that  no  longer  seem  to  show  fitness 
of  disposition  and  development  for  the  higher  tasks.  Dif- 
ferent grades  of  officials  and  warriors  are  thus  formed  from 
these.  This  sifting  process  leaves  ultimately  the  dlite,  who 
succeed  to  the  position  of  archons  and  dedicate  their  lives 
partly  to  the  furthering  of  science  and  partly  to  the  admin- 
istration of  the  state.  Herein  are  the  two  upper  classes  a 
great  family  ;  every  form  of  private  possession  is  renounced,^ 
and  their  external  wants  are  cared  for  by  the  state  support, 
which  is  furnished  by  the  third  class. 

The  Platonic  state  was  accordingly  to  be  an  institution 
for  the  education  of  society.  Its  higlicst  aim  was  to  pre- 
pare man  by  the  sensible  for  the  suj)ersensible  world,  by 
the  earthly  for  the  divine  life.  The  social-religious  ideal  is 
that  which  floats  before  the  philosopher  in  his  methodical 
delineation  of  the  "  best  "  state.  As  all  the  higher  interests 
of  man  will  be  included  by  this  social  community  of  life,  so 
the  philosopher  believed  that  the  state  should  have  exclu- 
sive control  not  only  of  education  and  science  but  also  of 
art  and  religion.  Only  that  art  shall  be  allowed  -whose 
imitative^  activity  is  directed  upon  the  Ideas,  especially  the 
Idea  of  the  Good.^  The  Greek  KaXoKdjadia  consisted  in 
the  evaluation  of  everything  beautiful  as  good.  Plato 
reversed  the  order  of  this  thought  by  establishing  only  the 
good  as  the  really  beautiful.  In  the  same  way  the  ideal 
state  accepts  in  the  main  the  myths  and  the  culture  of  the 
Greek  state  religion  as  educational  material  for  the  third 
class  of  society,  and  partly  also  for  the  second  class,  espe- 
cially in  childhood.*     But   the    state   expunges   from   the 

I  Rep.,  416  b.  -  Ibid.,  313. 

8/6irf.,376f.  *  Ibid.,  360  t. 


214  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

myths  all  things  immoral  and  ambiguous,  and  permits  their 
use  only  as  the  symbolical  representations  of  ethical  trutiis. 
The  religion  of  the  philosophers,  however,  consists  in  sci- 
ence and  virtue,  of  which  the  highest  goal  is  the  attainment 
of  likeness  to  the  Idea  of  the  Good,— the  Godhead. 

Plato  did  not  conceive  his  city  as  an  imaginary  Utopia,  but  in 
all  earnestness  as  a  practicable"^  ideal.  He  employed  therefore 
in  manv  particulars,  especially  in  social  arrangements,  numerous 
features  of  the  then  existing  Greek  states,  and  he  preferred,  natu- 
rallv  enough,  the  stricter  and  more  aristocratic  ordinances  of  the 
Doric  race.  Though  he  was  convinced  that  out  of  the  existing 
circumstances  his  ideal  could  be  realized  only  through  force,* 
yet  he  had  none  the  less  faith  that  if  his  proposal  were  tried,  he 
would  bestow  upon  his  citizens  lasting  content,  and  would  make 
them  strong  and  victorious  against  all  foreign  attack.  In  the 
incomplete  dialogue,  Critias,  the  philosopher  tried  to  develop 
this  thought,  —  that  the  state  founded  on  culture  should  show 
itself  superior  to  the  Atlantis,  the  state  founded  on  mere  ex- 
ternal power.  An  idealizing  of  the  Persian  wars  probably  floats 
before  him.  The  description  is  broken  off  at  the  very  begiiniing, 
and  there  is  wonderful  similarity  in  the  picture  of  the  Atlantis 
to  the  institutions  of  former  American  civilizations. 

As  to  details,  we  should  make  a  comparison  of  the  Republic 
with  all  of  Plato's  other  writings.  The  Politicus  offers  many 
similar  thoughts,  but  with  the  interweaving  of  much  that  is 
foreign,  and  it  has  predilection  for  monarchical  forms  of  govern- 
ment. It  deviates  from  the  Republic,  especially  in  its  theory  of 
the  different  kinds  of  constitutions,  contrasting  three  worse 
forms  with  three  better.^  The  kingdom  is  contrasted  to  the 
tyranny,  the  aristocracy  to  the  oligarch}-,  the  constitutional  to 
the  lawless  democracy'.  Inexact  sketches  are  drawn  of  the 
seventh,  or  best,  state  in  contrast  to  these.  In  the  Republic,^ 
Plato  used  his  psychology  to  show  how  the  worse  constitutions 
come  from  the  deterioration  of  the  ideal  states.  Tiiese  are  the 
timocracy  in  which  the  ambitious  rule,  the  predominance  of  the 
^u/u-oetSe; ;  the  oligarchy  in  which  the  avaricious  rule,  the  pre- 
dominance of  the  iirL6vfj.r]TiK6v ;  the  democrac}-  or  realm  of  uni- 
versal license ;  and,  finally-,  the  tyrann}'  or  the  unfettering  of 
the  most  disgraceful  arbitrary  power. 

The  aristocratic  characteristics  of  the  Platonic  state  corre- 
spond not  onl}'  to  the  personal  convictions  of  Plato  and  his 

1  Rep.,  540  d.  2  PoliL,  302  f.  ^  ji^p  ^  545  f. 


MATERIALISM  AND   IDEALISM  215 

great  teacher,  but  are  developed  necessarily  from  the  thought 
liiut  scientific  culture  can  be  obtained  only  by  the  very  few. 
In  scientific  culture  is  the  highest  virtue  of  man,  and  his  only 
title  to  political  administration  (Cforgias).  Likewise,  the  exclu- 
sion of  all  non-intellectual  labor  from  the  two  directing  classes 
is  consistent  with  the  universal  Greek  prejudice  against  the 
proletariat.  However,  it  is  justified  by  Plato  in  the  reflection 
tliat  all  true  labor  presupposes  love  for  its  task,  or  brings  love 
with  it ;  and  accordingly,  that  all  manual  work  necessarily  lowers 
the  soul  to  the  sensuous,  and  makes  distant  its  supersensible 
goal.  From  the  same  motive  came  the  exclusion  of  family  life 
and  private  possessions.  It  is  misleading  to  speak  here  of  a 
communism.  The  community  of  wives,  children,  and  goods  is 
expressly  delimited  to  the  two  higher  classes.  This  was  not  to 
satisfy  a  claim  for  universal  equality,  as  was  the  case  in  the 
naturalistic  investigations  of  radical  Cynicism,  but,  on  the 
contrar}',  to  prevent  private  interest  from  interfering  in  any 
way  with  the  devotion  of  the  warrior  and  ruler  to  tiie  welfare 
of  the  state.  It  is,  in  a  word,  a  sacrifice  made  to  the  Idea 
of  the  Good. 

The  peculiar  character  of  the  ethics  of  Plato,  and  at  the  same 
time  its  tendency  to  go  beyond  actual  Greek  life,  consisted  in 
the  complete  subordination  of  the  individual  life  to  tlie  purpose 
of  tlie  political  whole.  In  contrast  to  the  degenerating  Hellenic 
culture  the  philosopher  held  an  ideal  picture  of  political  societx', 
which  could  first  actually  lie  when  the  Platonic  thought  predom- 
inated :  that  all  eartlily  life  has  value  and  meaning  only  as  an 
education  for  a  higher  supersensible  existence.  To  a  certain 
extent  the  hierarchy  of  the  Middle  Ages  realized  the  Platonic 
state  but  with  the  priests  in  place  of  the  philosophers.  Other 
moments  of  the  Platonic  ideal  —  for  example,  the  control  of 
science  by  the  state  —  have  been  realized  also  to  some  extent  in 
the  public  measures  of  some  modern  nations. 

Concerning  Plato's  theory  of  education  see  Alex.  Kapp 
(Minden.  1833);  E.  Snethlage  (Berlin,  1834);  Volquardsen 
(Berlin,  1860);  K.  Benrath  (Jena.  1871)  ;  concerning  his  atti- 
tude toward  art,  K.  Justi,  Die  a'sth.  Elemente  in  cler  plat.  Phi- 
los.  (Marburg,  186^)  ;  concerning  his  attitude  toward  religion, 
F.  Ch.  Bauer,  Das  Chrisfliche  des  Platonismus  (Tubingen,  1873). 
Compare,  also,  S.  A.  Byk,  Hellenismus  xmd  Platonismus  (Leipzig, 
1870). 

Similarly  Plato's  ethics  also  experienced  as  disadvan- 
tageous a  later  transformation  in  the  Laws  as  his  theoretic 


v^ 


216  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

philosophy  in  the  lectures  of  his  old  age.  In  pessimistic  ^ 
despair^  as  to  the  realization  of  his  political  ideal,  the  phi- 
losopher attempted  to  sketch  a  morally  ordered  oommunity 
without  the  controlling  influence  of  the  theory  of  Ideas 
and  its  devotees.  In  the  place  of  philosophy,  on  the  one 
hand  religion  presented  itself  in  a  form  much  nearer  to  the 
national  mode  of  thought,  and  on  the  other  mathematics 
with  its  Pythagorean  tendencies  to  music  and  astronomy. 
Philosophical  culture  was  replaced  by  practical  prudence  ^ 
(^(f)p6vr]ais),  and  precise  conformity  to  law  and  the  Socratic 
virtue  by  a  moderate  dependence  on  ancient  worthy  cus- 
toms. Thus  the  state  in  the  RepuhUc  changed,  Avhen  it 
appeared  in  the  later  writings,  into  a  mixture  of  monar- 
chico-oligarchic  and  democratic  elements,  —  the  ideal  power 
into  a  compromise  with  historical  conditions.  Moreover, 
all  this  is  set  before  us  in  a  long-winded,  unconcentrated 
presentation,  which  seems  to  be  wanting  the  last  finishing 
touches  and  the  final  redaction.^ 

Just  because  the  Laios  give  details  of  contemporaneous  life, 
they  are  of  high  antiquarian,  even  if  of  very  little  i^hilosophieal 
value.  They  represent  so  great  a  deterioration,  not  only  from 
the  theory  of  Ideas,  but  from  Plato's  entire  idealistic  thought, 
that  the  doubts  which  have  been  wisely  put  aside  again  as  to 
their  genuineness  are  vet  entirely  conceivable.  Compare  Th. 
Oneken,  Staatslehre  des  ArisL,  197  f. ;  E.  Zellcr,  IP.  809  f. ;  the 
five  essays  by  Th.  Bergk,  concerning  tlie  llistor}'  of  Greek 
Philosoi)hy  and  Astronomy  (Leipzig,  1883)  ;  E.  Pra^torius,  De 
legibusPlnt.  (Bonn,  1884). 

37.  The  epistemological  dualism  of  the  theory  of  Ideas 
allowed  and  demanded  a  dogmatic  statement  concerning 
ethical  norms  of  human  life,  but  no  equivalent  recognition 

1  Laws,  644.  The  conviction  as  to  the  badness  of  the  world  grew  up 
here  to  the  extent  of  a  belief  in  an  evil  world-soul,  which  works  against 
the  divine  soul.     Compare  §  37.     See  Laws,  896  f. 

2  Ibid.,  739  f. 

'  Ibid.,  712,  in  exact  antithesis  to  Rep.,  473. 
*  Ibid.,  746  f. 


MATERIALISM   AND   IDEALISM  217 

of  nature  phenomena.  For  although  Plato  liacl  fully  deter- 
mined that  the  tasks  of  metaphysics  lay  in  regarding  the 
Ideas  and  especially  the  Idea  of  the  Good  as  the  cause  of 
the  sense-world,  that  world  nevertheless  remained  to  him 
as  hefore  a  realm  of  Becoming  and  Destruction.  According 
to  the  premises  of  his  philosophy,  this  realm  could  never 
he  the  object  of  dialectic  or  true  knowledge.  The  point  of 
view  of  the  theory  of  Ideas  presupposes  a  teleological  view 
of  nature,  but  it  offers  no  knowledge  of  nature. 

In  his  latter  days,  complying  with  the  needs  of  his 
school,  Plato  drew  natural  science  also  within  the  realm  of 
his  research  and  theory, —  which  science  he  in  the  spirit 
of  Socrates  had  earlier  entirely  avoided.  He,  nevertheless, 
remained  always  true  to  his  earlier  conviction,  and  empha- 
sized it  with  great  clearness  and  sharpness  at  the  beginning 
of  the  Timceiis,  in  which  the  result  of  these  investigations 
w^as  set  down.'  This  was  to  the  effect  that  there  can  be  no 
iina-Trjixrj  of  the  Becoming  and  destruction  of  things,  but 
only  7r[aTi<i :  no  science,  but  only  a  probable  conclusion. 
He  claimed  therefore  for  his  theory  of  nature,  not  the  value 
of  truth,  but  only  of  probability.  The  presentations  in  the 
Timceus  are  only  €U6Te<i  fivOot,  and,  however  closely  related 
to  his  theory  of  Ideas,  they  nevertheless  form  no  integral 
part  of  its  metaphysics. 

Aug.  Bockh.  De  Platonka  corporis  mundani  fahrica  (Heidel- 
berg, 1809)  ;  Untersuchnnc/en  iiber  das  kosmiscJie  System  des  Plat. 
(Berlin,  1852)  ;  II.  Martin,  Mudes  sur  le  Timee  (2  vols.,  Paris, 
1841).  ^ 

Plato's  philosophy  of  nature  stands,  then,  not  in  tlie  same,  bnt 
in  a  very  similar  relationship  to  the  metaphysic  of  his  theory  of 
Ideas,  as  the  hypothetical  physics  of  Parraenides  to  his  theory  of 
Being.   In  both  cases  it  seems  to  have  been  a  regard  for  the  needs 

1  Tim.,  28  f;  which  discussion,  27  d,  begins  with  the  recapitulation  of 
the  theory  of  the  two  worlds.  The  relation  of  the  philosophy  of  nature 
to  the  theory  of  Ideas  is  characterized  most  exactly  by  sentence  29  c; 
07-t  7re/j  irpos  yeveatv  ovaia,  tovto  npas.  TriaTiy  dXrjOeia. 


218  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

and  wishes  of  the  pupils  that  occasioned  their  descending  from 
interest  in  permanent  Being  to  an  experimental  interest  in 
the  changeable.  Plato  designated  expressly  this  play  with  the 
etKores  fxvdoi  as  the  onl}'  permissible  diversion  from  his  dialectic, 
which  was  his  life-work  (Tim.,,  59  c).  Although  a  critical  and 
often,  indeed,  polemical  consideration  of  existing  opinions  ap- 
peared here,  the  formal  moment  of  which  Diels  (Aofs.  z.  Zeller- 
Jub.,  254  f.)  made  of  great  importance  in  Parmenides,  Plato  took 
account  of  the  fact  that  a  school  that  had  a  school-membership 
of  the  organization  and  range  of  the  Academy  could  not  hold 
itself  indefinitely  aloof  from  natural  science,  and  that  such  a 
school  would  be  obliged  finally  to  come  to  some  terms  or  other.^ 
While,  however,  upon  the  basis  of  the  theory  of  Ideas  a  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  comparative  worth  of  llie  individual,  societ}', 
and  histor\-  could  be  obtained,  yet  the  determination  of  the 
reality  of  nature  through  the  Idea  of  the  Good  was  not  to  be 
developed  with  equal  certainty  as  to  details.  Suppose,  then, 
physics  and  ethics  to  be  the  two  wings  of  the  Platonic  edifice, 
the  ethical  wing  is  like  the  main  portion  of  the  edifice  in  style 
and  material ;  the  physics  is,  however,  a  lighter,  temporary' 
structure,  and  is  merely  an  imitation  of  the  forms  of  the  other. 

That  which  pressed  upon  the  philosopher  and  was  treated  by 
him  with  careful  reserve  was,  remarkably  enough,  made  of  the 
greatest  importance  by  his  disciples  in  later  centuries.  The 
Ideological  physics  of  Plato  was  regarded  through  Hellenistic 
time  and  the  entire  Middle  Ages  as  his  most  important  achieve- 
ment, while  the  theory  of  Ideas  was  pressed  more  or  less  into 
the  background.  Relationships  to  religious  conceptions  are 
chiefly  accountable  for  this,  but  still  more  the  natural  circum- 
stance that  the  school  had  an  especial  fondness  for  the  more 
tangible  and  useful  part  of  his  teaching.  Tliis  explains  why 
alread}'  Aristotle  (De  an.,  I.  2,  404  b,  16)  contended  against 
the  myths  of  the  Tiniceus  as  though  they  were  serious  state- 
ments of  doctrine. 

The  basis  for  the  myths  of  the  Timceus  is  the  metaphys- 
ics of  the  Philehus.  The  sense  world  consists  of  infinite 
space,  and  the  particular  mathematical  forms  which  that 
space  had  taken  on  in  order  to  represent  the  Ideas.  But 
conceptual  knowledge  cannot  be  given  of  the  efficacy  of 
these  highest  purposes.     Consequently  the  Timceus  begins 

^  Concerning  the  influence  of  Eudoxus,  see  H.  Usener,  Preuss.  Jahrh., 
LIII.  15  f. 


MATERIALISM  AND  IDEALISM  219 

by  personifying  this  efficacy  mythologically  as  the  world- 
forming  God,  the  SrjfXLovpjo'i.  It  is  purposeful  force ;  it 
is  good,  and  because  of  its  good-will  has  made  the  world. ^ 
In  the  act  of  creation  it  had  in  view  the  Ideas,  those  pure 
unitary  forms  of  which  the  world  is  a  copy.^  The  world 
is  therefore  the  most  perfect,  best,  and  most  beautiful,^  and 
since  it  is  the  product  of  divine  reason  and  goodness,  it  is 
the  only  world. 

The  perfectness  of  the  07ie  Avorld  which  is  reasserted  with 
especial  solemnity  at  the  end  of  the  Timceus.  is  a  necessary 
requisite  of  the  teUiological  basis  of  thought.  The  denial  of  the 
opposite  proposition,  that  there  are  numberless  worlds  (Tim., 
31  a),  appears  as  a  polemic  against  Democritus,  especially  in 
connection  with  what  immediately  precedes  (30  a).  According 
to  Democritus'  mechanical  principle,  the  vortices  arise  here  and 
there  in  the  midst  of  chaotic  motion,  and  out  of  these  the 
worlds  arise.  According  to  Plato,  the  ordering  God  forms  only 
one  world,  and  that  the  most  perfect. 

That,  however,  this  world  corresponds  not  perfectly  with 
the  Ideas,*  but  only  as  closely  as  possible,  is  due  to  the 
second  principle  of  the  sense  world,  to  space  into  which 
God  has  built  the  world.  Space  is  known  neither  by 
thought^  nor  sense.  It  is  neither  a  concept  nor  percept, 
Idea  nor  sense  object.  It  is  the  fir]  6u  or  what  possesses 
no  Being,  without  which  the  ovtws  6v  could  not  appear, 
nor  the  Ideas  ^  be  copied  in  sense  things.  It '  is  the  ^walrtov 
in  comparison  to  the  true  oLTtov;  and  so  also  the  things 
formed  in  it  in  the  individual  processes  of  the  world  are 
^vvaiTta.^     They  form  a  natural  necessity  {avdyKt]}  ^  beside 

1   Tim.,  29  0.  ^  Ibid.,  30  c. 

3  The  teleological  motive  of  the  teaching  of  Anaxagoras,  whieli 
was  accepted  already  in  the  Phcedo,  forms  one  of  the  fundamental 
teachings  of  the  Tinueus. 

*  Tim.,  30  a,  40  c.  ^  Ibid.,  52. 

6  Which  are  midway  between  Being  and  not-Being.     Rep.,  477  f. 

'   Tim.,  68  e,  meaning  a  second  kind  of  alria. 

8  Ibid  ,  46  c ;  Phcedo,  96  f. 

9  Tim.,  48  a,  another  term  used  completely  in  Democritan  sense. 


220  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

the  divine  reason,  which  necessity  under  certain  circum- 
stances stands  in  the  way  of  the  teleological  activity  of  the 
divine  reason.  Space  ^  (^^co/aa,  totto?)  is  that  wherein  the 
cosmic  process  comes  to  pass  (^eKelvo  ev  c5  yiyvcTai}  which 
takes  on  all  bodily  forms  (^<f)vai<i  to,  iravra  crfofiara  Be^ofxevT], 
also  the  rj  8e^a/xevi]  or  uTroSoj^r;  t/}?  7erecre&)>>),  and  is  in- 
determinate plasticity  (^afjiop<^ov  iK/xayelof).  Out  of  this 
Nothingness  ^  God  creates  the  world. 

The  identity  of  Platonic  "  matter"  of  the  TptTov  ycVos  (Tim., 
48  f.)  with  empty  space  is  most  certainly  proved  by  his  con- 
strnction  of  the  elements  out  of  triangles  (see  below),  in  which 
connection  the  philosopher  identified  the  niathematieal  bod}' 
immediately  witii  the  physical  body.  See  also  J.  P.  Wohlstein, 
3Iaterie  und  Weltseele  im j^lcitonischeii  )Si/ste/n  (Marburg,  1863). 

The  cosmos  must  also,  as  the  most  perfectly  perceivable 
thing,  possess  reason  and  soul.  The  first  task  of  the  de- 
miurge in  the  creation  of  a  world  is  the  creation  of  a  world- 
soul.3  As  the  life-principle  of  the  All,  the  world-soul  must 
unite  in  itself  its  Form-determining  capacity,  its  motion  and 
its  consciousness.  The  world-soul  is  the  mean  between  the 
unitary  (the  Idea)  and  the  divisible  (Space),  and  possesses 
the  opposite  qualities  of  sameness  (ravTov)  and  change 
(Odrepov).  It  holds  in  itself  all  numbers  and  dimensions. 
It  is  itself  the  mathematical  form  of  the  cosmos,  is  distrib- 
uted by  the  demiurge  into  harmonious  relations,  in  which 
distribution  an  inner  circle  of  changing  motions  and  an 
outer  circle  of  uniformity  (the  place  of  the  fixed  stars  and 
planets)  is  to  be  distinguished.  The  latter  is  again  divided 
proportionately  within  itself.  By  means  of  these  circles, 
each  moved  according  to  its  own  nature,  the  world-soul  is 
supposed  to  have  set  the  entire  cosmos  into  motion.  By 
means  of  this  motion,  permeating  the  whole  and  returning* 
to  itself,  the  world-soul  created  in  itself  and  in  individual 

i  fim  .  49  f.  2  Compare  the  claims  of  Democritus. 

8  Tim.,3^x.  •«  Ibid.,  37. 


MATERIALISM   AND   IDEALISM  221 

things  consciousness,  perception,  and  thouglit.  The  most 
perfect  kind  of  knowledge,  however,  is  the  circular  move- 
ment of  the  stai-s,  which  continually  returns  to  itself. 

The  particulars  of  tliis  extremely  imaginative  description  of 
the  Timceus  are  obscme,  and  have  been  subject  to  controversy 
(see  Zeller,  IF.  646  ft'.).  The  tendency  toward  the  number 
theor}'  of  the  Pythagoreans  as  well  as  toward  their  astronomy 
and  harmonies  is  unmistakable.  In  the  division  of  the  world- 
soul,  with  which  the  divisions  of  the  astronomical  world  are 
identical,  harmonic  proportion  and  iuiihmetical  means  play  the 
chief  role.  The  important  thought  is  that  with  tliis  general 
division  of  the  mass  and  motions  of  the  cosmos,  a  perpetual 
definiteness  of  form  (Trepas)  belongs  to  space,  which  is  a  com- 
panion principle  of  the  airupov  in  the  J-*hUebus  (§  35).  The 
mathematical  was  therefore  not  for  Plato  entirely  identical  with 
the  world-soul ;  but  it  was  in  the  most  intimate  connection  with 
it,  and  was  in  a  similar  intermediary  position  between  the  Ideas 
and  the  sense  world. 

The  characteristic  of  the  Platonic  theor}-  of  motion  is  that  it 
referred  all  motions  of  individual  objects  to  the  teleologicall}' 
determined  motion  of  the  whole.  It  thus  was  in  antipodal 
opposition  to  Atomism,  which  considered  motion  to  be  an  inde- 
pendent function  of  single  atoms.  It  is  remarkable  that  the 
Timceus  emphasizes  many  times  (Zeller,  II".  663,  3)  the  con- 
nection, nay  the  identity,  between  motions  and  intellections. 
The  "  right  idea  "  is  refei'red,  for  example,  to  the  Odrepov,  to 
irregular  motions  ;  rational  knowledge,  on  the  other  hand,  is  re- 
ferred to  TavTov,  the  uniform,  circular  motions  (Tin).,  37).^  It 
is  also  here  characteristic  that  all  particular  acts  are  referred  to 
the  universal  functioning  power  of  the  world-soul.  Thus  to  the 
world-soul  is  lacking  the  characteristic  of  personality. 

The  further  mathematical  formation  (Trepa?)  of  empty 
space  is  accomplished  in  the  individual  things,  which  have 
been  introduced  by  the  demiurge  into  the  harmonious  sys- 
tem of  the  world-soul ;  and,  firstly,  in  the  formation  of  the 
elements  {arox^ia)-  Besides  an  artificial  deduction  of  their 
fourfold  number,^  which  introduced  air  and  water  as  the  two 

^  If  in  these  theories  any  use  is  made  of  Democritus — which  I  re- 
gard by  no  means  improbable  —  his  teachings  have,  at  any  rate,  received 
an  independent  treatment. 

2   Tim.,  31  f. 


222  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

means  between  fire  and  earth,  Plato  ^  gave  a  stereometrical 
development  from  these  four  elements,  which  development, 
as  among  the  Pythagoreans,  presents  the  four  regular 
bodies  as  the  fundamental  forms  of  the  elements.  The 
tetrahedron  is  the  fundamental  form  of  fire;  the  octa- 
hedron, of  the  air;  the  icosahedron,  of  the  water;  the 
cube,  of  the  earth.  He  conceived,  however,  these  funda- 
mental bodies  as  constructed  out  of  planes,  and  indeed  of 
right-angle  triangles  which  are  sometimes  isosceles,  and 
sometimes  of  such  a  nature  that  the  catheti  stand  in  the 
ratio  of  one  to  two.^  With  this  construction  the  transfor- 
mation of  space  into  corporeal  matter  seemed  to  be  con- 
ceived. From  the  different  magnitudes  and  numbers  of 
these  indivisible  plane-triangles^  were  next  derived  with 
clever  fancifulness  the  physical  and  chemical  qualities  of 
individual  stuffs,  their  distribution  in  space,  their  mingling, 
and  the  continuous  motion  in  which  they  exist. 

Plato  also  believed  that  the  individual  elements  and  stuffs  are 
in  a  determined  part  of  space  according  to  the  predominating 
mass,  to  which  the  scattered  parts  then  strive  to  return.  It  is 
not  entire!}'  clear  how  he  introduced  the  relationships  of  weight 
into  this  thought.  At  any  rate,  he  had  been  sensible  of  the 
fact  that  the  direction  fiom  above  downward  cannot  be  re- 
garded as  absolute  ;  but  that  in  the  world-sphere  only  the  two 
directions,  to  the  centre  and  to  the  periphery,  exist. 

Plato's  astronomical  views  differ  from  those  of  the  Py- 
thagoreans essentially  in  his  acceptance  of  the  stationari- 
ness  of  the  earth.  According  to  his  theory,  the  earth  rested 
like  a  sphere  in  the  middle  of  a  spherical-shaped  world-all. 
Around  the  "  diamond "  axle  of  tlfis  world  with  daily 
revolution  from  east  to  west  swings  in  the  outermost  periph- 

1  Tim.,  53  f. 

2  The  square  is  constructed  out  of  the  former ;  the  equilateral  tri- 
angle, of  the  latter. 

^  Wh''h  accordingly  take  the  place  of  the  arofia  and  axr/fiura  of 
Democritus. 


MATERIALISM  AND  IDEALISM  223 

ery  the  heaven  of  the  fixed  stars,  in  which  the  single 
stars  are  conceived  as  "  visible  gods  "  ^  in  continuous  per- 
fect movement  upon  their  own  axes.  That  revolution  is 
communicated  to  the  seven  spheres,  viz.,  the  five  planets, 
the  sun  and  the  moon.  These  intersect  the  first  circle  (of 
the  fixed  stars)  in  the  direction  of  the  zodiac.  The  planets, 
sun  and  moon,  have,  however,  within  their  orbits  their  own 
reverse  movements  of  differing  velocity. 

The  last  proposition  as  an  astronomical  explanation  of  the 
apparent  irregularity  of  the  movements  of  the  planets,  remained 
foi-  a  long  time  authoritative.  The  methodical  principle 
lying  at  its  basis  has  been  strikingh'  formulated  b}-  Plato  or 
his  followers  in  the  question  :  tlvojv  vTroreOeiauiv  b/xaXwy  koI  reray- 
fiei'wv  KLvr](reu)v  hia<TUiOri  to.  Trcpi  ras  KLvrjcrcL's  t(dv  TrXavMfievojv  (paivo- 
fiera  (comp.  Simplicius  with  Aristotle,  De  ccelo,  119). 

The  theory  of  motion  in  the  Timceus  concludes  with  a 
detailed  account  of  the  psycho-physical  process  of  percep- 
tion.2  It  is  concerned  with  establishing  those  conditions 
of  motion  of  external  objects  and  of  the  body  which  call 
forth  the  motions  of  the  soul,  its  sensations  and  feelings.^ 
With  great  pains  in  this  connection  the  investigations  of 
the  physiologists,  just  as  the  theory  of  Protagoras,*  were 
adjusted  to  the  teleological  theory  of  motion.  Since  the 
subjective  moment  is,  moreover,  separated  from  the  objec- 
tive in  aiadT](Ti'i,  the  nature  philosophy  confirms  the  episte- 
mological  point  of  departure  which  the  Thecetetus  had  illu- 
minated. 

Finally,  by  way  of  appendix,  the  Timceus  gives  a  sketch 
of  a  theory  of  diseases  and  their  cures,  and  thus  yields  to 
the  encyclopaedic  demands  of  the  Platonic  school. 

1  Tim.,  40  a. 

2  Ibid.,  61  f.  For  details,  see  H.  Siebeck,  Gesch.  der  Psych. ^  I.,  1, 
201  f. 

^  In  this  respect  the  exposition  of  the  Timceus  is  supplemented  by 
that  of  the  Repulilic  and  the  Philehus,  while  it  develops  empirically  the 
theoretical  principles  of  the  Thecetetus. 

*  And  perhaps  much  also  which  belongs  to  Democritus. 


224  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHY  ' 

6.   ARISTOTLE. 

A  career  of  nearly  forty  years  in  teaching  gathered  a 
large  number  of  superior  men  around  Plato,  and  gave  to 
the  operations  ot  his  school,  in  its  treatment  of  ethico-his- 
torical  and  scientific  medical  studies,  that  comprehensive- 
ness of  which  indications  appeared  in  his  later  dialogues.* 
I'o  the  stately  number  of  men  that  belonged  to  the  school 
more  or  less  closely,  empirical  research  owed  much  valu- 
able enrichment  in  the  immediately  succeeding  time,  but 
philosophy  gained  at  their  hands  scarcely  anything  worthy 
of  mention.  Only  the  one  man,  Plato's  greatest  pupil, 
who  it  is  true  did  not  remain  in  the  ranks  of  the  Academy, 
but  founded  a  school  of  his  own,  was  called  to  bring  to 
completion  the  history  of  Greek  philosophy  with  his  won- 
derful system  of  thought.     This  man  was  Aristotle. 

The  liistory  of  the  Academy  is  generally  divided  into  three 
and  perhaps  five  [)eriods :  the  Older  Academy,  whicli  lasted 
about  a  century  after  the  death  of  Plato ;  the  Middle  Academ}', 
which  filled  out  the  second  century,  in  which  period  we  distin- 
guish two  successive  schools,  that  of  Archesilaus  and  that  of 
Carneades ;  the  New  Academy,  which  extended  to  neo-Platonism, 
and  in  which  the  dogmatic  movement  advocated  by  Philo  of 
Larissa  is  to  be  distinguished  from  a  later  eclecticism  of  Anti- 
ochus  of  Ascalon.  The  two  later  phases  belong  to  the  syncretic 
skepticism  of  Greek  philosoph}-.  For  general  comparisons,  see 
H.  Stein,  Sieben  Biicherzur  Gesch.  cl.  Platonismus  (3  vols.,  Got- 
tingen,  1862-75). 

38.  The  so-called  Older  Academy  stood  entirely  under 
the  influence  of  that  less  healthy  tendency  which  the 
Platonic  philosophy  in  later  time  had  shown  theoretically 
toward  the  Pythagorean  number  theory  and  practically 
toward  a  popular  and  religious  system  of  morals.  Speu- 
sippus  (d.  339),  the  nephew  of  Plato,  took  charge  of  the 

^  See  H.  Usener,  Ueber  d.  Organisnlion  d.  tvissenschafilichen  Arbeit 
im  Alterlhum  (Pi-euxs.  Jahrh.  53,  1  ff.)  ;  E.  Heitz,  D.  Philos.  schiden 
Athens  {Deutsche  Recue,  1884). 


ARISTOTLE  225 

school  after  Plato. 'and  Xcnocrates  of  Chalcedon  followed 
Speusippus,  To  the  same  generation  belonged  Heracleides 
of  Pontic  Heraclea  and  Philip  of  Opus.  The  astronomer 
Eudoxus  of  Cnidus  and  Archytas  of  Tarentum,  head  of  the 
Pythagoreans  of  that  time,  stood  in  a  loose  relation  to  the 
Platonic  scliool.  The  following  generation  of  the  school 
yielded  to  the  spirit  of  the  time,  and  turned  essentially  to 
ethical  investigations.  Polemo  of  Athens  was  then  head 
of  the  school,  from  314  to  270,  and  since  his  gifted  pupil, 
Grantor,  died  before  him,  Crates  of  Athens  became  his 
successor. 

An  exact  description  of  all  the  Academicians  of  this  time  is 
in  Zeller,  11^  836  f. ;  F.  Blicheler,  Acad,  philos.  index  Here ida- 
nensis  (Greifswald,  1869).  Our  knowledge  concerning  the  dif- 
ferent tendencies  within  the  Acadeni}'  arises  from  the  fact  that 
after  Plato's  death,  as  Speusippus  had  been  designated  b}-  Plato 
to  succeed  him  as  scholarcli,  Xenocrates  and  Aristotle  left 
Athens.  The  former  was  afterward  chosen  to  load  the  school ; 
the  latter  somewhat  later  founded  a  school  of  his  own. 

Judging  by  what  has  come  down  to  us  about  Speusippus,  he 
was  a  vague  and  diffuse  writer.  Diogenes  Laertius  (IV.  4  f.) 
gives  a  list  of  his  writings,  and  these  touch  upon  all  parts  of 
science.  The  most  appear  to  have  boon  iTrf/^vry/xaTa  in  reference 
to  his  career  as  a  teacher.  It  was  these  that  Aristotle  had  in 
mind  in  his  frequent  and  mostly  polemical  references  to  Speusip- 
l)us.  A  writing  is  particularly  mentioned  which  was  concerned 
with  the  PA'thagorean  number,  and  so  also  the  "Ojuoia,  which  is 
an  encyclopedic  collection  of  the  facts  of  natural  histor}'  arranged 
by  name.  Compare  Ravaisson,  Speus.  deprimls  rerum  prbici- 
piis  placita  (Paris,  1838) ;  M.  A.  Fischer,  De  Speus.  vita 
(Rastadt,  1845).  Xenocrates,  Plato's  companion  upon  his  third 
Sicilian  journey,  who  was  distinguished  for  his  strong,  serious 
personalit}-,  was  hardly  more  significant  as  a  i)hilosoi)lier  than 
Speusippus.  Diogenes  Laertius  (IV.  11  f.)  mentions  the  long  list 
of  his  writings.  R.  Heinze,  X.  (Leipzig,  1892),  gives  a  compre- 
hensive exposition  of  his  theory  with  the  fragments  appended. 
Heracleides  came  from  the  Pontic  Heraclea,  Avas  won  over  to 
the  Academy  by  Speusippus,  and  had  especialh'  as  an  astron- 
omer independent  importance.  Plato  passed  over  to  him,  dur- 
ing his  last  journey  to  Sicih',  the  leadersiiip  of  the  Academy. 
When  after  Speusippus'  death  Xenocrates  was  chosen  scholarch, 


^- 


226  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 


Heracleides  went  to  his  home  and  founded  there  his  own  school, 
which  he  administered  nntil  after  330.  He  was  a  many-sided, 
aesthetically  inclined,  and  productive  writer,  and  he  was  familiar 
not  only  with  the  Platonic  and  Pythagorean  teaching,  but  also 
with  Aristotelianism.  Compare  Diog.  Laert.,  V.  8G  f.  ;  Rouler, 
De  vita  et  scriptis  Her.  Pon.  (Loewen,  1828)  ;  E.  Deswert,  De 
Her.  Pon.  (Loewen,  1830)  ;  L.  Colin  (in  Comment,  phil.  in  hon. 
Reifferscheid.,  Breslau,  1884).  Philip  of  Opus  probably  edited 
the  Laws  of  Plato,  and  was  besides  the  author  of  the  Epinomis. 
The  renowned  astronomer  P^udoxus  (406-353)  joined  the  Acad- 
em}^  for  some  time  according  to  the  many  different  testimonies  of 
the  ancients  (Zeller,  IP.  845  f.),  and  he  developed  its  astronomical 
theories.  But  on  other  questions,  esj)ecially  ethical  ones,  he 
deviated  widely  from  the  Academy.  A.  Bockh,  IJeber  die 
Vierjahrigen  }^onnenJcreise  der  Alten,  besonders  den  eudoxi- 
schen  (Berlin,  1863). 

Among  the  later  Pythagoreans,  Archytas  was  pre-eminent. 
In  the  first  half  of  the  fourth  century  he  played  a  great  role  in 
his  native  city,  Tarentum,  as  scholar,  statesman,  and  general. 
Whatever  has  been  transmitted  with  any  assurance  concerning 
him  and  others,  shows  us  that  just  as  the  Pythagoreans  influ- 
enced Plato  in  various  ways,  so  also  Plato  on  his  side  influenced 
to  such  a  degree  the  Pythagoreans,  that  the  theory  of  numbers 
in  its  last  phase  fused  perfectly  with  the  theory  of  Ideas,  which 
was  nominall}'  its  rival.  The  significance  of  Archytas  lay  in  the 
realm  of  mechanics  and  astronomy.  His  philosophy  agreed 
throughout  with  that  of  the  Older  Academ}-.  On  account  of 
tiie  close  personal  relationship  in  which  he  stood  to  Plato,  the 
genuineness  of  those  fragments  ma}'  well  be  possible  in  which  he 
gave  a  Platonic  turn  to  Pythagorcanism.  These  fragments  are 
collected  by  Conr.  Orelli  (Leipzig,  1827)  ;  see  MuUach,  II.  16  f. ; 
G.  Hartenstein,  De  Arch.  Tar.  frag,  p/iilos.  (Leipzig,  1833); 
Tatersen  (Zeitsc/ir.  f.  Alter t inns wissenscha ft,  1836)  ;  O.  Gruppe, 
Hie  Frag,  des  Arch.  (Berlin,  1840)  ;  Fr.  Beckmann,  He 
Pythagoreorum  reliquiis  (Berlin,  1844);  Zeller,  V^.  103  f . ; 
Eggers,  He  Arch.  Tar.  etc.  (Paris,  1833). 

Polenu)  and  Crates  owe  the  leadership  of  the  Academy  more 
to  their  Athenian  birth  and  their  own  moral  worthiness  than  to 
their  philosophical  significance.  Grantor  originated  in  Soli  in 
Cilicia,  and  was  known  particularly  through  his  writing,  Trepi 
TrevOov?.  H.  E.  Meier,  Ueber  die  Schrift^  irefu  irivOov;  (Halle, 
1840)  ;  F.  Kayser,  He  Crantore  Academico  (Heidelberg,  1841). 

The  Older  Academy  took  in  general  the  Laws  of  Plato 
as  its  point  of  view.     It  pushed  the  theory  of  Ideas  aside 


ARISTOTLE  227 

to  make  way  for  the  number  theory.  Thus  Speusippus  on 
his  side  ascribed  to  numbers  a  reality  that  is  supersensible 
and  separated  from  the  objects  of  sense,  —  the  same  which 
Plato  had  given  to  the  Ideas.  Similarly  Philip  of  Opus  in 
the  Epinomis  declared  that  the  highest  knowledge  upon 
which  the  state  in  the  Laws  must  be  built  is  mathemat- 
ics and  astronomy.  For  these  sciences  teach  men  eternal 
proportions,  according  to  which  God  has  ordered  the  world 
and  by  which  he  is  leading  it  to  a  true  piety.  Besides  this 
mathematical  theology  Speusippus,  accommodating  himself 
to  the  spirit  of  his  school,  recognized  to  a  greater  degree 
than  Plato  the  worth  of  empirical  science.  He  dilated 
upon  an  aLadrjati;  iTnarrjfiovcKr],  which  participates  in  con- 
ceptual truth. ^  But  he  had  no  explanatory  theory  of  this, 
rather  only  a  collection  of  facts  arranged  logically  as  he  pre- 
sented them  in  his  compendium  (ofioia  ovofxara)  which  was 
manifestly  intended  for  the  use  of  the  school.  Xenocrates 
divided  philosophy  into  dialectics,  ethics  and  physics  as  a 
basis  for  instruction .^  He  held  firmly  to  the  theory  of 
Ideas,  but  recognized  that  mathematical  determinations  had, 
in  contrast  to  the  sense  world,  an  independent  reality  similar 
to  that  of  the  Ideas.  He  distinguished,  accordingly,  three  ^ 
realms  of  that  which  can  be  known :  the  supersensible,  the 
mathematically  determined  forms  of  the  world-all,  and  the 
sense  objects.  To  these  objects  there  corresponds,  first,  the 
eTncTTij/nr),  including  dialectics  and  pure  mathematics ; 
secondly,  the  Sofa,  which  as  an  astronomical  theory  is  given 
both  an  empirical  and  a  mathematical  basis ;  thirdly,  the 
acadr](ri<;,  which  is  not  false,  but  exposed  to  all  sorts  of 
delusions. 

jrim^J>Tojv.r|jpfg  goorp  t^  ^^nyp  fhnno-bt  flmt,  tbn  chief 
task  of  theirmetaphvsics  was  the  teleolo<ric«1  nnnstmctir>n 
of  a  graded  series  of   mediatory  principles  between   the 

1  Sext.  Emp.,  VII.  145.  2  7^;^.^  le.  8  j^d.,  147. 


228  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHY 

\supersensible  and  the  sensible.  In  the  solution  of  this 
task,  however,  two  opposing  tendencies  made  themselves 
felt,  which  are  connected  with  the  names  of  Speusippus 
and  Xenocrates.  If  the  former  abandoned  tlie  theory  of 
Ideas,  it  was  essentially  because  he  could  regard  the  Per- 
fect and  the  Good,^  not  as  the  aWia  of  the  more  Imper- 
fect, the  Sensible,  but  rather  as  its  highest  teleological 
result.  He  therefore  postulated  numbers  as  the  apxHi 
and  unity  and  plurality  as  their  elements  and  next  in  order 
geometrical  magnitudes  and  stereometrical  forms,  to  whose 
fourfold  number  he  added  the  Pythagorean  ether.^  Be- 
sides this,  he  found  the  principle  of  motion  in  the  world- 
soul  {voi)^)^  which  lie  seems  to  have  identified  with  the 
central  fire  of  the  Pythagoreans.  The  goal  of  motion  is 
the  Good,  which  as  the  most  perfect  belongs  at  the  end. 
Xenocrates  contrasted  with  this  evolution  theory  the  theory 
of  emanation,  in  that  he  derived  numbers  and  Ideas  from 
unity  and  indeterminate  duality  (dopiaTO'i  Sua*?).  Numbers 
are  to  him  identical  with  the  Ideas,  according  to  the 
schema  of  Plato's  aypairra  Boyfiara.  He  also  further 
defined  the  soul  as  self-moving  number.^  Thus  there  is 
a  descent  from  the  unity  of  the  Good  down  to  the  Sensi- 
ble ;  and  between  the  world-soul  and  corporeal  things 
exists  a  completely  graduated  kingdom  of  good  and  bad 
daemons.  In  this  very  contrast  Plato's  pupils  showed 
that  they  were  engaged  upon  the  unsolved  problems  of 
Plato's  later  metaphysics,  in  that  they  desired  to  develop 
further  his  teaching  on  its  religious  side.  The  opposition 
between  alrla  and  auvaiTtov,  between  Idea  and  space, 
between  the  perfect  and  the  imperfect,  grew  entirely  to* 
a  religious  antithesis  of  the  Good  and  the  Bad.  They  — 
especially  Xenocrates  —  surrendered  the  monistic  motive 

1  Arist.,  Met.,  XT.  7,  1072  b.  31.  2  See  §  24. 

3  Plato.  Procr.  an.,  I.  5  (K'12);  see  Arist.,  Anal,  past.,  II*.  91  a,  38. 

*  See  R.  Heinze.  Xenocr..  p.  15  f. 


ARISTOTLE  229 


ions 
in  the 


in  the  teaching  of  their  master  to  fantastic  speculati 
which  turned  particularly  upon  the  cause  of  evil  ^  in 
vrorld. 

More  interesting  than  the  fantastic  Pythagorizing  by  the 
leaders  of  the  school  is,  on  the  other  hand,  the  high  development 
of  mathematics  which  arose  in  the  Pythagorean-Platonic  circles 
at  this  time,  even  to  tlie  solving  of  the  more  difficult  problems. 
Tliere  was  the  diorism  of  Xeocleides,  the  theorv  of  the  propor- 
tion in  Archytas  and  Eudoxus,  the  golden  section,  the  spiral 
line,  the  doubling  of  the  cube  by  the  application  of  parabolas  and 
hyperbolas  (see  Cantor,  Gesch.  cler  Math.,  I.  202  f.).  Then 
there  was_  the  astronomy  taught  b}-  Hicetas,  Ecphantus,  and 
Heracleides,  concerned  with  the  stationariness  of  the  fixed  heaven 
of  stars  and  the  turning  of  the  axis  of  the  earth.  Herakleides 
thought  of  Mercurv  and  Venus  as  satellites  of  the  sun.  See  Ideler, 
Abhandl.  d.  Berl  Akad.  d.  Wiss.,  1828  and  1830.  On  the 
other  hand,  however,  there  is  the  fact  that  those  men,  who  were 
only  indirectly  related  to  the  school,  developed  the  relationship 
of  certain  motives  of  Platonism  with  other  teachings.  Thus 
Heracleitles  still  held  to  the  Platonic  construction  of  the  ele- 
ments when  he  advocated  the  synthesis  that  P^cphantes  sought 
between  Atomism  and  Pythagoreanism  (§  25).  Eudoxus  like- 
wise conceived  the  iScac  entirely  in  the  sense  of  the  honioiomerii 
of  Anaxagoras." 

With  such  a  mathematical  corruption  of  the  theorv  of 
Ideas  there  was  conjoined  the  lapse  into  popular  moraliz- 
ing on  the  part  of  the  older  Academicians.  Onlv  in  some 
measure,  however,  did  the  energy  of  their  religious  spirit 
compensate  for  this  deterioration.  As  concerns  morals, 
the  school  can  hardly  be  made  answerable  for  the  hedo- 
nism of  Eudoxus,^  especially  since  Heracleides  appears  ^  tr 
have  openly  antagonized  it.  The  theory  of  goods,  howevev, 
found  in  the  Philcbus^  was  cultivated  much  more  in  an  ac- 
commodative sense  :  for  Speusippus  sought  hajypiness  in  the 

^  See  Arist..  especially  Met.,  XIII.  4,  1091  b,  22. 

2  Ibid..  I.  9.  991  a,  16,  with  the  commentary  of  Alexander  Aphr. 
(.'•^chol.  in  Arist.,  572  b,  15). 

3  Arist.  Eth.  Xic,  I.  12,  1101  b,  27. 

*   .\then.,  XII.  512  a.  8  Compare  above,  §  36. 


^ 


230  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 


perfect  development  of  natural  gifts  ;  ^  Xenocrates,  though 
recognizing  fully  the  value  of  virtue,  nevertheless  recog- 
nized external  goods  as  also  necessary  to  the  attainment  of 
the  highest  good.  He  set  for  the  majority  of  mankind  ^  the 
practical  (f)p6v7]o-i<;  in  place  of  the  eTria-Tijfir)  wliich  falls  to 
the  lot  of  the  few,  and  finally,  in  opposition  to  the  Stoics, 
described  ^  virtue,  health,  pleasure,  and  wealth  as  the  various 
goods,  evaluating  them  in  that  order. 

It  is  especially  noteworthy  that  according  to  all  that  we 
know  the  social  ethical  character  and  the  political  tendency 
of  the  ]*latonic  morals  were  not  further  fostered  among 
his  pupils.  Rather  in  the  Academy  the  quest  after  correct 
rules  of  living  for  the  individual  came  more  and  more  into 
the  foreground.  Nature  philosophy  still  engaged  the  at- 
tention of  theorists,  as  can  be  seen  in  Grantor's  commen- 
tary to  the  Timceas.  Pjthical  researches,  however,  took  on 
the  individualistic  aspect  of  the  period.  Polcmo  taught 
that  virtue,  which  is  the  essential  condition  of  happiness, 
completely  gives  satisfactory  happiness  {aurapKr)  7rp6<i 
evBaifioviav)  only  in  connection  with  the  goods  of  the  body 
and  life.  Virtue  cannot  be  practised  in  scientific  research, 
but  in  action.*  Scarcely  a  step  was  necessary  from  such 
views  to  those  of  the  Stoa. 

89.  Beneath  these  different  efforts  of  the  Older  Academy 
would  obviously  lie  a  fundamental  tendency  to  adjusjUPlato's 
idealism  to  the  practical  interests  of  Greek  society  and_  of 
the  empirical  sciences.  But  dependence  upon  Pythagorean- 
ism  on  the  one  hand  and  on  the  other  a  general  lack  of 
philosophical  originality  always  stunted  all  these  under- 
takings. In  fim  iTie^'i  ^''Tip  the  problem  was  solved  by 
him  who  had  brought  with  him  into  the  Platonic  theory 

1  Clemens,  Strom. ,11.  21  (500).  Conii)are  concerning  Polemo,  Cicero, 
Acad.,  II.  42,  131. 

2  Clemens,  Strom.,  11.  5  (441). 

8  Sext.  Emp.  Adv.  math.,  XI.  51  f.  *  Diog.  Laert.,  IV.  18. 


ARISTOTLE  231 

an  inborn  predilection  for  medini'no  rtr,A  ihc  sfim^f^g  of 
nature.  This  perfecter  of  Greek  pliilnsnpliy  wns  AHstntlp. 
(384-322). 

Fr.  Biese,  Die  Philos.  des  Aristoteles  (2  vols.,  Berlin,  1835- 
42)  ;  A.  Rosmini-Scrbali,  Aristote  esposto  ed esaminato  (Torino, 
1858) ;  G.  H.  Lewes,  Aristotle,  A  Chapter  from,  the  History  of 
the  Science  (Lond.  1864;  German,  Leipzig,  1865)  ;  G.  Grote, 
Aristotle  (incomplete,  but  published  by  Bain  and  Robertson,  2 
vols.,  London,  1872)  ;  Yj.  Wallace,  Outlines  of  the  Philosophy 
of  Aristotle  (Oxford,  1883). 

The  home  of  Aristotle  was  Stagira,^  a  city  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Athos,  on  that  Tliracian  peninsula  which 
had  been  colonized  ^  chiefly  from  Chalcis.  He  came  from 
an  old  family  of  ])hysicians.  His  father,  Nicomachus,  was 
body-physician  and  a  close  personal  friend  of  the  king, 
Arayntas,  of  Macedon.  Detailed  reports  about  the  youth 
and  education  of  the  philosoj)her  arc  wanting.  His  edu- 
cation was  in  the  charge  of  his  guardian,  Proxonus  of 
Atarneus,  after  the  death  of  both  his  parents.  He  was 
only  eighteen  yeui's  old  when  ho  entered  the  Academy  in 
367,  aiid  his^  connection  with  it  was  uninterrupted  until 
Plato's  death,  so  far  as  we  know.  He  won  a  prominent 
place  in  it  very  quickly,  grew  early  from  the  position  of  a 
pupil  to  that  of  a  teacher  in  the  band,  was  the  champion 
literary  spirit  of  the  school  through  his  brilliant  writings 
which  at  once  made  him  famous,  and  in  public  lectures 
concerning  the  art  of  speaking,  antagonized  Isocrates,  to 
whose  anti-scientific  rhetoric  the  Platonic  school  had  never 
been  reconciled.^ 

Concerning  the  life  of  Aristotle,  see  J.  C.  Buhle,  Vita  Arist. 
per  annos  diyesta,  in  the  Bipontine  e(htion  of  the  works,  1. 80  f. ; 

1  Also  Stageiros. 

'^  Aristotle  disposed  in  his  will  (Diog.  Laert.,  V.  14)  of  a  piece  of  prop- 
erty in  Chalcis,  which  he  perhaps  inherited  from  his  mother,  Pliajstias. 

^  In  spite  of  the  advances  Plato  showed  to  him  in  the  Phcedrus  as 
always  preferable  to  Lysias. 


232  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

A.  Stahr,  Aristotelian  Part  I.,  on  the  life  of  Aristotle  (Halle, 
1830).  Of  the  ancient  biographies  of  the  philosoplier,  the  more 
valuable,  those  of  tlie  older  Peripatetics,  are  lost,  and  only  a 
few  of  the  later  remain. 

It  is  uncertain  whether  Aristotle  grew  up  in  Stagira  or  in 
Pella,  the  residence  of  the  Macedonian  kings.  It  is  as  little 
determinable  when  his  father  died,  and  where  he  himself  lived 
under  the  tutelage  of  Proxenus,  —  in  Stagira  or  Atarneus.^ 
We  are  also  entirely  restricted  to  the  following  suppositions  as 
to  his  educational  training  :  it  is  scarcely  to  be  doubted  that, 
according  to  the  family-  tradition,  as  the  son  of  the  Macedonian 
court  physician,  he  was  destined  by  his  family  for  medicine  and 
received  a  training  for  it ;  in  tlie  intimate  relationship  existing 
between  scientific  medicine,  in  which  Hippocrates  was  the 
leading  spirit,  and  the  Democritan  studies  of  nature,  it  may  be 
supposed  that  these  were  the  first  elements  in  the  earl}'  educa- 
tion of  our  philosopher.  At  any  rate,  he  grew  up  in  this  atmos- 
phere of  the  science  of  medicine  in  northern  Greece,  and  he 
owed  to  it  his  respect  for  the  results  of  experience,  his  keen 
perception  of  fact,  and  his  carefulness  as  to  details  in  investi- 
gation, which  contrast  him  with  the  Attic  philosophers.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  must  be  said  that  one  must  not  magnify  too 
much  the  reach  of  knowledge  that  his  seventeen  3ears  in  the 
Academy  brought  to  him.  It  was  certainh'  later  that  Aristotle 
got  his  immense  scientific  erudition,  —  in  part,  to  be  sure,  during 
his  attachment  to  the  Academy,  but  chiefly  during  his  stay  in 
Atarneus,  Mitylene,  and  Stagira  before  he  began  to  teach.  It 
is  possible  that  Aristotle  remained  true  to  this  scientific  incli- 
nation while  he  was  in  the  Academy,  and  tliat  he  was  in  part  re- 
sponsible for  gradually  causing  more  attention  to  be  paid  to  those 
matters  (§  37).  At  first,  however,  the  spirit  of  the  Platonic 
school  must  have  turned  him  in  other  directions,  and  what  we 
know  of  his  activity  in  the  twenty  years  of  his  stud}',  of  the 
form  and  contents  of  his  writings  of  that  time,  the  rhetoilcal 
lectures,  etc. ,  do  not  allow  us  to  suppose  that  such  inclinations 
predominated  in  him. 

The  malicious  school  gossip  which  was  circulated  in  later 
time  about  the  relations  between  Aristotle  and  his  great  teacher 
should  be  passed  over  with  a  deserved  silence.  See  particulars 
in  Zeller,  HI^.  8  f.  If  one  holds  himself  to  that  which  is  safely 
testified  to,  especially  in  the  writings  of  Aristotle,  one  finds  a 
simple  human  relationship.     The  pupil  looked  upon  his  teacher 

^  The  later  references  to  Atarneus  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that 
Hermeias  wiis  for  a  long  time  an  auditor  of  Plato. 


ARISTOTLE  233 

with  great  reverence.^  But  the  more  mature  he  became,  the 
more  independent!}'  did  he  pass  judgment  upon  Phato's  philo- 
sophical positions.  He  recognized  with  accurate  glance  their  es- 
sential defects,  and  he  did  not  conceal  his  doubts,  if  his  aged 
master  directed  his  theory  upon  unfortunate  lines.  Never- 
theless he  remained  a  member  of  the  fraternit}'  with  his  own 
independent  circle  of  activit}',  and  he  separated  from  the  school 
only  at  the  moment  when  after  his  master's  death  perversity 
was  exalted  to  principle  in  the  choice  of  an  insignificant  head 
of  the  school.  Nothing  makes  against  the  conclusion  that  in 
these  difficult  relations  Aristotle  avoided  both  extremes,  with 
that  worth}'  tact  that  always  characterized  his  actions. 

See  below  concerning  the  Avritings  of  this  period.  That  his 
relation  to  Isocrates  was  somewhat  strained,  we  see  on  the  one 
hand  from  Cicero's  reports  {De  orut.^  III.  35,  141  ;  Oral.,  19, 
62;  compare  Quint.,  III.  114),  and  on  the  other  from  the 
shameful  pamphlet  which  a  pupil  of  the  orator  published  against 
the  philosopher.  Aristotle  showed  here  also  his  noble  self- 
control,  when  he  later  in  tiie  Rhetoric  did  not  hesitate  to  give 
examples  from  Isocrates. 

After  Plato's  death  Aristotle  in  company  with  Xenoc- 
rates  betook  himself  to  Hcrmeias,  the  ruler  of  Atarneus  and 
Assus,  and  a  true  friend  to  xiristotle.  Aristotle  married 
his  relative,  Pythias,  later  after  the  tyrant  had  met  an  un- 
happy end,  the  victim  of  Persian  treachery.  Previously 
he  seems  to  have  migrated  for  a  time  to  Mytilene,  and 
perhaps  also  for  a  short  time  to  Athens.^  In  343  he 
obeyed  the  summons  of  Philip  of  Macedon  to  undertake 
the  e(Iucation  of  the  then  thirteen-year-old  Alexander. 
Although  we  are  entirely  without  information  concerning 
what  kind  of  education  this  was,  yet  the  entire  later  life 
of  Alexander  bore  the  best  witness  of  its  effect.  Also 
later  the  philosopher  remained  in  the  best  of  relations  with 
his  great  pupil,  although  the  treatment  of  the  nephew  of 
Aristotle,  Callisthenes,  by  the  king  may  have  brought  a 
temporary  estrangement. 

1  Compare  the  simple  beautiful  verses  of  Aristotle  from  the  elegy 
toEudemus:  Ohjmpioil.  in  Gorg.,  160. 

2  See  Th.  Bergk,  Rhein.  Mus.,  XXXVII.  359  f. 


234  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PniLOSOPHY 

The  regular  instruction  of  the  young  prince  ceased, 
at  all  events,  when  he  was  entrusted  by  his  father,  after 
340,  with  administrative  and  military  duties.  The  relation 
of  the  philosopher  was  therefore  more  independent  of  the 
Macedonian  court,  and  the  next  years  he  was  engaged  for 
the  most  part  in  scientific  work  in  his  native  city,  in  inti- 
inate  companionship  witli  his  somewhat  younger  friend, 
Theophrastus,  who  became  a  real  support  to  him  in  the 
following  time.  For  when  Alexander  entered  upon  his 
campaign  in  Asia  and  Aristotle  saw  himself  entirely  free 
of  immediate  further  obligation  to  him,  he  went  with  his 
friend  to  Athens  and  founded  his  own  school  there.  This 
school,  in  the  universality  of  its  scientific  interest,  in  the 
orderliness  of  its  methods  of  study,  and  in  its  systematic 
arrangements  for  joint  inquiry,  very  soon  rose  above  the 
Academy,  and  became  the  pattern  of  all  the  later  societies 
of  scholars  of  antiquity.  Its  place  was  the  Lyceum,  a 
gymnasium  consecrated  to  the  Lycian  Apollo,  from  whose 
shady  walks  ^  the  school  got  the  name  of  Peripatetic. 

Twelve  years  (335-323)  Aristotle  administered  this 
school  in  ceaseless  activity.  When,  however,  after  the 
death  of  Alexander,  the  Athenians  began  to  rise  up  against 
the  Macedonian  rule  in  Greece,  the  position  of  the  philoso- 
pher became  dangerous,  standing  as  he  did  in  such  close 
connections  with  the  royal  house.  He  betook  himself  to 
Chalcis,  and  in  the  following  year  a  disease  of  the  stomach 
cut  short  his  active  and  honorable  career. 

Concerning  Hermeias'^  of  Atarneus,  see  A.  Bockh,  Kleine 
Schrift,  VI.  185  ff. ;  P.  C.  Engelbrecht,  Ueber  die  Beziehungeu  zn 
yl^ea;ander  (Eisleben,  1845)  ;  Rob.  Geier  (Halle,  1848  and  1856) ; 
M.  Carriere  (Westermatm,  Monatsh.,  1865).    Aristotle  owed  to 

^  Probably  from  the  custom  of  lecturing  part  of  the  time  ambulando. 
See  Zeller,  flP.  29  f. 

2  In  memory  of  this  friend,  Aristotle  dedicated  his  hymn  upon  virtue  : 
Diog.  Laert.,  V.  7, 


ARISTOTLE  235 

/lis  relations  with  different  courts  and  to  his  own  eas}^  cireiini- 
stances  the  abundance  of  the  scientific  expedients  which  among 
other  things  made  his  extensive  collections  possible.  The 
reports  of  the  ancients  concerning  the  greatness  of  the  sums 
placed  at  his  disposal  are  obviously  somewhat  overestimated. 
One  cannot  doubt,  on  the  whole,  from  his  court  relationships, 
the  support  which  he  found  for  his  work. 

Concerning  the  relations  of  the  philosopher  and  his  great 
pupil,  gossip  has  circulated  widely,  just  because  there  has  been 
wanting  any  trustworthy  information  about  it.  If  the  friend- 
siiip  in  later  years  was  actuall}'  somewhat  cooler  (as  Plutarch 
also  reports,  Alexander,  8),  3-et  it  was  entire  foolishness  and  slan- 
der on  the  part  of  later  opponents  to  charge  Aristotle  with  a  share 
in  the  supposed  poisoning  of  the  king  (see  Zeller,  IIP.  36  f.). 
The  favorable  relations  of  the  philosopher  to  the  Macedonian 
court  were  most  clearly  confirmed  by  the  events  after  the  death 
of  the  king.  Doubtful  as  the  single  statements  here  again  ma}" 
be,  it  is  certain  that  the  philosopher  left  his  circle  of  activity  at 
Athens  in  order  to  avoid  a  political  danger.  How  great  it  had 
become  can  no  longer  be  determined  ;  for  the  reports  concern- 
ing the  charges  of  impiet^',^  concerning  his  defence  and  the 
excuse  for  his  escape  in  the  expression  that  he  wished  to  spare 
the  Athenians  a  second  crime  against  philosoph}-,  —  all  this 
smacks,  especially  in  its  details,"  stronglv  of  an  attempt  to  make 
Aristotle's  end  as  iiearl}'  as  possible  like  that  of  Socrates. 

To  every  depreciation  that  the  character  of  Aristotle  has 
suffered,  his  system  of  science  stands  as  the  best  contradic- 
tion. It  is  a  creation  of  such  magnificent  proportions  and 
of  snch  construction  that  it  can  have  been  only  the  work 
of  a  life  filled  with  the  pure  love  of  truth,  and  even  then  it  is 
almost  beyond  our  comprehension.  For  the  Aristotelian 
philosophy  includes  the  entire  range  of  knowledge  of  that 
time  in  such  a  way  that  it  comprehends  all  the  lines  of  ear^ 
lier  development  at  the  same  time  that  it  considerably  elab- 
orates thejnost^ofjthesejines.  It  turns  upon  all  territories 
an  equal    interest  and  an  equal  intellectual  appreciation. 

1  See  E.  Hcitz  in  O.  Muller,  Lit.  Gescli.,  IP.  253  f. 

2  Compare  H  Zeller  in  Hermes,  1876  ;  H.  Usener,  Die  Organisation 
der  u-issenschafilichen  Arbeit  bei  den  Alten  :  Preuss.  Jahrb.,  LIII.  If. 
(1884). 


236  HISTOKY   OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Aristotle  met  the  demands  of  the  history  of  Kcicncc  more 
completely  than  Plato.  Even  in  his  Etliies  the  purely  theo- 
retic and  not  the  practical  interest  is  fundamental.  lie  is  the 
scientific  spirit  /car'  e^oxw-  ^^^  lii'^^  the  process  of  the  in- 
dependence of  the  spirit  of  learning  completes  itself.  He 
is,  in  the  wonderful  many-sidedness  of  his  activity,  the  em- 
bodiment of  Greek  science,  and  he  has  for  that  reason 
remained  "the  philosopher"  for  two  thousand  years. 

Furthermore  he  became  "  the  philosopher,"  not  as  an  isolated 
thinker,  but  as  the  head  of  his  school.  The  most  striking  char- 
acteristic of  his  intellectual  personality  is  the  administrative 
abilit}'  with  which  he  divided  his  material,  separated  and  formu- 
lated his  problems,  ordered  and  co-ordinated  the  entire  scientific  / 
work.  This  methodizing  of  scientific  activity  is  his  greatest  / 
performance.  To  this  end  the  beginnings  already  made  in  the 
earlier  schools,  especially  in  that  of  Democritns,  might  well  have 
been  of  service.  But  the  universal  sketch  of  a  sjstem  of  science 
in  the  exact  statement  of  methods  such  as  Aristotle  gave,  first 
brings  these  earlier  attempts  to  their  complete  fruition.  His 
conduct  of  the  Lyceum  can  be  looked  upon  not  only  as  a  care- 
fulh'  arranged  and  methodically  progressive  instruction,  but  also, 
above  all,  it  must  especially  be  viewed  as  an  impulsion  to  inde- 
pendent scientific  research  and  organized  work.^ 

The  great  number  of  facts  and  their  orderly  arrangement  are 
only  to  be  explained  throngh  the  coml>ined  efforts  of  nuvny  forctes 
guided  and  schooled  I)}'  a  common  principle.  All  this  appeared 
and  was  developed  in  the  Aristotelian  writings.  The  activity 
of  the  school,  which  is  itself  a  work  of  the  master,  forms  an  in- 
tegral constituent  of  his  great  life-work  and  his  works. 

The  collections  of  writings  transmitted  under  the  name 
of  Aristotle  do  not  give  even  an  approximately  comj)letc 
picture  of  the  immense  literary  activity  of  the  man.  They 
apparently  include,  however,  with  relatively  few  exceptions, 
just  that  part  of  his  work  upon  which  his  philosophical  \ 
significance  rests,  viz.,  his  scientific  writings. 

1  Compare  E.  Zeller  in  Hermes,  1876;  H.  Usener,  7)/e  Orrjanisation 
der  wissensdiafllicJien  Arbeit  bei  den  Allen:  Preuss.  Jahrb.,  LIII.  IL 
(1884). 


ARISTOTLE  237 

The  preserved  remainder  of  the  Aristotelian  writings  fonns 
still  a  stately  pile,  even  after  the  genuine  have  been  separated 
from  the  doubtful  and  spurious.  But  in  extent  it  is  manifestly 
only  a  smaller  part  of  that  which  came  forth  from  the  literary 
workshop  of  the  philosopher.  From  the  two  lists  of  his  writings 
that  antiquity  has  preserved  (published  in  the  Berlin  edition,  V. 
1463  f.)  the  one  of  Diogenes  Laertius  (V.  22  f.),  which  was 
changed  by  the  anonymous  Megarian,  probably  by  Hesychius, 
is  supposably  based  upon  a  report  of  the  Peripatetic  Hermippus 
(about  200  B.  c),  concerning  the  Aristotelian  collection  in  the 
Alexandrian  library.  The  other  list  originated  with  the  Peripa- 
tetic, Ptolemieus,  in  the  second  century  a.  u.,  and  was  preserved 
partly  by  Arabic  writers  (Zeller,  IIP.  54). 

The  traditional  collection  appears  essentially  to  have  come 
from  the  published  Aristotelian  writings,  which  somewhere  in 
the  middle  of  the  first  century  u.  c.  were  prepared  by  Andro- 
nicus  of  Rhodes  with  the  co-operation  of  the  grammarian 
Tyrannion.  In  modern  time  it  was  printed  first  in  a  Latin 
translation  in  1489,  together  with  the  commentaries  of  Averroi'S, 
and  in  a  Greek  translation  in  Venice  in  1495  ff.  Of  the  later 
editions  ma}'  be  mentioned  the  Bi|)ontine,  b}-  Biehle  (5  vols., 
incomplete,  Biponti  et  Argodorati,  1791  f.)  ;  that  of  the  Berlin 
Acadenn'  (text  recension  by  Imm.  Becker,  annotations  by 
Brandis,  fragments  l)y  V.  Rose,  index  by  Bonitz  5  vols.,  Berlin, 
1831-70)  ;  the  Didot  edition  by  Dul)ner,  Biissemaker,  and 
Heitz  (5  vols.,  Paris,  1848-74)  ;  stereotype  edition  of  Tauchnitz 
(Leipzig,  1843).  Concerning  a  special  edition  of  his  single 
works,  see  Ueberweg,  I''.  186  f.  German  translations  are  in 
(liflTerent  collections,  particularly  in  J.  v.  Kirchmann's  Philos. 
Bihliothek. 

These  i)reserved  writings  offer  problems  for  solution  which 
differ  from  those  in  the  Platonic  writings,  but  are  no  less  diflB- 
cult.  Indeed,  there  is  but  little  agreement  among  the  authori- 
ties as  to  the  questions  involved.  The  discussion  has  been 
onl}'  a  little  concerned  with  the  chronology  of  single  works  ;  it 
has  had  more  concern  with  the  ver}'  doubtful  geiniineness  of 
many  of  them  ;  it  has  found  its  greatest  concern  with  the  liter- 
ary character,  the  origin  and  purpose  of  the  single  writings  and 
of  the  collection. 

J.  G.  Biihle,  De  lihrorum  Aristotelis  distrihxitione  in  exoteri- 
cos  et  ocronmatlcos  (Bipontine  ed.,  I.  105  f.) ;  Titze,  JJe  Arist. 
operum  serie  et  distinctione  (Leipzig,  1826)  ;  Ch.  Brandis 
{Rhein.  3Ii/s.,  1827)  ;  A.  Stahr,  Aristotelia.  Part  II.,  Die 
tSchicksale  der  Arist.  Schriften  (Leipzig,  1832);  L.  Spengel, 
Abhandl.  der  hair,  Akad.  der  Wiss.^  1837  f. ;  V.  Rose,  De  Arist. 


238  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

librorum  ordine  et  auctoritate  (Berlin,  1854)  ;  H.  Bonitz,  Arist. 
Studien  (Vienna,  1862  f.)  ;  Jae.  Bernays,  Die  Dialoge  des 
Arist.  (Berlin,  18G3)  ;  E.  Heitz,  Die  verlorenen  Sckriften  des 
Arist.  (Leipzig,  1865) ;  the  same  in  O.  Miiller's  Litteratur 
Geschich.,  II-.  256  f. ;  F.  Vahlen,  Arist.  Aufsdtze  (Vienna, 
1870  f.)  ;  R.  Slmte  (Oxford,  1888). 

The  writings  ^  of  Aristotle  are  divided  with  reference  to 
their  literary  character  into  three  classes  :  — 

(1)  The  Works  published  by  Aristotle  himself,  and  iu' 
tended  for  a  wider  circle  of  readers. 

Of  these  no  single  work  is  complete,  and  only  frag- 
ments are  extant.  They  originated  in  the  main  during 
Aristotle's  attendance  at  the  Academy,  and  showed  strongly 
the  influence,  even  in  their  titles,  of  the  Platonic  philosophy. 
They  were,  on  the  whole,  dialogues,  and  if  they  did  not  also 
possess  the  artistic  fancy  with  which  Plato  managed  this 
form,  they  are  striking,  nevertheless,  in  their  fresh  in- 
tuitions, happy  inventions,  florid  diction,  as  well  as  in  the 
richness  of  their  thought. 

Tiiese  cVSeSo/xcVot  Xo'yot  were  counted  b}'  Aristotle,  in  his  occa- 
sional mention  of  them  in  his  didactic  writings,  as  belonging 
to  the  general  class  of  i^MrepLKol  Aoyoi.  Bv  this  class  he  seems 
to  have  understood  the  more  popular  treatment  of  scientific 
questions  in  antithesis  to  the  methodical  and  scholastic  cultiva- 
tion of  science.  The  latter,  which  centres  in  the  lectures  of  the 
head  of  the  school,  api)eared  later  as  the  acroamatic  writings. 
The  opposition  of  the  exoteric  and  the  acroamatic  teaching  does 
not,  then,  necessarily  signif)-  in  itself  a  difference  in  content  of 
doctrine,  but  onh*  a  difference  in  form  of  presentation.  There 
is  no  word  about  a  secret  teaching.  It  may,  however,  be  ac- 
cepted as  true  that  the  exoteric  writings  originated  when  he  was 
iu  the  Academy,  and  the  acroamatic,  when  he  was  an  indepen- 
dent teacher ;  and  from  this  fact  even  essential  differences  are 
easily  explained.  See  Zeller,  IIP.  112  f ;  H.  Diels,  Sitzungsher. 
der  Berh  Akacl,  1883  ;  H.  Susemihl,  Jalirhnchf.  PhiloL,  "1884. 

Aristotle  owed  his  literary  fame  in  anti(juity  to  his  published 

1  Excepting  the  personal  writings  like  the  verses,  the  testament  (Diog. 
Laert.,  V.  13  f.),  and  the  letters,  of  which  scarcely  anything  genuine  is 
preserved. 


ARISTOTLE  239 

writings,  and  certainl}'  in  all  justice  if  we  ma}'  judge  from  the 
few  preserved  specimens.^  For  if,  on  account  of  the  "golden 
flow"  of  his  words,  he  is  classed  with  Democritus  and  Plato  as 
a  model,"-  nevertheless  this  praise  cannot  be  applied  to  the  writ- 
ings that  have  been  preserved.  The  "•  golden  flow  "  is  so  seldom 
in  these  writings  that  it  is  more  supposable  that  they  are  ex- 
cerpts from  his  dialogues  that  were  made  either  by  Aristotle 
himself  or  In*  some  of  his  pupils.' 

The  composition  of  the  Aristotelian  dialogues  is  said  to  have 
been  distinguished  from  the  Platonic  by  a  less  vivid  treatment 
of  the  dramatic  setting,  and  also  by  the  circumstance  that  the 
Stagirite  himself  gave  the  leading  word.  In  content  the}'  were 
affiliated  in  part  closeh'  to  the  Platonic  dialogues.  Thus,  the 
Eudenuis  especially  appears  to  have  been  a  detailed  copy  of  the 

Phcedo.    Other  titles  like  TTf.pl  hiKanMrvinff;,  F/jvAAos  rj  Trepl  pijTopLKrj<;, 

cro<f)Lcm]<;,  TroXtri/co?,  epwriKos,  avixTToatov,  Mtvcfero?  remind  US  imme- 
diately of  the  works  of  Plato  and  his  school.  Others  refer  directly 
to  popular  philosophical  discussions,  like  the  three  books  TrepI 

TroirfTwv,  TTCpL  ttXovtov,   ~epL   ei'\^9,   Trepi   €i'yf''f'''i?>   Trepi   yboinj^,   Trepi 

TraiStt'as,  Trepi  /Jao-tAciaj.*  The  genuineness  of  all  of  these  has  not 
been  established,  nor  is  it  certain  that  all  were  in  the  form  of 
the  dialogue.  It  is  verv  improbable  that  the  ITpoTpc-Ti/co?  was 
in  this  form  (P..  Hirzel,  in  Hermes,  X.  61  f.).  The  most  signifi- 
cant, and,  as  it  appears,  those  most  independent  of  the  Platonic 
influence  among  these  exoteric  writings,  are  the  three  books  of 
the  dialogue  irepl  </)iAoo-o^ius.  (See  Bvwater,  in  Jour,  of  Pliilol., 
1877,  64  f.) 

(2)  The  Compilations ;  partly  critical  excerpts  from 
scientific  works  {xnrofivrjfiaTa),  pai'tly  collections  of  zoologi- 
cal, literarj'-historical,  and  antiquarian  data  which  Aristotle, 
probably  with  the  help  of  his  pupils,  used  as  material  for 
scientific  research  and  theory. 

These  also  have  unfortunately  been  lost  except  a  very 
few  fragments,  although  it  appears  that  at  least  a  portion 
of  them  had  been  published  either  by  Aristotle  himself  or 
by  his  pupils. 

^  See  Cicero.  De  nat.  dear.,  II.  37.  95. 
2  See  place  in  Zeller,  IIP.  m.  i. 

8  See  Fr.  Blass,  An.  Beredtsamkeit,  427  note;  also  Rhein.  Mus. 
1875. 

*  Dedicated  to  Alexander,  as  also  nepi  anoiKimv. 


240  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

To  these  last  belong  the  notes  of  the  philosopher  concerning 
the  later  lectures  of  Phito  :  irepl  rayadov  and  irepl  twv  etSwv.  Com- 
pare Ch.  Brandis,  De  perditis  Aristotelis  cle  bono  et  ideis  lihris 
(Bonn,  1823).  There  are  also  reports  of  some  extracts  from 
the  Laws,  the  Republic,  and  the  Timceus,  the  critical  notes  about 
Alcmaeon,  the  Pythagoreans,  —  especially  about  Archylas,  — 
Speusippus,  and  Xenocrates.  Also  the  writings  De  Melisso 
Xenophone  Gonjla  arose  from  a  like  need  in  the  Peripatetic 
school.  The  fruits  of  this  comprehensive  study  of  the  histor}- 
of  philosophy  appear  in  the  numerous  historical  relations  which 
the  Aristotelian  didactic  writings  generally  set  up  in  entering 
upon  the  treatment  of  problems.  The  Trpo^X-^fiaTa  serve  similar 
purposes  of  instruction  and  of  research,  although  their  present 
form  is  a  later  conception  of  the  school.  Compare  C.  Prantl, 
Abhand.  der  Milnchn.  Akad.,  VJ.  341  f.  The  same  holds 
good  for  all  the  definitions  and  diaereses  which  antiquity  then 
possessed. 

In  the  magnificent  collections  which  Aristotle  planned  i 
the  L3-ceum  must  first  be  mentioned  the  ayaTofxai,  the  descri})- 
tive  basis  for  zoology,  furnished,  it  seems,  with  illustrations. 
Then  there  is  the  collection  of  the  rhetorical  theories  under  the 
title  Ttx^'wv  (Twaytoyr/.  and  of  the  rhetorical  models  IvOvfiinara 
prjTopLKo. ;  besides  the  collection  relating  to  the  history  of  trage- 
dies and  comedies,  and  the  questions  raised  about  the  different 
poets,  Homer,  Hesiod,  Archilochus,  Euripides,  and  others;  fi- 
nally', the  historical  miscellanies:  the  TroAiTfiat,  reports  concerning 
one  hundred  fifty-eight  Greek  state  constitutions,  rofufxa  f^ap/Ba- 

pLKO.,  SiKaLuyfiara  twv  ttoAcoh',  and  besides    OXvfjLTTtoi'LKai,    Trwtovi/cat, 
Trept  €vprjfiaT(iiV,  irtpX  OavfxacTLiav  aKovrr/xaTwi',  Trapoi/xiai,  etc. 

Concerning  the  character  of  these  scientific  materials,  which 
until  the  present  time  were  apparently  entirely  lost,  some  j-ears 
ago  a  very  surprising  disclosure  was  made,  ijartl3-  In'  the  fortimate 
discover}'  of  a  most  important  piece,  the  TToXtTft'a  tCjv  AO-qvatutv 
(published  by  G.  Kaibel  and  U.  v.  Wilamowitz-Mollendorf, 
Berlin,  1892  ;  translated  into  German  b}'  G.  Kaibel  and  A. 
Kiessling,  Strassburg,  181)1);  the  literature  on  it,  espocially  on 
its  genuineness,  has,  as  may  be  expected,  quickly  appeared  ;  a 
complete  review  can  be  found  in  the  English  edition  of  J.  E. 
Sandys  (Lond.,  1893,  p.  Ixvii).  To  be  sure,  the  beginning  and 
end  are  wanting,  but  by  far  the  greatest  part  is  preserved  in 
nearly  a  complete  continuity.  It  appears  not  as  a  dry  collection 
of  facts,  but  as  a  ripe  historical  work  clearly  and  perfectly  devel- 
oped. The  greatness  of  conception,  the  practical  simplicit}' 
of  representation,  the  accuracy'  of  judgment  make  it  appear 
a  worthy  writing  of  the  master  in  whose  last  years  its  composi- 


ARISTOTLE  241 

tioii  must  have  occurred.  Should  this  history'  of  the  Athenian 
constitution  be  the  work  of  one  of  his  pupils,  then  would  it 
indeed  be  a  new  honor  for  the  Lyceum. 

Although  many  of  those  collections  that  are  attributed  to 
Aristotle  may  have  come  from  his  pupils,  or  perhaps  even 
later,  and  although  by  no  means  can  all  those  titles  refer  to 
writings  of  the  philosopher  himself,  they  nevertheless  give  proof 
of  the  versatility  and  cyclopedic  character  of  the  scientific  work 
of  the  school.  Upon  all  territories,  both  historical  and  scien- 
tific, he  gave  the  fruitful  impulse  to  seek  out  the  entire  existing 
material  and  to  place  it  in  order,  and  thus  to  make  it  available 
for  scientific  treatment.  The  Lyceum,  in  its  storing  of  the 
treasures  of  erudition,  was,  to  a  higher  degree  than  theAcadem}-, 
the  centre  of  culture  of  Greece. 

(3)  The  Didactic  Writings  originating  in  the  school  and 
intended  for  its  use.  It  is  these  only  that  have  been  pre- 
served, and  they  together  make  what  is  known  as  the  col- 
lection of  Aristotle's  works.  They  are  not  complete,  how- 
ever, and  in  many  cases  probably  not  in  the  original  form. 
They  nevertheless  exhibit  in  the  highest  degree  some 
peculiar  characteristics.  A  sharply  impressed,  delicately 
worked  out,  and  consistently  developed  terminology  is  com- 
mon to  them.  On  the  other  hand,  complete  absence  of 
grace  and  of  aesthetic  motive  of  presentation  is  to  be 
noted.  The  scheme  of  investigation  is,  on  the  whole,  the 
same:  the  precise  formulation  of  the  problem,  the  criticism 
of  opinions  which  are  submitted  concerning  the  problem, 
the  careful  discussion  of  the  single  points  of  view  as  they 
appear,  the  comprehensive  marshalling  of  the  facts,  and  the 
striving  for  a  clear  and  conclusive  result.  In  all  these 
respects  the  Aristotelian  writings  make  a  complete  antithe- 
sis to  the  Platonic  ;  the  dilTerence  being  that  between  sci- 
ence and  aesthetics.  The  Aristotelian  writings  afford 
different  and  therefore  less  attractive  enjoyment.  It  must 
not  be  forgotten  that  the  excellences  of  the  Aristotelian 
works  are  qualified  in  many  striking  ways.  The  unequal 
development,  wherein  many  parts  give  the  impression  of 

16 


242  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

being  masterly  and  final  and  others  of  being  hasty  and 
sketchy ;  the  disorder  which  predominates  in  the  principal 
writings  of  the  transmitted  series  of  books  ;  the  —  in  part 
verbal — repetitions  of  even  lengthy  sections;  the  unful- 
filled promises,  —  all  these  facts  forbid  the  belief  that  the 
writings  in  their  present  form  were  intended  by  Aristotle 
for  publication ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  in  point  of  form 
and  content  the  interconnection  of  the  works  is  evident,  and 
is  emphasized  by  numerous  cross  references  that  are  often 
reciprocal. 

All  these  characteristics  are  only  explicable  and  are 
also  fully  conceivable  upon  the  hypothesis  that  Aristotle 
entertained  the  purpose  of  developing  into  text-books  the 
written  notes  that  he  had  made  the  basis  of  his  lectures. 
These  text-books  would  have  been  manuals  of  instruction 
for  the  Lyceum,  and  would  have  been  given  into  the  hands 
of  his  pupils.  In  addition  it  is  supposable  that  Aristotle 
undertook  this  work  in  direct  connection  with  his  lectures, 
and  about  the  same  time  with  reference  to  the  sciences 
treated  by  him.  He  probably  pursued  this  work  during 
the  twelve  years  of  his  leadership.  Before,  however,  this 
giant  work  came  to  an  end,  death  had  seized  him.  Except- 
ing the  smaller  works,  which  perhaps  were  waiting  to  be 
included  in  his  larger  works,  only  parts  of  the  Logic  —  the 
Topics  in  particular —  appear  to  have  been  completed.  It 
may  also  be  accepted  that  the  gaps  which  thus  remained 
were  filled  in  part  by  the  most  intimate  pupils,  probably 
on  the  basis  of  their  notes  of  the  Aristotelian  lectures. 
These  interpolations  were  made  by  different  pupils  differ- 
ently. Thus  in  the  school  many  redactions  of  the  text 
books  were  handed  on,  and  among  such  redactions  many 
later  productions  of  the  school  slipped  in.  This  went  on 
until  Andronicus  of  Rhodes  published  the  first  edition 
(60-50  B.  c),  which  lies  at  the  basis  of  the  present 
documents. 


ARISTOTLE  243 

The  close  relationship  between  the  preserved  writings  of 
Aristotle  and  his  actual  teaching  is  evident,  even  if  we  take  no 
account  of  such  direct  evidence  as  his  address  to  his  auditors  at 
the  conclusion  of  the  Topics.  The  question  is  onl}'  as  to  a 
clearer  determination  of  the  relationship,  and  it  would  appear  as 
if  all  the  opinions  expressed  about  the  relationship  may  be  justi- 
fied to  a  certain  extent.  Undoubtedly  the  notes  of  the  philoso- 
pher form  the  body  of  the  discourses  ;  —  not  only  such  sketches 
as  he  might  use  for  his  lectures,  but  on  the  other  hand  also  such 
as  he  had  made  ready  for  the  text-book.^  The  latter  set  forth 
in  a  wonderful  manner  the  clearness  and  ripeness  of  the  Aris- 
totelian spirit.  Other  facts,  especiall}-  the  different  redactions  of 
the  same  book,  hardly  allow  another  interpietation  than  that  of 
Scaliger,  that  interpolations  from  the  writings  of  the  auditors 
have  taken  place.  In  accordance  with  this  theory  the  presence 
of  such  parts  or  of  entire  writings  which  cannot  in  Ibrm  or  con- 
tent be  ascribed  to  Aristotle,  is  most  simply  explained. 

A  very  vent'.resome  but  in  itself  a  not  incredible  theorj"  was 
spread  in  antiquit}'  concerning  the  fate  of  the  Aristotelian  manu- 
scripts.^ They  were  supposed  to  have  fallen  with  the  property 
of  Theophrastus  to  his  pupil,  Neleus  of  Scepsis  in  Troas,  and 
to  have  been  hidden  in  a  cellar  by  his  descendants  out  of  fear 
of  the  mania  for  collecting  of  the  kings  of  Pergamus.  After- 
wards they  were  found  and  purchased  in  a  much  damaged  state 
by  the  Peripatetic  Apellicon  of  Teos  and  removed  to  Athens. 
When  Sulla  conquered  that  city,  the  writings  fell  into  his  hands 
and  were  published  at  Rome  by  the  grammarian  Tyiannion, 
and  finallv  by  Andronicus  of  Rhodes.  This  story  does  not 
explain,  of  course,  the  remarkable  condition  of  the  transmitted 
documents.  It  is  indubitably  proved  in  the  case  of  single  writ- 
ings—  as  is  obvious  —  that  the  Peripatetic  school  possessed  the 
scientifically  most  important  writings  of  its  founder  from  the 
beginning.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  nevertheless  not  improb- 
able that  the  rediscovery  of  the  original  manuscripts  aflforded 

^  In  this  fact  and  in  the  smaller  importance  of  the  copies  by  his 
auditors  consists  the  chief  difference  between  the  character  of  the  corpus 
Aristolelicum  and  the  somewhat  analogous  form  in  which  a  series  ot 
Hegel's  lectures  is  presented  to  us.  Hegel  had  not  begun  a  remodelling 
of  his  Hefte  for  text-books,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  we  owe  the  most 
valuable  of  the  preserved  works  of  Aristotle  to  the  fact  that  he  had 
begun  such  a  remodelhng. 

2  Phitarch,  Sulla,  26  ;  Strab .  XITI.  1,  54  ;  compare  E.  Essen,  Der 
Keller  zu  Skepsis  (Stargard,  18SG). 


244  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHY 

Andronicus  not  only  the  occasion  but  also,  as  far  as  the  manu- 
scripts readied,  the  distinct  ground  for  his  standard  edition  in 
contrast  to  the  school  tradition. 

Since  the  didactic  writings  form  internally  a  perfectl}'  con- 
sistent whole,  the  question  about  the  order  of  their  origination 
is  comparativel}'  unimportant.  The  question  is,  moreover,  en- 
tirely purposeless,  since  it  ma}'  be  accepted  that  work  upon  tlie 
writings  was  continuously  and  simultaneously  carried  on  in  con- 
nection with  the  lectures  repeatedly  given  during  the  twelve 
years  of  his  activity  as  a  teacher.  It  nevertheless  appears  that 
the  Logic  was  the  first  to  be  conceived,  and  relatively  to  the 
others  was  brought  more  nearly  to  completion. 

Compare  with  the  following  Zeller,  111''.  67-109. 

The  preserved  didactic  writings  are  most  simply  ar- 
ranged in  the  following  groups :  — 

(a)  The  Treatises  on  Logic  and  Rhetoric  —  the  Cate- 
gories, the  very  doubtful  treatise  On  the  Proposition,  the 
Analytics,  and  the  Topics,  including  the  last  and  compara- 
tively independent  book  Concerning  the  Fallacies ;  and  the 
Rhetoric. 

The  grouping  of  the  logical  works,  in  the  customary  series, 
under  tl  e  name  opyavov,  occurred  first  in  the  Byzantine  period. 
A  special  edition  is  published  by  Th.  Waitz  (2  vols.,  Leip., 
1844-4G).  The  genuineness  of  the  Karayopiat  is  doubted,  espe- 
cially b}^  Prantl  (Gesch.  d.  Log.,  I.  207  f.).  The  conclusion  of 
these  writings,  i.  e.,  concerning  post-predicaments,  can  at  all 
events  not  be  ascribed  to  Aristotle,  and  the  remainder  of  the  book 
appears  to  lie  based  upon  his  sketch  only  in  essentials.  Ilcpt 
kpfirjvcLas  is  subject  to  stronger  suspicions  to  which  even  as  earl}' 
a  writer  as  Andronicus  gave  expression.  The  Analytics  is  a 
masterl}'  logical  groundwork,  which  develops  the  theory' of  the 
conclusion  and  of  jiroof  in  two  parts  (dvaXvrt/ca  irporepa  and 
va-Tepa),  each  consisting  of  two  books,  — ^the  second  part  being 
not  so  completel}'  rounded  out  as  the  first.  Joined  to  it,  as  the 
most  complete  of  all  the  works,  is  the  Topics,  which  treats  of 
tlie  method  of  probabilit}'.  In  connection  with  it,  as  its  ninth 
book  (Waitz),  there  is  inpl  o-o^kttlkwv  IXiyx^v.  There  are  pre- 
served besides  a  great  number  of  titles  of  logical-epistemological 
theoretical  discussions,  of  which  the  Aristotelian  authorship  is 

more  or  less  doubtful  :  Trcpt  ciSaJv  koI  yei'oiv,  irtpX  twv  avTiKUfxiviiiv, 
irept  KaTa:jid(T€w<;,  crwAAoyicr/iOt,  opiaTLKa,  irepl  toO  Trpos  Ti,  irepl  8o$t]<;, 
Trepl  lina'TrjUTj'i,  etc. 


ARISTOTLE  245 

The  first  two  books  of  the  Rhetoric  ma}-  be  rcgardeci  as  gen- 
uine in  spite  of  some  difficulties  (Spengel  in  Abh.  der  Munch. 
Akad.^  VI.).  The  third  is  doubtful.  The  so-called  Rhetoric 
to  Alexander  is,  on  the  contrary,  generally  regarded  as  spuri- 
ous, but  it  probabl}'  belongs  to  the  Peripatetic  school.  The 
Rhetoric  of  Theodectes  is  also  mentioned,  which  was  published 
during  the  life  of  Aristotle.  This  work  embodied  the  teachings 
of  the  philosopher,  and  was  probabl}'  based  upon  his  lectures. 

(Jb)  The  Writings  on  Theoretic  Philosophy  —  the  Meta- 
physics y\\\\\c\\  in  Aristotelian  terminology  was  called  "  first 
philosophy  "  or  "  theology  ; "  besides,  the  book  on  mathe- 
matics being  lost,  the  Physics^  the  History  of  Animals,  the 
Psychology,  and  the  three  minor  treatises  belonging  to 
these  three. 

The  Metaphysics  (special  edition  b}'  Brandis,  Berlin,  1823  ; 
Schwegler,  with  translation  and  commentar},  Tubingen,  1847- 
48  ;  Bonitz,  Bonn,  1848-49  ;  translated  into  German,  Berlin, 
1890;  Greek  edition  by  W.  Christ,  Leipzig,  1886)  has  pre- 
served its  traditional  name  for  the  philosophic;  science  of  prin- 
ciples, because  of  its  p)lace  in  the  ancient  collection  (/Acra  to, 
^vo-tKu). 

From  the  fourteen  preserved  books  the  second  (a  iXaTTov)  is 
certainl}'  to  be  set  apart  as  a  school  compilation  of  many  parts 
welded  together.  Among  the  other  thirteen  books  the  first, 
second,  third,  fifth,  sixth,  seventh,  and  eighth  books  (numbered 
according  to  the  Berlin  edition)  form  a  connected  but  not  a  com- 
pleted, and  also  not  a  finalh'  edited  investigation,  to  which  after 
a  break  the  ninth  book  also  belongs.  The  fourth  book,  which 
was  cited  by  Aristotle  himself,  under  the  title  vrepi  rov  7rocra;^co9, 
is  a  school  manual  containing  a  discussion  of  terminology. 
The  first  eight  chapters  of  the  tenth  and  the  first  half  of  the 
eleventh  book  are  either  an  Aristotelian  sketch  or  a  school- 
extract  from  the  chief  investigation.  The  second  half  of  the 
eleventh  book  is  an  outline  of  the  teaching  of  the  Godhead. 
The  conclusion  of  the  tenth  book  is  a  compilation  from  the 
Physics,  obviously  not  by  Aristotle.  Books  twelve  and  thirteen 
appear  to  be  an  older  form  of  the  criticism  of  the  Platonic 
Ideas.  The  preserved  collection  is  so  much  the  more  unique, 
since  it  is  the  more  probable  that  it  was  taken  in  hand  soon 
after  the  death  of  Aristotle,  perhaps  by  Eudemus. 

From  the  series  of  mathematical  writings  only  the  discussion 


246  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHY 

TTepl  aTOfxwv  ypafifiwv  is  extant,  and  its  transmitted  form  is 
probably  spurious. 

Of  the  eight  books  of  lectures  on  the  science  of  nature,  <f>va-LKr} 
aKpoao-i?,  —  the  modern  name  would  be  "  philosophy  of  nature," 
—  books  five,  six,  and  eight  treat  -n-epl  Ktviyo-tw?.  The  earlier 
books  are  concerned  witli  universal  principles  in  the  explanation 
of  nature  (yrepl  dpx<ov) ;  the  seventh  book  gives  one  the  impres- 
sion of  being  a  preliminary  sketch.  Astronomy  and  physics 
proper  are  included  as  developments  :  irepl  oipavov,  irepi  yeveo-eo)? 
Koi  <f)6opa<;  ju€TcwpoAoyi»ca.  A  number  of  separate  treatises  are 
lost,  the  firfxaviKa  is  spurious,  and  also  the  irepl  Koafuv.  See 
below,  §  49. 

The  parallel  work  to  the  irepl  to.  4<Sa  laopia,  of  which  book  ten 
is  presumably  not  genuine,  is  the  irepl  (fivTwv,  which  is  lost.  On 
the  other  hand,  some  restorations  of  the  former  are  preserved : 
irepl  ^OMov  (lopLwv,  irepl  ^wtov  y£V£0"£cos,  irepl  ^okov  iropeia<i. 

Among  the  most  mature  works  belong  the  three  books  Trepi 
i/a;x^s  (published  by  Barthi^lem}'  St.  Hilaire,  Paris,  1846;  A. 
Torstrick,  Berlin,  1862  ;  A.Trendelenburg,  2ded.,  Berlin,  1877  ; 
E.  Wallace,  Cambridge,  1882).  With  these  are  collected  a 
number  of  treatises  on  physiological  psychology  :  irepl  aio-^iyo-cws 
KOL  aurdrfToiv  ',  irepl  uvrjfir]<;  koi  dvafiVT](reu)<;  ;  irepl  virvov  koi  eyprjy6pcreu)<i  ; 
irepl  ewTTVLujv  and  irepl  Trj<;  Ka6'  virvov  fiavTiiajs  \  irepl  juaKpojSioTT^TO? 
Kol  /3pa)(y^L6Tr)TOs ;  irepl  ^w^s  kol  Oavdrov  ;  irepl  dvairvorj<;.  The  writ- 
ing irepl  m'evfiaros  owes  its  origin  to  the  Aristotelian  school. 

(c)  The  Writings  on  Practical  and  Poetic  Philosophy/ : 
the  Ethics  (in  the  Nicoraachean  and  Eudemean  versions), 
the  Politics^  and  tlie  Poetics. 

Among  the  preserved  forms  of  the  Ethics,  the  so-called  'H^txa 
McyoAa  is  essentially  only  an  extract  from  both  the  others,  of 
which,  moreover,  the  ten  books  of  the  ^WOlko.  l^iKOfidxeLa  appear 
to  be  nearest  to  Aristotle's  design.  The  seven  books  of  the 
'HOlko.  'EvSrj^eia  appear  to  be  based  on  the  notes  of  Euderaus. 
The  identity  of  the  Nicomachean  Ethics  V.-VII.  and  the 
Eudemian  IV.-VI.  allows  room  for  various  interpretations  of 
a  mutual  supplementation  of  the  two  redactions.  Of  smaller 
ethical  treatises  nothing  is  preserved.  The  essa}'  irepl  dperthv 
Kol  KUKLwv  is  spui'ious. 

The  eight  books  of  the  likewise  incomplete  Politics  (published 
by  Susemihl,  Leipzig,  1870)  are  problematic  as  to  their  preserved 
order.  See  literature  in  Zeller,  IIP.  672  f.  Books  seven  and 
eight  should  undoubtedly  come  directly  after  book  three.     The 


ARISTOTLE  247 

transposition  of  books   five   and  six   is  still  in  dispute.     The 
Economics  is  not  genuine. 

The  fragment  Trepi  7roir]TiKyj<;  is  preserved,  but  only  in  a  verj- 
fragmentary  and  altered  condition  (published  by  Susemihl, 
Leipzig,  1865,  and  Vahlen,  Berlin,  1867;  G.  Teichmiiller, 
Anstotelische  Forschungen,  Halle,  1860  and  1869). 

40.  The^effort  to  transform  the  Socratic-Platonic   con-. 
ceptuaj^_jjhilQSophy    into   a   theory  that   will   explain  theji/ 
phenomenal    world    was    the    centre    of    the    AristotelianV 
philosophy.     The  conviction  that  the  tasks  of  science  can 
be  solved  only  by  the  Socratic  method  —  the  method    of 
conceptual  knowledge  —  was   taken  for   granted  by  Aris- 
totle, and  was  his  reason  for  reckoning  himself  in  later  time 
still   within   the  Platonic  circle.     The  advance,  however, 
which  he  made  upon  Platonism  was  base^^un^tts  insight 
into  the   insufficiency   of  the   theory  of  Ideas  to  explain 
empirical  facts.     It  is  true  that  Plato  had  in  the  end  very  '^ 
emphatically  asserted  that  the  Ideas,  which  at  first  for 
him  meant  only  permanent  Being,  were  also  the  ahla  of 
the  world  of  sense.     Howevei-,  as  Aristotle  later  showed, 
Plato  had  not  been  able  to  harmonize  this  thought  with  his 
first  conception  of  the  world  of  Ideas,    Aristotle  justly  found 
the  ultimate  ground  for  this  inharmony  in  Plato's  funda- 
mental ascription  of  a  self-substantial  separate  reality  to  the 
world  of  Ideas.     This  transcendence  of  the  Ideas,  which  es- 
sentially is  only  a^duplication  of  the  empirical  world,  must 
be  annulled.    The  Ideas  must  not  be  conceived  as  different 
from  the  objects  of  experience  and   as  existing  separate 
from  them.     They  must  be  known  as  the  peculiar  essence 
of  existence,  as  its  determining  content.     Plato's  weakness 
as  well  as  his  greatness  lay  in  his  theory  of  two  worlds.    ' 
The  fundamental  thought  of  Aristotle  was  that  the  super-  / 
sensible  world  of  Ideas  and  the  world  of  sense  are  identical. 

The  polemic  of  Aristotle  against  the  theory  of  Ideas,  espe- 
cially in  the  first,  sixth,  and  twelfth  book  of  the  Meta'pliysiics^ 
concealed  the  fact  to  the  earlier  criticism  that  his  antagonism 


248  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

was  far  outweighed  by  the  importance  of  the  r61e  assigned  in  his 
own  philosophy  to  the  theory  of  Ideas ;  for  his  dependence  on 
that  theory  was  an  accepted  fact  by  him  and  the  circle  of  his 
pupils,  although  Aristotle  only  incidentally  alluded  to  it.  The 
polemic  was  directed  solel}'  against  the  xwpia-fio?,  the  hypostasiz- 
ing  of  Ideas  into  a  second  and  higher  world.  He  pointed  out 
the  difHculties  involved  therein :  that  the  Ideas  make  neither 
motion  nor  knowledge  conceivable,  and  that  their  relation  to 
the  world  of  sense  has  not  been  satisfactorily  and  consistentlj' 
defined.  In  other  respects  the  Stagirite  shared  throughout  the 
fundamental  conceptions  of  the  Attic  philosophy  :  he  defined 
the  problem  of  philosophy  to  be  the  knowledge  of  what  really 
is,^  and  he  asserted  that  this  knowledge  is  not  acquired  by  per- 
ception,^ precisel}'  because  the  things  of  sense  change  and  are 
destroyed.^  He  likewise  characterized  the  universal,  the  con- 
cepts, as  the  content  of  true  knowledge,  and  accordingly  also  of 
the  truly  actual.*  However,  from  the  beginning  Aristotle  united  v 
a  genetic  theory  with  his  ontology,  and  he  demanded  that 
science  explain  the  origin  of  phenomena  from  what  reall}'  is.* 
He  insisted,  therefore,  that  the  Ideas  be  so  understood  that 
the}',  as  the  true  essence  of  sense  objects,  make  these  objects 
conceivable.  If  Aristotle  did  not  solve  his  problem  perfectly,^ 
it  was  due  entirely  to  his  continuous  dependence  on  fundamental 
definitions  of  the  Platonic  philosoph}-. 

See  Ch.  Weisse,  J)e  Platonis  et  Aristotelis  in  constituendis 
summis  philosophise  pnncipiis  differentia  (Leipzig,  1828) ; 
M.  Carriere,  De  Aristotele  Platonis  amico  ejusque  doctrinoe  justo 
censore  (Gottingen,  1837);  Th.  Waitz,  Platon  u.  Aristoteles 
(Cassel,  1843) ;  Fr.  Michelis,  De  Aristotele  Platonis  in  idearum 
doctrina  adversaria  (Braunsberg,  1864);  W.  Rosenkrantz,  Die 
platonische  Ideenlehre  und  ihre  Pekdmpfang  durch  Aristoteles 
(Mainz,  1869) ;  G.  Teichmiiller,  Studien  (1874),  p.  226  f. 

Since  the  essence  of  things  is  known  by  means  of  class 
concepts,  the  fundamental  problem  of  Aristotelianism  is  >< 
the  relationship  of  the  universal  to  the  particular.  When 
Aristotle  made  this  fundamental  principle  of  scientific 
thought  —  recognized  by  Socrates  in  inspired  intuition  — 
an  object  of  separate  preliminary  investigation,  he  created 

1  Anal,  post.,  IT.  19,  100  a,  9.       a  Ibid.,  I.  31,  87  b,  28. 

3  Met.,  VI.  15,  1039  b,  27. 

*  lUd.,  II.  4,  999  a,  28;  II.  6,  1003  a,  13. 

^  De  an.,  I.  1,  402  b,  16. 


ARISTOTLE  249 

tho  science  of  logic.  He  introduced  tliis  science  as  a  uni- 
ver^al-tbeQix^f  scielitiBc  merhod^  preliminary  to  single 
practical  investigations.  In  this  sclf-knowTecTge  of  science 
the~liistorical  process  of  emancipation  of  the  intellectual 
life  perfects  itself  into  full  consciousness.  As  the  "  Father 
of  Logic,"  Aristotle  represented  the  maturity  of  Greek  v^ 
scientific  development. 

Although  Aristotle  certainly  separated  the  single  branches  of 
science  and  fixed  upon  their  relationship  of  I'ank.  yet  the  pre- 
served documents  offer  no  generally  complete  division.  On  the 
one  hand,  he  treated  the  branches  pedagogically,  proceeding 
from  the  facts  up  to  their  causes,  and  on  the  other  he  inversely 
l)roceeded  from  the  principles  down  to  the  consequences.  The 
division  in  the  Acadeni}'  at  one  time  was  into  logical,  physical, 
and  ethical  researches,^  at  another  time  into  theoretic,  piactical, 
and  poetic  science,^  while  in  the  Peripatetic  school*  the  division 
into  theoretic  and  practical  science  w^as  customar}'.  So  much 
appears  to  be  certain,  viz.,  that  Aiistotle  introduced  the  Logic 
(Analytics  and  Topics)  as  a  universal  and  formal  preparation 
or  methodology  for  all  other  branches,  since  he  himself  does 
not  mention  it  under  "  theoretic  "  sciences.® 

A.  Trendelenburg,  Elementa  logices  Aristotelecp.  (3d  Ad., 
Berlin,  1876)  ;  Th.  Gumposch,  Ueber  die  Logik  u.  d.  logischen 
Schriften  des  Arist.  (Leipzig,  1839)  ;  H.  Hettner,  De  logices 
Aristotelicce  speculativo  jirincipio  (Halle,  1843)  ;  C.  Heyder, 
Die  Methodologie  der  arist.  Philos.  (Erlangen,  1845);  C. 
Prantl,  Gescli.  d.  Logil;  I.  87  f,  (see  Aljhandl.  derhayer.  Akad.y 
1853)  ;  F.  Kampe,  Die  Erkenntnisstheorie  des  Arist.  (Leipzig, 
1870)  ;  R.  Eucken,  D.  Methode  der  arist.  Forschung  (1872, 
Berlin)  ;  R.  Biese,  D.  Erkenntnisslehre  des  Arist.  n.  Kanfs 
(Berhn,  1877). 

Tlie  principle  of  the  Aristotelian  logic  is  the  thought 
that  just  as  in  natura  rerum  the  universal  or  conceptually 
defined  essence  is  the  cause  or  ground  of  definition  of  the 
particular,  so  also  the  ultimate    task    of  an   explanatory 

1  Met.,  in.  3,  1005  a,  33.  "-  Top.,  L  14,  105  b  20. 

8  Met.,  I.  1025  b,  18. 

4  See  Eth.  Eud.,  L  1,  1214  a,  10  ;  Met.,  I.  993  b,  20. 

5  Met.,  V.  1,  1026  a,  18,  counts  as  such  only  physics,  mathenmtic?, 
and  theology  (metaphysics). 


250  mSTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

science  consists  in  deriving  (aTroSet^i?)  the  single  from  the 
universal,  and  thereby  in  attaining  the  conceptual  necessity 
of  the  empirically  actual.^  Scientific  explanation  consists 
in  understanding  the  perceptually  known  from  its  causes./ 
It  is  the  reproduction  by  the  process  of  knowledge  —  in 
the  relationship  of  ground  and  consequent  —  of  the  real 
relation  of  the  universal  cause  to  its  particular  result. 

However,  all  knowledge  consists  ^  only  in  the  union 
of  concepts  (X6'yo<;  as  av/jLirXoKij  of  ovofia  and  pi^fMo),  that  is, 
in  the  premise  (irpoTaai'i')  or  in  the  judgment  {d7r6(f>av(Ti<i)y 
since  either  as  an  affirmative  judgment  {Kardt^aais:)  it  ex- 
presses ^  real  union  or  as  a  negative  judgment  (d'n-6<j>aai<;) 
real  separation  of  the  determinations  of  content  that  are 
thought  in  the  subject  and  predicate.  So  the  last  task  of 
all  scientific  explanation  (i-irLarrjfni)  is  the  derivation 
{d-TTolet^Lf;)  of  particular  judgments  from  the  universal. 
On  this  account  the  theory  of  the  conclusion  and  proof,  V 
which  he  himself  called  the  Analytics,  formed  the  centre 
of  the  Aristotelian  logic. 

The  Aristotelian  Analytic  acquired  the  appearance  of  an  ab- 
stract formal  logic  through  misunderstandings  and  through  the 
misapplied  development  of  it  by  the  School  in  later  times.  In 
truth,  it  was  conceived  b}-  Aristotle  methodologically  in  the  most 
vital  relationship  to  the  practical  tasks  of  science  ;  and  therefore 
in  the  Peripatetic  school  the  logical  treatises  are  rightly  called 
"  organic."  But  just  for  this  reason  are  they  ruled  throughout 
by  a  number  of  epistemological  presuppositions  concerning  that 
which  reall}'  is  and  the  relationship  of  thought  to  Being.  The 
highest  presupposition,  even  if  not  expressl_y  formulated  by 
Aristotle,  is  the  identity  of  the  forms  of  apprehending  thought 
with  the  forms  of  relationship  belonging  to  actuality.*  Thus  the 
first  sj'stematic  sketch  of  logic  includes  in  close  union  the  three 
points  of  view  under  which  tliis  science  was  later  treated. 
These  are  the  formal,  methodological,  and  epistemological.^ 

1  Anal,  post.,  I.  2  f.  •■«  De  cat.,  4,  2  a,  6. 

8  Met.,  III.  7,  1012  a,  4. 

■*  See  Met. J  IV.  7,  10J7  a,  23;  Satixw  Xeyerai,  TO(ra)(a>s  to  tivai 
iTTjiuiivei, 


ARISTOTLE  231 

One  can  determine  the  forraul  difference  between  Plato  and 
Aristotle  b}'  noting  that  the  point  of  departure  of  Plato  is  the 
concept,  of  Aristotle  the  judgment.  Aristotle  sought  truth  and 
error  onh'  in  the  union  of  concepts  *  in  so  far  as  such  a  union 
is  asserted  or  denied.  If  this  emphasizes  principally-  the  quality 
of  the  judgment,  yet  the  syllogistic,  as  the  theor}-  of  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  judgment,  demands  a  treatment  of  quantity  and 
thus  a  distinction  between  general  and  particular  judgments 
(KaOoXov  —  ii'  |U£/j€i).^  The  consideration  of  judgment  from  the 
points  of  view  of  relation  and  modality  was  still  distant  from 
Aristotle.  When  he  pointed  out  that  the  content  of  judgment 
is  the  knowledge  either  of  actuality  or  necessity  or  possibility,^ 
this  assertion  rests  upon  that  principal  point  of  view  in  his 
Metaphysics  (§  41),  and  has  nothing  to  do  with  modality  in  its 
modern  sense  (Kant,  Critique  d.  r.  Vernun/t,  §  9,  Kehrb.  92  f.). 
But,  finally,  all  researches  which  Aristotle  instituted  for  distin- 
guishing judgments  are  decided  by  reference  to  the  theory  of 
the  conclusion,  that  is,  by  the  question  what  significance  they 
can  have  in  the  conclusion.  As  mediating  between  the  two,  he 
treated  in  a  thoroughgoing  way  the  theories  of  reasoning : 
Anal,  prior.,   I.  2  f. 

The  Aristotelian  syllogistic  is  the  search  for  that  which 
can  *  be  derived  with  perfect  certainty  from  given  proposi- 
tions. It  finds  the  fundamental  form  of  inference  in  the 
establishing  of  the  particular  proposition  through  the  univer- 
sal, and  the  subsumption  thereunder  (inference  by  subalter- 
nation).  To  this  so-called  first  figure  of  the  syllogism  he 
referred  its  other  two  forms  {(TxviJi.aTa),  which  are  character- 
ized ^  by  the  different  logical  place  of  the  middle  term 
{fjuea-ov^  in  both  premises  (redivra), and  thus  mediate  in  the 
conclusion  {avfnrepaa-fia)  the  differing  relations  of  the  two 
chief  concepts  (^aKpa).  So  Aristotle  conceived  tliat  the 
result  of  the  syllogism  is  always  an  answer  to  the  question, 
whether  at  all  and  to  what  extent  one  of  these  concepts 
is  subsumed  under  the  other  ;  that  is,  how  far  the  universal 
determination  of  the  latter  concept  holds  for  the  former. 

1  De  an.,  III.  6,  430  a,  27.  Compare  De  interpr.,  I.  16  a,  12. 
This  thought  was  hinted  at  in  the  dialogue  of  the  Sophist,  259  f. 

2  Anal,  prior.,  T.  1,  24  a,  17.  3  Ihi</.,  2,  25  a,  1. 
^  Ibid.,  1,  24  b,  19.  »  Ibid.,  4-6. 


y 


252  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

The  syllogistic  includes  accordingly  a  system  of  rules,  by 
which,  provided  universal  pro[)ositions  are  established,  particu- 
lars can  be  derived  from  them.  According  to  the  purpose  of  the 
philosopher,  it  would  therefore  be  established  how  in  the  perfected 
science  all  particular  knowledge  may  be  derived  from  universal 
principles  and  its  su!»ject  niatter  be  explained.  For  practice 
a  universal  schematism  of  proof  was  accordingly  given,  in 
which  the  tentative  efforts  of  the  Sophists  for  an  art  of  proofs 
were  carried  out  to  their  scientific  conclusion.  For  the  Aris- 
totelian Analtjtics  with  a  perfectly  conclusive  certainty  solved 
this  definitely  circumscribed  problem,  viz.,  according  to  what 
rules  propositions  follow  from  given  propositions.  It  is 
therefore  conceivable,  on  the  one  hand,  that  this  system  during 
the  entire  Middle  Ages,  when  science  was  directed  not  to  research 
but  to  proof,  passed  as  the  highest  philosophical  norm,  and  on 
the  other  hand  that  this  system  in  the  Renaissance,  which  was 
filled  with  a  need  for  new  knowledge  and  sought  an  ars  mveui- 
endi,  was  set  aside  in  every  part  as  insufficient.  Indeed  the 
limitations  of  the  system  of  Aristotle,  like  its  greatness,  consisted 
in  its  attention  to  the  entire  process  of  inference  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  subsumptive  relations  between  concepts.  It 
analyzed  these  relations,  moreover,  with  absolute  completeness. 
See  Ueberweg,  St/stem  der  Logik^  §  100  f. 

Proof  and  inference,  which  make  np  the  form  of  the 
completed  science,  presuppose  ultimate  premises,  which  are 
not  derived  from  more  univei'sal  propositions  but  arc  imme- 
diately certain  (^ayueaa)?  These  {ap-)(aX  d-TToSei^eoi^)  are,^ 
in  part  the  axioms  that  rule  all  knowledge,  among  which 
are  the  law  of  contradiction  and  that  of  the  excluded 
middle;  in  part  special  propositions,  applying  to  the  separate 
branches  and  those  arrived  at  only  from  the  exact  knowl- 
edge of  the  objects  *  themselves. 

The  highest  principles  of  explanatory  theory  cannot  be 
Accordingly  demonstrated,  but  only  strengthened  as  to  their 
validity  for  all  particulars.      They  must  be  sought  out  by 

^  His  investigation  also  concerning  contradiction,  indirect  proof,  and 
false  conclusions  answers  this  end. 

2  A?ml.post.,  I.  3,  72  b,  18.  3  j^id.,  7,  75  a,  39. 

*  Anal,  prior.,  I.  30,  46  a,  17. 


ARISTOTLE  25S 

science  in  its  development  (investigation  in  distinction  from 
diroBei^L'i^.  The  process  of  induction  {iiraywyj]) ,  as  opposed 
to  deduction,  promotes  this  attempt.  Induction  ascends 
from  the  facts  of  experience  {ifiireipla)  and  the  opinions 
{hSo^a)  about  experience  to  the  universal  conceptual  defi- 
nitions by  which  the  former  are  explained.  This  task  of 
investigation,  directed  to  the  establishment  of  principles,  is 
called  Dialectic  1  by  Aristotle.  The  Topics  develop  its 
method.  Its  results  are  not  logically  certain  in  themselves, 
but  only  probable.  They  have,  however,  the  character  of 
knowledge  in  so  far  as  they  explain  phenomena ;  while  on 
the  other  hand  this  dialectic,  operating  as  it  does  with 
probable  proof  (eVt;^et/3?7/LtaTa)  forms,  where  it  is  used  in  the 
practical  service  of  politics,  the  scientific  foundation  of 
rhetoric. 

Immediate  certainty  formed  an  extremel}'  difficult,  but  also  the 
most  important,  tenet  of  the  Aristotelian  theory  of  knowledge.  In 
contrast  to  Plato,  the  Stagirite  here  distinguished  the  logical 
from  the  psychological  point  of  view  in  a  very  suggestive  way. 
The  ultimate  and  fundamental  propositions,  from  which  all 
inference  proceeds,  are  logicalh'  undemonstrable,  but  they  are 
neither  psychologicallv  innate,  nor  are  the\'  gained  in  early  life. 
They  must  rather  be  won  from  experience,  through  which  the}' 
cannot  be  demonstrated  but  only  presented.  What  the  nature 
of  these  highest  principles  is,  Aristotle  did  not  explain.  From 
the  logical  laws  valid  for  all  sciences,  he  mentioned  only  the 
above,  —  especially  the  principle  of  contradiction  as  the  most 
unconditional  and  most  universal  fundamental  principle.^  He 
emphasized  very  righth'  that  particular  principles  belong  to  the 
individual  sciences,  but  he  did  not  develop  these  in  detail. 

What  Aristotle  understood  by  induction  is  to  be  carefuUv  dis- 
criminated from  the  present  meaning  of  the  word.  He,  for  in- 
stance, did  not  mean  by  induction  a  kind  of  proof  that  is  different 
from  the  syllogism,  but,  on  the  contrary,  a  method  of  research 
and  discovery.  From  this  ver}-  fact  he  was  satisfied  in  its 
application  with  a  relatively  universal  (cVi  to  ttoXv)  everywhere, 
where  human  knowledge  does  not  lend  to  the  absolutely  univer- 
sal.    The    syllogistic   explanation  of  all  particulars  from    uni- 

1  Met.,  III.  2.  1004  1),  25 ;    Top.,  I.  2,  101  b,  2. 

2  i/e;_^  ixi.  3,  1005  b,  17. 


254  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

versal  principles  floated  before  him  as  the  ultimate  ideal  of  all 
science.  But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  material  of  experience 
reaches  in  main'  ways  (and  everywhere  in  the  special  sciences) 
only  to  an  approximate  comprehensiveness,  which  satisfies  the 
needs  of  explanation  within  empirical  limits.  At  this  point 
Aristotle  caused  the  investigator  of  nature  to  assume  the  role 
that  the  philosopher  is  obliged  to  relinquish. 

Another  practical  point  of  view,  the  political,  supplements 
scientific  exactness  in  the  science  of  rhetoric  by  means  of 
instructive  persuasiveness  {ivOvfirjfia),  which  is  supported  upon 
what  is  in  general  true.  Accordingly  rhetoric  in  the  scientific 
form  that  Aristotle  first  gave  to  it,  is  in  respect  to  its  purpose, 
an  auxiliary  science  of  politics.  But  in  its  content  and  the 
technism  developed  from  it,  it  is  a  branch  of  Dialectic  and 
the  Topics.  For  if  a  speech  be  parliamentary,  juridical,  or 
aesthetic  (ctu^^ovAcutikov,  Slkuvlkov,  iTTiScLKTiKov  ycvos —  Rhetoric, 
1,  3),  it  must  always  begin  with  popular  ideas  in  order  to  lead 
the  auditors  to  the  speaker's  goal.  We  can  refer  here  only  in  a 
general  way  to  tlie  accurac}'  of  the  applied  ps\chology  with 
which  Aristotle  gave  his  directions  in  the  Rhetoric. 

When  Aristotle  thus  regarded  the  derivation  of  the 
particular  from  the  universal  as  the  ultimate  problem  of 
science,  but  maintained  that  the  insight  into  the  highest 
principles,  though  not  indeed  proved,  is  sought  for  and 
clarified  by  the  epagogic  investigation  based  upon  facts,  this 
apparent  circle  of  reasoning  explains  itself  from  the  con- 
ception which  he  held  of  the  human  thinking  process  and 
its  relation  to  the  essence  of  things.  He  held  this,  more- 
over, in  intimate  connection  with  his  general  view  of  the 
world.  For  he  meant  that  the  historical  and  psychological 
development  of  human  knowledge  corresponds  inversely  to 
the  metaphysical  and  logical  connection  of  things,  in  that 
the  thinking  process,  bound  as  it  is  to  sense  perception  and 
developing  from  it,  is  recipient  of  the  phenomena  ;  and 
that  then  from  the  phenomena  it  advances  by  induction  to 
a  conception  of  the  true  essence  of  things.  Out  of  this  as 
their  fundamental  ground  the  perceivable  things  arose,  and 
are  therefore  to  be  entirely  explained  by  the  perfected 
science  through  the  process  of  deduction. 


ARISTOTLE  255 

The  inverted  parallelism  in  wliieh  the  method  of  deduction 
{Analytics)  and  that  of  investigation  {Topics)  exist  in  Aris- 
totle's teaching,  is  explained  by  his  distinction  between  ps}x*ho- 
logical  and  logical  relations.  That,  for  instance,  which  is  the 
Trporepov  Trpos  r//iias,  i.  e.,  the  phenomena,  is  the  vrmpov  rfj  ^vau ; 
conversel}',  that  which  is  the  Trporepov  rrj  ^vcret,  i.  e.,  the  essence  of 
the  thing,  appears  in  the  development  of  our  ideas  as  the  va-repov 
Trpos  rifia<;.^  While  the  relationship  between  cause  and  effect  is 
identical  with  that  between  ground  and  consequent  for  the  ideal 
of  a  perfect  explanatory  science,  this  relation  in  the  genesis  of 
knowledge  is  inverted.  In  investigation  the  (sensible  and 
particular)  result  is  the  basis  of  our  knowledge  of  (conceptual 
and  universal)  cause.  As  soon  as  we,  in  accordance  with  the 
philosopher's  explanations,  discriminate  between  the  ideal 
problems  of  explanatory  science  and  the  actual  process  of 
investigations  leading  to  it,  all  apparent  differences  and  difficul- 
ties of  some  of  his  single  expressions  vanish.  Aristotle  made 
use  of  his  universal  metaphysical  concepts  of  possibilit}-  and  actu- 
ality (§  41,  and  Zeller,  IIP.  198  f )  for  conceiving  the  psycho- 
genetic  development  of  perception  in  his  explanatory-  theory',  in 
that  he  assumed  that  the  concept  of  Essence  that  has  not  come 
actually  into  consciousness  is  latent  as  an  undeveloped  possi- 
bilit}'  in  sense  representation. 

The  most  important  point  is  that,  accord inglj",  human  knowl- 
edge can  obtain  a  conception  of  the  essential  and  the  permanent 
only  through  exact  and  careful  scrutin\-  of  the  facts.  In  these 
teachings  Aristotle  theoreticalh"  adjusted  Platonism  to  empiri- 
cal science.  Aristotle  was  not  at  all  the  nominalist  or  empiri- 
cist that  he  has  been  represented  here  and  there ;  but  he 
showed  that  the  problem  which  Plato  set  for  himself,  and  which 
he  made  liis  own,  was  to  be  solved  only  through  the  widest 
elaboration  of  the  facts. 

The  fundamental  philosophical  question  about  the  con- 
ceptual essence  of  that  which  really  is,  could  be  solved, 
according  to  Aristotle,  only  in  systematic  connection  with 
the  explanation  of  the  facts.  The  logical  form  of  these 
solutions  for  which  all  science  accordingly  strives,  is 
Definition  2  (opto-/Lt6?)  in  which  the  permanent  essence  (ovaia, 
TO  rt  riv  ehai)  is  established  as  the  ground  of  the  changing 
conditions  and  manifestations  (to.  a-Vfi^e^rjKOTa)  for  every 

1  Anal,  post.,  I.  2,  71  b,  34. 

2  See  especially  the  sixth  book  of  the  Topics. 


256  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

single  phenomenon  ;  but  at  the  same  time  the  conceptual 
dependence  upon  the  more  universal  is  expressed.  The 
logical  form  is  therefore  the  judgment  of  determination  in 
which  the  subject  is  defiued  by  its  superordinated  class-con- 
cept and  by  its  own  specific  characteristic.  These  deter- 
minations of  concepts  are  based  partly  upon  deduction  and 
partly  upon  induction,  but  they  in  turn  presuppose  ulti- 
mately undcrivable  and  only  illustrable  definitions  of  the 
highest  class-concepts  {yii/r}). 

Concepts  appear  thus  here  as  content  of  immediate  knowledge, 
and  their  unfolding  (the  analytical  judgments  of  Kant)  gives 
the  highest  axioms  of  the  deductive  theories.  See  Zeller,  IIP. 
190  f.  Here  appears  a  wider  development  of  the  Socratic- 
Platonic  principle  for  the  exi)lanation  of  reality.  M.  Rassow, 
Arist.de  notionisdefinitioi^edoctrimi  (Berlin,  1843);  C.  Kiihn, 
De  notionis  definitione  qualem  Arist.  constituerit  (Halle,  1844). 

The  Aristotelian  system  of  concepts  has  no  point  of  uni- 
fication like  the  Platonic  Idea  of  tlie  Good.  As  a  scientifi- 
cally inclined  thinker,  he  remained  entirely  conscious  of 
the  many  possible  independent  points  of  departure  for 
scientific  theory,  and  he  demanded  only  that  every  branch 
of  knowledge  should  grow  from  his  [jcculiar  principle.  He, 
however,  made  no  attempt  to  collect  and  systematically  to 
arrange  the  indemonstrable  principles  (Secret?  dvajroSeiKToi), 
and  just  as  little  the  resulting  immediate  premises  {irpoTa- 
a€i<i  dfMeaoi). 

The  possible  kinds  of  predicates,  the  Categories,  are  the 
highest  class-concepts  for  logical  investigation,  and  are 
irreducible.  They  represent  the  different  points  of  view 
under  which  the  different  concepts  can  be  made  elements 
of  a  proposition  or  judgment  by  virtue  of  the  factual  rela- 
tions of  their  contents.  Aristotle  gave  ten  ^  categories  : 
oucria,  TToaov,  ttoiop,  7rp6<i  ri,  ttov,  iroTe,  irotelv,  Trda'^^eiv, 
Keicrdai,  e;^eiy.     He  sometimes,  however,  omits  the  last  two.^ 

1  Top.,  I.  9,  103  b,  21  ;  De  cat.,  4,  1  b,  25. 

2  Anal,  post.,  I.  22,  83  b,  16;  Phys.,  V.  1,  225  b,  5;  Met.,  IV.  7, 
1017  a,  24. 


ARISTOTLE  257 

A.  Trendelenburg,  Gesch.  der  Kategorienlehre  (Berlin, 
1846)  ;  H.  Bonitz,  Arist.  Studien,  Part  VI. ;  Fr.  Brentano, 
Von  der  mannigfachen  Bedeutiing  des  Seienden  nach  Arist. 
(Freiburg  in  Breisgau,  1862);  W.  Schuppe,  Die  arist. 
Kategorieii  (Gleiwitz,  1866)  ;  Fr.  Zelle,  Der  Unterschied  in 
der  Auffassung  der  Logik  hex  Arist.  u.  K^<nit  (Berlin,  1870)  ; 
G.  Bauch,  Aristotelische  Studien  (Dobberan,  1884) ;  W. 
Luthe,  Die  arist.  Kategorien  (Ruhrort,  1874)  ;  A.  Gercke, 
Ursprung  der  arist.  Kategorien  {Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Ph..,  IV. 
424  f.). 

Metaphysical  motives  enter  into  Aristotle's  theor}'  of  the  cate- 
goriea  no  more  than  into  his  whole  system  of  logic,  which  has, 
as  its  most  general  presupposition,  the  identity  of  the  Form  of 
thought  witli  that  of  Being.  The  principle  of  this  theor\'  is 
manifestly  concerned  with  the  office  tlic  elements  of  judgment 

(ra    Kara    ^rj^tftiai'    (TVi.nrXoKT]v    Acydjueva,  —  cat.    4)    are    fitted   tO 

assume  in  the  judgment  itself.  The^-  are  either  that  whereof 
affirmation  is  made,  and  which  can  onl}"  be  subject,  i.  e.,  the 
oiWa,  the  Ti  icTTL ;  or  tliat  which  is  predicated  of  the  substance, 
and  is  to  be  thought  as  actual  onl}'  in  connection  with  it.  Aris- 
totle made  this  contrast  of  the  ovaia  to  all  the  other  categories 
(Anal,  post.,  I.  22,  83  b,  24).  Under  the  avfi/^i/^qKOTa  he  dis- 
tinguished {Jlet.,  XIII.  2,  1089  a,  10)  only  modes  and  relations 
(irddr],  Trpos  ti).  In  the  minute  enumeration  of  possible  pred- 
icates, the  advance  is  unmistakable  from  quantitative  and 
quaUtative  determinations  to  spatial  and  temporal  relations  and 
thence  to  causal  relations  and  dependence.  Also  the  grammati- 
cal distinctions  of  substantive,  adjective,  adverb,  and  verb,  appear 
to  play  parts  in  the  ten  or  eight  categories.  The  medial  catego- 
ries, Keia-dai  and  Ixtti',  were  held  i)y  the  philosopher  occasionally 
as  unnecessary,  compared  to  the  active  and  passive. 

41.  Aristotle's  attempt  to  reconcile  the  theory  of  Ideas 
with  his  empirical  conception  of  the  world  is  developed 
in  liis  JIt'tapli/sics,  cliiefly  in  his  theory  concerning  that 
which  really  is  {ovaia).  The  conviction  that  only  a  con- 
ceptual nniversal  can  be  the  object  of  true  knowledge,  i.  e., 
absolute  actuality,  forbids  us  thinking  the  content  of  tem- 
porary, particular  perceptions  as  ovaia.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  conviction  that  the  universal  does  not  have  a 
higher  actuality,  separated  from  sense  objects,  forbids  the 
hypostasizing  of  class  concepts  in  the  Platonic  manner. 

17 


258  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

True  actuality  is  the  individual  which  is  thought  of  con- 
ceptually  in  contrast  to  changing  states  and  conditions 
{(TVfi^e/SrjKOTa).  Accordingly  in  it,  and  only  in  it,  does  the 
general  determination  (etSo?)  become  actual.  The  ulti- 
mate object  of  scientific  knowledge  is  neither  the  particular 
form  perceived  nor  the  schemata  of  abstraction,  but  the 
thing  which  maintains  its  conceptual  essence  in  the  change 
of  its  sensible  phenomenal  asaects. 

In  the  concept  of  the  ovcn'a,^oth  antithetical  tendencies  of 
Aristotelian  thought  come  together  in  such  a  way  that  his  defini- 
tion thereof  is  as  difficult  as  it  is  important.  Here  is  a  task 
which,  as  it  happens,  is  not  faciUtated  bj-  the  technical  use  of 
the  word  ouo-ia  in  the  preserved  writings.  Plato  gave  form  to 
this  concept  in  antithesis  to  ycVto-t?,  and  constructed  the  same 
opposition  between  Aoyos  and  ato-^T/o-is,  and  Aristotle  remained 
everywhere  loyal  to  the  same  use  of  the  terms.  But  he  gave 
objectively  to  ova-ta  and  accordingly'  subjectivel}'  to  Aoyo?  an 
entirely  different  content.  He  asserted  most  positively'  that 
complete  metaphysical  f^ality  belongs  only  to  the  individuals  ^ 
as  over  against  a  dualism  \(;^u)/)t(r|uos).  The  class  concepts  (et8>7 
and  yivTj,  species  and  gerlera)  are  always  only  qualities,  which 
are  common  to  several  things,  can  be  actual  onl3'  in  things,  and 
predicated  ^  of  things.  They  subsist  not  Trapa  ra  TroXAa  but 
Kara  ttoXXwv.^  This  factor  in  the  teaching  of  Aristotle  makes 
him  later  appear  as  the  opponent  of  scholastic  realism,  i.  e.,  as 
the  opponent  of  the  recognition  of  the  metaphysical  priority  of  the 
class  concepts,  and  it  makes  him  also  appear  as  a  nominalist  by 
the  same  sign.  This  tendency  is  expressed  so  strongl3'  in  the 
preserved  form  of  the  writing  Trept  Karrjyopiwv  *  that  there  the 
individual  things  are  designated  as  Trpwrat  oia-iaL,  beside  which 
the  yevrj  can  be  called  only  by  way  of  derivation  Sevrepai  ova-lai. 
On  the  other  hand,  Aristotle  distinguished  with  exactitude  every 
present  perception  of  phenomenal  things  from  the  eonceptuallj- 
recognizable  substances  (rj  Kara  tov  Xoyov  ova-ia).^  He  asserted 
that  these,  permanent  in  contrast  to  phenomena,  are  determined 
by  the  ctSos.     The  cTSos  is  true  Being :  to  ti  ^v  ctvai  cKaara)  koi 

1  Met.,  II.  6,  1003  a,  5. 

2  Ibid.,  VI.  13,  1038  b,  8;  Anal. post.,  I.  4,  73  b,  26. 
'  Anal,  post.,  I.  11,  77  a,  5. 

*  De  cat.,  5,  2  a,  11.     See  Met.,  TV.  8,  1017  b,  10. 

*  Met.,  V.  1,  1025  a,  27. 


ARISTOTLE  259 

T17V  TrpwTTjv  ovmav.^  This  ovata  is,  theu,  the  essence  which  is 
determined  and  recognizable  by  its  universal,  permanent 
qualities.  It  is  an  essence  which  is  the  basis  of  the  perceptual 
phenomenal  forms.  Therefore  ova-La  can  sometimes  mean  es- 
sence, sometimes  species,  sometimes  Form,  sometimes  stuff. 
Met.,  VI.  3,  1028  b,  33  ;  Zeller,  IIP.  344  f. 

Metaphysical  reality  is,  then,  to  be  found  between  the 
class-forms  and  the  perceptual  forms :  viz.,  in  the  concept- 
ually determined  individual  thing.     Aristotle  attempted  to 
obviate  the  difficulty  of  this  manner  of  representation  by 
the  universal  relationship  Avhich  governs  his  entire  under- 
taking :    the  relationship  of  matter_to  Forrru-Qf-^o&^ihility 
to  its  actualih/.      This  mediation  between  the  universal, 
conceptual   essence  of  things  and  its  particular,   percep- 
tual phenomenon,  he  found  in  the   Principle  of  Develop]- 
ment.      His    conception    of   the  nature  process    (^yiveaiA^^ 
was:  that  therein  the  permanent,  original  essence  (oucrta)!  »■«< 
of  things  passed  over  from  mere  possibility  {8vvafjii<i),  into  d>A/v^*-*^/%^A-* 
actuality    {ivepyeia} ;    that    this    process    completes    itself  -Awv.iA-^* 
when  matter  (vXr]),  which  contains  all  possibilities  in  itself,  /-vsjjJS- 
yields  to  the  Form  (e28o<;,  fjbop4>v)  that  is  latent  in  it.    Aris-f  -a-i-A** ,■'— ^ 
totle  took  analogies  in  part  from  human  technical  activity,10'Y\i^'^^Wsi, 
and  in  part  from  the  life  of  organic  bodies,  for  grounding 
this  theory,   and   they  became   to    him    the   fundamental 
ideas  of  his  conception  of  the  world. 

These  fundamental  ideas  were  for  Aristotle  the  universal  form 
of  apperception,  under  which  he  regarded  all  things  and  sought 
to  solve  all  problems,  —  sometimes  too  in  a  very  schematic  way. 
When  we  speak  of  a  formalism  of  the  Aristotelian  method,  the 
formalism  lies  in  the  predominance  of  these  concepts  of  relation, 

^  Met.,  VI.  1032  b,  1.  The  apparent  terminological  contradiction 
between  this  passage  and  De  cat.  5,  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the 
categories  are  spurious.  The  contradiction  is  explained  away  by  the 
fact  that  on  the  one  hand  ovaia  means  sometimes  the  perceived  thing 
(Met.,  n.  4,  999  b,  14,  ovala  altrdriTf),  ibid.,  VII.  2,  1028  b,  24)  some- 
times essence,  while  £?§«?,  on  the  other  baud,  means  sometimes  species- 
concept,  sometimes  Form. 


260  HISTORY   OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

which  are  not  alwaj'S  in  point  of  content  the  same  for  the 
philosopher.  This  is  shown  very  plainly  in  their  application  to 
the  problematic  relation  of  the  particular  with  the  universal.  On 
the  one  hand,  that  is  to  say,  the  class  forms  the  undetermined 
possibility  {v7roKct)u£vov,  dopiarov)  which  is  not  actual  for  itself 
alone :  viz.,  the  material  which  is  formed  and  accordingly  actual- 
ized in  the  oiaia  by  a  specific  difference  (reXevTaia  6ia<f>opa).^ 
On  the  other  hand,  these  universal  determinations  are  also 
the  Forms  through  which  and  on  account  of  which  all  actualiza- 
tion of  the  possible  is  explicable.'^  There  is  no  doubt  that 
Aristotle's  acceptation  of  the  double  meaning  (Form  and  Class- 
concept)  of  the  elSos  is  an  important  factor  in  the  unsolved 
difficulties  of  the  situation. 

The  examples  that  Aristotle  used  **  for  elucidating  this  funda- 
mental relationship,  viz.,  house,  statue,  growth  of  plants,  prove 
on  the  one  hand  that  the  principal  motive  of  this  most  impor- 
tant doctrine  was  the  need  of  explaining  process  and  change  ; 
on  the  other  hand,  that  the  philosopher  had  in  mind  sometimes 
the  work  of  tlie  artisan  upon  the  plastic  material  and  sometimes 
the  organic  process  of  development.  The  ratification  therein 
found  of  the  teleological  presupposition  develo[:ed  to  a  universal 
principle  of  explanation.  Aristotle  is  throughout  governed  by 
Plato  in  this  formation  of  his  fundamental  principle,  and  the 
ascendenc}'  of  his  philosophy  wholly  obscured  the  mechanical 
conception  of  the  world  of  Democritus. 

In  this  connection  Aristotle  perfected  in  these  concepts  of 
relation  the  ripest  synthesis  of  the  Heracleitan  and  F^leatic  prin- 
ciples that  inspired  ancient  philosoph}-.  Those  who  had  tried 
to  recognize  the  permanent  had,  Plato  not  excepted,  not  been 
able  to  explain  Becoming.  Those  to  whom  change  was  patent 
had  been  able  to  give  to  it  either  no  substrate,  or  no  meaning 
comprehensible  in  view  of  the  essence  of  that  which  really  is. 
Aristotle  established  the  concept  of  that  which  possesses  Being 
as  the  substance  that  realizes  itself  and  is  conceived  in  the  pro- 
cess from  possibility  to  its  actualization.  He  believed,  accord- 
ingly, that  this  definition  satisfied  both  the  ontological  and  tiie 
genetic  interest  of  science.     The  earlier  systems,  he   taught,* 

1  Arist.  Met.,  VII.  6,  1045  a,  23. 

^  Precisely  for  this  reason  Aristotle  has  used  oima  and  tlBos  many 
times  as  equivalents,  while  in  the  stricter  meaning  the  oiala  is  a  avvo- 
Xoj/  f^  vXrjs  Koi  fi8ovs- 

3  Met.,  VI.  8,  1033  a,  27  ;  VII.  2,  1043  a,  14  ;  VIII.  6,  1048  a,  32  ; 
Phys.,  I.  7,  190  a,  3,  etc. 

*  Phys.,  I.  6  ff. ;  especially  I.  8,  191  a,  34. 


ARISTOTLE  261 

have  furnished  the  proof  that  Becoming  is  to  be  explained  as 
derived  neillier  out  of  that  which  is  nor  out  of  that  which  is  not, 
nor  out  of  the  union  of  Uie  two.  So  it  remained  to  conceive  of 
that  which  is  as  something  which  in  its  inmost  essence  is  in  the 
process  of  development.  It  remained  also  to  formulate  the  con- 
cept of  Becoming  so  that  it  formed  the  transition  from  a  condi- 
tion of  a  substratum,  tliat  no  longer  is,  to  one  that  not  jet  is,  for 
which  tiie  transition  is  essential. 

Compare  J.  C.  Glaser,  Die  Metaphysih  cIps  Arist.  (Berlin, 
1841)  ;  F.  Ravaisson,  Essai  siw  la  Metaj^hysique  d' Arist.  (Paris, 
1837-46)  ;  J.  Barthelemy  St.  Hilaire,  De  la  Metaphysique  (Paris, 
1879)  ;  G.  v.  Hertling,  Materie  unci  Form  bei  Arist.  (Bonn,  1871). 

The  fundamental  relation  betw-een  matter  and  Form  is 
applied  on  the  one  hand  to  individual  things,  and  on  the 
other  to  relations  between  things  in  such  a  way  that  insight 
into  the  essence  of  Becoming  (Jas  G-esehehen)  is  made  to 
result  from  it.  In  every  individual  thing  Form  and  matter 
are  in  such  correlation  that  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as 
formless  matter  or  matterless  Form.  But  precisely  on  this 
ac«>unt  they  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  distinct  pre-existi^ig 
potencies  which  have  found  their  union  in  the  individual  ;^ 
but  the  same  unitary  essence  of  the  individual,  in  so  far  as 
it  is  a  potentiality  and  in  so  far  as  it  is  viewed  only  as  a 
possibility,  is  matter;  and  in  so  far  as  it  presents  a  complete 
actuality  it  is  Form.  There  exist  neither  pure  potentialities 
nor  perfectly  actualized  Forms.  The  ovcria  is  not  merely 
hwdfiet,  nor  purely  evepyeia.  It  is  rather  a  potentiality,  in 
the  continuous  process  of  actualization.  The  temporal 
change  in  its  conditions  is  determined  by  the  changing 
measm-e  of  this  actualization.  Aristotle  called  the  poten- 
tiality which  belongs  to  the  essence  of  the  individual^  and 
comes  to  reality  in  the  individual,  the  ia-xc'i'^v  ^^V' 

^  The  potential  tree  and  the  complete  tree  do  not  exist  independent 
of  and  before  the  growing  tree.  They  are  only  different  conceptions  of 
the  thing  that  is  forming  itself  in  the  tree. 

2  Met.,  YIJ.  6,  1045  b,  18  ;  VI.  10,  1035  b,  30.  The  expression  is  used 
in  the  logical  sense.    In  the  descending  process  from  the  most  universal, 


262  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

On  the  other  hand,  this  relationship  becomes  entirely  dif- 
ferent whenever  it  obtains  between  different  individual 
things.  In  this  case,  where  one  is  the  receptive  matter  and 
the  other  is  the  moulding  Form,  the  two  stand  also  in  a  rela- 
tion of  necessary  reciprocity.  Yet  they  exist  also  indepen- 
dent of  each  other,  and  only  in  their  union  create  the  new 
thing  in  that  now  the  one  is  the  matter  and  the  other  is  the 
Forra.^  In  all  these  cases  the  relation  of  Form  and  matter 
is  only  a  relative  one,  because  the  same  thing  can  be  con- 
ceived in  one  aspect  as  Form  and  in  another  aspect  as 
matter  for  a  higher  Form. 

There  is,  therefore,  a  scale  of  things  in  which  every  indi- 
vidual is  the  Form  in  respect  to  what  is  beneath  it  and  the 
matter  in  respect  to  what  is  higher.  This  system  of  devel- 
opment must,  however,  have  a  limit,  both  below  and  above : 
below  in  a  matter  which  is  no  longer  Form  ;  above  in  a  Form 
which  is  no  longer  matter.  The  former  is  stuff-material 
(TrpoiTi]  v\7])  ;  the  latter  is  pure  Form  or  Godhood  {to  tl  rjv 
elvat  TO  irpwTov).  Since,  however,  matter  is  pure  possibility, 
it  does  not  exist  for  itself,  but  ever  in  formed  states.  It  is, 
nevertheless,  the  foundation  for  the  realization  of  all  par- 
ticular Forms.  On  the  other  hand,  the  concept  of  pure  Form, 
as  absolute  reality,  excludes  all  matter,  all  pure  possibility, 
and  signifies  accordingly  perfect  Being. 

Aristotle  did  not  expressly  formulate  the  two  different  uses  of 
the  schemata  of  possibilit}'  and  actuality,  matter  and  Form  {polen- 
\Ua  and  actus),  but  he  thoroughh'  applied  them  in  practice.    One 

undetermined  possibility  (npayrr]  vXtj)  to  ever  narrower  definition  of 
essence  and  logical  determination,  the  specific  difference,  by  which  the 
individual  is  distinguished  in  its  genus  prozimum  from  other  individuals, 
is  "  the  last."  This  difference  coincides  with  the  form  of  the  individual. 
Yet  sometimes  this  is  entirely  turned  about  and  designated  as  rrpwrTj  vXtj 
of  the  individual.     See  Met.,  IV.  4,  1014  b,  32. 

1  Thus  the  timber  exists,  and  the  thought  of  the  house  in  the  head  of 
the  builder  exists,  each  by  itself.  The  house  is  the  result  of  the  co- 
operating influence  of  the  Form  of  the  latter  with  the  material. 


ARISTOTLE  263 

nse  of  these  terms  is  suited  to  organic  development,  the  other  to 
technical  activity.  In  this  difference  alone  can  be  explained  the 
fact  that  this  difficult  subject  is  sometimes  so  presented  as  if 
BvvafiLs  and  ivepyeta  were  identical  in  essence,  and  only  different 
ways  of  conception  or  phases  of  development  of  the  same  ovata 
uniting  ciSos  and  vXrj  in  itself.  At  other  times  Form  and  matter 
are  represented  as  separate  realities,  which  influence  each  other. 
There  is  a  kind  of  reconciliation  between  both  methods  of  repre- 
senting the  case  ;  for  also  in  the  first  method  the  two  factors, 
which  are  separated  only  in  abstracto  are  ^et  so  treated  as  if  one 
influenced  the  other  ;  ^  the  automatic  or  self-developing  process 
is  so  presented  as  if  it  divided  itself  into  a  moving  Form  and  a 
moved  Stufif.^ 

In  presenting  matter  ^  thus  on  the  one  hand  as  the  not-yet 
actual,  on  the  other,  nevertheless,  as  the  unoriginated  and  inde- 
structible* basis  {vTroK€Lfi€vov)  of  all  Becoming,  in  conceiving 
the  system  of  the  latter  as  an  unbroken  progress  from  possibility 
to  actuality,  finally  in  defining  tiie  Godhead  as  an  absolutely 
pure  exclusion  of  all  possibility  from  himself,  the  Aristotelian 
philosophy,  like  the  Platonic,  established  differing  grades  and 
kinds  of  metaphysical  reality.  The  lowest  is  matter  whose  posi- 
tive character  is  recognized  by  Aristotle  in  his  rejection  of  the 
Democritan-Platonic  term  fxi]  ov  and  in  his  desire  to  cj\11  it 
o-repijo-ts  in  so  far  as  it  is  thought  in  abstracto  as  deprived  of  all 
Form.  The  highest  is  the  Form  complete  in  itself  and  entirel}' 
changeless,  corresponding  to  the  Idea,  or  ama  of  Plato.  Between 
tiiese  two  extremes  there  is  the  whole  realm  of  graded  things, 
in  which  and  between  which,  movement  passes  from  the  lower  to 
the  higher  grades  of  actuality.  Different  grades  of  knowledge 
correspond  in  Aristotle  to  the  different  grades  of  Being.  Matter 
as  the  a^iopf^ov,  aircLpov,  and  aopiarov,  is  also  the  dctSe's  and  the 
ayvuxTTov.^  Since  all  systematic  knowledge  is  directed  toward 
the  €t8os  and  the  ovcria,  and  God  is  pure  form  and  primary  es- 
sence, the  object  of  the  highest  and  most  perfect  knowledge  is 
the  Godhead.  The  things  of  Becoming  must,  however,  be  con- 
ceived in  that  their  eiSos  is  developed  out  of  their  v\rj. 

^  As  shown  especially  in  the  activity  of  the  soul ;  §  42. 

2  Phys.,  III.  2,  202  a,  9. 

^  See  Jas.  Scherler,  Darstellung  und  Wurdigung  des  Begriffs  der 
Materie  hei  Arist.  (Potsdam,  1873). 

*  Met.,  VII.  1,  1042  a,  32  ;   3,  1043  b,  14. 

5  Phys.,  III.  6,  207  a,  25;  Met.,  VI.  10,  1036  a,  8;  De  ccelo,  III.  8, 
306  b,  17. 


264  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHY 

Motion,  Becoming,  and  Change  is  a  transition  from  the 
condition  of  possibility  to  that  of  actuality,  and  is  based 
in  part  upon  the  essence  of  the  individuals  themselves,  in 
part  upon  their  relations  to  one  another.  Development 
belongs  accordingly  to  the  nature  of  things,  and  is  eternal, 
without  beginning  or  end.^  Every  motion  (/ciVr;o-t<?)  presup- 
poses on  the  one  hand  moved  material,  which  is  the  primal 
state  of  possibility,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  moving  Form, 
which  is  the  final  state  of  actuality.  Form  is  then  the  cause 
of  the  motion  which  is  to  be  found  ^  in  that  which  really  is. 
In  so  far  as  the  ivepjeta  creates  this  process  of  actualization, 
it  is  also  called  by  Aristotle  evreke-xeia.  On  the  other  hand, 
motion,  precisely  as  transition,  is  determined  not  only  by  that 
which  is  about  to  become  and  which  exercises  the  impelling 
force ;  but  also  by  that  out  of  which  it  is  to  become,  —  by 
the  matter  to  be  changed  and  bearing  in  itself  the  possibility 
of  change.  Matter  stands,  however,  in  an  essential  relation 
to  its  Form,  and  has  therefore  the  tendency  to  realize  ^  the 
Form,  In  this,  matter  reciprocates  the  influence  of  Form. 
As  possibility,  it  is  also  possibility  for  something  else,  and 
in  so  far  it  conditions  movement  to  the  extent  of  preventing 
perfect  realization  of  the  Form,  and  of  bringing  about  inci- 
dental results  which  do  not  directly  follow  from  the  Form. 
In  this  sense  matter  is  the  cause  of  the  imperfect  and  the 
accidental  in  nature. 

Thus,  according  to  Aristotle,  two  kinds  *  of  causes  are 
to  be  distinguished  in  the  explanation  of  motion  :  the 
formal  causes  and  the  material  causes.  The  former  are 
teleological  (ov  eveKa) ;  the  latter  are  mechanical  (e^ 
dvdjKr)^').  Pui-pose  and  nature-necessity  arc  of  equal  im- 
portance as  principles  of  the  cosmic  process.  The  Platonic 
and  Democritan  explanations  of  nature  are  reconciled  in 
the  relation  of  Form  and  matter. 

1  Phys.,  VIIT.  1,  252  b,  5.  2  ^Ifg^.,  VIII.  8,  1049  b,  24. 

8  Phjs.,  L  9,  192  b,  16.  *  De  part,  an.,  I.  1,  639  b,  11. 


ARISTOTLE  265 

Aristotle  incidentally  ^  distinguished  four  principles  (ap^ni)  in 
explaining  movement :  vX-q,  ciSos,  vcf>  ov,Te\o<;.  But  the  tliree  last 
are  together  always  contrasted  with  the  first.  If  the  three  are 
sometimes  separated  in  the  realm  of  particular  processes,  they 
form  nevertheless  more  frequentl}-  onl}'  one  principle  (especially 
in  the  organic  development  of  the  individual)  in  that  the  essence 
of  the  fact  (ctSos),  as  the  thing  to  be  realized  (re'Aos),  is  the  mov- 
ing force  (klvovv). 

In  this  sense  as  teleological  cause  the  substance  or  essence  is 
entelech}'.  The  expressions  ivepyeia  and  ivreXexeta  are  gener- 
ally indifferently  used  in  Aristotle,  and  an  exact  difference  is 
hardly  attempted,  certainly  not  developed,  between  the  two 
words.  See  Zeller,  IIP.  350  f.  The  etymology  of  the  word 
TcAo?  is  obscure  ;  see  R.  Hirzel,  ivreXex^ia  unci ivSeXe^eia  {Rliein. 
Museum,  1884). 

The  reality,  which  Aristotle  ascribed  to  matter,  appears  most 
significanth'  in  the  reciprocal  actions  that  he  gave  to  it  in  its 
relation  to  final  cause.  It  is  due  to  the  indeterminateness  of 
vXr/,^  that  the  Forms  are  imperfectly  realized.  In  this  respect 
matter  is  a  principle  of  obstruction.  Hence  it  follows  that  for 
Aristotle  nature's  laws,  which  originate  in  the  conceptual  forms 
of  things,  are  not  without  exceptions,  but  are  valid  only  l-n-l  to 
TToXv.^  In  this  way  he  explained  unusual  phenomena,  repara,  — 
abortions,  monstrosities,  and  the  like.  But  furthermore  the 
positive  character  of  matter  appears  in  tliat  it  leads  to  acciden- 
tal results  *  in  motion  on  account  of  its  indeterminate  possi- 
bilities, and  these  accidents  aie  not  immediateh'  involved  in  the 
essence  or  purpose.^  Aristotle  named  these  av^/Se/SrjKOTa, 
accidental ;  their  appearance  he  called  chance,  avrofiarov  ;  ^  and, 
within  the  region  of  purposed  events,  rvxV'''  Aristotle's  con- 
ception of  accident,  therefore,  is  entirely  teleological.  It  is  also 
logical  so  far  as  the  purpose  is  identical  witli  the  concept.  See 
W.  Windelband,  Die  Lehren  vom  Zufall  (Berlin,  1870^  p.  58  f., 
59  flf.  '  ' 

The  application  of  the  name  dmy/oy  to  the  efl^iciency  of  the 
stuff  makes  us  at  once  see  Aristotle's  intention  of  recojinizino: 

1  Met.,  I.  3,  983  a,  26  ;  IV.  chap.  2;  Phys.,  II.  3,  194  b,  23. 

2  De  gen.  an.,  IV.  10,  778  a,  6. 

3  De  part,  an.,  III.  2,  663  b,  28  ;  De  gen.  an.,  IV.  4,  770  b,  9. 
*  Phys.,  II.  4  ff. 

s  These  hai)pen  7r«/>a  (fivaiv  {Phys.,  II.  6,  19  7  b,  34),  in  whicli  (pvais 
=  ovaia  =  et'Sos.  Compare  the  exprost;ioii  napacpvds,  Eth.  Nic,  I.  4, 
1096  a,  21. 

6  Phijs.,  IT.  6,  197  b,  18.  1  Ibid.,  5,  196  b,  23. 


266  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

the  Democritan  principle  of  mechanism,  while  at  the  same  time 
the  teleological  activity  of  the  Form  is  manifestly  only  a  de- 
velopment of  the  Platonic  concept  of  the  alria.  Democritus 
thought  that  an  event  is  determined  only  through  what  pre- 
ceded it ;  Plato  thought  an  event  determined  bj-  what  shall 
issue  from  it.  Aristotle  sought  to  reconcile  this  antagonism, 
and  so  he  attributed  to  matter  one  kind  of  determination  and  to 
form  the  other  kind.  His  teaching  is  therefore  the  last  word  of 
Greek  philosopliy  on  the  problem  of  Becoming  (§  13). 

But,  however  much  the  pliilosopher  takes  account  of  the 
Democritan  motive,  yet  in  this  solution  the  Platonic  thought 
obviously  preponderates.  For  not  onl}-  the  higher  actuality 
belongs  to  the  final  cause  in  contrast  to  that  of  the  material 
cause,  but  also  in  their  operations  the}-  are  so  distinguished  that 
all  results  of  value  come  from  the  final  cause,  while  all  that  is 
less  important  comes  from  the  material  cause.  Matter  is  the 
ground  of  all  imperfection,  change,  and  destruction.  To  its 
positive  capacity  for  obstruction  and  deflection  Aristotle 
ascribed,  with  a  far  better  right,  all  those  consequences  with 
which  Plato  overloaded  the  firj  w.  This  preference  of  the  Stagi- 
rite  for  his  teacher  shows  itself  also  in  his  introduction  of 
mechanical  causes  under  the  names  ovvaLTiov  and  ov  ovk  dvev, 
which  are  taken  from  the  Phmdo  and  the  Timmus}  In  this 
way  mechanical  causes  are  characterized  directly  as  causes  of 
the  second  class,  or  accidental  causes.  Matter  alone  could  not 
move,  but  if  it  is  moved  by  the  Form,  it  nevertheless  is  a  deter- 
mining factor  in  the  movement.  Matter  is,  then,  in  ever}- 
respect  a  secondary  cause. 

With  this  active  antagonism  the  Aristotelian  teaching  mani- 
fests, in  spite  of  its  effort  at  harmony,  an  expressly  dualistic 
character  which  ancient  thought  could  not  overcome.  For  the 
independence  of  existence  and  activity,  attributed  to  matter  in 
the  explanation  of  nature,  permeates  the  entire  S3'stem  along  with 
his  fundamental  monistic  principle,  that  matter  and  Form  are 
essentially  identical,  and  matter  is  onl}'  a  striving  toward  the 
realization  of  Form.  All  the  oppositions  meet  finally  in  Aris- 
totle's conception  of  God. 

Every  motion  in  the  world  has  a  (relative)  apxi->  which 
is  the  Form  that  causes  it.  Since,  however,  on  account  of 
its  connection  with  matter,  this  Form  is  also  itself  moved, 
the  series  of   causes   would   have   no  end  ^  unless   there 

1  Phys.,  II.  9,  200  a,  5  ;  Met.,  IV.  6,  10  15  a,  20. 

2  Mel.,  XL  6,  1071  b,  6. 


ARISTOTLE  267 

exists,  as  an  absolute  dp^v  of  all  motion,  the  pure  Form, 
the  sharer  of  no  mere  possibility  and  therefore  of  no 
motion,  —  the  Godhead.  Itself  unmoved,  it  is  the  cause  of 
all  motion^  tlie  TrpMTov  klvovv.^  Eternal  even  as  motion  ^ 
itselfPunitary  and  single  even  as  the  band  of  the  entire 
system  ^  of  the  universe,  and  unchangeable,*  it  calls  all  the 
motions  of  the  world  forth,  but  not  by  its  own  activity. 
That  would  be  a  motion  in  which  the  Godhead,  as  without 
matter,  cannot  share.^  But  it  calls  forth  all  the  motion  of 
the  world  through  the  desire  of  all  things  for  it,  and 
through  the  endeavor  of  all  things  to  actualize  Kara  to 
hvvarov  the  Form  that  is  eternally  realized  in  the  Godhead. 
As  the  object  of  desire,  it  is  the  cause  of  all  motion :  KLvel 

CBf  ip(i)fjL€VOV.^ 

The  essence  of  the  Godhead  is  immateriality,''  perfect  in- 
corporeality,  pure  spirituality,  vov<i.  It  is  thought,  which 
has  no  other  content  than  itself  (vorjai';  vor](r€(o<i),^  and 
this  self-contemplation  (dewpi'a)  is  its  eternal  blessed  life.^ 
God  wishes  nothing,  God  does  nothing.^''  He  is  absolute 
self-consciousness. 

In  the  conception  of  the  Godhead  as  the  absolute  Spirit  who, 
himself  unmoved,  moves  the  universe,  Aristotle's  theory  of 
nature  culminated  in  such  a  way  that  he  designated  his  science 
of  principles  as  a  theology.  The  scientific  establishment  of 
monotheism,  which,  since  Xenophanes,  formed  a  leading  theme 
of  Greek  philosophy,  appeared  here  completed  as  its  ripest 
fruit.  In  its  form  it  is  like  the  so-called  cosmological  proof; 
in  its  content,  through  its  concept  of  the  Godhead  as  a  pure 
spirit,  it  is  far  superior  to  all  the  earlier  atterai)ts.  The  funda- 
mental  principles   of  Plato   are  just    at  this  point,    however, 

1  Met.,  III.  8,  1012  b.  31.  2  Ph>/s.,  VIII.  G,  258  b,  10. 

8  ifet.,  XI.  8,  1074  a.  3G. 

*  avaXXoiWos  and  d7ra6(')s '■   Met.,  XI.  7,  1073  a,  11. 
5  Ihid,  1072  b,  7.  6  [i,;,i_  io72  a,  26. 

'   Ihid.,  1073  a,  4  :  Kf)((opiafxevri  raiv  aladTjToiv. 
f  Ibid..  1074  b,  34  ^  Ihid.,  1072  b,  24. 

10  Eth.  Nic,  X.  8,  1178  b,  8  ;  De  crelo,  II.  12,  292  b,  4. 


268  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

decisive  for  Aristotle.  For  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  centres  ^ 
in  God  nil  attributes  whicii  Plato  had  ascribed  to  the  Ideas,  and 
the  wa}-  in  which  the  Stagirite  determined  the  relation  of  God 
to  the  world  is  onl}'  the  exact  and  sharp  definition  of  the  teleo- 
logical  principle,  which  Plato  had  indicated  by  the  ama.  On 
this  account  the  Aristotelian  Godhead  shares  with  the  Platonic 
Idea  the  characteristic  of  transcendence.  In  his  theolog}', 
Aristotle  is  the  perfecter  of  Platonic  imniaterialisra.  Thought 
conceived  itself  and  hjpostasized  its  self-consciousness  as  the 
essence  of  the  Godhead. 

The  self-sufficiency  of  the  God  of  Aristotle,  to  whose  absolute 
perfection  there  can  be  no  want,^  whose  activit}',  directed  u[)on 
himself  and  upon  naught  else,  can  be  no  activity  nor  creation 
in  our  sense  of  the  word,  did  not  satisfy  the  later  religious 
need.  This  idea  is,  however,  the  true  corner-stone  of  his 
83'stem,  and  at  the  same  time  eloquent  testimony  for  the  theo- 
retic character  of  tlie  Aristotelian  philosopliy. 

Jul.  Simon,  De  cleo  Aristotelis  (Paris,  1839)  ;  A.  L.  Kym, 
Die  Gotteslehre  des  Ari. stole fes  und  das  Christentum  (Zi'irich, 
1862) ;  L.  F.  Goetz,  Der  aristotelisclie  Gottesbegriff,  mil  Bezug 
auf  die  christliche  Gottesidee  (Leipzig,  1871). 

42.  Aristotle  looked  upon  nature  as  the  organic  bond 
of  all  individuals,  which  actualize  their  Form  in  their 
motions,  and  in  their  totality  are  determined  by  pure  Form 
as  their  highest  purpose.  There  is,  therefore,  only  this 
one^  world,  and  this  world  is  permeated*  in  its  activity 
with  a  purpose  both  in  the  motions  and  relationships  of 
the  individual  things.  The  actualizing  of  the  purposes 
of  things,  however,  occurs  always  through  the  motion  of 
matter.  (Kivrjai^  or  fxera^oXi]).  This  motion^  is  either 
change    of   place    (Kara   to    ttov  —  cfiopd),   or   change    of 

^  Therefore,  in  contrast  to  Speusippus,  the  Homeric  citation  is  given 
in  the  spirit  of  monism  :  ovk  dyaOov  noKvKoipav'ir)  •  els  Koipavos  eaTco- 
Met.,  XI.  10,  1076  a,  4. 

2  He  is  avTdpxrjs.     Ibid.,  XIII.  4,  1091  b,  16. 

3  De  ccelo,  I.  8,  276  a,  18  ;  Met.,  XI.  8,  1074  a,  31. 

*  Phys.,  II.   2  and  8;  I)e  ccelo,  I.  4,  271  a,  33  :  6  dfos  koi  v  0iW 
ov8eu  fiaTTjv  iroiova-iv.     Polit.,  I.  8,  1256  b,  20. 
6  Phys.,  V.  2,  225  b,  18 ;  II.  1,  192  b,  14. 


ARISTOTLE  269 

quality  (^Kara  to  iroiov  —  dWolcoaL'i^,  or  change  in  quan- 
tity {Kara  to  iroaov  —  av^r]ai<;  kuI  ^Oiai'i). 

Ch.  Leveque,  La  physique  d'Aristote  et  la  science  confem- 
poraine  (Paris,  1863). 

4>v(rL<;  was,  in  truth,  in  Aristotle  not  a  substance,  nor  an 
individual,  but  a  unitary  somewhat,  the  total  teleologieal  life  of 
the  corporeal  world.  In  this  sense  he  spoke  of  the  activities, 
purposes,  etc.,  of  nature.  In  connection  with  his  theor}'  of 
nature  belongs  therefore  also  that  of  the  soul,  because,  although 
not  corporeal  itself,  the  soul  as  Form  of  the  body  is  its  principle 
of  motion.  On  the  contrary,  all  those  bodies  are  excluded  from 
his  definition  of  nature  which  get  their  form  and  motion  from 
human  activity,  and  not  from  their  own  essence.^ 

Teleolog}"  in  Aristotelianism  was  not  only  a  postulate,  but 
also  a  developed  theory.  It  was  not  at  all  a  mythical  imagining, 
but  an  essential  docti'inal  principle.  The  Platonic  principle  in 
this  theory  did  not  displace  the  Democritan,  but  the  Democritan 
is  accepted  as  a  factor,  since  the  mechanical  motion  having 
its  basis  in  the  material  appears  as  a  means  toward  the 
actualization  of  the  Form. 

The  teleologieal  fundamental  principle,  that  there  is  a  rela- 
tionship of  rank  and  value  among  phenomena,  governs  Aris- 
totle's conception  of  the  three  kinds  of  motion.  Cliange  of 
place  is  the  lowest,  3et  it  is  indispensable  to  the  higher  processes. 
For  qualitative  changes  perfect  themselves  alwa3S  by  spatial 
dislocations,  like  condensation  and  rarefaction.'-  On  the  other 
hand,  growth  is  always  conditioned^  by  the  qualitative  processes 
of  assimilation  and  the  consequently  necessar}'  spatial  changes. 
Thus  tliis  division  makes  the  gradation  into  mechanical,  chemi- 
cal, and  organic  processes,  in  which  the  higher  always  involves 
the  lower. 

Under  the  class  concept  of  ^era^oAr/,  which  is,  to  be  sure, 
often  made  equivalent  to  Kti/T^o-is,  Aristotle  contrasted  origina- 
tion (yeVccris)  and  destruction  ((f>9opa)  to  KLyrja-t^  in  the  nar- 
rower sense.  This  kind  of  change  concerns,  however,  onh*  the 
compounded  individual  things,  since  there  is  no  a])solute  origi- 
nation and  destruction  i"*  further,  one  of  the  three  kinds  of  motion 
is  always  present  in  this  change. 

In  his  investigation  into  the  fundamental  principles  of 
mechanics,  Aristotle  came  to  look  upon  the  world  as  limited 

1  Phys.,  II.  1,  193  a,  31.        2  //^/,/,^  vill.  7,  260  b,  4. 
8  Ibid.,  260  a,  29;  De  gen.  et  corr.,  I.  5.  320  a,  15. 
*  Ibid.,  3,  317  a,  32. 


270  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

in  space,  but  on  the  other  hand  as  moving  in  time  without 
beginning  or  end.  He  disallowed  reality  to  empty  space, 
and  denied  actio  in  distans.  Motion  is  possible  only  through 
contact.^ 

The  form  of  the  limited  world-all  is  the  most  perfect, 
i.  e.,  it  is  a  sphere.  Within  the  world  there  are  two  funda- 
mental kinds  of  motion,  —  in  a  circle  and  in  a  straight 
line.  Of  these  two,  the  former,  as  self-limiting  and  unitary, 
is  the  more  nearly  perfect,  while  the  latter  involves  the 
opposition  of  the  centripetal  and  centrifugal  directions. 
These  primitive  spatial  motions  are  distributed  among  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  matter.  The  natural  medium  of  the  circular 
motion  is  the  aether,  out  of  which  the  heavenly  bodies  are 
formed.  Motions  in  straight  lines  belong  to  the  elements 
{(TToi-x^eia)  of  the  terrestrial  world. 

Thus  Aristotle  separated  his  world-all  into  two  essen- 
tially different  systems :  the  heaven  with  the  regular, 
circular  motions  of  the  aether,  and  the  earth  with  the 
changing,  antagonistic,  and  straight-line  motions  of  the 
elements.  The  heaven  is  the  place  of  perfectness,  regular- 
ity, and  changelessness.  The  earth  is  the  theatre  of  im- 
perfection and  of  the  eternally  changing  manifold.  While 
earthly  things  come  and  go,  while  their  qualities  are 
received  and  lost,  while  on  earth  there  is  increase  and 
diminution,  yet  the  stars  do  not  Become  nor  pass  away. 
Like  the  blessed  gods,  they  suffer  no  change,  and  in  un- 
changeable revolutions  they  move  in  orbits  eternally  the 
same. 

In  the  definition  of  space  (totto?)  as  "  the  boundar}'  of  an 
enclosing  body  on  the  side  of  the  enclosed  "  ^  Aristotle  went 
beyond  the  relative  space  relationships  of  particular  bodies,  but 
did  not,  therefore,  reach  an  intuition  of  space.  In  contesting 
the  notion  of  the  void,  he  had  Democritus  ^  particularly  in  mind. 

1  Phys.,  III.  2,  202  a,  6. 

2  Ibid.,  IV.  4,  211  b,  14 ;  De  ccelo,  IV.  3,  310  b,  7. 
»  Phys.,  IV.,  4-6. 


ARISTOTLE  271 

In  the  dispute  as  to  the  reality  of  space,  he  contended  against 
Plato's  position,  to  whose  construction  of  the  elements  he 
opposed  ^  the  distinction  between  mathematical  and  physical 
bodies.  Against  the  notion  of  the  endlessness  of  the  corporeal 
world  (aTTcipov)  he  maintained  -  that  the  world  can  be  thought 
onlv  as  complete  and  perfected,  as  a  fully  formed  thing.  Time, 
on  the  contrar}-,  as  the  "  measure  of  motion  "  ^  and  as  not  actual 
in  itself,  but  used  only  for  computing,^  is  beginningless  and 
endless,  like  the  motion  that  belongs  necessarily  to  Being. 
Therefore  the  Aristotelian  philosophy  offered  in  opposition  to 
all  earlier  philosophy  no  picture  of  a  creation  of  the  world,  and 
contended  against  in  this  respect  the  presentation  in  the  Platonic 
Timceus. 

On  the  other  hand,  his  philosophy'  in  its  essentials  was  greatly 
influenced  b}'  the  Timceus.  For  the  antagonism,  formulated 
b}'  Aristotle  in  an  authoritative  way  for  many  hundred  years,  — 
the  antagonism  between  the  heavenly  and  the  terrestrial  world, 
—  was  based  entirely  upon  that  which  Plato  had  developed  in 
his  divisions  of  the  world  (see  Plato),  and  also  upon  those 
dualistic  reflections  that  had  been  peculiar  to  the  Pythagoreans 
in  earl}'  times.  Aristotle  developed  these  notions  in  a  theoretic 
way.  He  gave  the  theory'  greater  forcefulness  conceptually  than 
had  been  the  case  with  Plato's  mathematical  development  of  it ; 
these  notions  became  transformed  at  once  into  qualifications  of 
value. 

Such  a  theory  obtained  also  in  the  contrast  drawn  between 
the  aetlier  and  the  four  elements.  Also  in  this  the  Eleatic  in- 
variabilit}-,  unoriginatedness,  etc.,  was  attributed  to  the  God- 
head ^  in  that  he  explained  the  stars  as  living  things  moved 
by  reasoning  spirits  of  a  higher  and  superhuman  order  ^  (Oela 
a-wfiaTa)J  Therefore  there  must  be  for  these  a  better  matter, 
the  aether,  corresponding  to  their  higher  form. 

Aristotle's  particular  conceptions  concerning  mechanical  mo- 
tion have  no  peculiarities.  His  very  anthropomorphic  division 
into  drawing,  pushing,  carrying,  and  turning  he  did  not  further 
develop,  and  he  did  not  reach  the  point  of  formulating  laws  of 
mechanics. 

O.  Ule,  Die  Baumtheorien  des  Arist.  und  KanVs  (Halle, 
1850)  ;  A.  Torstrick,  Ueher  des  Arist.  Ahhandlang  von  der  Zeit 
(Philol.    1868) ;    H.    Siebeck,    Die   Lehre   des  Arist.  von   der 

1  De  ccelo,  III.  1,  299  a,  12.  2  pj^yg^  ni.  5  f. 

3  Ibid.,  IV.  11,  220  a,  3.  *  Ibid.,  14,  223  a,  21. 

6  Meteor.,  I.  3,  339  b,  25.  «  ^;^,  jVjc,  VI.  7,  1141  a,  1. 

"  Met.,  XI.  8,  1074  a,  30. 


272  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

JSwigkeit  der  WeU  ( Unters.  z.  Fh.  d.  G.,  1873) ;    Th.  Poselger, 
Arist.  luechanischeProbleme  (Hannover,  1881). 

The  astronomical  theory  of  the  Stagirite  was,  that  around 
the  stationary  sphere  of  tlie  earth  tlie  hollow  spheres  revolve 
concentrically,  in  which  spheres  the  moon,  sun,  live  planets, 
and  the  fixed  stars  are  placed.  Aristotle  conceived  that 
these  last,  by  virtue  of  their  relatively  unchanging  position, 
have  only  a  common  sphere.  This  heaven  of  fixed  stars 
in  the  outermost  circle  of  the  world  is  set  in  motion  by  the 
Godhead,^  while  the  other  spheres  find  the  principle  of  their 
movements  in  their  own  spirits.  Aristotle  followed  here 
Eudoxus  and  Callippus,  the  pupil  of  Eudoxus,  when  in  his 
explanation  of  aberrations  he  ascribed  to  the  planets  a  plural- 
ity of  spheres  dependent  on  one  another  in  their  movements. 
The  star  concerned  was  supposed  to  have  its  seat  in  the 
lowest  of  these  spheres.  He  conceived  in  his  development 
of  this  theory  fifty-five  spheres  in  all.  The  motions  of  the 
planets  influence  the  motions  of  the  elements,  and  in  this 
way  the  planets  in  general  influence  terrestrial  life. 

The  theory  of  the  spheres  in  the  form  establislied  under  the 
name  of  Aristotle  inished  aside  the  riper  conceptions  of  tlie 
Pythagoreans  and  Platonists.  It  itself  had  to  yield  later  to  the 
hypothesis  of  the  epicvcles.  J.  L.  Ideler,  Ueher  Eudoxus 
(Abhandl.  d.  Berl.  Acad.,  1830). 

Aristotle  provided  for  a  later  demonology  in  his  theory  of  the 
subordinate  gods  of  the  spheres  of  the  planets,  as  on  the  other 
hand  his  theory  of  the  dependence  of  eartlily  existence  on  the 
stars  gave  occasion  for  astrological  superstition.  To  the  chang- 
ing positions  of  the  sun,  moon,  and  jilanets  in  relation  to  the 
earth,  he  attributed  the  character  of  eternal  change,  which 
in  earthly  life  is  to  be  contrasted  with  the  eternal  regularity  of 
the  "  first  heaven."  ^ 

Aristotle  developed  the  differences  between  the  earthly 
elements  from  their  tendencies  to  move  in  straight  lines  iu 

*  Kivtl  at  fpafitvov,  as  above  mentioued. 
'  De  gen.  et  corr.,  II.  10,  336  b,  11. 


AllISTOTLE  273 

opposite  directions.  Fire  is  the  centrifugal,  earth  the  cen- 
tripetal element.  Between  tlie  two  there  is  tlie  air,  which 
is  relatively  liglit,  and  the  water,  which  is  relatively  heavv 
Therefore  the  earth  has  its  natural  place  in  the  middle 
point  of  the  world-all  ;  and  successively  toward  the  peri- 
phery of  the  heaven,  stand  water,  air,  and  fire. 

Bat  the  elements  have  qualitative  differences  as  well  as 
mechanical,  and  these  are  not  originally  and  in  particular 
derived  from  mathematical  differences.  In  their  develop- 
ment^ Aristotle  nsed  the  same  pairs  of  opposites  which  had 
played  a  great  role  already  in  the  most  ancient  nature- 
piiilosophy  and  afterward  in  the  younger  physiology.  These 
opposites  were  warm  and  cold,  dry  and  moist.  Of  these 
four  fundamental  kinds  of  sensation,  he  called  the  two 
first  active  and  the  two  last  })assive,  and  constructed  accord- 
ingly out  of  the  fonr  possible  combinations  the  qualities  of 
the  four  elements,  each  one  of  which  must  include  ^  an  active 
and  passive  quality.  Fire  is  warm  and  dry ;  air  is  warm 
and  moist ;  earth  is  cold  and  dry  ;  water  is  cold  and  moist. 
No  element  appears  unmixed  in  any  individual  thing;  on 
the  contrary,  there  is  a  mixture  of  all  elements  in  each 
thing. 

Aristotle  explained  the  common  elemental  meteorological 
phenomena  by  means  partly  of  the  mechanical,  partly  of  the 
chemical  qualities  of  the  elements,  using  the  earlier  theories 
in  a  most  comprehensive  way.  j^loreoverhe  made  a  special 
study  of  the  distinctly  chemical  processes,  and  distinguished 
between  bodies  of  equal  and  of  unequal  parts,  and  investi- 
gated the  origin  of  new  qualities  arising  from  the  combina- 
tion of  simple  bodies. 

Concerning  the  predecessors  of  Aristotle  as  to  the  doctrine  of 
the  elements,  see  Zeller,  IIP.  441,  2.  For  Aristotle  to  have 
assumed  the  four  elements  of  Empedocles  is  consistent  with  the 
traces  elsewhere  found  of  the  influence  of  that  philosopher.     The 

^  Be  gen.  et  con:,  II.  2  and  S.  -  Meteor.,  IV.  1,  378  b,  12. 

18 


274  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

assertion  as  to  the  priraariness  of  qualities  was  aimed  expressly 
against  Plato  and  Democritus,  and  therewith  Aristotle  turned 
away  from  mathematical  science  to  an  anthropocentric  view  of 
nature.  For,  inasmuch  as  the  first  qualities  of  the  elements 
were  deduced  from  tactile  sensations,  so  the  wider  chemical 
investigations  were  chiefly  derived  from  mixtures  of  other  sense- 
qualities,  especially  from  those  of  taste  and  smell,  but  also  as 
well  from  those  of  hearing  and  sight.  In  this  way  the  investiga- 
tions of  physiological  ps3chol()gy  {De  an.,  II.,  and  in  smaller 
treatises)  complete  the  specific  chemical  treatments  which  form 
Meteorologia,  IV. 

The  contrast  of  active  and  passive  qualities  involved,  on  the 
one  hand,  the  thought  of  the  internal  vitality  of  all  bodies.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  led  in  the  whole  of  the  system  to  the  applica- 
tion which  the  different  kinds  of  matter  receive  in  the  organisms. 
Yet  the  present  division  into  organic  and  inorganic  chemistr}-  is 
not  to  be  read  into  his  division  of  ot^oio/tcp^  and  avofioLOfieprj, 
even  if  the  latter  were  also  designated  as  more  completely  repre- 
senting organic  purposiveness. 

That,  finally,  this  beginning  of  chemical  science  at  first  had  at 
its  disposal  very  sporadic  and  inexact  knowledge,  and  in  Aris- 
totle was  still  limited  ^  to  clumsy  methods  of  experimentation, 
like  boiling,  roasting,  etc.,  cannot  be  wondered  at.  Neither  does 
it  detract  from  the  value  of  the  first  special  treatment  of  chemical 
problems.     See  Ideler,  Meteorologia  veterum  (Berlin,  1832). 

The  series  of  grades  of  living  creatures  is  determined  by 
differences  of  soul,  which  as  the  entelecliy  of  the  body  ^  in 
all  things  is  the  Form  that  moves,  changes,  and  fashions 
matter.  Souls  also  have  a  relative  ranking.^  Tlie  lower 
can  exist  without  the  higher,  but  the  higher  only  in  con- 
nection with  the  lower.  The  lowest  kind  of  soul  is  the 
vegetative  (to  OpeirrcKov),  which  is  limited  in  its  functions 
to  assimilation  and  propagation,  and  belongs  to  plants. 
The  animal  possesses  in  addition  to  this  the  sensitive  soul 
(to  aladtjTtKov),  which  at  the  same  time  is  appetitive  (ope- 
KTiKov),  and  has  also  to  some  degree  the  power  of  locomotion 
(jav7)TLKov  Kara  roirov).  Man  possesses,  besides  both  these 
other  souls,  reason  (to  BiavorjTiKov  re  koX  vovs:). 

1  Meteor.,  IV^.  f.  2  £)e  an.,  II,  1,  412  a,  27. 

»  Ibid..  3.  414  b,  29. 


ARISTOTLE  275 

The  purposiveness  of  the  organism  is  explicable  from  the 
activity  of  the  soul.  The  soul  builds  ^  for  itself  out  of 
matter  the  body  as  an  organ,  or  as-  a  system  of  organs.  It 
finds  its  limitations  only  in  conflict  with  matter,  whose 
nature-necessity  leads  to  Forms,  that  are  from  the  circum- 
stances purposeless  or  purpose-thwarting. 

The  significance  of  Aristotle  as  an  investigator  of  nature 
lies  in  his  development  of  organology.  Under  his  principal 
teleological  treatment  came  the  questions  of  sy stomatology, 
of  morphology,  of  anatomy  and  physiology,  and  of  biology, 
in  a  way  that  was  for  his  time  exhaustive  and  for  many  cen- 
turies authoritative.  His  philosophical  principle  was  that 
nature  strives  upward  from  the  very  first  signs  of  life,  which 
signs  can  be  seen  even  in  inorganic  processes,  and  that 
the  striving  is  expressed  in  an  unbroken  series  from  the 
lowest  kinds  of  spontaneous  creations  to  the  highest  form 
of  terrestrial  life  which  is  manifested  in  man. 

When  Aristotle  conceived  the  soul  as  a  principle  of  inde- 
pendent motion  of  the  individual,  he  attributed  to  it  a  number 
of  functions  (especially  all  the  vegetative)  which  pass  in  the 
present-day  science  as  purely  physiological.  The  soul  was 
thought  b}'  Aristotle  to  be  incorporeal  but  nevertheless  bound 
to  matter  which  is  the  possibility  of  its  activity  and  does  not 
therefore  exist  for  itself  alone.  It  has  its  seat  in  a  particular 
organic  matter,  —  in  the  Oepfxov  or  the  irvcv^a,  —  which  is  related 
to  the  aether  and  is  supposed  to  be  found  in  animals  in  the 
blood  chiefl}'.  In  this  doctrine  Aristotle  allowed  himself  to  be 
misled  back  into  the  popular  view,  which  was  opposed  to  the  in- 
sight of  Alcma^on,  Demociitus,  and  Plato,  that  the  heart  is  the 
principal  organ  of  the  soul ;  and  the  brain  plays  the  secondary 
rOle  of  a  cooling  apparatus  for  the  blood  boiled  in  the  heart. 
The  spiritus  animales  of  later  times  were  developed  theoreti- 
cally from  Aristotle's  physiological  psychology. 

The  three  grades  of  life  of  the  soul  correspond  in  general, 
although  onh'  very  vaguely,  to  Plato's  three  divisions  of  the  soul. 
Yet  this  doctrine  is  conceived  and  developed  with  much  more 

1  See  classical  development  of  the  human  form  :  De  part,  an.,  IV.  10, 
68Ga,  25. 


276  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

conceptual  sliaipness  and  clearness  in  Aristotle  than  in  his 
predecessor. 

Aristotle's  predilection  for  teleology  in  the  realm  of  the  or- 
ganic sciences,  in  which  his  thoroughgoing  treatment  of  the 
facts  most  brilliantly  appears,  in  no  way  hindered  the  care  of 
his  observations  and  comparisons.  It  rather  sharpened  to  a 
high  degree  Iiis  insight  into  the  anatomical  structure  of  the 
organs,  their  morphological  relations,  their  physiological  func- 
tions, and  their  biological  significance.  Some  mistaken  analogies 
and  unfortunate  generalizations,  which  have  been  correctl}' 
enough  charged  against  him  by  modern  investigators,  cannot 
injure  the  fame  which  is  due  him  in  this  field.  They  are  only 
the  excrescences  and  imperfections  of  his  great  and  comprehen- 
sive conception.  In  details  he  utilized  chiefly  the  previous 
works  of  Democritus,  whose  mechanical  theory,  it  must  be  said, 
had  not  stood  in  tlie  way  of  his  conception  and  admiration  of 
tlie  purposefulness  of  organisms. 

See  J.  B.  Meyer,  Aristoteles'  Tierkimde  (Berlin,  1855)  ;  Th. 
Watzel,  Die  Zo'uloyie  des  Aristoteles  (in  three  parts,  Reichenberg, 
1878-80). 

The  psychology  of  Aristotle  has  two  parts,  whicli,  al- 
though running  over  into  each  other,  still  reveal  the  pre- 
dominance of  two  distinct  scientific  points  of  view:  (1)  the 
general  theory  of  animal  souls,  a  doctrine  of  the  psychical 
processes  which  are  possessed  in  common  by  animals  and 
men,  although  developed  in  man  more  richly  and  more 
nearly  perfectly  ;  (2)  the  doctrine  of  the  pov<;  as  the  dis- 
tinctive possession  of  man.  We  can  designate  these  two 
views  as  the  empirical  and  speculative  sides  of  Aristotle's 
psychology.  The  former  he  treated  essentially  as  an  inves- 
tigator by  carefully  recording,  ordering,  and  explaining  the 
facts.  The  latter  view,  on  the  contrary,  was  governed 
partly  by  his  general  metaphysics,  partly  by  his  interests 
in  epistemology  and  ethics.^ 

K.  Ph.  Fischer,  De  principiis  Aristotelicm  de  anima  doctrincB 
(Erlangcn,  1845)  ;  \Y.  Volkmann,  Die  Grundzuge  der  aristo- 

^  Aristotle  himself  distinguished  between  the  physical  and  philosoph- 
ical treatment  of  the  soul :  De  an.,  I.  403  b,  9;  De  part,  an.,  I.  1,  641  a, 

17. 


ARISTOTLE  277 

telischen  Psycliologie  (Prague,  1858)  ;  A.  E.  Clmignet,  Essai 
sur  la  psycliologie  cVAristote  (Paris,  1883) ;  H.  Sicbeck, 
Geschichte  der  Psychologie,  I.  2,  pp.  1-127  (Gotha,  1884). 

Aristotle  found  predeeessors  in  empirical  psycliolog}',  —  which 
is  partly  physiological  psychology,  as  we  to-day  designate  it,  but 
is  not  entirely'  embraced  by  it,  — partly  iu  the  physicians  and  later 
nature-philosophers,  partly  in  Democritus,  and  also  perhaps  in 
Plato  in  the  Timmus.  But  he  also  betrayed  in  his  theory  of  the 
voCs  the  inclination  which  had  led  all  early  philosophers  to  adjust 
their  conceptions  of  psycholog}'  to  their  epistemological  and 
ethical  views. 

The  animal  ^ul  is  differentiated  from  the  vegetable  soul 
essentially  by  its  concentration  and  unity  (ytteo-oT?;?),^  which 
is  wanting  in  plants.  Sensation  is  the  fundamental  form 
of  activity  (at'o-^^T/o-t?),  which  he  explained^  by  the  con- 
cert of  action  between  the  active,  Form-giving  perceived 
thing  and  the  passive,  impressionable  perceiving  thing, — 
an  action  mediated  in  different  senses  through  different 
media.  The  most  primary  sense  and  common  to  all  ani- 
mals is  the  sense  of  touch,  with  which  Aristotle  likewise 
classified  taste.     In  value,  however,  hearing  is  first. 

However,  the  activity  of  the  special  senses  is  restricted 
to  receiving  those  qualities  of  the  external  world  wdiich  are 
peculiar  to  the  senses  themselves,  —  senses  which  are  in  the 
similarity  of  their  material  adapted  to  sucli  reception. 
The  combination  of  the  psychic  elements,  nevertheless,  into 
complete  perceptions  and  the  conception  of  the  conditions 
of  things,  which  are  common  to  the  different  senses — the 
conception  of  their  number,  their  spatial  and  temporal  con- 
nections, their  conditions  of  motion  —  takes  place  througli 
the  central  sense  organ,  the  "  common-sense  "  (aladrjr-qpiov 
Koivov),  which  has  its  seat  in  tlie  heart.  In  this  central  or- 
gan arises  our  knowledge  of  our  own  activities.^  In  it  the 
ideas  remain  *  as  (pavraaiat  after  the  external  stimulus  has 
ceased.     Imagination  becomes  memory  (fxvr'jfMT])  as  soon  as 

1  De  an.,  IT.  11,  424  a,  4.  ^  jf,i,i^  5^  4^7  ^^  g 

8  Ibid.,  III.  2,  425  b,  17.  *  Ibid  ,  3,  427  b,  14. 


278  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

it  becomes  recognized  as  the  copy  of  an  earlier  perception. 
The  entrance  of  remembered  ideas  is  conditioned  upon  the 
series  in  which  they  are  bound  together.  Upon  the  basis 
of  this  association  of  ideas  voluntary  recollection  is  possible 
in  man  {dvdixvr^cns:).^ 

H.  Beck,  Arist.  de  sensiium  actione  (Berlin,  1860)  ;  A.  Crata- 
cnp,Arist.  de  serisibus  doctrina  (Montpellier,  1866) ;  CI.  Bjiuniker, 
Des  Arist.  Lehre  vo7i  dem  dusseren  und  inneren  Shinesvermogen 
(Leipzig,  1877)  ;  J.  Neuliauser,  Arist.  Lehre  von  dem  sinnlichen 
Erkenntnisvermogen  und  seinen  Organen  (Leipzig,  1878)  ;  J. 
Freudeuthal,  Ueber  den  Begriff  des  Woj-tes  <^uvTao-ia  hei  Aristo- 
teles  (Gottingen,  1867)  ;  Fr.  Seheiboldt,  De  imaginatione  dis- 
quisitio  ex  Arist.  lihris  repetita  (Leipzig,  1882)  ;  J.  Ziaja,  Die 
aristotelische  Lehre  vom  Credcichtnis  und  von  der  Association  der 
Vorstelhmgen  (Leobschiitz,  1882), 

Aristotle's  idea  of  single  processes  of  perception  is  condi- 
tioned b}'  the  general  principles  of  his  philosophy  of  natural 
science,  and  is  in  many  ways  distinguished  from  that  of  his  pre- 
decessors. The  most  important  point  in  the  theoretic  part  of 
his  animal  psychology'  is  his  insight  into  the  S3'nthetic  character 
of  perception,  which  is  expressed  in  the  hypothesis  of  the 
common-sense.  Aristotle  did  not  follow  further  the  valuable 
thought  that  consciousness  of  activities,  i.  e.,  the  inner  percep- 
tion as  distinguished  from  the  objects  of  those  activities,  is 
rooted  in  this  synthesis.  In  the  doctrine  of  the  association  of 
ideas  and  in  the  distinction  between  voluntary'  and  involuntary 
memory  he  scarcely  advances  beyond  Plato. 

Next  to  the  different  grades  of  ideas,  desire  (ope^t?)  is 
the  second  fundamental  form  of  tlie  activity  of  the  animal 
soul.  It  originates  in  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or  displeasure 
(^r/Bv  and  Xvirr/pov),  which  is  derived  from  the  ideas  so  far 
as  the  content  of  these  promises  to  fulfil  a  purpose  or  not. 
Therefore  affirmation  or  negation  results,  which  express 
the  essence  of  the  practical  life  of  the  soul  in  pursuit  or 
in  aversion  (^BicoKetu  —  <p€vyeiv^.^  In  all  cases,  then,  the  idea 
of  the  agreeable  is  the  cause  of  pleasure  and  desire,  and  vice 
versa.     Desire,   however,   calls  ^  forth   teleological   move- 

^  See  the  writing  nepi  ixvrjfx-qs  koI  dvaixv-qatcos. 

2  Be  an.,  III.  7,  431  a,  15.  3  d^  j„gf^  ^^^  7^  701  b.  7. 


ARISTOTLE  279 

ments  of  the  organs  through  their  warming  or  their  cooling 
which  follow  physiologically  from  the  intensity  of  the 
feelings  of  pleasure  and  displeasure. 

In  the  fundamental  division  into  theoretical  and  practical  ^ 
activities  of  souls,  Aristotle  associated  feeling  with  the  desire  as 
a  constant  accompanying  phenomenon.  Yet  he  taught,  on  the 
other  hand,  entirely  in  the  spirit  of  the  Socratic  psj'cholog}',  that 
every  desire  presupposes  the  idea  of  its  object  as  something  of 
value.  He  represented  indeed  the  genesis  of  desire  as  a  con- 
clusion wherein  the  momentarv  content  of  the  idea  is  subsumed 
under  a  more  universal  teleological  thought.^  The  result  is, 
then,  affirmative  or  negative,  as  in  a  conclusion.  It  is,  more- 
over, interesting  that  Aristotle  identified  the  act  of  agreement 
or  disagreement  in  the  practical  functions  of  feeling  and  desire 
exactly  with  the  logical  terms  of  affirmative  and  negative  judg- 
ments (KaTa</)acrts  and  aTro^acn?) .  This  showed  in  him,  not  only 
in  his  psychology  but  in  his  entire  teaching,  the  characteristic 
tendency  to  subordinate  the  practical  under  the  prevailing 
determinations  of  the  theoretical. 

All  these  activities  of  animal  souls  constitute  in  man  the 
material  for  the  development  of  the  Form  peculiar  to  him, 
i.  e.,  the  reason  (vov<i).  No  longer  a  Form  of  the  body,  but 
rather  of  the  soul,  it  is  purely  immaterial,  is  not  to  be  con- 
fused with  the  body  as  a  potentiality,  and  as  mere  Form  it 
is  simple,  unchangeable,  and  incapable  of  suffering.^  The 
vovf  does  not  originate  with  the  body,  as  the  animal  func- 
tions of  the  soul  originate.  It  enters  from  without*  as 
a  higher,  godlike  activity,  and  it  therefore  alone  remains 
after  the  body  has  passed  away.^ 

The  fundamental  activity  of  the  soul  is  thought  (^Siavoeia- 
Oai),^  and  its  object  is  those  highest  principles,  in  which 
the  ultimate  ground  of  all  Being  and  knowing  is  immediately 
(dfiea-a)  conceived.     Only  in  so  far  as  the  reasoning  insight 

1  This  he  also  calls  evfios:  Pol.,  VI f.  7,  1327  b,  40:  see  P.  Meyer, 
6  6vfi6s  apud  Aristotelem  Plalonemque.  Bonn,  1877. 

2  De  mot.  an.,  7,  701  a,  8;  Eth.  Nic,  VII.  5,  1147  a,  26. 

3  De  an.,  III*.  429  a,  15.        *  De  gen  an.,  IT.  3,  736  b,  27. 
6  De  an.,  III.  5,  430  a,  23.      6  Ibid.,  III.  4,  429  a,  23. 


280  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

can  become  the  cause  of  desire,  is  the  reason  also  practi- 
cal.* This  higher  kind  of  opeft?  is  designated  as  ^ovXr]ai<i. 
In  the  human  individual,  however,  the  reason  is  not  pure 
Form  but  self-developing  Form.  Therefore  we  must  again 
distinguish  also  in  human  reason  between  its  potentiality 
and  its  actuality,  between  its  passive  material  and  its  active" 
Form.  Therefore,  although  Aristotle  designated  ^  the  vov^ 
itself  as  iroiovv,  he  contrasted  it  with  its  potentiality  which 
is  capable  of  being  actualized,  as  the  vov<;  ttuOijtiko^. 
This  potentiality  exists,  howev^er,  in  the  theoretic  func- 
tioning of  animal  souls,  yet  only  so  far  as  these  functions 
can  become  in  the  liuman  oiganism  the  occasion  for 
reflection  upon  those  highest  and  immediately  certain 
principles.^  Historical  development  of  the  reason  in  men 
is  therefore  this,  —  that  through  the  persistence  of  sense 
impressions  (^^ovrj^  *  general  notions  arise  (to  irpoirov  iv 
rf]  yjrvxv  Ka66\ou),  and  these  then  form  the  entire  occasion 
in  the  epagogic  process  for  the  knowledge  of  the  actual 
reason  appearing  upon  the  original  tabula  rasa^  of  the  yoO? 
7ra67)TLK6<;.  The  actualizing  of  the  reason  is  dependent 
upon  the  physiological  process  of  representation,  and  it 
remains  so  because  the  sensuous  pictures  are  always  asso- 
ciated also  with  the  supersensible  product  of  the  thinking 
process.^ 

Jul.  Wolf,  De  intellectu  afjente  et  patiente  doctrina  (Berlin, 
1844)  ;  W.  Hielil,  JJeber  den  Hef/rijf  des  vov<i  bei  Aristoteles 
(Linz,  18G4) ;  F.  Brentano,  Die  Psychologie  des  Aristoteles 
insbesoxdere  seine  Xe/ire  vom  voSs  ttoit/tikos  (Mainz,  1867);  A. 
Bullinger,  Aristoteles  Niis-Lekre  (Dillingen,  1884)  ;   E.  Zeller, 

1  De  an.,  III.  10,  433  a,  1.4.  2  /j^y/  ^  5^  430  a,  12,  19. 

8  These  functions  man  shares  with  the  beast ;  but  among  animals 
they  are  not  instruments  of  tlie  reason  because  the  active  principle  of 
reason  is  wanting.  This  relation  does  away  with  the  doubt  raised  by 
Zeller,  IIP.  576  f. 

*  Anal,  post.,  II.  10,  99  b,  36.  ^  £,g  an..  III.  4,  429  b,  31. 

•  Ibid.,  7,  431  a,  16. 


ARISTOTLE  281 

Ueher  die  Lelire  des  Aristoteles  von  der  Excigheit  des  Geistes 
(/Sitzungs-Berichte  der  Berl.  Ak.,  1882). 

The  difficulties  of  Aristotle's  theory  of  the  i/ovs  lie  first  in  the 
tact  that  the  reason  in  our  usual  terminology  is  defined  and 
treated  as  the  peculiarity  of  the  human  soul,  but  it  is  tliereb}'  so 
restricted  tliat  it  can  fall  no  longer  under  the  class  concept  of 
the  soul  as  '•'•  the  entelechy  of  the  body."  With  Aristotle  the  true 
relationship  is  ratiier  this  :  that  the  voSs  bears  tlie  relation  to  tiie 
human  i/'vxv  (^^^'^^^  ''^  ^^^  ^^^  ^'^^^  ^^  ^^""0  ^^  animal  souls)  as  the 
animal  ijl^uxr/ bears  to  the  body.^  In  some  respect  the  distinction 
is  the  same  in  the  German  between  Geist  and  /Seele,  and  in  the 
Middle  Ages  a  similar  distinction  was  made  between  spiritus 
or  spiraculum  and  (ininia.  Therefore  the  reason  in  itself  is 
thought  to  be  pure  actuality,  and  to  have  no  relation  to  the 
body,  to  come  from  without  into  the  body  and  to  live  after  the 
body.  Aristotle's  "  possibility  "  is,  on  the  contrar}',  the  animal 
fpuxv  '  ^"^^  therefore  the  vovs  Tra^vjrtKos  '■^  is  also  mortal  ((ji6apT6<i) . 
On  the  other  hand,  the  animal  i/'^x^/  does  not  become  the  vovs 
ra6riT(.K6<;  until  by  the  influence  of  the  voi)?  TrotijTtKo?  upon  it.  In 
itself  it  is  empty  so  far  as  reasoning  knowledge  goes,  and  only 
offers  the  occasion  for  the  reasoning  knowledge  to  actualize  itself. 

On  account  of  this  the  Aristotelian  didactic  writings  leave  in 
a  very  uncertain  state  the  question  of  individual  immortalitj', 
concerning  which  the  commentators  were  in  livel}-  dispute  even 
until  the  Renaissance.^  For  doubtless,  according  to  the  Aris- 
totelian definition  of  a  concept,  all  those  psycliical  contents 
which  compose  the  essence  of  the  individual  belong  to  the  vov<; 
TTu^r/TiKos,  which  is  destro^'ed  with  the  bod}'.  Pure,  universal 
rational  knowledge  of  the  voBs  ttoit/tikos  has  remaining  in  it  so 
little  that  is  individual,  that  according  to  the  characteristics  that 
are  ascribed  to  it  —  pure  actuality,  unchangeablencss,  and 
eternalness — a  difference  between  it  and  the  divine  spirit  can- 
not be  made  out.  We  cannot  decide  whether  or  by  what  method 
Aristotle  tried  to  solve  this  problem. 

But,  at  any  rate,  his  speculative  psychology  shows  a  strong 
dependence  upon  the  Platonic,  and  particular!}'  upon  the  form  of 
Platonism  in  the  Timceus.  In  both  cases,  to  the  distinction 
between  a  reasoning  and  an  unreasoning  part*  of  the  soul  there 

^  So  the  vovs  in  Aristotle  is  called  a  higher  kind  of  soul:  Z)e  an.,  II. 
2,  413  b,  26. 

2  Ibid.,  III.  5,  430  a,  24. 

'^  See  Windelband,  Gesch.  der  neueren  Phil.,  I.  (Leipzig,  1878),  p.  15  f. 

*  Elh.  Nic,  I.  13,  1102  a,  27.  There  is  also  in  Aristotle  a  voCs 
XcopicTTos  :  De  an..  III.  5,  430  a,  22. 


282  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

is  added  the  postulate  that  the  former  is  immortal  and  the  latter 
is  mortal  with  the  body. 

The  psyeho-epistemological  conception  which  Aristotle  devel- 
oped concerning  the  temporal  actualizing  of  the  vov<;  in  man, 
resembles,  also,  the  Platonic  conception.  For  if  the  epagogic 
processes  of  ^vT^ftrj  and  i/A-n-eipia  lead  to  the  highest  principles, 
whose  certainty  rests  upon  the  immediate  intuition  of  the  vo??, 
if  indeed  the  natural  way  from  the  TrpoVcpov  Trpos  ly^uas  to  the  -n-po- 
repov  TTJ  (fivaci  does  not  include  the  grounding  of  the  highest 
premises,  but  ultimately  only  the  occasion  for  immediate  intuition 
of  the  same  to  enter,  —  then  this  theory  is  only  the  development 
and  refinement  of  the  Platonic  doctrine  of  avdfiVT)(TL<;. 

The  8iaj/ota,  the  knowledge  which  the  reason  possesses,  has  a 
theoretical  and  practical  use  (iirLo-rqfiovLKov  and  AoywrriKov)  .^  The 
former  as  Oewpia  leads  to  iTna-nfin-q^  the  latter  as  i^p6vTqcn<:  to  rexfr]. 
But  it  is  also  true  that  the  practical  reason  in  itself  is  only  a 
theoretic  activity,  an  insight  into  the  right  principles  of  action. 
Whether  the  individual  shall  follow  that  knowledge  or  not 
depends  upon  his  free  choice. 

L.  Schneider,  Die  Unsterhlichkeitslehre  des  Aristoteles  (Pas- 
sau,  1867)  ;  K.  Schlottmann,  Das  Vergdngliche  und  JJnver- 
gdngliche  in  der  menschlichen  Seele  nach  Aristoteles  (Halle, 
1873)  ;  W.  Schrader,  Aristotle  de  voluntate  doctrina  (Branden- 
burg, 1847) ;  J.  Walter,  Die  Lehre  von  der praktischen  Vernunft, 
in  der  griechischen  Philosophie  (Jena,  1874). 

43.  Furthermore,  the  practical  philosophy  of  Aristotle 
was  built  up  on  these  universal  theoretic  principles.  The 
goal  of  evQfy  human  action  is  a  Good,  to  be  realized  by 
activity  (jrpaKTov  u'^aQov).  Yet  this  goal  is  only  a  means 
to  the  highest  goal.  Happiness,  on  account  of  which  all  else 
is  desired.  To  perfect  e^Sat/*oi'ia  belongs  also  the  possession 
of  the  goods  of  the  body,  of  the  outer  world,  and  of  success  ; 
but  since  these  are  only  accessories,  their  lack  will  only  give 
a  certain  limitation  ^  to  the  amount  of  happiness.  The 
essentia]  condition  of  happiness,  on  the  contrary,  is  activ- 
ity, and  indeed,  the  activity  peculiar  to  man ;  that  is,  it  is 
that  of  reason.^ 

Now  the  state  (el^t?)  *  which  renders  possible  to  man  the 

1  Eth.  Nic,  VI.  2,  1139  a,  11,         ^  Tbid.,  VII.  14,  1153  b,  17. 
*  Ibid.,  I.  6,  1097  b,  24,  *  Ibid.,  11.  4,  1106  b,  11. 


ARISTOTLE  283 

perfect  use  of  his  peculiar  activity  is^viftue.  Virtue  has  in 
certain  bodily  qualities  its  natural  aptitude,  out  of  which  it 
is  developed  ^  only  by  use  of  the  reason.  From  the  exercise 
of  virtue,  pleasure  ^  follows  as  a  necessary  result  of  perfect 
activity. 

The  problem  of  the  reason  is  twofold  :  first,  it  is  concerned 
with  knowledge ;  secondly,  with  the  direction  of  desire  and 
action  through  knowledge.  In  this  way,  Aristotle  distin- 
guished between  the  dianoetic  and  ethical  virtues.^  The 
former  are  higher.  They  unfold  the  pure  formal  activity 
of  the  vov<;,  and  give  the  most  noble  and  perfect  pleasure. 
The  human  being  finds  in  them  his  possible  participation 
in  the  divine  blessedness. 

K.  L.  Michelet,  Die  Elhik  des  Aristoteles  (Berlin,  1827)  ;  Q. 
Hartenstein,  Ueber  den  wissenschaftlichen  Wert  der  aristotelischea 
Ethik(\n  Hist.-philos.  Abhandl.,  Leipzig,  1870);  R.  Eucken,  Ueber 
die  Methode  und  die  Grundlageu  der  aristotelischen  Etliik 
(Frankfort  a.  M.,  1870);  P.  Paul,  An  Analysis  of  Aristotle's 
Ethics  (London,  1874)  ;  A.  Olle-lapruno,  De  Aristotelece  ethices 
fwidamento  (Paris,  1880).  Concerning  the  Highest  Good, 
G.  Teichmiiller,  Die  Einheit  der  aristotelischen  Euddmofiie 
(in  Bulletin  de  la  classe  des  sciences  hist.,  etc.,  de  I'academie  de 
St.  Petersbourg,  XVI.  305  ff.).  Concerning  dianoetic  virtues, 
see  C.  Prantl  (Ml'inchen,  1852,  Gliickw.-schr.  an  Thiersch)  and 
A.  Kiihn  (Berlin,  1860). 

The  sense  for  what  is  actual,  the  thoroughgoing  investigation 
of  facts,  and  the  inclination  to  bring  qualitative  distinctions  to 
the  same  touchstone,  are  shown  in  the  practical  philosophy  of 
Aristotle  perhaps  more  than  in  his  theoretical  philosophy.  The 
Nicomachaean  ethics  definitely  refused  to  take  its  point  of  de- 
parture from  the  abstract  Idea  of  the  Good,  adopting  in  its  stead 
llie  Good  so  far  as  it  is  an  object  of  human  activit}'  (I.  1,  1094  a, 
19).  In  the  determination  of  tiie  concept  of  happiness,  also, 
which  to  him  was  obviously  the  highest  good,  he  included  the 
possession  of  material  wealth  and  good  fortune,  although  always 
subordinated  to  the  exercise  of  the  reason,  if  the  reason  is  to 
reach  complete  and  untrammelled  development.  Onl}'  this 
potential  value  justifies  the  consideration  of  earthly  good  in  ethics 

1  Elh.  Nic,  VI.  13,  1144b,  4.        2  m^^^  x.  4,  1174b,  31. 
8  Ibid.,  I.  13,  1103  a,  2. 


284  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

The  dialectic  that  had  been  developed  bj'^  Socrates  upon  the 
(luestion  of  the  relation  of  pleasure  and  virtue  was  completed 
with  exalted  simplicity  by  Aristotle  ;  for  he  taughtj  iOjintago- 
nism  to  the  one-sided  doctrines,  that  pleasure  is  never  the  motive, 
l)Ut  alwaj's  the  result  of  virtue.  Therefore,  also,  the  acLivity.of 
tTie  reason  unfolding  itself  in  virtue  is  always  the  measure  of  the 
vxDith  of  the  ditEerent  pleasures  (Eth.  Xic,  X.  3.  flf.).  ~~'~-~-. 

In  respect  to  the  psychological  characterization  of  virtue, 
Aristotle  laid  weight  upon  its  conception  as  a  continuous  con- 
dition and  not  as  a  single  state.  On  the  other  hand,  lie  found  a 
8i'i'a/iis  for  it  in  bodily  qualities-,  such  as  the  characteristics  of 
tlie  natural  disposition,  temperament,  inclination,  and  feelings. 
These  are  also  in  children  and  animals,  but  the}-  are  not  tliere 
under  the  rule  of  the  reason. 

The  dianoetic  virtues  are  related  to  theoretical  as  well  as  to 
practical  insight.  The  latter  is  either  tcxi'/;  a^ihe  kuowletlge  of 
the  right,  requisite  for  artistic  creation,  or  (ftpovrja-i^  as  tlie  recog- 
nition of  justice,  which  recognition  is  necessary  for  activity  in 
public  or  private  life  {E(h.  a^7c•.,  VI.  5  ff.).  The  <^p6inq<TL<i  is 
also  split  into  (1)  o-iWo-ts,  the  understanding  of  objects  and  rela- 
tions which  are  the  cause  of  its  activity,  and  (2)  cuySoAm,  the 
knowledge  of  teleological  processes.  The  o-o<^ta  is  of  more  value, 
for  it  is  the  knowledge  having  no  ulterior  purpose,  but  sought  on 
account  of  itself.  Its  content  is  highest  actuality  and  first  prin- 
ciples. 'Its  application  to  single  sciences  and  departments  is 
iTTtcmjfiri ;  its  knowledge  of  itself  is  ^ulvoia,  or  the  lovs  as  pure 
Form.  It  is  that  Oewpia,  in  which  the  highest  happiness  con- 
sists {Met.,  XI.  7,  1072  b,  24  ;  see  ^th.  Nic,  X.  7,  1177  a,  13), 
and  this  makes  the  perfectness  of  God  :  i)  duupCa  to  yj^ia-Toy  koL 
dpuTToi:  This  is  ethically,  as  well  as  metaphysically,  the  funda- 
mental principle  of  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle.  It  is  rooted  in 
his  personality  :  and  is  tlie  expression  of  that  pure  joy  in  knowl- 
edge that  forms  the  basis  of  all  science  and  is  the  absolute  con- 
dition of  the  independence  of  science.  In  the  logic  of  Aristotle 
Greek  science  recognized  and  formulated  its  essence,  and  in  his 
ethics  its  practicability. 

As  the  dianoetic  virtues  have  their  seat  in  the  intellect, 
jthe  ethical  virtues  have  theirs  in  tlie  will.  Rational 
jinsight,  as  experience  teaclies  us,  is  not  alone  sufficient  for 
right  action,  but  there  must  be  added  to  it  the  strength  of 
the  will  (ey/c/jareai),^  in  order  to  give  the  insight  validity 

1  Not  reckoned  among  the  virtues  :  Elh.  Xic,  TV.  15.  1128  b,  33. 


ARISTOTLE  286 

ill  contrast  to  the  affections  and  desires. ^  This  is  only  pos- 
sible by  the  will  choosing  freely  what  it  Iviiows  to  be  good. 

Ethical  virtue  is,  then,  that  continuing  state  of  the  will  by 
means  of  which  practical  reason  rules  the  desires.  Besides 
disposition  and  insight,  virtue  also  needs  for  its  develop, 
ment  exercise,^  because  the  direction  of  the  will  must  be 
established  through  habit.  The  ydo^  is  developed  out  of 
the  6^09. 

The  control  of  the  desires  by  the  reason  consists  in  the 
right  mean  being  chosen-'  between  the  extremes,  toward 
which  uncurljcd  desires_press.  It  is  the  task  of  practical 
insight  to  recognize  this  right  mean  in  individual  rela- 
tions by  using  our  knowledge  of  objects  and  of  human 
nature ;  and  it  is  tlie  business  of  virtue  to  act  according 
to  this  insight  (^6pdo<;  A.070'?). 

Out  of  this  principle  Aristotle  developed  from  his 
accurate  knowledge  of  the  world  and  human  kind  the 
single  ethical  virtues  in  a  rising  series,  which  seem*  not  to 
have  been  systematically  grounded,  articulated,  or  deline- 
ated. The  purely  Greek  fundamental  principle  in  it  is 
that  of  the  value  of  moderation. 

A.  Trendelenburg,  Das  Ebenmass^  ehi  Band  der  Verwandt- 
schaf't  zwischen  (jrlechischen  Archiiolugie  ic?id  griechischen 
Philosoplne  (Berlin,  I8G0). 

Although  Aristotle  regarded  right  insight  as  the  conditio 
sine  qua  non  of  right  action,  yet  he  was  still  conscious  that  it  is, 
after  all,  the  j)rovince  of  the  will  to  follow  right  insight,  and  that 
the  will  has  the  power  of  doing  the  wrong  thing  contrary  to  right 
insight.  It  is  for  us  to  sa}'  (c(/)'  y^iCiv)  whether  we  wish  to  act 
well  or  ill.  The  investigation  concerning  freedom  that  Aristotle 
made  (iV//.  Nic.^  III.  1-8)  directs  itself  indeed  against  the 
Socratic  intellectualism,  and  views  the  question  essentiallj'  from 

1  See  the  polemic  against  the  Soeratic  doctrine,  Ktli.  Nic,  VII.  3  ff. 

2  Ibid.,  II.  1,  1103  a,  24.  3  Ibid.,  5,  1106  a,  28. 

*  See,  nevertheless,  F.  Hacker,  Das  Einleilun(/s-  und  Aiiordnu)if/ii- 
prinzip  der  moi'alischen  Tugendreihe  in  der  nihnnachischen  Ethik  (Berlin, 
1863);  Th.  Ziegler,  Gesch.  der  Ethik,  I.  116. 


f 


286  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

the  point  of  responsibility.^  Tlie  question  is,  how  far  a  human 
being  can  be  regarded  as  the  dpxn  of  his  own  activity.^  This 
freedom  is  annulled  through  ignorance  of  the  facts  and  through 
external  force.  The  Trpoaipeo-ts  is  essential  to  it,  which  is  the 
decision  through  choice  between  contemplated  possibilities. 

The  dogmatic  completeness  which  characterized  the  Platonic 
ethics  was  not  reached  by  Aristotle's  system.  Aristotle  made 
amends  for  it  by  his  deep  rational  insight  into  the  manifold 
relations  of  life.  The  virtues  treated  by  him  are :  courage 
(tti/8/3eia),  as  the  mean  between  fear  and  daring;  temperance 
(o-(o(^jOoo-w77) ,  between  intemperance  and  insensibleness  ;  liberal- 
ity (eXeu^epiorr;?),  and  in  larger  relationships  magnificence 
^^;ucya\o7rp£7r£ia),  between  stinginess  and  prodigality;  high-mind- 
edness  (fieyaXoij/vx^a) ,  and  in  affairs  of  less  importance  ambi- 
tion, between  vaingloriousuoss  and  self-abasement;  mildness 
(TrpaorT/?),  between  irascibility  and  indifference;  friendliness 
(also  called  (j>i\ia) ,  between  obsequiousness  and  brusqueness ; 
candor  {a\^6ua),  between  boastfulness  and  dissembling ;  ur- 
banity (euT/jaTTcAcia),  between  trifling  and  moroseness  f  finally, 
justice  (SiKaioa-vvr)) ,  which  consists  in  recognizing  the  rights  of 
men  neither  too  much  nor  too  little.  The  philosopher  gives  an 
exhaustive  treatment  of  justice  {Eth.  Nic,  V.),  on  the  one  hand 
because  in  a  certain  sense  it  comprehends  *  in  itself  all  the 
virtues  in  respect  to  our  fellows,  on  the  other  because  it  is  the 
foundation  of  the  political  life  of  society.  Its  fundamental 
principle  is  equality,^  —  either  the  proportional  equalit}-  of  merit 
or  the  absolute  equality  of  legal  rights.  Therefore  Aristotle 
distinguished  JistrpTufive'  justice  (to  ip  rats  Siaj/Ojuais  or  to 
htave^rfTLKOv  Si'/caiov),  and  commutative  justice  (to  Iv  ToZ<i awaXXay- 
fiaa-L  or  TO  8lop6(i}tik6v  St/catoi/)."  Both  investigations  led  to  inter- 
esting details  of  political  economy  and  political  law. 

1  With  express  reference  indeed  to  criminal  law,  Eth.  Nic,  III.  1, 
1109  b,  34.  Metaphysical  aporia  from  freedom  of  the  will  are  not  yet 
considered  in  this  connection ;  and  only  once  in  connection  with  the  law 
of  the  excluded  third  term  :  De  interpr.,  9,  18  b,  31. 

•^  Eth.  Nic,  III.  5,  1112  b,  31  ;  3,  1111  a,  73. 

3  Also  shame  (albas)  and  sympathy  are  mentioned  by  Aristotle  in 
this  series,  but  they  indicate  excellences  of  temperament  (Eth.  Nic,  II. 
7,  1108  a,  32);  in  other  words,  (f)v(nKa\  cLperai. 

♦  Ihid.,  V.  3,  1129  b,  17.  5  ibyi_^  5,  1130  ^^  9 

^  Wherever  the  latter  legally  carried  out  would  not  satisfy  the  ethical 
need,  and  where  the  former  takes  its  place,  there  reigns  the  virtue  of 
fair-mindedness  (to  frrifiKti). 


ARISTOTLE  287 

A  principle  in  this  series  of  virtues  is  to  be  found  only  in  its 
content,  since  the  formal  mean  (/itcrdrv;?)  is  everywhere  the  same. 
The  principle  consists  in  the  gradual  advance  from  the  individual 
relations  toward  the  social  relations  and  among  the  latter,  from 
the  external  to  the  more  spiritual  relations  of  life.  At  the  be- 
ginning stands  courage,  the  virtue  of  self-preservation  of  the 
individual ;  at  the  end  justice,  the  ethical  basis  of  the  state. 

Finally,  the  beautiful  representation  of  friendship,  whose  ideal 
the  philosopher  found  in  the  common  striving  for  the  beautiful 
and  good  (</)iA.ta)i  forms  a  transition  to  the  treatment  of  social 
life.  He  applied  this  standard  to  some  similar  relations  of 
friendship,  to  conventional  and  unconventional  social  relations, 
raising  the  latter  from  their  utilitarian  origin  to  means  for 
ethical  ennoblement.  The  same  obtains  also  in  regard  to  the 
state.  See  R.  Eucken,  Aristoteles  Aiischaimm/  von  Freund- 
schaft  und  Lebensgiitern  (Berlin,  I884j  ;  also  Aristoteles'  XJrteil 
iiber  die  Menschen  {Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Ph.,  III.  o41  ff.). 

Man,  however,  who  is  designed  by  nature  {'(u)ov  iroXt- 
TiKov)  ^  as  an  essentially  social  being,  can  perfect  his 
activity  only  in  communal  life.  The  natural  and  funda- 
mental form  of  society  is  the  family  (oIkio)  ;  the  most 
perfect,  however,  is  the  state.  Since  the  ethical  virtues  of 
man  can  develop  perfectly  ^  only  in  the  life  of  the  state,  so 
also,  although  the  state  arose  ^  out  of  the  needs  of  utility, 
the  state  is  essentially  and  theoretically  the  actualization  of 
the  highest  good  of  the  active  man  {rdfOpcoTrivov  dyaOop). 

This  idea  seemed  so  important  to  Aristotle  that  in  the  begin- 
ning of  his  Ethics  he  designated  the  whole  of  practical  philos- 
ophy- as  TToXiTiKT],^  which  is  divided  into  the  theory  of  the  con- 
duct of  the  individual  (Ethics)  and  the  theory  of  the  conduct 
of  the  whole  (Polities).  The  relationship  is  not  to  be  so  con- 
ceived as  if  ethics  set  up  an  ideal  of  perfect  individuality, 
and  as  if  politics  then  showed  how  this  ideal  was  developed  by 
society.     But  as  the  whole  is  more   valuable    and    essentially 

1  Eth.  Nic,  YITI.  f.  2  poi^  J  2,  1253  a,  3. 

2  In  the  treatment  of  friendship,  Aristotle  used  frequently  the  ex- 
pression avCnv-      See  Eth.  Nic,  IX.  12,  1171  b,  32. 

*  See  conclusion  of  Ethics  and  beginning  of  Politics. 
^  Which  he  also  called  philosophical  anthropology  (^  rr<f>t  ra  av6pa>Tnva 
(^Cko(To^ia)  in  Eth.  Nic  ,  X.  10,  1181  b,  15. 


288  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

earlier  than  the  parts,  so  also  a  man  as  an  active  being  attains 
in  social  life  a  more  perfect  actuality  than  in  isolation  {Eth. 
Nic,  I.  1,  1094  b,  7). 

Aristotle  agreed  with  Plato  and  the  author  of  the  dialogue, 
Politicus,  in  the  ethico-teleological  conception  of  the  life  of 
the  state.  But  he  was  thinking  here,  as  in  general,  not  of 
the  transcendent,  but  the  immanent  teleology.  His  state  is 
no  form  of  government  of  superluiman  beings,  but  the  perfection 
of  the  earthly  life,  the  full  actualization  of  the  natural  dis- 
position of  man.  On  the  other  hand,  Aristotle  was  far  from 
letting  man  be  swallowed  up  in  the  state,  as  was  the  case  with 
Plato.  The  individual's  participation  in  the  divine  holiness  of 
the  dimpia  remains  liis  independent  enjoyment,  even  if  he  must 
be  guided  by  social  education  to  dianoetic  and  ethical  virtue. 
While  subordinating  the  citizen  to  the  community,  Aristotle 
nevertheless  gave  to  him  in  private  life^aver^-  much  greater 
circle  of  independent  activity,  since  he  expressly  contended 
against  the  Platonic  conception  ^  of  a  community  of  wives, 
cliildren,  and  property.  So  his  theory  of  the  state  held  the 
nappy  mean  between  the  socialism  of  Plato  and  the  individual- 
Ljlsm  of  other  schools,  and  it  became  thereby  the  ideal  expression 
(of  Greek  life. 

Aristotle  gave  the  same  relative  independence  also  to  the 
family,  the  natural  community,  upon  which  the  state  is  built. 
Tlie  fauiily  is  the  prototype  of  the  political  forms  in  its  relation- 
ships of  man  to  wife,  parents  to  children,  and  to  slaves.^  The 
conception  of  marriage  reached  a  height  in  Aristotle  which 
antiquity  did  not  surpass.  lie  saw  in  it  an  ethical  relation- 
ship between  peers  in  which  only  from  natural  disposition 
the  man  is  the  determining,  the  wMfe  the  determined  element. 
Slavery,  which  he  desired  to  treat  in  all  humaneness,  is  an  in- 
dispensable groundwork  for  family  and  political  life.  He  justi- 
fied it  —  feeling  its  practical  importance  for  Greece —  because 
only  through  it  the  good  of  leisure  (o-xfAr;)  *  is  made  possible  for 
the  citizen!  and  this  leisure  is  a  condition  necessary  to  the  exer- 
cise of  virtue.  He  also  was  of  the  opinion  that  natural  dis- 
position has  predetermined  one  man  as  slave,  another  as  free 
citizen. 

See   W.  Oncken,   Die   Staatslelire   des  Aristoteles    (Leipzig, 

^  He  said  emphatically  that  the  state  consists  in  individuals  that  are 
in  some  respects  like  and  in  others  nnlike.     Politics,  IV.  11,  1295  a,  25. 
^■Ibid.,U.  2ff 

8  Elh.  Nic,  VIIT.  12,  1160  b,  22. 
*  Concerning  the  word  "leisure,"  see  Thid.,  X.  7,  1177b,  4. 


ARISTOTLE  289 

1870)  ;  C.  Bradley,  The  Politics  of  Aristotle  ;  P.  Janet,  His- 
toire  de  la  science  politique  (Paris,  1887),  I.  165  ft'. 

The  living  and  jQerfected  virtue  of  all  its  citizens  is  the 
finftPpurpose  of  the  state.  For  the  realization  ^  of  this 
purpose  we  must  take  the  material  at  hand  ;  viz.,  a  natural, 
historical  and  concrete  society  in  a  particular  environment. 
Although  it  is  impossible  to  fix  upon  a  valid  norm  for  the 
constitution  of  all  states,  nevertheless  under  all  circum- 
stances the  actual  constitution  must  be  measured  by  the 
general  purpose  of  the  state,  and  its  worth  will  be  assessed 
according  to  its  sufficiency  {opQr])  and  deficiency  QqfiapTT)- 
IxeuT)').  The  political  constitution  is  an  arrangement  in 
which  the  rule  is  in  the  hands  of  a  justly  ordained  power. 
Therefore  the  worth  of  a  state  depends  on  the  ruling 
power  keeping  the  purpose  of  the  state  (to  kolvov  avjM- 
(^epov)  in  view.  Since  the  rule  may  be  in  the  hands  of 
the  one  or  the  few  or  the  many,  there  are^  six  possible 
forms  of  political  constitutions, —  three  good  and  three 
that  are  deficient.  The  former  three  are  monarchy  ( /9a- 
(TiXela),  aristocracy,  and  "  polity  "  (iroXtTeia)  ;  ^  the  latter 
three  are  despotism  {rvpavvl.'i),  oligarchy,  and  democracy 
(8'r]fxoKparLa)^  With  the  fine  analysis  of  an  observing 
statesman,  Aristotle  investigated  the  essential  principles  of 
these  different  forms,  their  conditions,  their  rise,  their  fall, 
and  their  legitimate  transmutation  one  into  another.  With 
the  firm  hand  of  a  philosopher  he  drew  his  estimate  of 
these   various    forms    after    the    "  concept "    of   a   state. 

1  Pol.,  VTI.  4,  1325  b,  35. 

2  Aristotle  changed  the  somewhat  external  principle  of  division  of 
the  number  of  rulers  (Ibid.,  Til.  17,  1287  b,  37)  by  considerations  about 
the  character  of  the  different  peoples. 

8  Ibid.,  7,  1279  a,  25. 

*  What  Aristotle  here  calls  TroXirela  in  the  narrower  sense  was  later 
known  as  democracy  {drjfiOKpaTta).  Poly  bins  has  a  better  name  for  the 
Aristotelian  democracy,  which  is  Sx^oKparla. 

19 


290  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PmLOSOt»IlY 

Among  the  good  constitutions,  monarchy  and  aristocracy 
are  the  most  perfect,  since  they  are  the  rule  of  the  best 
man  or  men,  ethically  speaking.  Of  these,  monarchy 
would  be  preferred  if  we  could  hope  that  it  would  ever 
correspond  entirely  to  its  concept ;  that  is,  to  the  rule  of 
one  man  who  surpasses  all  others  in  virtue.^  In  reality 
the  aristocracy  offers  greater  guarantees.  Among  the 
degenerate  kinds  of  constitutions,  the  rule  of  the  masses 
is  always  less  unendurable,  that  of  tyranny  the  most 
abominable. 

Under  the  presupposition  of  fulfilling  all  conditions  which 
were  demanded  for  realizing  the  political  ideal,  the  idea  of 
the  best  state  was  delineated,  whose  development  Aristotle 
began  but  did  not  complete.^  The  best  state  must  have  the 
fundamental  form  of  "  polity  "  at  least,  but  the  administra- 
tion of  public  affairs  must,  as  in  the  aristocracy,  be  in  the 
hands  ^  of  the  virtuous.  It  would  be  a  state  of  peace  and 
not  of  war,^  and  its  chief  task  would  be  the  correct  educa- 
tion of  all  its  citizens.  The  citizens  would  not  only  be 
efficient  in  practical  affairs,  but  they  would  ^  also  be  sen- 
sible to  beauty  and  finally  capable  of  the  highest  enjoyment, 
that  is,  of  that  which  attends  knowledge. 

The  incompleteness  of  the  Aristotelian  writings  is  perhaps 
nowhere  so  much  to  be  regretted  as  in  the  Politics.  The  torso 
of  this  work  shows  a  wonderful  thoroughness,  a  philosophical 
penetration  of  all  the  political  conditions  of  Hellenic  history, 
the  clearest  understanding  of  the  limitations  and  the  develop- 
ments of  political  life.  These  excellences  make  all  the  more 
keen  our  regret  that  the  ideal  picture  of  the  state,  based  on 
what  he  has  given,  was  only  proposed  and  not  developed.     In 

1  Pol,  V.  10,  1310  b,  31.  2  /5j-^.^  vTT.  4  ff. 

'  Aristotle  distinguished  —  in  a  manner  not  entirely  consistent  to 
the  new  theory  of  the  three  kinds  of  power,  but  yet  with  an  approximate 
suitability  —  to  ^ov\tv6fXfvov  Trepl  rav  koivwp,  to  nepi  ras  dp)(as,  t6  SiKa^ov 
(Ibid.,  IV.  14,  1297  b,  41). 

*  Ihid.,  VII.  14  f.  6  iiid.,  VIII.  2  f. 


ARISTOTLE  291 

the  same  way  the  theoiy  of  eduction  of  Aristotle  comes  to  an 
abrupt  end  after  a  sketch  of  the  elementary  principles  of  educa- 
tion, suggesting  many  valuable  points  of  view.  It  put  forth  in  a 
clear  way  that  all  aesthetical  training  is  to  bring  about  the 
ethical  and  theoretical  unfolding  of  what  is  essentially  human. 

With  Aristotle's  practical  philosophy  is  connected  the 
Poetics,  the  science  of  the  creative  activity  of  man.  But 
in  the  preserved  writings,  this  science  is  developed  only  on 
the  side  of  beauty  in  fine  art,  and  particularly  in  reference 
to  poetry  in  the  Poetics. 

J.  Bernays,  Zicei  Abhandlungen  iiber  die  aristotelische  Theorie 
des  Dramas  (Berlin,  1880)  ;  A.  Doring,  Die  Kunstlehre  des 
Aristoteles  (Jena,  1876)  ;  the  details  of  a  rich  bibliography  are 
found  in  Doring,  p.  263  ff.  ;  Ueberweg-Heinze,  1'^.  225. 

All  art  is  imitation,  and  the  different  arts  are  to  be  dis- 
tinguished partly  by  their  media,  partly  by  the  objects  to  be 
imitated.^  The  media  of  poetry  are  words,  rhytlim,  and  har- 
mony.2  The  objects  of  poetry  are  men  and  their  conduct, 
good  or  bad.^  Tragedy,  to  whose  analysis  the  preserved 
fragment  on  poetry  is  essentially  limited,  presents  directly 
to  the  spectator  in  beautiful  language  a  significant  and 
complete  action  througli  its  different  characters.^ 

The  purpose  of  art,  however,  is  to  arouse  tlic  emotions  of 
man  in  such  a  way  that  he  may  be  freed  and  purified  {ku- 
6apai<i)  from  their  power  —  precisely  through  their  arousal 
and  intensification.  This  is  possible  only  when  art  presents, 
not  tlie  em]iirically  actual,  but  that  which  could  Le  in  itself 
possible, — so  presenting  it  that  it  raises  the  object  into 
universality. 

1  Poet.,  If.  2  jf)i(j^^  Y,  1447  a,  22.  »  [hid.,  2  f, 

*  The  celebrated  and  much  discussed  definition  of  tragedy  is  (Ibid., 
r>.  1449  b,  24) :  eoTiv  ovv  Tpaya>8'ia  filfirja-ii  npa^fajs  (nr<.v8aias  Kai  TtXtias, 
fityfdoi  (\ovaT]s,  f]8vafj.€V(o  Xoyco.  x'^P'-^  fKaarov  t<ov  tlhaiv  kv  toIs  jMopiois, 
SpaivTwv  Koi  ou  8i  aTTayyeXias,  8i  eXeov  Koi  (^o^ov  7repaivov(ra  Tqv  rmt 
ToiovTcop  TTaOrjuaTdv  Kadapcriv. 


292  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

The  ethical  result  of  traged}',  the  purification  of  the  passions, 
whether  the  KaSapa-i^  is  used  in  religious,  medical,  or  other 
analog},  goes  accordingly  hand  iu  hand  with  its  intellectual 
significance.  Art,  like  philosophy,  presents  the  actual  in  its 
ideal  purit}'  {Poetics^  9,  145]  b,  5),  and  is  more  than  the  mere 
facsimile  of  individual  facts,  as  the  la-Topia  presents  them.  This 
conception  of  the  universal  significance  annuls  the  emotions  of 
fear  and  sympath}-  through  which  traged}'  has  to  operate. 

The  long  strife  over  the  meaning  of  the  Aristotelian  definition 
of  traged}-  has  graduall}'  resolved  itself  into  the  belief  that 
the  healthiness  which  this  Ka^apo-ts  brings  with  it  rests  upon 
this  idealizing  of  the  aesthetic  result,  —  upon  an  exaltation  to 
immediate  knowledge  of  the  universal. 

Thus  Aristotle  fulfilled  upon  this  territorj',  in  contrast  to  the 
greatest  poetic  performances  of  his  nation,  the  task  of  its 
philosoph}',  which  is  no  other  than  the  attainment  of  the  self- 
consciousness  of  Hellenic  culture. 


HELLENIC-EOMAN   PHILOSOPHY  293 


B.   HELLENIC-ROMAN  PHILOSOPHY 

44.  If  in  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle  the  essence  of  Greek 
civilization  was  reduced  to  conceptual  expression,  yet  it 
appeared  when  the  sun  of  Greece  was  setting.  The  philos- 
ophy of  Aristotle  was  the  legacy  of  dying  Greece  to  the 
following  generations  of  man. 

Tiie  spiritual  decay  of  the  Grecian  civilization  at  the  time 
of  its  Enlightenment  had  advanced  in  ever-widening  circles, 
and  from  then  on  led  to  its  external  destruction.  Already, 
since  the  conclusion  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  which  de- 
stroyed forever  the  vitality  of  Athens,  the  centre  of  Greek 
culture,  the  influence  of  the  Persian  power  in  the  politics 
of  Greece  had  been  dominant.  Moreover,  out  of  this 
lamentable  situation  Greece  got  freedom  only  through 
subjection  to  the  Macedonian  kingdom.  Likewise  in 
the  succeeding  time  Greece  in  intermittent  and  inconse- 
quential movements  could  only  occasionally  stagger  to  an 
independence  amid  the  vicissitudes  of  tlie  Hellenic  king- 
doms, especially  of  Macedonia.  Finally,  however,  it 
entii'ely  lost  its  political  independence  by  its  being  incor- 
porated into  the  Roman  Empii-e,  in  order  to  save  here  and 
there  a  wretched  respectability. 

But  precisely  through  its  political  decadence  Greece  ful- 
filled in  a  higher  sense  the  problems  of  its  civilization. 
The  kingly  pupil  of  the  ripest  Greek  philosopher  had 
borne  the  victorious  Greek  spirit  into  the  far  East  with 
his  conquering  ai-ms.  In  the  enormous  mingling  of  the 
peoples,  which  was  begun  by  his  campaign  of  conquest  and 
furthered  by  the  varying  battles  of  his  successors,  did 
Greek  culture  become  the  common  possession  of  the  ancient 
world,  and  finally  the  commanding  spirit  of  the  Roman 
Empire,  and  the  eternal  possession  of  humanity. 

After  the  creative  period  of  Greek  philosophy  there  fol- 


294  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

lowed,  therefore,  centuries  of  criticism,  appropriation, 
readjustment,  and  remodelling.  This  second  section  of  the 
history  of  ancient  thought  is  incomparably  much  poorer  in 
content,  although  covering  a  longer  period  of  time.  Every 
conceptual  principle  for  comprehending  and  judging  reality 
had  been  presented  by  Greek  science  in  its  youthful  in- 
spiration. There  only  remained  for  the  epigones  to  see 
their  way  clearly  in  their  variously  animated  world,  to 
employ  the  previously  discovered  points  of  view  in  every 
possible  way,  to  combine  the  inherited  thought,  and  to 
make  this  combination  fruitful  for  the  purposes  of  the  new 
situations  of  life. 

Tlie  very  little  originality  which  the  Ilellenic-Roman  philoso- 
phy shows  in  contrast  to  Greek  philosopln^  is  true  even  of  neo- 
Platonism,  its  most  significant  intellectual  phenomenon.  In 
all  the  independence  which  its  religious  principle  seemed  to 
give  to  it,  neo-Phitonism  remained  inextricably  bound  to  the 
thought  of  Plato  and  Aristotle. 

From  the  cntiral  point  of  view,  which  is  the  authority  for 
the  divisions  of  this  sinvey,  Hellenic-Roman  philosophy  appears 
to  be  only  a  gleaning  of  Greek  philosophy.  It  is  only  the 
"after-effects"  (Brandis)  of  Greek  philosophj-  in  the  Hellenic 
and  Roman  realms.  Among  these  after-effects  the  great 
S3'stems  of  Stoicism  and  Epicureanism  are  to  be  reckoned,  not 
only  because  they  took  root  and  blossomed  in  tliose  times 
when  tlie  divisions  between  Greek  and  barbarian  began  to 
break  down,  but  especiall}'  also  for  these  two  reasons :  (1)  be- 
cause the}',  though  with  great  refinement  in  details,  represented 
in  general  onl}'  a  new  distortion  of  tlie  old  principles  which 
the  original  development  of  Greek  thought,  until  Aristotle,  had 
gained ;  (2)  because  they  made  this  distortion  in  a  typical 
manner  from  the  new  points  of  view  of  individual  practical 
wisdom. 

On  the  whole,  the  second  section  of  this  history  is  less  im- 
portant to  philosophy  than  to  the  histor}-  of  civilization  and 
literature.  This  is  a  natural  result  of  the  fact  that  in  this 
period  the  literar}-  sources,  although  very  far  from  pure,  are 
nevertheless  very  much  richer.  Therefore  on  this  account  this 
period  is  extraordinarily  rich  in  interesting,  difficult,  and  various 
problems  still  unsolved,  although  its  product  of  philosophical 
principles  and  fundamental  concepts  is  relatively  small. 


HELLENIC-ROMAN  PHILOSOPHY  295 

With  this  relative  deficiency  in  originality  we  note  the 
appearance  in  the  post- Aristotelian  philosophy  of  the  great 
school-associations,  with  their  wholesale  scientific  produc- 
tions, rather  than  of  single  personalities.  It  is  true,  detailed 
research  also  here  betrays  individual  shadings  in  the  con- 
struction of  single  theories,  although  often  indeed  seen 
with  difficulty  and  not  with  full  certainty  ;  yet  such  varia- 
tions stand  in  value  and  significance  far  behind  the 
great  and  general  antagonisms  of  the  school  systems. 
Moreover,  such  antagonisms  are  much  less  those  of 
scientific  theory  than  those  of  the  conception  of  life  and 
its  conduct. 

The  post-Aristotelian  philosophy  showed,  therefore,  the 
peculiar  phenomenon  of  the  practical  convictions  of  differ- 
ent schools  existing  in  sharp  conflict,  while  the  peculiar 
scientific  differences  became  gradually  obliterated.  Scien- 
tific activity  was  turned  to  special  researches,  and  found 
neutral  ground  partly  in  nature  studies,  partly  in  history, 
especially  the  history  of  literature.  Upon  this  neutral 
ground,  although  with  a  certain  agreement  in  fundamental 
conceptions  and  methods,  the  representatives  of  the  differ- 
ent schools  were  in  active  rivalry.  This  ardent  cultivation 
of  the  special  sciences  had  the  most  universal  results  of 
Greek  philosophy  for  its  obviously  valid  fundam^ental  prin- 
ciples, and  interest  in  metaphysical  problems  passed  more 
and  more  into  the  background.  Erudition  pressed  out 
the  spirit  of  speculation.  The  special  sciences  became 
independent. 

The  beginning  of  this  specialization  in  science  already'  existed 
in  the  Abderite,  the  Platonic,  and  particularly  the  Aristotelian 
schools.  In  the  Hellenic  period  specialization  was,  however, 
the  more  remarkable  because  the  period  was  wanting  in  great 
determining  personalities  and  organizing  fundamental  prin- 
ciples. This  popular  impulse  for  specialization  was  limited 
neither  to  Athens  nor  to  Greece.  Rhodes,  Alexandria,  Per- 
gamus,   Antioch,    Tarsus,    etc.,    became  scientific   centres,    in 


296  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

"which  scholarly  work  by  means  of  great  libraries  and  collections 
was  being  systematically  carried  on.  Later  Rome,  and  finally 
also  Byzantium,  entered  into  the  competition. 

That  now,  however,  the  conflict  between  the  schools  was 
no  longer  waged  over  theoretical  but  practical  philosophy, 
was  due  not  only  to  the  fact  that  Aristotle  had  given  the 
final  word  to  the  speculative  movement,  but  also  to  the 
changing  character  of  the  times  and  the  changing  philo- 
sophical demands.  The  more  the  Greek  national  life  and 
spirit  faded  through  the  universal  mixing  of  nations  and 
their  destinies,  so  much  the  more  the  individual  retired 
within  himself  and  away  from  the  changing  external 
world.  From  the  great  maelstrom  of  things  he  sought  to 
save  as  much  as  possible  of  inward  peace  of  mind  and  sure 
happiness,  and  to  secure  them  within  the  quiet  of  his  in- 
dividual life.  This,  then,  in  Hellenic  time  is  what  was 
expected  from  philosophy  :  it  should  be  the  director  of  life  ; 
it  should  teach  the  individual  how  to  be  free  from  the 
world  and  to  stand  independent  by  himself.  The  deter- 
mining, fundamental  point  of  view  of  philosophy  became 
that  of  practical  wisdom. 

The  Greek  Enlightenment  showed  tendencies  in  this  direction 
in  the  teachings  of  Socrates,  especially,  however,  in  the  teachings 
of  the  Cynics  and  Cyrenaics,  which  expressed  through  their  atom- 
istic principles  the  dismemberment  of  Greek  society  (see  §  29  f.). 
Opposed  to  this  the  great  systems  of  Greek  science,  especially 
Platonism  and  Aristotelianism,  had  maintained  the  higher  thought 
with  the  essential  political  tendency  of  their  ethics.  The  post- 
Aristotelian  philosoph}'  even  in  the  schools  of  both  masters 
turned  to  the  ethics  of  the  individual.  The  antagonisms  that 
developed  between  them  concerned  fundamentallj'  only  their 
subtleties  and  the  enriched  developments  of  the  simple  types 
which  Greek  life  in  its  bloom  had  brought  forth. 

While  then  the  essence  of  Greek  philosoph}'  was  exclusively 
directed  to  a  unified  conceptual  knowledge  of  the  world,  the 
science  of  the  succeeding  centuries  divided  (1)  into  specializa- 
tion into  single  branches,  for  which  methodical  bases  had  been 
established ;  and  (2)  into  a  philosophj'  which  made  all  knowl- 


HELLENIC-ROMAN  PHILOSOPHY  297 

edge  an  ancillar}-  maiden  to  the  art  of  living,  and  was  concerned 
entirely  in  setting  up  an  ideal  of  a  perfect,  free,  and  happy 
man.  This  art  of  living  still  retained  the  name  of  philosophy, 
and  it  is  only  this  side  of  the  scientific  life  of  antiquity  which 
is  to  be  followed  out  further  in  this  place. ^ 

Individualistic  ethics,  which  the  post-Aristotelian  schools 
made  the  burden  of  their  philosophy,  was  virtually  called  to 
restore  to  the  cultured  world  of  antiquity  the  religion  lost 
in  the  Greek  Renaissance.  Its  fundamental  problem  ^  was 
on  this  account  the  release  of  man  from  the  power  of  the 
outer  world  and  the  vicissitudes  of  life.  But  virtue,  as  the 
Stoics  and  Epicureans  taught  it,  did  not  prove  adequate  to 
be  the  solution  of  this  problem ;  thus  philosophy  also  be- 
came drawn  into  the  great  religious  movement  which  had 
possessed  the  races  of  the  Roman  Empire.  In  that  move- 
ment the  terrified  mind  seized  upon  all  kinds  of  religious 
forms  and  cults,  and  eagei'ly  pressed  on  to  a  saving  con- 
viction. The  more  this  tendency  became  predominant  in 
philosophy,  and  the  more  philosophical  interest  passed  from 
ethics  to  religion,  so  much  the  more  did  Platonism,  the 
specific  religious  form  of  philosophy,  come  into  the  fore- 
ground. Its  transcendent  metaphysics,  its  separation  of 
the  material  and  immaterial  worlds,  its  teleological  prin- 
ciple, which  regarded  the  life  of  nature  and  man  with 
reference  to  a  divine  cosmic  purpose,  made  it  seem  called 
to  give  scientific  form  to  the  amalgamation  of  religions. 
Its  concept  of  the  world  was  equal  to  absorbing  the  reli- 
gious forms  of  the  Orient.  It  gave  the  philosophic  material 
with  which  Christianity,  the  new  religion,  constituted  itself 
into  a  didactic  system.  Out  of  it  the  Hellenic  w^orld  tried, 
finally,  to  create  its  own  religion  as  the  daughter  of  science. 

1  For  the  development  of  the  special  sciences  since  Aristotle  one 
should  consult  the  respective  parts  of  this  manual. 

2  See  K.  Fischer,  Gesch.  der  neueren  Philos.,  I.  (2  ed.,  Mannheim, 
1865),  p.  33  f. 


298  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

This  gradual  transmutation  of  ethics  into  religion  divided 
the  Hellenic-Roman  philosophy  into  two  parts  (see  above, 
Introduction) ;  in  the  former  of  which  the  ethical  interest 
predominated;  in  the  latter,  the  religious  interest ;  Syncretic 
Platonism  made  the  transition.  The  controversies  between 
the  schools  and  their  adjustment  in  Skepticism  and  Eclecti- 
cism, preceded  the  transition  period.  Patristics  on  the 
one  hand,  and  neo-Platonism  on  the  other  came  after  this 
transition. 

1.  The  Controversies  of  the  Schools. 

45.  The  development  of  the  Peripatetic  school  took  a 
similar  course  to  that  of  the  Academy  (§  38).  It  had  in 
fact,  at  first,  its  siguificant  centre  in  the  person  of  the  old 
friend  and  coadjutor  of  its  founder;  to  wit,  in  Theophrastus. 
Theophrastus  knew  how  to  direct  the  activities  of  the  school, 
how  to  inspire  the  development  of  the  sciences  in  the  true 
spirit  of  the  master,  and  how  to  give  to  the  Lyceum  an 
eminent  position  in  the  intellectual  life  of  Athens  through 
the  brilliancy  of  his  lectures.  Yet  for  him  in  his  recasting 
and  supplementation  of  the  Aristotelian  doctrine,  and  also 
for  the  majority  of  his  associates,  the  empirical  outweighed 
the  philosophical  interest,  and  so  more  and  more  the  school 
tended  to  the  specialization  of  scientific  work.  Thus  Theo- 
phrastus developed  the  science  of  botany  especially  :  Aris- 
toxenus,the  theory  of  music;  Dicaearchus, historical  sciences. 
History  seems  to  have  taken  the  most  space  in  the  scien- 
tific work  of  the  school.  Literary-historical  and  scientific- 
historical  work  were  especially  carried  on  in  this  and  the 
succeeding  generations  of  the  Peripatetic  school,  and  to 
such  a  degree  that  this  school  is  designated  as  the  unique 
centre  of  the  above  very  learned  but  little  creative  spirit. 

The  ethical  questions,  also,  were  treated  by  all  these  men, 
and  especially  by  Eudemus,  more  particularly  upon  their 


CONTROVERSIES  OF  THE  SCHOOLS  299 

empirical  side  and  with  reference  to  popular  morality.  On 
the  other  hand,  however,  the  etliical  questions  were  sub- 
ordinated to  a  theological  interest,  in  which  metaphysical 
demands  seem  to  have  been  centred.  Influenced  doubtless 
by  Platonic  and  Pythagorean  doctrines,  Eudemus  inclined 
to  emphasize  the  transcendence  of  the  divine  Being,  and  in 
a  similar  manner  to  maintain  the  speculative  psychology  of 
Aristotle  with  the  transcendence  (-^^^opKr/xoi;}  of  the  reason. 
There  was  another  tendency,  which,  beginning  witli  The- 
ophrastus,  ran  counter  to  the  above,  and  developed  the 
principle  of  immanence,  both  metaphysically  and  psycho- 
logically. This  tendency  grew  to  a  thoroughgoing  pan- 
theism and  naturalism  in  the  person  of  Strato,  who  from 
287  to  269  followed  Theophrastus  as  head  of  the  school. 

"When  Strato  explained  the  concept  of  pure  Form  meta- 
physically and  psychologically  as  unnecessary  and  equally 
as  impossible  as  that  of  pure  matter,  he  practically  identified 
God  and  the  world  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other 
thought  and  perception.  The  whole  world-system  and  all 
particular  events  therein  are  only  explainable  by  the  quali- 
ties and  forces  in  things  under  the  law  of  mechanical 
necessity.  Warmth  is  the  most  important  force  among 
these,  both  in  the  macrocosm  and  in  the  microcosm.  The 
soul  %  the  unifying  reasoning  power  {^yefiovcKov),  and  it 
has  the  senses  as  its  organs.  Thus  the  activity  of  sensa- 
tion is  never  complete  without  thought.  Thought,  however, 
on  its  side  is  limited  to  the  given  perceptual  content. 

The  theory  of  Strato  seems  to  be,  on  the  whole,  a  victory 
for  the  Democritan  element  that  was  in  the  Aristotelian 
doctrine,  although  in  particular  assertions  Strato  approaches 
very  near  the  Stoic  philosophy. 

W.  Lyugg,  Die  peripatetische  Schule  (in  Philosophisclie 
Studien,  Cliristiania,  1878)  ;  H.  Siebeck,  Die  Umhildunq  der 
peripatetischen  Natiirphilosopliie  in  die  der  Stoiker  {Unters. 
z.  Fhilos.  d.  Gr.,  2  ed.,  181-252). 


300  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Theophrastus,  from  Eresus  in  Lesbos,  was  about  twelve  years 
_yoiinger  than  Arislolle.  He  probably  got  acquainted^  with 
Aristotle  in  the  Acaden}y,  and  he  remained  a  lifelong  friend  to 
the  Stagirite.  He  shared  the  residence  of  Aiistotle  after  the 
latter  bade  adieu  to  the  Macedonian  court,  and  was  his  right- 
hand  man  in  the  administration  of  the  Lyceum.  Theophrastus 
afterwards  assumed  the  conduct  of  the  Lyceum  himself,  and 
directed  it  with  the  greatest  success.  An  attempt  to  drive  the 
philosophical  schools  out  of  Athens  (306  b.  c.)  seems  to  have 
lailed  solely  by  reason  of  the  respect  in  which  he  was  held 
(F.  A.  Hoffmann,  De  lege  contra  jyhilosojyhos  imprimis  The- 
ophrastum  auctore  Sophocle  Athenis  lata,  Carlsruhe,  1842). 
There- have  been  preserved  of  his  numerous  works  (list  in  Diog. 
Laert.,  V.  42  ff.)  the  two  botanical  vvoi'ks,  Trepi  cfun-wv  icrroptu? 
and  Trepl  <f)VT(x)v  aiTiwv,  —  of  the  greatest  importance,  since  the 
corresponding  works  of  Aristotle  are  lost,  —  certain  fragments 
of  his  metaphysics,  of  the  historj'  of  physics,  besides  some 
minor  treatises.  Tiie  tjOlkoI  )(apaKTrjp€^,  a  description  of  moral 
failings  based  on  many  observations,  are  a  selection  from  the 
ethical  work  of  this  |)hilosopher.  These  are  published  b}-  J.  G. 
Schneider  (Leipzig,  1818);  Fr.  Wimmer  (Breslau,  1842-62); 
a  portion  of  the  metaphysics  in  Chr.  Brandis'  iSeparat-ausgabe 
der  aristoteliscken  (Berlin,  1823),  p.  308  ff. ;  also  newly  published 
by  H.  Usener  (Bonn,  1890)  ;  Characters,  Dlibner  (Paris, 
1842)  and  E.  Petersen  (Leip.,  1859)  ;  Philippson,  vX-q  avOpwirivr] 
(Berlin,  1831)  ;  H.  Usener,  Analecta  Theophrastea  (Bonn, 
1858)  ;  the  same  in  XVI.  volume  of  Hhein.  Miis.;  Jac.  Bernays, 
IVi.'s  Schriji  liber  die  Friimmicjheit  (Berlin,  1866)  ;  H.  Diels, 
Dox.  Gr.,  p.  475  ff.  ;  E.  Meyer,  Gesch.  der  Botavik,  p.  164  flf,  ; 
Th.  Gomperz,  Ueber  die  Charactere  Th.'s  (  Wiener  Sitz.-Ber., 
Berhn,  1888). 

The  naturalism  of  Theophrastus  seems  to  be  expressed  in  his 
subsumption  of  thought  under  that  of  motion  (kiVt/o-is),  although 
he  did  not  materialize  the  concept  in  the  Democritan  manner. 
The  dubious  consequences,  that  followed  for  the  Aristotelian 
concept  of  God,  seem  to  have  been  expressly  deduced  first  by 
Strato. 

The  significance  of  Theophrastus  lies  in  the  realm  of  science, 
and  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  only  few  fragments  of  his  history 
of  natural  science  have  been  preserved  {({ivaiKr]  to-ropta).  On 
the  whole  he  contented  himself  with  the  perfecting  of  the  Aris- 
totelian system,  and  he  probably  remained  its  most  complete 
representative.     The   results   in   logic  also,  which  he  reached 

1  Diog.  Laert.,  V.  36. 


CONTROVERSIES  OF  THE  SCHOOLS        301 

with  the  aid  of  Eudenms,  concerning  the  modaUt}-  of  the  judg- 
ment and  the  theory  of  the  hypothetical  syllogism,  are  only  of 
minor  importance. 

Eudemus  of  Rhodes  seems  to  have  been  a  man  of  less  signifi- 
cance, although  he  also  possessed  encyclopedic  knowledge  and 
wrote  extensive  works,  later  widely  used,  on  the  histor}-  of 
geometry,  arithmetic,  and  astronomy.  Spengel  has  collected 
the  fragments  of  Eudemus'  writings  (Berlin,  1870).  See  A. 
Th.  H.  Fritzsche,  De  Eudemi  Jihod'd  vita  et  scriplis  (Regens- 
burg,  1851,  in  connection  with  the  edition  of  the  ethics).  His 
theological  bias  likewise  appears  to  some  degree  in  his  elabora- 
tion of  the  Aristotelian  ethics.  His  departure  from  its  funda- 
mental political  idea  is  seen  in  his  insertion  of  economics  between 
ethics  and  politics. 

Aristoxenus  of  Tarentum  was  stimulated  b}-  the  Pythagorean 
doctrine,  which  he  carried  into  psychology'  and  ethics.  He  is 
especiall}'  notable  in  the  field  of  the  history  and  tlieor}'  of  music. 
Besides  the  fragments,  there  has  in  particular  been  preserved 
his  writing,  vepl  ap/xovLKwv  a-roix'^iwv,  published  by  P.  Marquardt 
(Berlin,  1868),  translated  into  German,  with  annotations  b}-  R. 
AVestphal  (Leipzig,  1883)  ;  see  W.  L.  Mahne,  De  Aristoxeno 
(Amsterdam,  1793)  ;  C.  v.  Jan  (Landsberg  a.  W.,  1870).  The 
fragments  of  the  historical  works  of  the  Peripatetics  in  general 
have  been  published  by  C.  Miiller,  Fragmenta  Jiistoricorum 
grcecorum,  II.  (Paris,  1848). 

Apostasy  from  the  theoretic  ideals  of  Aristotle  began  to 
appear  already  in  Dicajarch  of  Messene,  in  his  preference  for 
the  practical  life  which  was  of  interest  indeed  to  the  historian 
and  political  theorist.  From  his  numerous  works  in  political 
and  literary  history,  among  which  the  /3tos  'EAAaSos  is  the  most 
important,  and  also  from  his  TptTroXtrt/co?,  only  small  portions 
have  been  preserved.  M.  Fuhr,  DlccBarchi  qum  supersunt 
(Darmstadt,  1841)  ;  F.  Osann,  Beitrage,  II.  (Cassel,  1839). 

The  more  original  genius,  Strato  of  Lampsacus,  wms  called 
"the  physicist,"  and  this  shows  how  actually  independent  he 
became  of  Aristotle.  He  threw  aside  all  the  Platonic  imma- 
terialism  that  Aristotle  had  retained,  —  the  pure  spirituality  of 
God  and  the  supersensible  origin  and  character  of  the  human 
reason.  Even  if  he  thereby  threw  away  the  keystone  of  the 
Aristotelian  teleology,  Strato  was,  on  the  other  hand,  opposed  to 
tlie  Democritan  mechanical  atomism.  He  found  the  explanation 
of  the  world  in  the  inherent  qualities  and  forces  (8wayu,€ts)  of 
particular  things.  He  designated  the  fundamental  forces  (apxaO 
as  heat  and  cold.  Of  the  two,  heat  plays  the  more  important 
and  creative  role.     The  renewal  of  the  old  Ionic  modes  of  repre- 


302  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

sentation  is  thus  completed  in  the  Peripatetic  school,  and  it  also 
at  the  same  time  found  expression  among  the  Stoics.  It  was 
a  return  chaiacteristic  of  tlie  time  of  the  epigones.  G.  Rodier, 
La  physique  de  /Strato  d.  Lamp.  (Paris,  1891). 

In  the  following  generations  the  Peripatetic  school  be- 
came completely  absorbed,  so  far  as  we  know,  in  the 
specialized  investigations  of  Alexandrian  erudition,  in  which 
its  champions  played  an  important  role.  Under  Andronicus 
of  Rhodes,  the  eleventh  head  of  the  school  after  the  founder, 
the  school  made  a  great  effort  for  pliilosophical  autonomy. 
The  publications  of  Andronicus  marked  the  beginning  of  a 
systematic  reproduction,  interpretation,  and  defence  of  the 
original  teaching  of  Aristotle.  This  activity  continued  then 
through  the  following  centuries,  and  found  in  Alexander 
of  Aphrodisias  (200  a.  d.)  its  most  distinguished  repre- 
sentative. The  activity  was  maintained  to  later  time,  until 
the  Peripatetic  school  was  lost  in  neo-Platonism. 

A  great  number  of  names  of  Peripatetic  philosophers  have 
come  down  to  us  from  the  compan}-  around  Tlieophrastus  and 
Strato,  as  well  as  names  of  some  of  both  the  nearer  and  the 
more  remote  pupils  of  the  latter.  Tliese  latter  have  in  the 
main  no  longer  significance  for  us :  Clearchus  of  Soli  (M. 
Weber,  Breslau,  1880),  Pasieles  of  Rhodes,  who  was  presum- 
ably the  author  of  the  second  book  of  the  Metaphysics,  Phanias 
of  Eresus  (A.  Voisin,  Gant.,  1824),  Demetrius  of  Phalerus 
(Ch.  Ostermann,  Hersfeld,  1847,  and  Fulda,  1857),  Hipparchus 
of  Slagira,  Duris  of  Samos,  Chameleon  of  Heraelea  (Kopke, 
Berlin,  1846)  ;  Lvco  of  Troas,  who  succeeded  Strato  (269-226) 
as  head  of  the  school,  whose  successor  was  Aristo  of  Ceos ; 
Aristo  of  Cos,  Critolaus,  who  belonged  ^  to  the  embassy  to 
Rome,  155  b.  c.  ;  and,  finall}',  Diodorus  of  Tvre. 

From  the  works  of  the  Peripatetics  dealing  with  the  history  of 
literature  and  the  specific  history  of  philosophy,  the  yStot  of  Her- 
mippus  and  Satyrus  (200  b.  c),  the  AtaSoxat  tw  <^t\oo-d^<uv  of 
Sotion,  and  the  abstract  of  the  last  by  Heracleides  Lembus 
(about  150)  deserve  especial  mention.  The  later  writers,  who 
form  our  secondary  sources,  have  drawn  upon  these  works. 

1  Cicero,  Acad.,  II.  45,  137 ;  see  Wiskemann  (Hersfeld,  1867). 


CONTROVERSIES  OP  THE  SCHOOLS        303 

The  serviceable  work  of  Andronieus  was  further  carried  on 
chiefly  bj-  his  pupil,  Boethus  of  Sidon,  nevertheless  in  a  spirit 
akin  to  that  of  Strato  and  the  Stoics.  The  later  exegetes, 
like  Nicolaus  of  Damascus,  and  later  Aspasius,  Adrastus,  Hcr- 
minus,  Sosigenes,  held  rather  to  the  logical  writings  of  Aristotle. 
A  comprehensive,  philosophical,  and  competent  appreciation 
and  exposition  of  his  teaching  is  first  found  in  the  commentji- 
ries  of  Alexander  of  Aphrodisias,  "the  exegete."  Among  his 
commentaries  those  upon  the  Analytics  prior  I.,  Topics,  3Iete- 
reology,  De  se?isu,  and  especiall}'  the  Metaphysics  have  been 
preserved.  The  last  is  in  the  Bonitz  edition  (Berlin,  1847). 
See  J.  Freudenthal,  Ahhandl.  der  Berl.  Akad.  d.  Wiss.,  1885. 
In  his  own  writings  (Trcpl  i/'^x^s  —  Trepi  tiyu.ap/A€K>^s  —  <}iv(TLKwv  koI 
rjOiKuiv  aTTopiwv  koX  Ai'crcwv,  et  al.) ,  he  defends  his  naturalistic  in- 
terpretation of  Aristotle,  especially  against  the  Stoics. 

46.  The  most  important  scientific  system  tliat  the  Greek 
epigones  developed  was  Stoicism,  Its  founder  was  Zeno  of 
Citium,  a  man  perhaps  of  Semitic  or  lialf-Semitic  origin. 
Captivated  but  not  satisfied  by  the  Cynic  Crates,  he  listened 
in  Athens  also  to  the  Megarian  Stilpo,  and  the  Platonists 
Xenocrates  and  Polemo.  After  long  preparation  he  opened 
his  school  in  the  ^roa  ttolklXt]  in  the  last  decade  of  the 
fourth  century,  and  from  this  place  his  society  got  its  name. 
His  countryman,  Persaeus,  as  well  as  Cleanthes  of  Assus, 
who  was  Zeno's  successor  as  scholarch,  Aristo  of  Chios, 
Herillus  of  Carthage,  and  Sphaerus  from  the  Bosphorus,  are 
named  among  his  pupils.  Tliese  from  a  philosophical  point 
of  view  stand  far  behind  the  third  head  of  the  school, 
Chrysippus  of  Soli  in  Cicilia,  who  was  really  the  chief 
literary  representative  of  the  school.  Among  his  numerous 
followers  there  appeared  later  Zeno  of  Tarsus,  Diogenes  of 
Seleucia,  a  Babylonian  living  in  Rome  in  155,  and  Antipater 
of  Tarsus.  In  connection  with  the  Stoic  school,  Eratosthe- 
nes and  Apollodorus  stand  among  the  great  scholars  of  the 
Alexandrian  epoch. 

For  a  general  history  of  the  Stoa,  see  Dietr.  Tiedemann,  Si/s. 
der  stoischen  philos.  (3  vols.,  Leipzig,  1776);  F.  Ravaisson,  Essai 
sur  le  Stoicisme  (Paris,  185G)  ;  R.  Hirzel,  Untersuchungen  zu 


304  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Cicero's  philos.  Schrijlen  (2  vols.,  Leipzig,  1882)  ;  G.  P.  Wey- 
goldt,  Die  Philos.  der  Stoa  nach  ihrerti  Wesen  undihren  Schick- 
salen  (Leipzig,  1883) ;  P.  Ogereau,  Essai  sur  le  systeme  philos.  dxi 
Sto'icisme  (Paris,  1885).  The  chief  source  for  the  older  Stoics, 
whose  original  literature  is  nearl}'  entirely  lost,  is  found  in  Diog. 
Laert,  VII.,  who  breaks  off  in  the  midst  of  an  exposition  of 
Clirjsippus.  His  statements  go  back  in  substance  to  Antigonus- 
Carystius  (see  U.  v.  Wilaraowiz-Mollendorff,  Berlin,  1881). 

The  Stoa  was  characterized  as  the  ty[)ical  philosophy  of  Hel- 
lenism, from  the  fact  that  it  was  created  and  developed  in  Athens 
on  the  principles  of  Attic  philosophy,  and  by  men  that  originated 
in  the  mixed  races  of  the  East.  Likewise,  it  was  of  great  moment 
for  the  general  progress  of  the  world  that  this  particular  doctrine- 
was  afterwards  extended  and  most  vigorousl}'  developed  in  the 
Roman  Empire. 

Zeno  of  Cition,  the  son  of  Mnaseas,  340-265  —  for  the  diffi- 
cult chronology  see  E.  Rhode  and  Th.  Gomperz,  Rhein.  Mus., 
1878  f.  —  was  a  merchant  whose  residence  in  Athens  was  perhaps 
occasioned  b}'  a  shipwreck.  He  entered  the  different  schools, 
and  co-ordinated  their  teaching  with  painstaking  care.  His 
writings  (see  list  of  Diog.  Laert.,  VII.  4)  deal  with  the  most 
varied  subjects,  yet  their  form  is  not  remarkable.  See  Ed. 
Wellmann,  Die  Philos.  des  Sloikers  Zeno  (Leipzig,  1873)  v  C. 
Wachsmuth,  Gomtnentationes  I.,  II.  de  Zeno  Citii  et  Cleanth. 
Assio  (Gottingen,  1874)  ;  A.  C.  Pearson,  The  Fragments  of 
Zeno  and  Cleanthes  (London,  1890). 

N.  Saal,  De  Aristone.,  Ohio  et  Ilerillo  Carth.  commentatio 
(Cologne,  1852)  ;  H.  Heinze,  Ariston  v.  Chios  hei  Plutarch 
und Horaz.,  and  O.  Hense,  Ariston  v.  Chios  (Phein.Mus.,  1890, 
497  ff.  and  541  ff.). 

Cleanthes,  who  is  said  to  have  performed  menial  work  by 
night  in  order  to  listen  to  Zeno  by  day,  is  in  his  simplicity, 
perseverance,  and  austerit}-  a  type  of  the  Cynic  Wise  Man,  but 
he  is  insignificant  as  a  philosopher.  His  hymn  to  Zeus  is 
preserved  and  published  b}-  Sturz-Merzdorf  (Leipzig,  1835). 
See  F.  Mohnike,  Kleanthes  der  Stoiker  (Greifswald,  1814). 

The  scientific  systematizer  of  the  Stoic  doctrine  is  Chrysippus 
(280-206),  a  copious  writer  of  great  dialectic  ability.  The 
titles  of  his  writings  are  listed  in  Diog.  Laert.,  VII.  189  ff. 
See  F.  N.  G.  Baguet,  De  Chrisippi  vita  doctrina  et  reliquiis 
(Loewen,  1822)  ;  A.  Gercke,  Chnisijypea  {Jahrh.  f.  Philol.., 
1885).     For  further  information,  see  Zeller,  IV^  39,  44,  47  f. 

A  second  period  of  the  Stoic  philosophy,  in  which  it 
made  a  nearer  approach  to  the  Peripatetic  and  Platonic 


CONTROVERSIES  OF  THE   SCHOOLS  305 

teaching,  began  in  the  middle  of  the  second  century  b.  c. 
with  Panaetius  of  Rhodes,  who  introduced  Stoicism  into 
Rome.  Boethus  of  Sidon  worked  beside  him,  animated 
by  a  similar  spirit.  After  him  his  pupil  Posidonius,  of 
Apamea  in  Syria,  directed  the  school  in  Rhodes  with 
great  success. 

Panffitiiis  (180-110)  won  in  Rome  the  friendship  of  men  Hke 
Laelius  and  Scipio  Afrieanus  the  Younger,  and  accompanied 
the  latter  on  his  mission  as  ambassador,  in  143  to  Alexandria. 
He  became  scliolarch  in  Athens  later.  He  brought  the  Stoa 
into  great  repute  and  made  its  success  assured  in  Rome.  This 
success  was  promoted  by  his  forming  Stoicism  into  a  kind  of 
philosoph}'  of  universal  culture  for  the  needs  of  the  Roman 
Empire.  He  ameliorated  its  original  severit}',  he  accommodated 
it  to  other  great  systems,  he  expressed  the  system  itself  in  a 
clever  and  tasteful  way.  His  chief  writing,  according  to  Cicero, 
was  irepl  Tov  KaOifKovToq.     See  F.  G.  van  Lynden  (Leyden,  1802). 

His  contemporary'  ^  Boethus  of  Sidon  partially  followed  the 
doctrine  of  Strato  and  Aristotle  in  tlieology  and  ps3'chology. 
The  eclectic  tendency  appeared  still  stronger  in  Posidonius 
(135-150).  He  was  listened  to  with  delight  by  the  aristocratic 
Roman  3'outh  in  Rhodes,  vvhere  after  extended  journeys  he  had 
settled  as  head  of  the  school.  See  J.  Bake,  Posidonii  Rhodii 
reliquice  doctrince  (Leyden,  1810)  ;  P.  Topelmann,  De Posklonio 
lih.  rerum  serijitore  (Bonn,  1867)  ;  R.  Scheppig,  De  Posidoiiio 
Apamensi,  rerum,  c/enfiw/i,  terrarimi  scriplove  (Berlin,  1870); 
P.  Corssen,  De  Posidonio  Rhodii.  M.  T.  Ciceronis  in  libr.  I. 
7\isc.  auctore  (Bonn,  1878).  In  his  comprehensive  erudition 
and  many-sided  interests,  Posidonius  is  the  most  successful 
representative  of  syncretism,  that  blending  of  Stoic,  Platonic, 
and  Aristotelian  doctrines.  He  is  also  the  most  important  of 
tiiose  who  prepared  the  way  for  the  Alexandrian  philosophy. 
A  thorough  examination  of  his  work  in  detail  seems  to  be  the 
most  j^bortant  and  most  difficult  desideratum  for  the  history 
of  H^^^ic  philosophy. 

F^Fa  list  of  the  Stoics  of  this  period,  see  Zeller,  IV^  585  ff. 
See  A.  Schmekel,  Die  Philos.  der  mittleren  Stoa  (Berlin,  1892). 

During  the  time  of  the  empire,  Stoicism  became  merely 
a  popular  moral  philosophy  ;  but  even  in  this  condition  it 
joined  together  the  noblest  convictions  of  antiquity  in  an 

1  Zeller,  TV3.  46,  1. 

20 


^, 


306  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

impressive  form  and  manner,  and  it  directed  the  moral 
feeling  along  religious  paths.  Seneca,  Epictetus,  and 
Marcus  Aurelius  appeared  as  its  chief  representatives  at 
this  time. 

Lucius  Annaeus  Seneca,  son  of  the  rhetorician  M.  Annaeus 
Seneca,  was  born  about  4  A.  D.  in  Cordova.  He  was  educated 
in  Rome  and  called  to  dirterent  offices  of  state.  He  was  the 
teacher  of  Nero,  and  condemned  to  death  by  his  pupil  in  65  a.  d. 
He  has  expressed  most  completely  the  monitory  character  of 
later  Stoicism  in  his  sententious  writings,  —  to  which  the  name 
of  scientific  researches  cannot  be  unqualifiedly  applied.  Besides 
his  unimportant  Quoestiones  naUirales,  there  are  preserved  J)e 
providentia^  De  constantia  sapientis,  De  ira,  JJe  consolatione, 
De  brevitate  vitce,  De  otio^  De  rita  beata^  De  tranquillitate 
aiiimi,  De  dementia,  De  ienejicns^  and  the  Epistolce  morales. 
Also  in  his  stronglj*  declamatory  tragedies  there  is  involved  this 
same  conception  of  life.  Complete  sets  of  his  works  are  pub- 
lished by  Fickcrt  (3  vols.,  Leipzig,  1842-45)  and  Haase  (3 
vols.,  Leipzig,  1852  f) ;  German  translation  by  Moser  and 
Pauly  (17  vols.,  Stuttgart,  1828-55),  P^nglish  translation  or  para- 
phrase by  T.  Long  (London,  1614)  ;  see  Holzherr,  Die  Philos., 
L.  A.  Seneca  (Tubingen,  1858  f.)  ;  Alfr.  Martens,  De  L.  A. 
Senecoe  vita  et  de  tcm.pore  quo  scripta  eius  2^^ti^osophica 
composita  sint  (Altona,  1871);  H.  Siedler,  De  L,  A.  Senecm 
philosophia  m.orali  (Jena,  1878)  ;  W.  Ribbeck,  X.  A.  Seneca 
der  Philosoph  u.  sein  VerhUltniss  zu  Epicur,  Plato  v.  dem, 
Christenthum  (Hannover,  1887).  Further  in  the  history  of  the 
bibliography,  see  Ueberweg,  244  f. ,  especially  for  the  writings 
cited  elsewhere  about  his  relationship  to  Christianity,  of  which 
the  most  important  are  edited  b}-  F.  Chr.  Baur,  Seneca  und 
Panlus  (1858),  printed  in  three  dissertations  and  published  by 
Zeller  (Leipzig,  1875). 

The  satirical  poet  Persaeus,  the  erudite  Heracleitus,  and  L. 
Annaius  Cornutus,  who  systematically  developed  the  allegoi-ical 
significance  of  myths  in  a  theological  writing,  are  mentioned 
among  the  man}-  names  of  Stoics,  and  in  particular,  C.  Muso- 
nius  Rufus,  who  confined  himself  more  closely  to  the  practical 
teaching  of  virtue.  Compare  P.  Wendland,  Qnwstiones  musoni- 
anm  (Berlin,  1886). 

His  pupil  is  Epictetus,  the  notable  slave  of  a  freedman  of 
Nero.  He  later  became  free  himself,  and  lived  in  Nicopolis  in 
Epirus,  when  the  leaders  in  philosophy  were  proscribed  by 
Domitian.     His  lectures  were  published  by  Arrian  as  Aiarpt/Sat 


CONTROVERSIES  OF  THE   SCHOOLS  307 

and  'Ey;^eipi8iov,  and  in  modern  times  b}'  J.  Scliweighauser 
(Leipzig,  1799  ;  in  the  appendix  is  the  commentary  of  Simplicius 
to  the  Encheiridion,  18U0).  See  J.  Spangenberg,  Die  Lekre  des 
Epiktet  (Hanau,  1849)  ;  E.  M.  Schranka,  Der  Stoiker  Epictet 
u.  seine  Philos.  (Frankfort  a.  O.,  1885)  ;  R.  Asmus,  Questiones 
EpictetecB  (Freiburg,  1888)  ;  H.  Schenkl,  Die  epikteteischen 
Fragmente  (Vienna,  1888)  ;  A.  Bonhofer,  Epictet  u.  d.  Stoa 
(Stuttgart,  1891). 

The  last  significant  expression  of  the  Stoic  literature  is  the 
Meditations  (to.  eis  iavTov)  of  the  noblest  of  Roman  emperors. 
Marcus  Aurelius  Antoninus  (121-180).  These  are  edited  by  J, 
Stich  (Leipzig,  1882),  and  translated  into  German  by  A.  Witt- 
stock  (Leipzig.  1879)  [English  translation  by  G.  Long,  Bohn's 
Librar}',  The  T/ioaghts  of  the  Emperor,  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus']. 
See  A.  Bach,  De  31.  Aurelio  imperatore  pjhilosophante  (Leipzig, 
1826)  ;  M.  E.  de  Suckau,  Mude  sur  Marc  Aurele,  sa  vie  et  sa 
doctrine  (Paris,  1858)  ;  A.  Braune,  M.  Aurel's  Meditationen 
(Altenburg,  1878)  ;  P.  B.  Watson,  Marcus  Aurelius  Antoninus 
(London,  1884). 

The  more  Stoicism  took  to  moralizing,  the  more  did  its 
Cynic  inheritance  begin  to  preponderate.  Thus,  in  the  first  and 
second  centuries  after  Christ,  Cynicism  revived  in  the  persons 
of  those  wandering  preachers  who  went  from  cit}'  to  city  in  the 
costume  of  the  philosopher  with  obtrusive  inconsiderateness  and 
in  affectation  of  beggary.  They  were  eccentric  figures,  but  are 
of  more  interest  to  the  student  of  history  than  of  science.  The 
chief  types  are  Demetrius,  a  contemporarv  of  Seneca  ;  Oinomaus 
of  Gadara ;  particularly,  however,  Demonax,  concerning  whom 
we  have  information  in  a  writing,  reported  under  Lucian's  name 
(see  also  F.  V.  Fritsche,  De  fragm.  Demon,  phihs.,  Rostock  and 
Leipzig,  18G6),  and  Perigrinus  Proteus,  whose  extraordinary 
end  has  been  pictured  by  Lucian.  See  J.  Bernays,  Lukian  v. 
die  Kyniker  (Berlin,  1879). 

Stoicism,  as  originally  presented,  especially  by  Chrysip 
pus,  was  a  perfectly  well-rounded  scientific  system,  whicli 
gradually  grew  lax  in  some  particular  doctrines,  and  finally 
vanished  into  a  philosophically  colorless  moralizing.  Yet 
it  must  be  admitted  that  from  the  very  beginning  it  was 
wanting  in  such  organic  coherence  of  its  parts  as  one  finds 
in  the  separate  Greek  philosophical  systems.  In  the  teach- 
ing of  Zeno  and  Chrysip])us  a  number  of  the  elements  of 
the  earlier  sciences  are  closely  interwoven  without  making 


308  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

the  texture  logically  necessary  and  consistent.  The  Eclectic 
development,  then,  which  the  Stoic  school  took,  was  not  a 
fate  that  came  to  it  from  without,  but  the  necessary  conse- 
quence of  its  inner  constitution. 

However  man}-  analogous  relations  may  exist  between  the 
different  parts  of  the  Stoic  teaching,  yet  one  must  not  make  tlie 
mistake  of  thinking  that  its  ethical  teaching  of  submission  to 
natural  law  might  not  have  been  as  compatible  to  an  idealistic 
metaphysic  as  to  its  materialism.  It  is,  moreover,  equalh' 
certain  that  the  Stoics'  anthropological  principle  of  the  identity 
of  the  human  soul  and  the  divine  reason  might  have  been  placed 
at  the  basis  of  a  rationalistic  theory  of  knowledge,  just  as  well  as 
at  the  basis  of  their  sensualism  and  nominalism.  The  theories 
of  the  Stoa  are  not  an  organic  creation,  but  woven  together  with 
care  and  cleverness.  The3'  make  a  well-connected  system,  but 
are  not  homogeneous.  They  could  afterwards,  therefore,  be 
separated  with  relative  ease. 

The  scholastic  division  of  philosophy  into' logic,  physics, 
and  ethics  was  likewise  especially  distinct  among  the  Stoics. 
The  main  point  in  their  teaching  lies  in  their  ethics.  To 
teach  virtue  as  the  art  of  living  was  for  them  the  entire 
purpose  and  essence  of  philosophy.  Virtue  was  conceived 
by  them  entirely  in  its  practical  meaning  of  right  action. 
Only  so  far  as  this  definition  of  virtue  was  identical  with  the 
Socratic  "  correct  knowledge,"  did  the  first  division,  ethics, 
need  the  other  two  divisions,  logic  and  physics,  for  its  basis. 

The  development  of  special  sciences  corresponded  so  little 
with  the  originally  established  general  relationship  of  the  three 
divisions,  and  the  Stoic  logic  and  physics  stood  in  such  loose 
connection  with  its  ethics,  that  it  is  perfectly  conceivable  how 
Aristo,  a  member  of  the  school  standing  at  first  close  to  pure 
Cynicism,  should  estimate  these  collateral  subjects  of  ethics  as 
useless.  It  is  not  remarkable,  either,  that  the  physical  and 
logical  doctrines  of  the  old  Stoa  were  changed  for  others  and 
then  laid  entirel}'  aside.  The  care  with  which  ph3'sics  and  logic 
were  pursued  in  the  old  Stoa  in  contrast  with  ethics  shows 
rather  that  the  scientific  interest  of  the  school  had  not  been 
fully  lost.  To  this  interest,  which  was  expressed  in  the  numer- 
ous special  works  —  particularly  the  historical  —  Herillus  com- 


CONTROVERSIES  OF  THE  SCHOOLS  309 

mitted  himself,  when  he  declared  science  in  the  Aristotelian 
sense  to  be  the  highest  good. 

G.  J.  Diehl,  Zur  Etliik  des  Stoikers  Zeno  (Mainz,  1877)  ;  F. 
Ravaisson,  De  la  morale  du  Sto'icisme  (Paris,  1850) ;  M.  Heinze, 
Stoica  ethica  ad  origines  suas  relata  (Naumburg,  186*2)  ;  Kiis- 
ter,  Grundziige  der  stoischen  Tugendlehre  (Berlin,  1864)  ; 
Th.  Ziegler,  Gesch.  der  Ethik.,  I.  167  ff. 

The  central  point  in  Stoicism  is  the  Ideal  of  the  Wise 
Man.  Stoicism  drew  its  picture  of  the  normal  man  after 
the  model  of  Socrates  and  Antisthenes.  It  was  its  funda- 
mental motive  to  picture  the  perfect  man  in  absolute  free- 
dom from  the  changes  of  this  world.  This  ideal  was 
consequently  first  defined  negatively  as  the  independence  of 
will  and  conduct  from  the  passions  {Affekte).  This  apathy 
(emotionlessness)  of  the  Wise  Man  consists  in  his  refusal 
to  submit  {avjKarudeai^')  to  the  excess  of  natural  im- 
pulse, from  which  excess  the  passion  springs.  This  re- 
fusal makes  up  the  judgment  of  worth  and  the  functioning 
of  the  will.  The  Wise  Man  feels  impulse,  but  he  does  not  let 
it  grow  into  a  passion,  and  he  regards  the  exciting  object  as 
neither  a  good  nor  an  evil.  For  to  him  virtue  is  not  only  the 
highest  but  the  only  good,  and  in  this  he  is  a  true  Cynic. 

M.  Heinze,  Stoicorum  de  ajfectibus  doctrina  (Berlin,  1861)  ; 
O.  Apelt,  Die  stoischen  Definitionen  der  Affekte  und  Poseido- 
nius  (Jahrb.  f.  Philol.  1885). 

One  must  regard  it  as  a  result  of  the  ethical  psycholog}'  of 
Aristotle,  that  the  Stoics  so  turned  the  Cynic  unity  of  virtue 
and  knowledge  that  they  found  the  essence  of  passion  in  the 
judgment  of  worth,  inasmuch  as  this  judgment  is  immediately 
identical  with  feeling  and  willing.  To  desire,  and  to  regard 
something  as  a  good,  are  two  expressions  for  the  same  thing. 
The  excess  of  impulse  (bpfj^rj  TrXewdCovcra)  leads  the  powers  of  the 
soul  (iTyc/xovtKov)  into  false  judgment,  and  at  the  same  time  to  a 
reasonless  and  unnatural  excitement  (aAoyos  kuI  -n-apa  <^vcnv  vfrvxv^ 
KLvrj(TL<;),  and  in  this  very  thing  consists  the  excitement,  Trd$o<s  (per- 
turbatio).  The  Stoa  distinguished  four  fundamental  kinds  of 
unnatural  excitement :  pleasure,  trouble,  desire,  and  fear.  They 
and  their  subordinate  classes  were  treated  as  diseases  from 
which  the  Wise  Man  is  free,  for  he  has  true  health. 


310  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Since  the  passions  consist  in  false  judgments  and  men- 
tal disturbance,  so  the  virtue  of  the  Wise  Man,  positively 
defined,  consists  in  reasonable  insight  and  the  resulting 
power  of  will.  Virtue  is  the  reason  determining  itself 
theoretically  and  practically  {recta  ratio).  Whether  man 
will  let  loose  this  or  that  passion  in  himself,  depends 
on  him.  That  is  to  say,  the  matter  is  not  determined  by 
external  events,  but  through  his  own  inner  nature. 

"  Nature  "  (<^yo-t<?),  which,  according  to  the  fundamental 
principle  of  the  Stoics,  is  identical  with  reason  (X070S),  forms 
the  content  of  insight,  and  obedience  to  insight  consti- 
tutes virtue.  By  "  Nature  "  is  meant  partly  the  universal 
nature  of  things,  partly  human  nature.  While  passion  is 
unnatural  and  unreasonable,  the  Wise  Man  acts  naturally 
and  reasonably  when  he  makes  his  will  to  agree  with  the 
universal  law  of  nature,  and  when  he  subordinates  himself 
to  that  law.  But  in  this  subordination  he  is  only  acting  as 
the  reason  of  man  requires.  The  ethical  principle  of  the 
Stoa  was  obedience  to  the  world  law,  and  in  this  way  it  pos- 
sessed a  religious  coloring. 

The  ethical  dualism  of  the  Stoics,  witli  its  contrast  between 
nature  and  what  is  contrary-  to  nature,  and  with  its  identification 
of  reason  and  natin-e,  goes  back  to  the  Sophistic  Enhghtenment. 
It  avoided,  however,  the  sharpened  Cynic  antithesis  between 
civilization  and  nature.  It  rather  referred  what  is  contrary  to 
nature  to  the  preponderance  of  the  individual  impulse,  and  it 
characterized  the  natural  as  reason  dwelHng  in  each  and  all 
alike.  The  latter  thought,  which  led  to  the  conventional  reli- 
gious principle  of  subjection  to  the  world-reason,  is  an  obvious 
revival  of  the  logos  doctrine  of  Heracleitus. 

The  possihility  of  unnatural  and  unreasonable  phenomena,  as 
the}'  are  supposed  to  appear  in  the  passions,  is  absolutely  irre- 
concilable with  the  metaphysical  development  of  the  Stoics'  doc- 
trine, and  with  their  idea  of  fate  and  providence.  Their  ethical 
dualism  and  metaphysical  monism  stand  in  absolute  contra- 
diction. This  difficulty  came  to  the  Stoics  in  the  form  of  the 
problem  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  and  the  responsibilit}'  of 
conscience.  These  are  ethical  postulates  whose  union  with 
mechanical  necessitv  made  difficulties  for  them,  and  difficulties 


CONTROVERSIES   OF  THE   SCHOOLS  311 

ihat  were  solvable  onlj-  in  appearance.  In  respect  to  these  diffi- 
culties they  had  to  defend  themselves  against  the  attacks  of 
Epicnrus  and  Carneades. 

In  designating  the  ofxcXoyovixevoy;  rfj  <f>v(r€L  ^rjv  as  the  positive 
content  of  virtue,  and  in  representing  at  the  same  time  the  cosmic 
universal  law  as  "  Nature,"  the  Stoic  lacked  a  principle  of  morals 
that  had  real  content.  Consequently,  on  the  one  hand  in  the 
Stoic  school,  human  nature  was  substituted  for  </)i;o-is,  —  at  all 
events,  according  to  Chrysippus,  with  reference  to  its  unity  with 
the  world  reason.  On  the  other  hand,  the  purely  formal  charac- 
ter of  the  consistency  and  of  the  harmony  of  the  reason  was 
accentuated  (simply  o/xoAoyou/xcVcos).  In  this  sense,  suggestive 
of  the  "categorical  imperative,"  was  Stoicism  accepted  by  the 
iron  statesmen  of  Rome.  Nevertheless,  in  the  Stoic  metaphys- 
ics, the  formula  of  subjection  to  the  world  reason  remained  an 
empty  form  which  found  its  living  content  first  in  the  Christian 
doctrine  of  love. 

The  Stoics  were  little  able  to  make  theoretically  clear  their 
antithesis  of  the  reasonable  and  the  unnatural,  yet  the}-  rendered 
the  service  of  introducing  into  moral  philosophy  the  principle  of 
dut}'  by  the  accentuation  of  this  antithesis,  and  by  defining  vir- 
tue as  subjection  to  cosmic  law ;  and  furthermore  of  having  laid 
a  greater  stress  upon  the  antithesis  between  that  which  is  and 
that  which  ought  to  be.  Whollv  consonant  witli  this  is  the 
pessimism  which  they  for  the  most  part  held  concerning  the 
great  mass  of  mankind  and  the  circumstances  of  life. 

The  Socratic  concept  of  virtue,  that  the  Stoa  held,  concentrated 
into  practical  insight  {(^fyov-qa-ii)  the  whole  of  moral  life,  and  allowed 
the  existence  of  a  plurality  of  virtues  only  in  the  sense  of  the 
application  to  manv  objects  of  this  single  fundamental  virtue  of  in- 
sight. In  this  way,  for  instance,  the  four  Platonic  cardinal  virtues 
were  derived.  Yet  herein  the  Stoic  clung  to  the  thought  of  tlic 
unity  of  virtue  to  such  a  degree  that  all  the  particular  forms  of 
virtue  exist  in  inseparable  union.  They  form  not  only  the  en- 
during characteristic  (dta^ecrts)  of  the  Wise  Man,  but  they  also 
animate  his  ever}-  action. 

The  unity  and  perfectness,  which  the  Stoics  like  the  Me- 
garians  and  Cynics  regarded  as  essential  in  the  concept  of 
virtue,  and  in  the  ideal  of  the  Wise  Man,  led  them  in  the 
first  thoroughgoing  statement  of  their  system  to  say  that 
this  ideal  is  reached  either  entirely  or  not  at  all.  In  neither 
goodness  nor  badness  arc  there  degrees  of  ethical  value. 


312  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Men  arc  either  good  (^airovBaioi),  or  bad  (^aOXot),  and  to 
the  latter  belong  all  who  do  not  attain  the  ideal  of  wisdom. 
It  makes  no  difference  whether  they  be  near  to  it  or  far 
from  it.  They  are  all  fools, —  spiritually  sick.  Thus  for 
the  older  Stoics  all  virtuous  actions  {KaTopOco/iaTo)  were 
ethically  of  equal  value,  and  likewise  all  sins  (dfiapT^fiara). 
With  the  same  rigorism  the  Stoics  declared  virtue  as  the 
only  good,  vice  as  the  only  evil,  and  all  between  as  (dBi- 
d<f>opa)  indifferent  things. 

The  last  definition  led  to  many  serious  consequences  in  ap- 
plied ethics  in  which  tlie  Stoics  agreed  with  the  Cynics,  although, 
it  must  be  said,  in  theory  nioro  than  in  practice.  Since  the 
Stoics  assessed  the  disix)sition  ethicalh-,  they  therefore  made  the 
AVise  Man  indifferent  in  principle  to  external  conventional  forms 
of  performance  or  non-performance.  In  their  theory'  of  goods, 
the\'  made  a  iwlemic  attack,  especially  against  the  Peripatetic 
recc^nition  of  the  im|X)rtancc  which  the  goods  of  fortune  were 
supposed  to  have  for  perfect  happiness.  Especially  prominent 
is  their  treatment  of  life  as  an  dSta^opoi',  which  theoretically  and 
practically  represented  suicide  as  permissible  for  the  Wise  Man. 

This  rigoristic  dualism  could  not  last  long,  and  so  the 

school     gradually    inserted     the     striving,    earnest    man 

{irpoK&irTaiv)  between  the  Wise  Man  and  the  fool,  and  the 

fitting  action  (to  Ka6i)Kov)  between  virtue  and  sin.     The 

school  distinguished  in  the  great  interval  which  lies  between 

the   highest  good   and   the   evil,   the  irpoiryfieva  from  the 

tnToirpoTf^fxeva. 

On  the  whole,  the  Stoics  are  the  most  outsj^ken  doctrinaires 
that  antiquity  witnessed.  The  Stoa  was  a  school  of  character 
building  and  also  a  school  in  reckless  stubbornness  (Cato).  In 
the  development  of  the  school  there  entered  with  the  different 
individuals  many  varieties  and  compromises  of  doctrine  accord- 
ing to  impending  practical  needs.  These  changes  kept  pace 
with  the  approach  of  the  school  to  the  teaching  of  the  Lyceum 
and  the  Academy.  Thereupon  the  perfectly  unpedagogical 
character  was  gr.ndually  stripped  off,  which  the  representation 
of  the  ideal  of  the  Wise  Man  originally  had,  and  in  its  place  in 
later  times  came  the  reverse  and  admonitory  teaching,  how  one 
should  become  a  Wise  Man. 


CONTROVERSIES  OF  THE  SCHOOLS  313 

KaropOfofxa^  the  conduct  of  a  Wise  Man,  coming  from  a  good  dis- 
position, and  KuOrJKov^  the  activit}-  of  the  ordinaiy  ambitions  man 
adjusted  to  external  requirements,  stand  somewhat  in  the  rela- 
tionship which  modern  ethics  marks  between  morality  and 
legality.  The  setting  up  of  this  distinction  shows  how  the 
realized  ideal  of  the  Wise  Man  was  making  way  to  the  more 
modest  ambition  of  approximating  that  ideal. 

The  individualistic  tendency  expressed  in  the  ideal  of 
the  self-sufficient  Wise  Man,  is  counterbalanced  by  the 
concept  of  the  subordination  of  the  individual  to  the 
cosmic  law  and  the  society  of  rational  beings.  The 
Stoics  recognized,  therefore,  the  social  needs  of  man  as 
natural  and  reasonable.  Tliey  saw  the  realization  of  those 
needs  simply  on  the  one  side  in  the  friendship  of  individual 
Wise  Men,  and  on  the  other  in  the  rational  communion  of  all 
men.  Whatever  lies  between  —  that  is,  the  national  life  in 
its  different  political  forms  —  passed  for  them  more  or  less  as 
of  historical  indifference  {dScdcpopov}.  The  Wise  Man  bows 
to  this  as  a  temporal  necessity,  but  he  holds  aloof  from  it 
as  far  as  possible.  Historico-national  distinctions  vanish 
before  that  reason,  which  gives  equal  laws  and  equal  rights 
to  all.  The  point  of  view  of  the  Stoic  Wise  Man  was  that  of 
the  cosmopolitan. 

For  the  remarkable  synthesis  of  individualism  and  univer- 
salism  which  characterized  the  vStoa,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the 
school  soon  passed  in  its  social  theor\'  from  individualism  to 
the  most  general  principle  of  association.  The  later  Eclectic 
Stoics  in  particular  were  concerned  with  the  theory  of  the  state, 
and  followed  Aristotle  in  man\'  things.  But  the  ideal  of  the 
school  remained  still  the  citizenship  of  the  world,  the  fraternity 
of  all  men,  the  ethico-legal  equalization  of  all  distinctions  of 
condition  and  race.  From  this  thought  proceeded  the  begin- 
nings of  the  idea  of  natural  or  reasonable  right,  which  later 
were  laid  as  fundamental  in  the  scientific  theory  of  Roman 
right. ^     They  reflect  in  theoretical  form  the  levelling  of  those 

1  See  M.  Voigt,  Die  Lehre  vom  jus  naturale,  etc.  bei  den  Romem 
(Leipzig,  1856)  to  p.  81  ff. 


?14  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

tistorical  distinctions,  which  was  completed  for  antiqiiit}'  about 
the  beginning  of  this  era,  and  thus  show  Stoicism  to  be  the  ideal 
philosophy  of  the  Roman  Empire.^ 

To  this  ethical  teaching  there  was  joined  in  a  most  re- 
markable manner  an  outspoken  materialistic  metaphysics. 
The  monistic  tendency,  expressed  in  the  metaphysics,  was 
nnited  with  the  ethical  principle,  and  was  developed  in  an 
open  polemic  against  the  Aristotelian  dualism.  Uncreative 
themselves,  the  Stoics  accepted  the  naive  materialism  of 
the  pre-Socratic  philosophy  in  the  form  of  Heracleitanism. 
They  expressly  taught  that  nothing  is  real  except  the 
corporeal.  They,  however,  recognized,  in  regard  to  the 
relationships  of  individual  things,  the  Aristotelian  duality 
of  a  passive  and  an  active  principle,  a  moved  matter  and  a 
moving  force  (irdaxov  and  iroiovv).  They  give  to  the  uni- 
fying cosmic  force  all  the  characteristics  of  the  Heracleitan 
\0709  and  the  Anaxagorean  1^01)9.  But  they  emphasize 
particularly  the  materiality  of  this  reasonable  cosmic  force. 

In  their  confessed  materialism,  the  Stoics  went  nearly  to  the 
childish  consequence  of  looking  u}X)n  all  qualities,  forces,  and 
activities  of  bodies  as  again  themselves  bodies  which  were 
supposed  to  inhere  spatiall3'  in  the  first  bodies  (KpSo-is  Bt  oAwv). 
This  reminds  us  in  some  measure  of  the  homoiomeriai  of 
Anaxagoras.  The  Stoics  also  regarded  time  quanta  and  the 
like,  as  bodies  —  assertions  that  show  nothing  more  than  the 
doctrinaire  wilfulness  of  the  authors.  See  H.  Siebeck  on 
the  subject. 

The  Stoics,  like  Heracleitus,  found  in  fire  the  unifying 
cosmic  force,  which  is  God, —  which  is  changed  by  its  own 
inner  rational  law  into  the  world.  They  conceived  fully 
that  fire  was  the  identity  of  the  corporeal  primeval  matter 
and  the  rational  spirit,  and  in  this  way  they  fell  back  from 

1  Cicero  especially  (De  rep.  and  De  leg.)  developed  the  Stoic  thought 
of  the  (f)v(rfi  SUaiov  as  the  lex  naturce  bom  in  all  men  ;  but  also  he  has 
attempted  to  be  just  te  the  historical  moments  of  jurisprudence.  See  K. 
Hildenbrand,  Gesch.  u.  System  der  Rechts-  u.  Staatsphilos.,  I.  523  £f. 


CONTROVERSIES   OF   THE   SCHOOLS  315 

the  dualism  of  the  time  of  the  epigones  to  the  naively 
vague  monism  of  the  previous  time.  Fire  is  therefore  on 
the  one  hand  the  original  corporeal  substrate,  the  apx^  of 
the  Milesians.  On  the  other  it  is  the  primeval  spirit,  the 
world-soul,  the  reason  moving  and  forming  all  things, 
permeatiug  and  governing,  like  a  divine  living  breath 
(TTj/eO/ia),  the  entire  world  of  plienomena  proceeding  from 
it.  It  is  indeed  the  creative  world-reason,  the  \0709 
cr7repfjbaTiK6<i. 

Fire  has  differentiated  air,  water,  and  earth  from  itself 
at  tiie  beginning  of  things,  so  that  the  two  more  volatile 
elements  stand  as  the  active  and  forming  principle,  in 
contrast  to  the  two  heavier  as  matter.  In  the  cosmic  devel- 
opment the  primitive  fire  is  destined  gradually  to  reabsorb 
the  world  of  variety  into  itself,  and  will  finally  consume  it 
in  a  universal  catastrophe  {iKTrvpwcn<i).  The  complete 
cosmic  cycle  is  so  perfectly  determined  in  all  particulars 
by  the  divine  Being  that  it  is  exactly  repeated  periodically. 
In  so  far  as  the  Godhead  acts  like  a  body  under  the  law  of 
mechanical  necessity,  is  this  absolute  determination  of  the 
movements  of  all  individuals  Fate  (^el^apfievrf).  In  so  far 
as  it  acts  as  a  purposeful  spirit  it  takes  on  the  garb  of 
Providence  (TrpovoLo)^  and  the  Stoic  evidently  means  by 
this  that  nature  can  yield  only  perfect  and  teleological 
forms  and  relationships. 

In  all  this  we  do  not  meet  new  concepts  or  new  ways  of 
stating  facts.  The  Heracleitan  principle  is  combined  with  the 
Platonic  and  Aristotelian  concepts  without  being  scientifically 
more  serviceable.  No  scientific  contribution  worlhv  of  the 
name  can  be  found  among  the  Stoics.  In  particular  cases,  as 
in  astronomy,  the  Stoics  join  themselves  in  essentials  with  the 
Peripatetics.  On  the  whole,  in  their  treatment  of  these  questions, 
the}'  show  a  relapse  from  the  inductive  science  of  Aristotle  to 
the  old  metaphysics. 

The  pantheistic  character  of  this  conception  of  nature  led  the 
Stoic  to  a  nature  religion,  which  at  the  same  time  is  a  religion 
of  reason.     A  characteristic  monument  to  this  is  the  hymn  to 


316  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Zeus  of  Cleanthes  (preserved  in  Stob.  Ecl.^  I.  30).  In  the 
same  spirit  thej'  made  the  most  comprehensive  use  of  the  alle- 
gorical interpretation  of  mj'ths.  Teleology  was  so  connected 
with  this  interpretation,  and  was  so  attenuated  to  a  small  an- 
thropomorphic spirit  in  praise  of  the  arrangements  useful  for 
human  needs,  that  it  anticipated  to  a  great  degree  the  tasteless 
philosoph}'  of  the  eighteenth  centurj'.  The  great  ethical  prin- 
ciples of  the  Platonic  and  Aristotelian  philosophy  diminished  in 
the  hands  of  the  Stoics  to  a  miserable  utilitarian  theory,  which 
was  the  more  characteristic  the  less  it  found  a  point  of  support 
in  the  Stoic  doctrine  of  goods. 

It  is  of  particular  interest  to  note  how  the  Stoics  began  to 
work  a  positive  religion  into  their  natural  religion  ;  for  they 
treated,  b}'  the  use  of  the  nature-myth  interpretation,  the  gods 
and  daemons  of  the  popular  faith  as  special  forms  of  the  original 
divine  force.  They  came  in  this  wa}'  to  a  systematic  tlieolog3-  of 
polytheism,  and  the}'  subjoined  to  it  their  widely  accepted  theory 
of  divination,  based  on  the  principle  of  a  universal  teleolog}'. 

The  pantheism  and  determinism  in  Stoicism  stood  finally  in 
absolute  contradiction  with  its  ethical  dualism.  The  former  was 
as  optimistic  as  the  latter  was  pessimistic.  That  everything 
bad  happens  Trapa  <^i'(nv  was  treated  as  ethically  fundamental, 
although  according  to  their  metaphysical  principle  it  was  impos- 
sible. This  contradiction  seems  to  have  come  in  some  measure 
to  the  consciousness  of  some  of  the  Stoics.  In  response  to  the 
sharp  attacks  of  their  opponents,  particularly  of  Carneades,  it 
was  the  occasion  for  evasions  tending  toward  such  questions  as 
the  reconciliation  of  evil  with  a  divine  omnipotence,  which  we 
have  later  designated  as  theodicy.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Stoics 
attempted  to  disclaim  the  realit\'  of  evil,  and  then  on  the  other 
to  make  sin  and  suffering  the  teleologically  indispensable  parts 
of  the  good  and  perfectly  organized  universe. 

The  an  til  Topology  of  Stoicism  was  consistent  with  its  uni- 
versal physical  postulates.  The  body,  teleologically  put 
together  out  of  crass  elements,  is  permeated  through  and 
through,  and  in  all  its  functions  ruled  by  the  soul.  The 
soul  is  the  warm  breath  {irvevfia  hdepfjbov'),  which,  as  an 
emanation  of  the  divine  soul  of  the  world,  forms  the  uni- 
tary, living  guiding  force  of  man  (to  rj'yefiovLKov).  It  con- 
stitutes his  reason ;  it  is  the  cause  of  his  physiological 
functions,  of  his  speech,  of  his  imagination  and  desires; 
and  it  has  its  seat  in  the  breast. 


CONTROVERSIES  OF  THE  SCHOOLS        817 

Ludw.  Stein,  Die  Psydiologie  der  Stoa  (2  vols.,  Berlin, 
1886-88). 

The  essential  identity  of  the  human  and  divine  soul  (taught 
also  by  the  pre-Socratifs)  was  carried  out  b}'  the  Stoics,  espe- 
cially on  ethical  and  religious  lines.  The  analogy  seemed  suitably 
drawn  between  the  relation  of  the  liuman  soul  to  its  body,  and 
the  divine  reason  to  the  unirerse. 

The  Stoics  consistently  ascribed  to  the  soul  of  man  no  abso- 
lute immortalit}'.  At  the  most  they  gave  to  it  a  permanence 
until  the  eK-i'pwo-ts,  the  absorption  of  all  things  in  the  divine. 
Yet  some  Stoics  reserved  this  last  privilege  onh'  for  the  souls 
of  the  Wise,  while  the  </>uvA.oi  were  dissipated  both  in  soul  and 
body. 

In  the  Stoic  anthropolog}',  as  in  their  entire  system,  the  fun- 
damental contradiction  was  this  :  their  theoretic  doctrine  allowed 
to  appear  as  mechanically  necessary  that  very  I'ationality  which 
according  to  their  ethical  postulate  was  requisite  to  the  formation 
of  the  ideal,  so  that  the  actual  incompleteness  of  the  ideal  is  incon- 
ct'ivable.  From  this  is  explained  the  fact  that  the  whole  theoretic 
philosophy  of  the  Stoa  was  subjected  to  the  point  of  view  of 
that  insight  which  guides  the  perfectly  Wise  Man  in  his  con- 
duct. The  same  contradiction  showed  itself  in  the  Stoic  episte- 
mology,  where  the  emanation  from  God  (e/x^vrov  Trvevfxa)  was 
represented  as  a  tabuki  rasa.  The  tabula  rasa  does  not  alread_y 
possess  its  rational  content,  as  one  would  expect  from  this 
teaching,  but  wins  its  content  gradually  b}"  the  action  of  the 
senses.^ 

We  must  go  back  to  tlie  Cynic  opposition  to  tlie  Academy 
to  understand  how  the  Stoics  can  combine  a  sensualistic 
and  nominalistic  theory  of  knowledge  with  their  doctrine  of 
a  cosmic  reason.  The  Stoics  sought  in  their  nominalism, 
even  as  extrinsically  as  in  tlicir  ethics,  to  give  to  their  funda- 
mental principle  of  individuality  the  concept  of  nniversal 
validity,  —  a  validity  from  which  they  could  in  neither  situ- 
ation escape.  The  soul  is  originally  like  a  tablet  of  wax,  on 
which  nothing  is  written,  and  in  which  ideas  (^^avTaa-iat) 

1  There  was  therefore  an  easy  union  possible  with  Stoic  metaphysics, 
when  the  later  eclectic  popular  philosophy  (Cicero)  said  that  knowledge, 
particularly  that  of  practical  truths,  was  God-implanted,  universal  to 
humanity,  and  ocpially  innatf. 


318  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

appear  through  the  influence  of  things.  Every  original 
idea  is  an  impression  (ruTrwo-t?)  on  the  soul,  or  a  change  in 
it  —  as  Chrysippus  said,  in  order  to  refine  this  crude  materi- 
alism. On  that  account  this  idea  always  refers  to  par- 
ticular things  or  conditions.  Concepts  (ewoiai)  are,  however, 
pictures  aroused  by  memory  and  the  reasoning  faculty 
rendered  possible  by  the  memory.  They  are  purely  sub- 
jective, and,  therefore,  nothing  v  actual  corresponds  to 
them,  as  in  the  case  of  the  perceptions.  Yet  the  Stoa 
vaguely  tried  to  find  in  them  the  essence  of  all  scientific 
knowledge.^ 

Concepts  originate  in  perception,  in  part  involuntarily 
from  the  very  necessity  of  the  mental  mechanism,  in  part 
with  conscious  premeditation.  The  former  are  a  natural 
production,  and  are  common  to  all  alike  (^kolvoX  evvoiai). 
This  class  is  therefore  to  be  regarded  as  the  norm  of  ra- 
tional knowledge,  and  as  the  \ix\\A presupposition  {irpoXrii^L^). 
In  this  sense  the  consensus  gentium  plays  a  great  role 
in  Stoic  argumentation,  especially  in  ethics  and  religion. 
For  the  coyisensus  gentium  is  a  common  property  of  concepts 
existing  for  all  men  with  equal  necessity. 

As  regards  the  scientific  construction  of  concepts,  the 
Stoics  busied  themselves  with  great,  and,  for  the  most  part, 
very  unfruitful  formalism  in  their  detailed  study  of  the 
Aristotelian  logic.  They  combined  this  study  with  that  of 
grammar.  In  treating  of  the  hypothetical  character  of 
logical  truth,  which  they  emphasized  especially  in  their 
theory  of  the  syllogism,  they  needed  a  criterion  of  truth  for 
those  original  Ideas,  from  which  the  logical  work  of  thought 
is  supposed  to  proceed.  They  found  such  an  one  only  in 
immediate  evidence.,  according  to  which  single  Ideas  force 
themselves  upon  the  soul  and  compel  its  assent  (avy/caTa- 
decn<i).     An  idea  of  this  sort  they  called  ^avraaia  Kardkry 

1  See  Zeller,  IV^.  77  £f. 


CONTROVERSIES  OF  THE  SCHOOLS        319 

TTTLKr]}     They  found  it  either  in  clear  and  certain  percep- 
tions or  in  the  kolvoX  evvoiai. 

R.  Hirzel,  De  logica  Stoicorum  (Bei-lin,  1879)  ;  V.  Brochard, 
Sii,r  la  logique  du  Sto'icisme  {Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos.,  V. 
449  £f.)- 

Under  the  collective  name  of  logic,  which  the}'  first  employed 
in  the  study  of  terms,  the  Stoics  grouped  grammatical  and  rhe- 
torical studies.  Tlie}'  —  especiallj-  Chrysippus  —  investigated 
man}'  grammatical  problems,  and  decided  a  great  many  of  the 
questions  of  fact  and  terminolog}'  for  more  than  for  antiquit}'. 
Compare  Lersch,  Die  Spradq)hilosophie  d.  Alten  (Bonn,  1841)  ; 
Schomann,  Die  Lelire  von  den  Medefeilen,  nach  den  Alten  dar- 
(jestellt  M.  benrteilt  (Berlin,  1863)  ;  Steinthal,  Gesch.  d.  Sprach- 
tviss.  hei  d.  Griechen  und  R'dmern  (Berlin,  1863). 

Concerning  the  formal  logic  of  the  Stoics,  see  C.  Prantl, 
Gesch.  d.  Log.,  I.  401  ff.  When  the  Stoics  distinguished  studies 
concerned  with  the  criterion  of  truth  from  those  concei-ned  with 
correct  s^'llogistic  method,  they  transmuted  the  Aristotelian  logic 
into  a  purely  formal  science.  They  were  stranded,  however,  in 
empty  sophistry,  which  was  unavoidable  in  such  a  limited  con- 
ception. The  Aristotelian  analytic  always  is  the  frame  on  which 
the}'  stretch  out  their  artificial  system  with  its  unnecessary  ter- 
minological changes.  They  have  added  nothing  significant. 
Even  in  their  simplification  of  tlie  tlieory  of  the  categories  Aris- 
totle himself  had  preceded  them.  They  recognized  only  the  fol- 
lowing four  categories  :  vTroKeL/xevov,  ttolov,  ttw?  ^X'^>y,  vrpos  n  TTu)? 
€X<)v:  substratum,  quality,  condition  and  relation.  See  A.  Tren- 
delenburg, Gesch.  der  Kategorienlehre  (Berlin,  1846),  p.  217  ff. 

The  distinction  of  involuntary,  universal  ideas  that  enter  the 
mechanism  of  representation,  from  those  formed  with  scientific 
consciousness  (Lotze,  Xof//^•,  1874,  §  14),  has  psychological  and 
logical  value,  but  its  ei)istemological  use  by  the  Stoics  is  an 
unhappy  one.  They  also,  however,  according  to  their  ethical 
principle,  first  ascribed  full  certainty  to  scienee  as  a  system  of 
fully  developed  concepts:  Diog.  Laert.,  VII.  47;  Stob.  Eel., 
II.  128. 

See  "W.  Luthe,  Die  Erkenntnisslehre  der  Stoiker  (Leipzig, 
1890). 

47.  With  less  philosophical  originality,  but  with  a  greater 
degree  of  unity  and  compactness.  Epicureanism  was  the 

1  Of  the  difficulty  with  this  term,  —  the  comprehension  of  the  actual 
from  the  side  of  the  spirit,  or  the  coniprehensibilitv  of  the  spirit  from  the 
side  of  what  is  actual,  see  Bonnhbfer,  Epiktet  und  die  Sloa,  p.  288  ff. 


320  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

form  in  which  the  Cyreiiaic  conception  of  life  found  devel- 
opment just  as  Stoicism  was  the  development  of  Cynicism. 
In  contrast,  however,  to  the  multiform  eclecticism  which 
characterized  the  Stoa  in  the  persons  of  many  of  its  active 
scientific  champions  through  the  centuries.  Epicureanism 
was  born  mature  in  its  founder  as  a  complete  method  of 
living.  Its  numberless  disciples  in  all  antiquity  changed 
it  scarcely  more  than  in  its  uncssentials. 

Consequently,  apart  from  Ei)icurus  himself,  who  founded 
the  school  in  his  garden  in  Athens  in  306,  there  are  no 
independent  thinkers  of  the  school  to  be  named.  We  may 
name  some  literary  representatives :  Metrodorus  of  Lamp- 
sacus,  the  friend  of  the  founder ;  Colotes  of  the  same  city  ; 
Zeno  of  Sidon  (100  b.  c.)  ;  Phaedrus,  whom  Cicero  heard 
in  Rome  about  90  b.  c.  ;  Philodemiis  of  Gadara  and  more 
especially  the  Roman  poet  Titus  Lucretius  Cams. 

See  P.  Gassendi,  De  tnta,  moribus  et  doctrina  Epicnn  (Leydcn, 
1647);  G.  Prezza,  Epicnro  e  V Epicvreismo  (Florence,  1877); 
M.  Guyaii,  La  morale  iVEpicure  (Paris,  1878)  ;  P.  v.  Gizycki, 
Ueher  das  Lehen  und  die  Mora^^hiloHopMe  des  Epi'k%tr  (Halle, 
1879);  W.  Wallace,  Epicureanism  (London,  1880)  ;  R.  Schwen, 
Ueher  (jriech.  u.  rom.  Epicnreismxis  (Tarnowitz,  1881). 

As  original  sonrees,  besides  what  is  left  by  Epicurus,  there 
are  the  didactic  poem  of  Lucretius,  De  reritm,  natura  (edited  by 
Lachmann,  BerUn,  1850,  and  Jac.  Beinays,  Leipzig,  1852),  and 
the  writings  found  in  Ilerculaneum,  particularly  of  Philodemus: 
Herctdanensium  vohiminnm.  qnm  snpersutd  (first  series,  Naples, 
1793-1855,  second  since  1861).  Compare  D.  Comparetti,  La 
villa  del  Pisoni  (Naples,  1879);  Th.  Gomperz,  Ilerkulanen- 
sische  Studien  (Leipzig.  1865  f.,  Wiener  Sitzungsherivhte,  1876, 
1879).  Secondary  anti(|ue  sources  are  Cicero  (/>e  .^«/&w5  and 
De  natura  deoruvi),  Seneca,  and  Diogenes  Laertius,  B.  10. 

Epicurus  was  born  341  in  Samos  of  an  Athenian  of  the  deme- 
Gargettos.  His  father  seems  to  have  been  a  school-teacher. 
Epicurus  grew  up  in  simple  circumstances.  He  had  read  some 
philosophers,  especially  Democritus,  and  perhaps  also  listened 
to  some  of  his  older  contemporaries  in  Athens.  But  he  had  not 
at  any  rate  enjo3'ed  a  thorough  education,  when,  having  tried 
his  hand  as  a  teacher  in  Mytilene  and  Lampsacus,  he  afterwards 


CONTROVERSIES  OF  THE   SCHOOLS  321 

founded  his  school  in  Athens,  which  was  later  named  after  the 
garden  in  which  it  was  held  (ot  airo  twv  kt/ttcov;  horti).  His 
teaching  was  opportune,  easily  understood,  popular,  and  in  har- 
mony with  the  spirit  of  the  time.  It  is  thus  explicable  how  he 
found  wide  acceptance  equally  with  the  more  serious  schools 
of  science.  Owing  to  his  personal  charm,  and  because  he  did 
not  make  so  high  and  strict  demands  either  upon  the  life  or 
thought  of  his  auditors  as  others  made,  he  became  greatly 
esteemed  as  the  head  of  the  school.  As  such  he  worked  until 
his  death  in  270.  He  wrote  rauch,^  only  a  little  of  which  lias 
been  preserved.  Of  the  thirty-seven  books  of  Trept  ^vVew?  onl}- 
two  were  found  in  the  Herculanean  librarj* ;  (published  b}'  Orelli, 
Leipzig,  1818.)  In  addition  three  didactic  letters  and  the 
Kvptai  86$aL,  besides  many  more  or  less  extensive  fragments, 
have  been  found.  H.  Usener  has  published  a  notably  complete 
and  orderl}'  collection,  excepting  the  two  books  Trept  </)vo-£ws 
by  the  name  Epicarea  (Leipzig,  1887). 

Epicurus'  confidant  and  celebrated  colleague,  Metrodorus,  died 
before  him.  See  A.  Duening,  De  M.  Epicurei  vita  et  scriptis,  cum 
fragm.,  Leipzig,  1870,  Alfr.  Korte,  Metrodori  fragm.,  Leipzig, 
1890).  The  headship  of  the  school  passed  directly  then  from 
Epicurus  to  Hermarciuis.  From  that  time  on,  numerous  pupils 
and  heads  of  the  school  are  mentioned  (see  Zeller,  IV^.  368- 
378),  but  seldom  in  such  a  way  as  to  lead  us  to  know  their  dis- 
tinction as  philosophers.  We  know  Colotes  from  the  treatise 
which  Plutarch  aims  against  him,  as  the  champion  of  the  school ; 
Zeno  and  Phsedrus  from  the  reports  of  Cicero  ;  also  Philodemus, 
whose  works  in  part  were  found  in  Herculaneum.  See  the  liter- 
ature in  Ueberweg-Heinze,  V.  264  f. ,  especially  H.  v.  Arnim, 
Philodemea  (Halle,  1888). 

Especiall}'  at  Rome,  where  C.  Amafinius  (middle  of  second  cen- 
tur}-,  B.  c.)  had  first  naturalized  Epicureanism  to  a  considerable 
degree,  the  theory  found  many  supporters,  and  most  of  all  in 
its  i)oetical  presentation  in  Lucretius  (97-54).  See  IT.  Lotze, 
Qwrstiones  Lucretianre  (Philol,  1852)  ;  C.  Martha.  Le  pohne 
de  Lucrece  (Vims,  1873)  :  J.  Woltjer,  L.  ptliilosophia  cnmfontibus 
comparata  (Groningen,  1877). 

Concerning  the  development  of  the  school,  see  R.  Hirzel, 
Unters.  zu  Cicero's  philosophischen  Schriften,  T.  98  ff. 

The  ethics  of  Epicunis  was  a  reproduction  of  hedonism 
(§  30)  in  a  form  riper  in  so  far  as  the  more  youthful  fresh- 
ness of  the  Aristippan  doctrine  of  sense-pleasure  made  way 

1  See  Diog.  Laert.,  X.  26  ff. 
21 


322  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

for  deeper  reflection,  such  as  already  existed  among  the 
later  Cyrenaics.  The  limitation  of  philosophy  to  a  search 
for  the  means  of  attaining  individual  happiness  was  most 
boldly  expressed  by  Epicurus,  and  was  developed  utterly 
regardless  of  every  other  interest,  especially  of  science. 
Science  and  virtue  are  nothing  that  should  be  prized  in 
themselves.  They  have  worth  only  as  indispensable  means 
for  the  attainment  of  pleasure,  and  pleasure  is  the  natural 
and  obvious  goal  of  every  desire. 

Pleasure  is  not  only  positive  pleasure  in  the  narrower 
sense  which  arises  out  of  a  motion  that  satisfies  the  need 
(Jjhovr)  €v  KLvrj(T€L).  It  is  the  more  valuable  pleasure  of 
painlessness,  which  goes  with  the  state  of  more  nearly  per- 
fect rest  ^  (J)hovr)  Karaa-TTjfMaTiK^),  a  state  consequent  upon 
the  satisfaction  of  wants.  The  latter  affords  doubtless 
a  certain  pleasure,  but  perfect  happiness  (^jxaKapico^  ^rjv') 
can  be  found  only  in  a  state  in  which  every  want  is  absent. 
Happiness  is  health  to  the  body  and  repose  {drapa^ia)  of 
the  soul :  8cKaio(rvvr)<i  /capTro?  fiiyiaTot  drapa^ia.^ 

Epicurus  showed  his  deficiency  in  scientific  training  in  the 
ambiguity  of  his  expressions,  and  in  his  lack  of  logical  clearness. 
His  deficiency  also  appears  in  his  disdain  of  all  theoretical  occu- 
pations. He  had  no  appreciation  of  scientific  investigations 
which  serve  no  use.  Mathematics,  history,  the  special  natural 
sciences  were  closed  to  him.  The  theory  of  pleasure  that  he 
called  ethics,  strictly  included  his  entire  philosophy.  Physics, 
which  had  a  determined  ethical  task  to  perform,  and  was  pur- 
sued only  so  far  as  it  performed  it,  was  only  ancillary ;  and 
as  a  help  in  preparation  for  this,  a  little  logic  was  deemed 
necessar}'. 

It  has  given  rise  to  much  confusion,  because  Epicurus  con- 
sidered rj8ovT]  sometimes  as  a  positive  pleasure  arising  from  the 
satisfaction  of  all  want,  and  because  he  sometimes  used  the  word 
in  the  more  general  sense  when  he  meant  the  more  valued  ataraxy 
(drapalta).  The  introduction  of  the  latter  idea  probably  can  be 
traced  back  to  Democritus.     When  the  TrdOr]  are  designated  as 

1  Olymp.  in  Plato's  Phileb.,  274  (also  Fr.  416). 

2  Clem.  Strom.,  VI.  2  (also  Fr.  519). 


CONTROVERSIES  OF  THE   SCHOOLS  328 

storms,  and  yaXy)VL<Tfj6^  as  tranqnillit}-  (Diog.  Laert.,  X.  83),  we 
are  reminded  of  the  manner  of  expression  of  tlie  great  Abderite. 
This  Epicurean  drapa^la  has  oni}'  an  outward  resemblance  to  the 
Stoic  apath}-.  The  former  is  the  virtue  of  ethical  indifference 
to  all  passions  ;  the  latter  is  passionlessuess,  which  is  based 
upon  the  perfect  satisfaction  of  all  desire.  On  this  account  it 
was  looked  upon,  both  by  P^picureans  and  Cynics,  as  acquired 
only  through  a  limitation  of  desire. 

Therefore  Epicurus  distinguished  formal!}-  three  classes  of 
wants:  natural  and  indispensable ;  natural  and  [)erhaps  dispen- 
sable ;  and  finally,  imaginary,  which  are  neither  natural  nor  in- 
dispensable. Without  satisfying  the  first,  man  cannot  live ; 
without  satisfying  the  second,  he  cannot  be  happy  ;  the  third 
are  to  be  disregarded.  Thus  the  opposition  which  tlie  Cyrenaics 
urged  between  the  natural  and  the  conventional  was  taken  up. 
Its  strenuousness  was  diminished,  however,  in  so  far  as  the  Epi- 
cureans gave  a  place  to  much  in  the  second  categorv,  which  the 
Cyrenaics  were  compelled  to  discard,  because  they  recognized 
only  the  first  categorv. 

Feeling  (Tra^os^)  can  only  decide  as  to  what  exists  in 
any  particular  pleasure.  We  need,  in  order  to  counteract 
this,  to  reflect  upon  the  course  of  life,  and  to  assess  the 
different  pleasures  so  as  to  bring  out  also  their  conse- 
quences.' Such  an  estimate  is  possible  only  through  the 
rational  insight,  the  fundamental  virtue  of  the  Wise  Man 
((jip6v7]ai<i').  This  virtue  was  developed  into  different  single 
virtues,  according  to  the  different  problems  to  be  assessed. 
Through  it  the  Wise  Man  is  able  to  estimate  the  different 
impulses  according  to  their  value  for  perfect  satisfaction. 
He  is  able  to  ap]»reciate  expectations  and  fears  at  their  true 
value,  to  free  himself  from  illusionary  ideas,  feelings,  and 
desires,  and  to  find  in  the  proper  balance  of  enjoyment  that 
serenity  of  soul  which  is  allotted  only  to  him. 

The  Epicurean  ideal  of  the  Wise  Man  is  represented  in 
nearly  the  same  particulars  as  the  Stoical  Wise  Man.  The 
Wise  Man  is  to  the  Epicureans  also  as  free  as  the  gods. 
By  his  reflective  insight,  rising  superior  to  the  course  of 

1  Eus.  Prap.  ev.,  14.  21  (also  Fr.  44-2). 


324  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

tlie  world  and  of  external  fate,  he  finds  happiness  only  in 
himself  and  in  his  virtne,  which  once  acquired  can  never 
be  lost.  Yet  the  Epicurean  description  is  made  in  some- 
what brighter  colors  than  the  Stoic,  rather  more  pleasing 
and  more  joyous.  But  even  if  they  avoided  the  sombreness 
of  the  Stoics,  they  were,  on  the  other  hand,  rather  lacking 
in  vigor:  the  Stoic  feeling  of  duty  was  wanting,  as  were 
both  the  submission  of  the  individual  to  universal  law  and 
the  consciousness  of  responsibility.  Epicurus  prized,  it  is 
true,  spiritual  above  bodily  satisfactions,  because  they  are 
better  qualified  to  lead  to  the  ideal  of  rest  to  the  soul.  In- 
deed, he  recommended  what  he  himself  to  a  high  degree 
possessed,  —  a  pure  and  noble  morality,  social  refinement, 
benevolence,  and  consideration  toward  all.  But  all  this  is 
commended  to  us,  because  every  kind  of  roughness  of  deport- 
ment must  appear  to  an  educated  Greek  as  inharmonious 
with  the  sesthetic  enjoyment  of  existence,  which  had  become 
to  him  a  natural  want.  The  wisdom  of  life  of  the  Epi- 
cureans was  aesthetic  self-enjoyment.  Their  egoism  became 
delicate  and  refined,  but  nevertheless  it  was  still  egoism. 

The  concept  of  <f>p6vr}(ri<;  appeared  in  Epicurus's  theory  almost 
exactly  as  it  appeared  in  that  of  Aristippus,  only  the  matter  of 
measuring  the  consequences  of  particular  pleasures  is  rather  more 
emphasized  than  in  Epicurus.  Merely  upon  this  distinction  of 
consequences  Epicurus  founded  his  preference  for  spiritual  pleas- 
ures over  bodil}'  pleasures,  and  not  upon  an  original  distinction 
of  worth.  He  insisted,  in  accordance  with  his  sensualistic  psy- 
chology', that  the  spiritual  pleasures  reduce  in  their  simplest 
terms  to  bodily  ((rdp$)  ^  pleasures. 

The  fundamental  characteristics  of  the  ethical  atomism  of 
Epicurus  are  shown  most  clearly  in  his  treatment  of  social 
relations.  He  recognized  no  natural  community  of  man- 
kind, but  he  treated  all  the  mutual  relations  of  individuals 
(1)  as  those  which  depend  upon  the  will  of  the  individuals, 
and  (2)  those  which  depend  upon  a  rational  consider- 
1  Athen.,  XII.  546  (also  Fr.  409). 


CONTfiOVERSIES   OF  THE   SCHOOLS  325 

ation  of  useful  consequeuces.  He  regarded  these  human 
relations  not  as  higher  powers,  but  only  as  self-chosen 
means  for  individual  happiness.  In  this  spirit  he  dissuaded 
the  Wise  Man  from  entering  upon  marriage,  because  it 
threatens  him  with  care  and  responsibility.  So  also  he 
recommended  avoidance  of  public  life.  He  regarded  the 
state  as  a  union  ^  that  has  arisen  out  of  the  need  of  mutual 
protection,  and  created  by  the  rational  reflection  of  the 
individuals.  The  functions  of  the  state  are  conditioned  in 
their  entirety  by  the  point  of  view  of  general  utility.  This 
purpose  of  law  brings  about  certain  universal  principles  as 
everywhere  necessary,  but  law  takes  a  variety  of  forms  of 
single  laws  under  different  circumstances. 

Friendship  is  the  only  social  relationship  worthy  of  the 
Wise  Man.  It  rests  indeed,  too,  upon  the  calculation  of 
mutual  usefulness.  Among  wise  and  virtuous  men,  how- 
ever, it  rises  to  a  disinterested  communion,  and  in  it  the 
happiness  of  the  individual  reaches  its  zenith. 

It  is  thoroughly  characteristic  of  the  Epicurean  conception  of 
life,  for  its  social  ideal  to  be  a  purely  individual  relationship, 
viz.,  friendship.  Friendship  was  particularly  cultivated  in 
tliis  school,  and  in  connection  with  its  view  of  the  Wise  Man 
friendship  easily  got  an  insipid  character  of  mutual  admiration. 
The  Xd6e  l3LMa-a<i  is  the  reverse  side  of  it,  wherein  indifference  to 
political  interest  and  responsil)ility,  the  selfish  isolation  of  the 
individual,  decay  of  national  loyalty,  is  raised  tD  a  principle. 
With  this  egoistic  withdrawal  into  private  life.  Epicureanism  be- 
came the  "  common  sense  "  philosophy  of  the  Roman  world. 
For  the  strongest  basis  of  despotism  is  that  desire  for  enjoy- 
ment with  which  every  individual  seeks  in  the  quiet  of  his  own 
life  to  save  as  much  individual  comfort  as  possible  out  of  the 
universal  confusion. 

The  utilitarian  politics  of  Epicurus  has  also  its  germ  in  that 
of  the  Sophists.  Yet  Epicurus  seems  to  have  been  the  first  to 
carry  politics  out  consistently,  and  thus  also  to  have  developed 

1  Diog.  Laert.,  X.  150  (from  the  Kvpim  8<)$ni)  :  to  t^s  (f)va-{a>s  dUcuou 
f(TTi  aiifi^oXov  Tov  <TVfi<PepovTos  fls  TO  fir]  ^XdnTetv  dXXijXovs  fJ.T]8e  (i\d- 
TTTecrdai. 


326  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHY 

the  leading  principle  of  political  compact  (a-vvBrjKrf).  It  was  by 
the  use  of  this  theory  that  the  Enlightenment  of  the  seventeenth 
and  eighteenth  centuries  tried  to  conceive  the  state  as  the  pro- 
duct of  the  selfish  reason  of  individuals  who  were  without  a 
state.  There  was,  therefore,  for  Epicurus  such  a  thing  as  right 
and  wrong  only  where  this  sort  of  agreement  about  universal 
utility  takes  place  between  individuals.^  Lucretius  has  repre- 
sented in  a  typical  manner  this  supposed  transition  of  man 
from  a  state  of  savagery  to  a  state  of  society  (V.  922  ff.). 

If  the  insight  of  the  reason  shall  afford  peace  of  soul  to 
the  Wise  Man,  it  accomplishes  this  principally  by  freeing 
him  through  correct  knowledge  from  all  superstition,  erro- 
neous representations  of  the  nature  of  things,  and  therefore 
from  all  related  idle  fears  and  liopes  which  could  falsely 
determine  the  will.  In  so  far  the  insight  is  this  <f)p6i'r)(Ti<;, 
being  not  only  practical  but  theoretical  in  its  purpose.  To 
this  end  we  need  a  physical  view  of  the  world  which  ex- 
cludes all  myths  and  miracles,  all  transcendent,  religious, 
supersensible,  and  teleological  aspects.  Epicurus  finds  such 
a  view  in  Democritus. 

Compare  Alb.  Lange,  Gesch.  des  Jfnterialismns,  (2  ed.  Iser- 
lohn,  1873,  I.  74  tf.,  97  ff.).  Familiarity  with  the  theory  of 
Democritus  is  said  to  have  been  made  possible  to  Epicurus 
through  Nausiphancs.  At  any  rate,  it  is  the  most  significant 
scientific  influence  which  he  experienced.  Yet  he  is  far  from 
understanding  and  taking  up  into  himself  the  body  of  thought 
of  the  Domocritau  system.  lie  selected  from  the  cosmology  of 
Democritus  wluit  appeared  useful  for  his  shallow  pseudo-enlight- 
enment, and  he  left  untouched  what  was  really  philosophically 
significant.  The  identification  of  his  physical  and  metai)hysical 
theory  with  that  of  Democritus  has  undoubtedly  done  the 
most  to  hinder  an  earlier  recognition  of  the  scientific  greatness 
of  Democritus. 

The  renewal  of  Atomism  by  Epicurus  is  betrayed  in  the 
theory  that  nothing  is  real  except  the  void  and  the  atoms, 
and  that  every  event  consists  merely  of  the  motion  of  the 
atoms  in  empty  space.     Epicurus  refused,  however,  to  ac- 

1  Kvpiai  do^ai,  32  f . ;  Diog.  Lacrt.,  X.  150. 


COXTROVERSIES   OF  THE   SCHOOLS  327 

cept  the  fundamental  thought  of  Democritus  of  the  pure 
mechanical  necessity  of  all  motion.  He  replaced  the  origi- 
nally irregular  motion  of  the  atoms  in  the  absolutely  direc- 
tionless and  boundless  space,  such  as  Democritus  taught,  by 
an  originally  uniform  motion  from  above  downward,  which 
the  senses  appeared  ^  to  represent  to  him  as  absolutely 
given.  This  is  the  rain  of  atom??  Since  the  intermingling 
of  the  atoms  could  not  in  this  way,  however,  be  explained, 
he  asserted  that  single  atoms  arbitrarily  deviated  in  a  very 
slight  degree  from  the  direct  fall.  In  consequence,  collis- 
ions and  vortices  arose,  from  which  the.  atom-complexes 
and  finally  the  worlds  came.  Thus  the  cosmic  theory  of 
Epicurus  again  blended  with  that  of  Democritus  and  ser- 
vilely followed  it  from  this  point  on.  Yet  he  depended 
on  the  theory  of  Democritus  only  in  its  most  general 
characteristics  of  anti-teleology  and  anti-spiritualism.  He 
took  pains  to  explain  that  it  is  a  matter  of  indifference 
how  one  answers  particular  scientific  questions.^ 

That  this  gross  representation  of  an  absolute  fall  of  the  atoms 
is  not  of  Democritan  origin,  but  a  new  theory  of  Epicurus,  can 
be  safe!}'  accepted  after  the  researches  of  Biieger  and  Lie|)- 
niann ;  so  also,  Lewes,  Hist,  of  Philos.,  I.  101  ;  Gnyau,  3Iorale 
(VEpicure,  p.  74  ;  Plutarch,  Plac,  I.  3,  26  (Box.,  285)  ;  Cicero, 
De  fin.,  I.  6,  17  ff . ;  De  fato,  20,  46  ff.  When  Lucretius  (IL 
225  ff.)  made  a  polemic  against  the  view  that  earlier  was  held 
as  Democritan,  which  alleged  that  the  collision  of  the  atoms  could 
be  explained  by  the  quicker  fall  of  the  heavier  ones,  he  had  in 
mind  supposahly  the  hypothesis  of  other  Epicureans.  These 
latter  wished  to  proceed  as  determinists  guided  by  the  funda- 
mental principle  of  the  master,  and  this  seems  to  have  been  at 
one  time  the  inclination  in  the  school.  It  is  not,  indeed,  im- 
possible that  Epicurus  in  part  used  also  this  more  mechanical 
method  of  explanation  side  by  side  with  the  acceptance  of  in- 
finitesimal (€A.a;(tcrToi')  declinations.      (Cicero,  De  fata,  10,  22.) 

Arbitrary  self-deviation  froin  the  perpendicular  fall  —  a  theory 
with  which  Epicurus  destroyed  entirely  the  theory  of  Democ- 

1  Diog.  Laert.,  X.  60.  2  Lucre.,  De  rer.  nat.,  II.  222. 

8  Diog.  Laert.,  X.  87  £E. 


328  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

ritus  —  is  onl}'  the  solution  of  a  self-created  difficulty.  That 
Epicurus  prepared  for  himself  this  difficult}-  is  to  be  explained 
from  his  anxious  adherence  to  the  truth  of  the  senses.  The 
wa}'  in  wliicU  he  explained  it  was  suited  to  his  etliical  conception 
of  the  metaphysical  independence  of  the  individual.  He  made 
the  deviation  of  the  atoms  from  the  perpendicular  fall  analogous 
to  the  voluntar}-  activity-  of  man.  He  showed  himself  to  be  in 
both  cases  the  opponent  of  Democritus'  leading  idea  of  the 
elfjiapixevr].     (Cicero,  De  fato,  10,  23.) 

This  anti-teleological  conception,  which  Lucretius  especially 
developed  in  details,  and  extended  in  an  Empedoclean  fashion 
to  the  apparentl}'  teleological  organic  forms,  seemed  to  the 
Epicureans  to  be  absolute  deliverance  from  superstition.  They 
spoke  as  little  of  natural  religion  as  of  positive  religion.  On  the 
other  hand,  Epicurus  developed  a  Democritan  thought  in  order 
to  imagine  blissful  gods  in  the  intermundia,  the  empt}'  space 
between  the  numberless  worlds.  These  gods,  undisturbed  as 
the}-  are  in  these  worlds,  appear  in  the  eternal  enjoyment  of 
their  self-satisfying  peace  as  a  glorified  actualization  of  the  ideal 
of  the  Wise  Man  who  does  not  reach  a  state  of  perfection  on 
earth. 

A  gross  sensualistic  epistemology  was  joined  to  the 
materialistic  metaphj'sics  of  Epicurus.  The  soul,  whose 
materiality  and  mortality  he  especially  emphasized,  receives 
all  the  content  of  its  ideas  from  sense  perception.  Sense, 
therefore,  with  its  immediate  evidence  (^ivdpyeia)  is  the 
only  criterion  of  truth.  If  concepts  (TrpoXT/i/ret*?)  arise 
through  the  aggregation  of  similar  perceptions,  and  if  out 
of  these  upon  reflection  concerning  the  causes  of  phenom- 
ena, opinions  (^Bo^ai)  and  accepted  views  (uTroX^yi/ret?)  arc 
developed,  the  only  criterion  of  their  truth  is  hi  their  re- 
peated confirmation  by  perception. 

The  Logic  of  Epicurus,  or,  as  he  called  it,  the  Canonic,  is  lim- 
ited to  such  meagre  definitions.  See  Th.  Tohte,  Epikufs  Krite- 
rien  der  Wahrheit  (Clausthal,  1874).  He  purposely  avoided  the 
theories  of  concepts  and  syllogisms.  In  his  school  Philodenius 
accomplished  something  in  the  scientific  construction  of  the 
hypothesis  and  the  inductive  method :  see  Fr.  Bahnsch,  Des 
Epicureers  Phil  Schn'ft,  irepl  a-rjixuwv  koI  a-rjfjLenixrewv,  L3-ck,  1879) ; 
Iv.  Pliilippson,  De  phil.  lihro,  ir(.p\  ot^/aciW  koX  cny/xciwo-cwv  et  Epi' 


SKEPTICISM   AND   SYNCRETISM  329 

cureorum  doctrina  logica  (Berlin,  1881);  P.  Xatorp,  Forschungen, 
209  ff.  In  the  interest  of  this  methodology  which  aimed  at  a 
theory  of  empirical  knowledge,  the  later  Epicureans  merged 
with  the  younger  Skeptics  (§  48).  But  in  contrast  to  the  out- 
spoken positivism  of  the  latter,  the  Epicureans  held  to  the  con- 
viction that  scientific  concepts  were  formed  to  give  us  on  the 
one  side  the  probabilities  of  the  imperceptible  causes  of  phe- 
nomena (aSr/Aov),  and  on  the  other  the  expectations  about  the 
future  (irpoa-fievov)  through  the  comparison  of  facts. 


2.   Skepticism  and  Syncretism. 

The  strife  concerning  philosophical  truth  which  waged 
fiercely  between  the  four  great  schools,  not  only  in  Athens, 
but  also  in  other  intellectual  centres,  especially  in  Alexandria 
and  Rome,  necessarily  presented  to  unprejudiced  minds 
the  skeptical  question  about  the  possibility  and  limits  of 
human  knowledge.  This  would  certainly  have  happened, 
even  if  the  question  had  not  already  come  up  in  the  earlier 
development  of  Greek  philosophy,  and  if  it  had  not  re- 
mained a  current  opinion  since  the  time  of  the  Sophists. 
It  is  perfectly  comprehensible  that  the  skeptical  way  of 
thinking  should  be  consolidated  during  these  school- 
controversies,  and  in  contrast  with  them  should  become 
more  and  more  systematic.  At  the  same  time,  however, 
skepticism  succumbed  to  the  universal  spirit  of  the  time, 
when  it  was  brought  into  most  intimate  relations  with  the 
question  of  the  wise  way  of  living. 

K.  F.  Staudlin,  GescJiichte.  u.  Geist  des  Skepticismus  (Leipzig, 
1794-95)  ]  N.  Maccoli,  The  Greek  Skeptics  from  Pyrrlio  to  Sextus 
(London  and  Cambridge,  1869)  ;  V.  Brochard,  Les  sceptiques 
Grecs  (Paris,  1887). 

48.  The  first  to  perfect  the  system  and  ethics  of  Skepti- 
cism was  Pyrrho  of  Elis,  whose  working  years  were  con- 
temporaneous with  the  origin  of  the  Stoic  and  Epicurean 
schools.  He  seems  to  have  confined  himself  essentially 
to  personal  instruction,  while  the  literary  champion  of  his 


330  HISTOKY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

thought  seems  to  have  been  his  pupil,  Timon  of  Phlius. 
The  doctrine  of  skepticism  was  of  such  a  nature  that  no 
school  could  form  around  it,  and  so  it  vanished  with  the 
next  generation  from  the  field  of  literature. 

Ch.  Waddington,  Pyrrhon  et  le  Pyrrhonisme  (Paris,  1877)  ; 
R.  Hirzel,  Untersuchungen  zn  Cicero's  philos.  /Schriften,  III.  1  ff. ; 
P.  Natorp,  Forschunge7i,  127  ff. 

Concerning  Pyrrho's  life  little  is  known.  He  lived  from  365 
to  275  approximatel}".  That  he  was  acqnainted  in  his  home  with 
the  P^lean-Eretrian  school,  the  Megarian  Sophism  (§  28),  is 
probable.  It  is  ver}'  doubtfnl  whether  or  not  this  happened 
through  the  medium  of  Bryso,  said  to  be  the  son  of  Stil[)o. 
A  safer  datum  is  that  he  joined  the  Alexandrian  campaign  with 
the  Democritan,  Anaxarchus.  He  later  lived  and  taught  at  his 
home.     No  writings  of  his  are  known. 

When  one  speaks  of  the  school  of  Skeptics,  it  lies  in  the  na- 
ture of  the  case  that  one  does  not  mean  an  organized  societ}'  for 
scientific  work,  like  the  four  others.  Although  moreover  the 
Greek  historians  here  also  speak  of  diadochi,  yet  for  this  as  for 
later  time  it  must  be  remembered  that  only  the  most  distin- 
guished representatives  of  the  skeptical  manner  of  thought 
(dywy?;)  are  meant.  Among  these  Timon  is  of  the  first  rank, 
while  the  other  names  in  the  time  succeeding  Pyrrho  (Zeller, 
IV^.  483)  are  of  no  importance.  Timon  lived  between  320 
and  230  in  Athens  in  his  last  years,  and  from  his  rich  literary' 
activity  are  preserved  particularly  fragments  of  his  o-iXAot,  in 
which  he  derides  the  philosophers.  See  C.  Wachsmuth,  De 
Timone  Phliasio  ceterisque  silloijraphis  Grcecis  with  the  frag- 
ments (Leipzig,  1859). 

The  direct  derivation  of  Pyrrhonism  from  Sophistry 
shows  itself  partly  in  its  reliance  on  Protagorean  relativism, 
and  partly  in  its  reproduction  of  the  Skeptical  arguments 
found  in  the  Cynic  and  Megarian  teaching.  As  regards 
the  relativity  of  all  perceptions  and  opinions,  Pyrrho  as- 
serted that  if  sense  and  reason  were  deceptive  singly,  no 
truth  could  be  expected  from  the  two  in  combination. 
Perception  does  not  give  us  things  as  they  are,  but  as 
they  appear  in  accidental  relations.  All  opinions,  not 
excepting  the  ethical,  are   conventional  (yoixrp),  and   not 


SKEPTICISM  AND   SYNCRETISM  331 

of  natural  necessity.  Therefore  any  assertion  can  be 
maintained  against  the  opposite.  Of  contradictory  propo- 
sitions one  is  not  more  valid  (ou  /jloXXou}  than  the  other. 
We  should  on  this  account  express  nothing,  but  should 
withhold  (eVe';^etj^)  our  judgment.  Since  we  know  nothing  of 
things,  things  are  also  indifferent  (d8id(f)opa)  to  us.  He 
that  abstains  from  judgment  is  secure  against  a  disturbed 
condition  of  mind  resulting  from  mistaken  views.  The 
moral  worth  of  the  abstinence  of  judgment  {i-rro'xri)  consists 
in  the  fact  that  it  alone  can  produce  equanimity  {drapa^ia), 
which  is  likewise  the  moral  ideal  of  the  Skeptics. 

The  equal  emphasis  on  drapa^ta  by  Epicurus  and  Pyrrho,  ac- 
companied by  a  most  distinct  disinclination  to  science,  ct)incides 
with  the  idea  of  a  common  source  of  tlie  two  theories  in  the 
younger  Democritans,  Anaxarchus  and  Nausiphanes.  But 
nothing  is  certain  about  it.  That  the  Democritan  view  of  the 
world  rather  than  that  of  the  teleological  systems  would  neces- 
sarilN'  further  an  ethical  quietism,  is  plain.  But  the  hedonistic 
tendency  and  the  one-sided  emphasis  of  the  Protagorean  relativ- 
ism—  which  was  subordinated  in  Democritus  —  maj'  be  charac- 
terized as  a  falling  away  from  Democritus  and  a  relapse  into 
So|)hism. 

Even  if  the  so-called  ten  troi)es  in  which  later  Skepticism  formu- 
lated its  relativity  of  perception,  should  not  be  stated  in  this  form 
in  Pyrrho,  nevertheless  the  Protagorean  principle  involved  is 
current  throughout  his  teaching.  That  he  took  pains  to  bring 
Skepticism  into  some  sort  of  a  system  is  to  be  seen  from  the 
division  which  Timon  made,  to  wit,  that  there  is  a  distinction 
between  the  constitution  of  things,  our  right  relation  to  them, 
and  the  profit  that  we  have  to  expect  from  them.  That  the  last 
is  the  proper  goal  of  the  entire  teaching  is  self-evident.  The  aru- 
pafta  is  the  happiness  of  the  skeptic.  The  l-rroxrj  not  only  in  the 
theoretical,  but  also  in  the  practical  sense  is  meant  as  the  abstuin- 
ing  from  judgment  in  general,  also  from  judgment  of  worth,  and 
therefore  from  desire  and  feeling.  It  reminds  us  of  the  Stoic 
apathy  which  was  also  a  restraint  of  assent.  In  either  case  the 
ideal  of  the  Wise  Man  is  equally  foreign  to  life,  and  a  denial  of 
life.  The  eVoxry  (called  also  aKaTaXrfipLo)  was  regai'ded  as  the 
central  and  characteristic  concept  of  the  system.  Its  adherents 
were  designated  on  that  account  l4>(^KTiKnL. 

In  this  Skeptical  theory  it  is  of  importance  to  note  that  the 


332  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

will  is  emphasized  as  a  moment  in  judgment.  Tiie  denial  of  the 
avyKardOea-Ls  (see  p.  318)  is  i)ossil)le  only  because  affirmation  or 
denial,  as  well  in  theoretic  judgment  even  as  in  the  approval  or 
disapproval  of  natural  feeling  and  impulse,  is  an  act  of  will,  and 
therefore  i(f>  rjfjLLv.  This  is  a  theory  conmion  to  Skeptics  and 
Stoics.  It  is  uncertain  how  far  the  former  philosophers  are 
dependent  on  the  latter. 

Skepticism  took  a  scientific  and  practically  more  avail- 
able form  at  the  time  when  it  temporarily  succeeded  to 
an  ascendency  over  one  of  the  great  schools.  Through 
Arcesilaus,  who  followed  Crates  as  leader  and  died  241,  it 
was  introduced  into  the  Platonic  society,  and  maintained 
itself  there  for  perhaps  a  century  and  a  half,  a  period  which 
is  customarily  called  that  of  the  Middle  Academy.  The 
most  significant  rci)resentative  of  the  school  at  that  time 
was  Carneades  of  Cyrcne,  who  died  129  b.  c.  after  a  long 
leadership. 

From  the  entire  Middle  Academy  only  these  two  personalities 
distinctly  appear.  Neither  seems  to  have  left  anything  in  writ- 
ing. The  theory  of  Arcesilaus  was  written  down  b}'  his  pupil 
and  successor,  Lacydes.  Clitomaehus,  who  died  about  110, 
stood  in  the  same  relation  to  Carneades.  We  know  about  these 
two  only  indirectly,  especially  through  Cicero,  Sextus  Empiricus, 
and  Diogenes. 

Arcesilaus  (written  also  Arcesilas),  born  about  315  in  Pitane 
in  ^olia,  had  listened  to  Theophrastus  and  the  Academicians. 
He  also  came  under  the  influence  of  the  Megarians,  and  prob- 
ably of  Pyrrho.  lie  was  notable,  moreover,  as  a  keen  and 
witty  orator.  See  A.  Geflfers,  De  Arcesila  (Gottingen,  1841)  ; 
ibid.^  De  Arcesilce  successor ibus  (Gottingen,  1845). 

In  scientific  significance  and  authority,  Carneades  towers  above 
him,  —  Carneades,  the  great  opponent  of  the  Stoics,  whose  writ- 
ings he  had  carefully  studied,  and  in  his  brilliant  lectures  re- 
futed. He  appeared  in  Rome  in  the  year  155  with  the  embassy 
of  philosophers,  and  gave  there  a  deeply  impressive  example  of 
the  in  utramque  ijartem  disputare  in  his  two  discourses  for  and 
against  justice.     Compare  Roulez,  De  Carneade  (GJient,  1824). 

For  the  names  of  the  above,  see  Zeller,  IV^  498,  523  ff. 

The  Academy  Skeptics  seem  to  have  made  the  nega- 
tive part  of  Pyrrho's  theory  their  own,  —  and  in  the  main 


SKEPTICISM  AND   SYNCRETISM  333 

in  unchanged  form.  In  using  this  negative  doctrine  in  its 
essentials  in  their  polemic  against  the  Stoics,  they  directed 
their  arguments  chiefly  against  the  tlieory  of  a  crite- 
rion of  truth.  In  this  respect  Carueades  took  the  lead 
with  his  destructive  dialectic  by  showing  how  little  the 
subjective  moment  of  assent  (^av^/Karddeat^')  is  a  safe 
determiner  of  truth  or  falseness,  and  by  investigating  thor- 
oughly the  numerous  difficulties  of  the  theory  of  the 
KaraXTjiTTiKr}  (jiai>raaia  (ideas  carrying  conviction).  But 
he  also  directed  his  attack  against  the  guaranty  of  the 
truth  in  logical  reasoning.  He  showed  how  every  proof 
demands  a  new  proof  for  the  validity  of  its  premises, 
which  leads  to  an  infinite  regress,  since  there  is  no  imme^ 
diate  certainty. 

It  is  astonishing  how  little  these  Platonists  seem  to  have 
cared  for  the  rationalism  of  their  original  school.  The}'  did  not 
lead  their  rationalism  into  the  field  against  the  Stoic  sensual- 
ism —  nay,  they  even  sacrificed  it.  for  their  radical  Skepticism 
holds  rational  knowledge  impossible.  They  did  not  seem  ex- 
pressly to  confute  rationalism.  Init  they  silently  neglected  it 
as  passe.  AVhen  it  is  said  of  Arcesilans  (Sextos  Empiricus, 
Pyrrh.  Hyp.^  I.  234  f.)  that  he  used  skepticism  simph'  on 
the  one  side  as  a  polemic  and  on  the  other  as  mental  gym- 
nastics, but  within  the  innermost  circle  of  the  school  he 
held  fast  to  Platonism,  the  statement  is  so  far  true  that  the 
Academy  took  the  skeptical  arguments  only  as  welcome  instru- 
ments against  the  continuously  pressing  competition  of  the 
Stoa.  But  in  doing  so,  nevertheless,  the  Academy  became 
estranged  from  its  own  positive  teaching.  It  is  not  impossible, 
but  perfectlv  probable,  that  even  if  the  above  were  a  fact  in 
regard  to  the  leaders  of  the  school,  in  the  school  itself  the 
Platonic  tradition  was  kept  alive  as  before.  The  strength  of 
the  polemic  interest  among  the  leaders  is  shown  in  Carneades, 
who  raised  with  these  formal  objections  many  practical  ones 
against  the  Stoics.  He  combated  particularly,  and  occasionalh' 
with  great  acumen,  their  theolog}',  teleology,  determinism,  and 
theory  of  natural  right. 

In  the  Middle  Academy  the  eTroxn  (see  p.  331)  is  the  result- 
ant of  these  views.     Meanwhile  Carneades  and  Arcesilaus 


334  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

saw  that  the  iiro-xi]  was  impossible  in  practice.  In  order  to 
act,  man  must  consent  to  certain  ideas,  and  if  he  renounces 
truth,  he  must  be  satisfied  with  probability  (^evXojov,  dXr)de<i 
<f>at,v6fi€vov)-  Neither  ethical  principles  nor  the  knowledge 
of  single  relations  will  bring  undoubted  certainty,  but  the 
will  is  moved  by  indistinct  and  not  fully  evident  ideas. 
Therefore  everything  depends  on  judging  correctly  the 
degree  of  probability  of  different  ideas.  There  are  many 
such  degrees,  three  in  particular.  The  lowest  degree  of 
probability  is  present  in  an  idea  that  is  plausible  in  itself 
alone  {mdavi']^  ;  the  higher  in  such  an  idea  as  without  con- 
tradictions can  be  joined  to  the  whole  body  of  ideas  to 
which  it  belongs  QmOavr]  kuI  direpiaTraaTo^^  ;  the  highest 
is  present  in  every  individual  of  such  a  body  of  ideas  when 
all  the  parts  have  been  tested  as  to  their  mutual  congru- 
ence (TTiOai^i]  Kul  (iTrepia-Traa-TO'i  koI  irepKoBevfxevr}). 

The  content  which  Carneades  gave  to  this  practical  prob- 
ability is  thoroughly  consistent  with  the  doctrine  of  goods 
in  the  Older  Academy.  The  entire  system  therefore  is  an 
attempt  to  destroy  dogmatism  through  skepticism  and  to 
found  a  system  of  morals  for  the  Academy. 

This  fact,  which  indeed  accorded  with  the  spirit  of  the  time,  is 
to  be  emphasized  :  —  that  the  theory  of  probability  of  the  Middle 
Academy  originated  from  an  etiiical,  and  not  from  a  logical  in- 
terest. It  was  applied  only  to  ethical  questions.  This  does  not, 
however,  prevent  our  recognizing  that  Carneades,  to  whom  we 
particularly  owe  the  development  of  this  theory,  proceeded  in  his 
woik  in  great  part  upon  the  basis  of  the  Aristotelian  topics, 
and  always  with  great  acuteness.  The  chief  source  is  Sextus 
Empiricns,  Adv.  malh.,  VII.  166  ff. 

Later  Skepticism  disassociated  itself  from  the  Academy, 
in  which  dogmatic  eclectic  tendencies  became  ascendant, 
and  was  propagated  especially  in  the  circles  of  the  medi- 
cal empiricists.  Tlie  representatives  of  this  theory  were 
^nesidemus,  Agrippa,  and  Sextus  Empiricus. 

Concernins:  the  careers  of  these  men  there  is  little  information. 


SKEPTICISM  AND  SYNCRETISM  335 

See  P.  L.  Haas,  De  philosophorum  scepticorum  sxiccessionihus 
(Wtirzburg,  1875)  ;  and  E.  Pappenheim,  Archiv  f.  Gesch.  d. 
Phil.,  I.  37  ff.,  who  puts  the  locality  of  the  later  Skepticism  in 
''  a  city  of  the  East,  unknown  to  us."  ^nesidemus  of  Cnossus 
taught  in  Alexandria,  and  wrote  Iluppweiot  Adyot,  which  he  dedi- 
cated to  the  Academician  L.  Tubero,  of  which  Photius  pre- 
pared an  abridgment  still  extant.  If  this  Tubero  was  the  friend 
of  Cicero,  one  must  put  the  activit}- of  ^nesidemus  at  the  latest 
in  the  middle  of  the  first  century,  or  a  little  earlier.  This  is, 
however,  not  fully  certain.  Zeller  places  him  at  the  beginning 
of  our  era,  and  Macoll  at  130  a.  d.  The  calculations  according 
to  the  Diadochi  are  doubtful  on  account  of  the  uncertainty  of 
the  duration  of  the  school  of  Skeptics.  See  E.  Saisset,  Le  scep- 
ticisme:  Enesideme,  Pascal,  Kant  (Paris,  1867)  ;  P.  Natorp, 
Forschungen,  63  ff.,  256  ff. 

We  know  about  Agrippa  only  by  the  mention  of  his  theory  of 
the  five  tropes.  The  names  only  of  many  of  the  other  Skeptics 
are  preserved  (Zeller,  V^.  2  ff.). 

Neither  the  native  place  nor  residence  of  Sextus  Empiricus 
(200  A.  D.)  is  known.  His  writings,  on  the  other  hand,  form  the 
most  complete  body  of  skeptical  theories.  The  Iluppoivetoi  vtto- 
TUTTwcret?  in  three  books  are  preserved,  and  also  two  other  works, 
which  are  usually  grouped  under  the  title  of  Adversiis  mathema- 
ticos.  Of  these  works,  one  (Books  1-6)  treats  of  the  science 
of  general  culture,  of  grammar,  rhetoric,  geometry,  arithmetic, 
astronom}',  and  music;  the  other  (Books  7-11)  criticises  the 
logical,  physical,  and  ethical  theories  of  philosophers  from  a 
skeptical  point  of  view.  See  E.  Pappenheim,  De  Sext.  Emp. 
librorum  numero  et  ordine  (Berlin,  1874)  ;  ibid.,  Lebensverhdlt- 
nisse  des  Sext.  Emp.  (Berlin,  1875).  The  same  author  has  also 
translated  and  annotated  tiie  sketches  of  Pyrrho  (Leipzig,  1877); 
S.  Haas,  Lehen  des  Sext.  Emp.  (Burghausen,  1883)  ;  ibid., 
Ueber  die  Schriften  des  Sext.  Emp.  (P'reising,  1883). 

This  later  Skepticism  moved  exactly  on  the  general  lines 
of  the  older,  and  it  sought  in  vain  to  disown  dependence 
upon  the  Middle  Academy.  It  particularized  the  Protag- 
orean  objections  to  knowledge  based  on  sensation,  and,  in- 
deed, as  appears  first  in  ^nesidemus,  there  were  considered 
ten  so-called  rpoiroc.  These  are  badly  arranged,  but  have 
for  their  purpose  partly  the  discussion  of  the  relativity  of 
the  perceiving  subject,  partly  that  of  the  perceived  object, 
and  partly  that  of  the  relationship  between  the  two.     The 


336  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

five  tropes  presented  by  Agrippa  are  of  more  importance. 
To  the  theory  of  the  relativity  of  perceptions  (o  cnro  rov 
irpo^  TL  TpoTTo?),  and  to  the  conflict '  among  opinions  (o 
ciiro  Trj<;  8ui(f>a}via<i},  he  added  the  thought  developed  by 
Carneades,  that  proof  demands  either  an  endless  regress 
from  the  premises  (o  et?  aireipov  e^ySaWwi;),  or  presupposes 
unallowed  and  unproved  premises  (6  inroderLKOi).  He 
finally  added  that  scientific  method  supports  its  proof  upon 
assumptions  which  themselves  could  only  be  verified  by 
the  thing  to  be  proved.  These  opinions  of  Agrippa  led  his 
followers  to  the  reduction  of  the  skeptical  theory  to  two 
tropes.  Knowledge  would  be  possible  either  through  im- 
mediate or  mediate  certainty ;  the  former  is  not  possible, 
because  the  relativity  of  all  representations  fails  of  a  cri- 
terion, and  the  second  would  be  possible  only  if  it  found 
its  premises  in  the  first.^ 

There  is  the  mooted  question  whether  among  all  the  Skeptics 
JEnesidemus  actnnlly,  .is  Sextus  also  seems  to  report,  found  in 
the  general  Sophistic  theory  of  the  imHrOa'tia  rCoy  Aoywr,  that  is, 
that  the  aflirniation  and  negation  of  every  pro|)Osition  can  be 
equally  well  defended,  a  bridge  to  the  reproduction  of  the  met.i- 
physieal  opinion  of  the  reality  of  opposites.  This  would  con- 
nect it  with  the  Ileracleit.in  thought,  and  Zeller  seems  to  be 
decided  (V.  34  ff.)  that  the  ancient  reporters  have  made  a  mis- 
take. See  E.  Pappenheim,  Der  angeblicJie  HeraTditismus  des 
JEnesideimis  (Berlin,  1889). 

The  new  tropes,  which  Agrippa  introduced  in  a  clever  wa}-, 
are  arrayed  especially  against  the  Aristotelian  theory  of  the 
a/xco-a,  that  is,  of  immediate  certainty,  and  are  closely  allied  to 
that  doubt,  which  in  modern  times  has  l)een  made  h3'  ]Mill 
against  the  syllogism.  The  dilliculty  is  that  the  particular  judg- 
ment, which  is  supposed  to  be  based  on  the  syllogism,  is  itself 
necessary  for  a  basis  of  the  general  premise.  (See  Sext.  P^mp., 
Pyrrh.  hyp.,  II.  194  flP. ;  J.  S.  Mill,  Logic,  11.  3,  §  2  ;  Chr. 
Sigwart,  Logik,  I.  §  55,  3. 

Connected  with  the  opinions  of  the  empirical  schools  of  ph\- 
sicians,  who  in  denying  all  causal  theories  limited  themselves 
entirely  to  medical  observatious  (ri/piyo-is) ,  there  is   the  more 

1  Sext.  Emp.,  Pyrrh.  hyp.,  I.  178. 


HELLENIC-ROMAN  PHILOSOPHY  337 

developed  treatment,  which  the  Skeptics  since  ^nesidemus 
bestowed  upon  the  concept  of  cnusaht}',  in  discovering  many 
dialectical  and  metaphysical  difficulties.  Relativity,  the  time 
relation  between  cause  and  effect,  the  plurality  of  causes  for 
everj'  event,  the  inadequacy  of  hypotheses  which  themselves 
demand  causal  explanation,  etc.,  are  among  these  difficulties. 
See  C.  Hartenstein,  Ueber  die  Lehren  der  antiken  /Skepsis 
{Zeitschrift /.  Philos.  n.  philos.  Kritik,   1888,  vol.  93). 

49.  The  four  great  schools  of  philosophy  which  existed 
side  by  side  in  Athens  —  the  Academy,  Lyceum,  Stoa,  and 
the  Gardens —  made  violent,  nay,  passionate  war  upon  each 
other  in  the  third  and  second  centuries.  Long  afterward  the 
opposition  was  so  outspoken  that  after  the  time  of  Marcus 
Aurelius  special  chairs  in  the  "  university "  of  Athens 
were  endowed  by  the  government  for  them.  Through  this 
mutual  contact  the  different  theories  were  so  far  recon- 
ciled that  in  the  first  century  before  Christ  the  tendency, 
appeared  in  these  schools  to  emphasize  less  their  disagree- 
ments, to  render  prominent  their  points  of  unity,  and  to 
unite  them  upon  that  common  ground  which  exists  in  the 
most  highly  generalized  ethics.  The  tendency  appeared 
least  of  all  in  the  Epicurean  school,  for  that  school  was 
relatively  stationary. 

The  Stoa  was  the  first,  in  conformity  "to  its  original  na- 
ture, to  incline  to  such  syncretic  views.  After  the  time  ol 
Pansetius  and  Posidonius,  it  adopted  into  its  teaching  many 
Platonic  and  Aristotelian  doctrines,  while  it  tempered  its 
ethical  rigorism,  and  enriched  its  scientific  interests.  The 
teleological  principle  proved  a  most  efficient  cement,  and 
on  this  account  Epicureanism  remained  to  a  greater  or  less 
degree  excluded  from  this  syncretic  process. 

How  far  on  the  other  hand  the  advances  on  the  part 
of  the  Aristotelian  school  could  be  under  the  circumstances, 
the  pseudo-Aristotelian  writing  irepl  Koa/xov^  shows.     This 

^  Published  in  the  works  of  Aristotle,  p.  391  ff. 
22 


338  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

was  written  probably  by  a  Peripatetic,  and  supposably  at 
the  beirinning  of  this  era.  It  contained  the  interestingr  at- 
tempt  at  uniting  Aristotelian  theism  and  Stoic  pantheism 
in  a  way  that  recognized  the  transcendence  of  the  divine 
spirit,  and  derived  the  teleologically  arranged  world  from 
its  omnipresent  creative  power.  It  is  to  be  noticed  that 
this  view  gave  to  power  a  value  independent  of  the  divine 
spirit. 

Compare  the  literature  in  Zeller,  IV.  631,  3,  as  well  as  the 
exposition  following  it ;  see  also  the  same  in  Sitzungs-Berichte 
of  the  Berlin  Akadeinie,  1885,  p.  399  ff.  Zeller  regards  as  a 
mean  between  the  Peripatetic  and  Platonic  ethics  (IV*.  647  f.) 
the  pseudo-Aristotelian  treatise  -repl  dpcrtui'  koL  kokimv. 

To  the  discrimination  between  the  transcendent  essence  and  the 
immanent  jxjwer  of  Go<1,  there  is  appended,  in  the  writing  irepl 
Koaftov,  a  conception  related  Ui  the  Stoic  theology.  Tliis  is  con- 
cerned with  the  degrees  of  divine  |>ower  in  which  the  peripatetic 
teaching  of  Tn'ci/xa  forms  the  natural  and  philosophical  link. 

The  union  of  the  teleological  systems  tiiat  existed  in  later 
times  seems  to  have  been  first  announced  in  the  Academy. 
In  that  school  Philo  of  Larissa  (87  b.  c.  in  Rome)  went 
from  Skepticism  to  dogmatism  when  he  asserted  that  in 
all  the  polemic  expressions  of  the  school  teleology  had 
always  remained  its  esoteric  teaching.  But  his  representa- 
tion of  this  teleology  resembled  genuine  Platonism  only  in 
very  slight  degree.  His  more  distinguished  pupil,  Antiochus 
of  Ascalon,  to  whom  Cicero  was  auditor  in  Athens  in  the 
winter  of  79-78  b.  c,  championed  the  opinion  that  Plato- 
nism and  Aristotelianism  were  only  different  aspects  of  the 
same  thing,  and  that  this  thing  also  definitely  reappears 
with  some  terminological  changes  in  Stoicism. 

J.  Grysar,  Die  Akademiker  Philon  und  Antiochus  (Cologne, 
1849) ;  C.  F.  Hermann.  De  Philone  Ixirissceo  (Gottingen,  1851, 
55) ;  C.  Chappe,  De  Antiftchi  Ascalonitce  vita  et  doctrina  (Paris, 
1854)  ;  R.  Hover,  De  Antiocho  Ascalonita  (Bonn,  1883). 

The  Platonism  of  this  third,  or  of  the  fourth  and  fifth  Acad- 
emies, is  only  to  l>e  found  in  its  ethical  teaching.  Even  Anti- 
ochus himself  set  aside  the  theory  of  Ideas,  although  he  was 


SKEPTICISM  AND  SYNCRETISM  339 

much  more  energetic  than  I'hilo  during  the  breach  with  the 
Skeptics  of  the  school.  Metaphysics  and  physics  both  remained 
in  the  background  for  these  two  men,  and  both  ei)istemology 
and  ethics  were  quite  as  Stoic  as  Platonic.  The  Alexandrians, 
Eudorus,  Arius  Didymus,  and  Potamo,  are  said  to  be  continuers 
of  the  movement  of  Antiochus. 

In  their  adoption  of  the  Greek  philosophy  the  Romans 
naturally  gave  to  it  a  thoroughly  eclectic  form.  When,  after 
conquering  their  first  aversion,  they  went  into  the  school 
of  Greek  science,  they  went  to  it  in  their  peculiarly  prac- 
tical way  with  the  need  for  ethical  orientation,  and  for  that 
general  culture  in  ethics  such  as  a  statesman  might  ask. 
Undisturbed  by  the  technicalities  and  hair-splittings  of  the 
"  controversies  of  the  schools,"  they  selected  in  the  differ- 
ent systems  what  was  suited  to  their  needs.  They  com- 
pleted this  choice  from  the  point  of  view  that  the  truth 
must  be  found  in  a  practically  useful  conviction  illumi- 
nating all  with  its  natural  evidence.  The  probabilism 
of  the  Middle  Academy  and  the  Stoic  teaching  of  consen- 
sus gentium,  however,  for  the  most  part  furnished  the 
point  of  view,  which  may  be  called  of  the  "  healthy  human 
understanding." 

It  was  Cicero's  merit  to  have  given  his  countrymen  a 
tasteful  presentation  of  Greek  philosophy  in  the  above  accep- 
tation of  the  term.  His  friend  Varro  and  the  School  of  the 
Sextians,  which  flourished  for  a  brief  period  at  the  begin- 
ning of  this  era,  may  be  mentioned  with  him.  Cicero,  who 
was  without  independent  philosophical  significance,  had 
great  success  in  naturalizing  the  pliilosophical  content  of 
Greek  thought  in  Latin  literature,  and  in  thus  making  it 
fruitful  even  beyond  Roman  civilization. 

E.  Zeller,  Ueber  die  Religion  und  Philosophie  bei  den  Romern 
(Virch.  Holtz.  Vortr.,  Berhn.  1866j  ;  Durand  de  Laur,  Le  mouve- 
ment  de  la  pensee  philosophiqiie  depuis  Ciceron  jusqu'd,  Tacite 
(Paris,  1874). 

The  fear  which  the  stricter  Romans  entertained  that  the  new 
learning  would  undermine  the  traditional  morals  of  societv  led 


340  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

to  a  decree  of  the  Senate  in  161  b.  c.  which  banished  philoso- 
phers and  rhetoricians  from  Rome.  But  in  the  middle  of  this 
century  the  flow  of  Greek  philosophy  into  Roman  intellectual 
life  began  and  went  on  uninterruptedly.  At  first  the  philo- 
sophic message  came  through  tiie  Greek  teachers  in  Rome, 
then  through  the  custom  among  the  younger  Romans  of  per- 
fecting their  education  in  the  centres  of  Greek  science,  —  in 
Athens,  Rhodes,  and  Alexandria ;  and,  doubtless,  not  the  least 
of  these  influences  was  the  embassy  of  Athenian  philosophers, 
Carueades,  Critolaus,  and  Diogenes  (156-155  u.  c). 

M.  Tullius  Cicero  (106-43)  had  listened  to  Greek  philos- 
ophers of  all  the  schools  in  Athens  and  Rhodes,  and  he  had 
read  much,  so  that  in  his  latter  years,  when  he  made  Greek 
philosophy  speak  the  Roman  tongue  (romisch  rechni),  a  rich 
material  stood  at  his  command.  Out  of  this,  without  much 
scientific  discrimination,  but  with  tact  for  what  was  suitable 
for  Rome,  he  brought  his  books  together  fairly  quickly.  Those 
preserved  are  :  Academica  (partly),  De  Jinibiis  bonorum  et  ma- 
lorum,  Disputationes  Tusculance,  De  officns,  Paradoxa,  De 
amicitia,  De  senedute^  De  natura  deorum,  De  fato  (imperfect), 
De  dii'inalione,  De  repuhlka  (partly).  Only  fragments  of 
Uortensius^  Consolatio,  De  legibus  remain.  Cicero  made  no 
secret  that  he  was  essentially  setting  forth  the  Greek  originals, 
and  in  many  cases  we  can  determine  his  sources.  From  the 
rich  literature  (see  Ueberweg-Heinze,  I'.  283  f.)  we  may  men- 
tion A.  B.  Krische,  Forschnngen,  Vol.  I. ;  Die  fheologischen 
Lehren  der  griechischen  Denker,  eine  JPrufnug  der  Darstellung 
Cicero's  (Gottingen,  1840) ;  J.  F.  Herbart,  Ueber  die  Philoso- 
phie  des  Cicero  (1811,  Complete  AYorks,  XII.  167  flf.) ;  R. 
Kiihner,  M.  T.  Cicero  in  philoso/Jiiam  ejiisqxie  paHes  merita 
(Hamburg,  1825) ;  C.  F.  Hermann,  De  interpretatione  Timcei 
diologi  a  Ciceronis  relicla  (G(3ttingen,  1842) ;  J.  Klein,  De 
fontibus  Topicorum  Ciceronis  (Bonn,  1844)  ;  Th.  Schiche,  De 
fontibus  libroruni  Ciceronis  qui  sunt  de  divinatione  (Jena,  1875)  ; 
K.  Hartfelder,  Die  Quellen  von  Cicero's  De  divinatione  (Frei- 
burg i.  B.,  1878) ;  especially  R.  Hirzel,  Untersuchungen  zu 
Cicero's  philos.  Schrijten  (3  vols.,  Leipzig,  1877-83). 

In  his  epistemology  Cicero  adhered  to  the  Middle  Academy's 
teaching  as  the  most  moderate,  elegant,  and  important  method 
of  philosophizing.  Metaph\'sically  he  was  a  Skeptic,  and  was 
indifl'erent  in  the  main  to  physical  problems.  Probability  how- 
ever did  not  satisfy  him  as  an  ethical  criterion,  but  he  appealed 
to  the  Stoic  co?isensus  gentium  both  in  ethics  and  in  the  allied 
topics  of  natural  religion,  —  that  is,  as  to  immortality,  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  and  providence.     Nevertheless  he  conceived  the 


SKEPTICISM  AND   SYNCRETISM  341 

KOLval  evvoML  not  in  the  sense  of  the  Stoic  7rpoAi/i//-ets  (see  p.  318), 
but  rather  as  innate  and  natural,  and  therefore  immediately  cer- 
tain convictions  ;  and  his  strength  rests  in  a  noble  representa- 
tion of  these. 

Likewise  his  friend,  the  learned  M.  Terentius  Varro  (llG-27), 
made  such  a  profound  study  of  Greek  philosophy  as  to  enable 
him  to  distinguish  two  hundred  and  eighty-eight  Greek  sects. 
He  found  the  suitable  synthesis  of  these  in  the  eclecticism  of 
Antiochus  of  Ascalon,  to  which  he,  in  the  spirit  of  Pantetius, 
added  somewhat  more  Stoicism.  He  took  in  particular  from 
Panajtius  the  distinction  between  a  philosophical,  a  poetical, 
and  a  popular  religion.  His  fragments  offer  much  yet  for  the 
history  of  Hellenistic  philosophy.  See  E.  Norden,  Beiti'iiye, 
p.  428  f. 

Yet  nearer  to  Stoicism  stand  the  Sextians,  whose  first  mem- 
ber, Quintus  Sextus,  lived  as  early  as  in  the  Augustinian  age. 
His  son,  who  bore  his  name,  and  Sotion  of  Alexandria  followed 
him.  The  latter  was  a  revered  teacher  of  Seneca  and  of  several 
others  (Zeller,  IV^.  676  f.).  The  school  soon  became  extinct, 
because,  as  it  appears,  it  rested  on  the  personal  impression 
made  by  the  dignified  moral  instruction  of  the  Sextians.  Some 
of  their  Sentences  are  still  in  a  Syrian  version  (Gildemeister, 
Bonn,  1873).  The  Stoic  morals  form  the  essential  content  of 
these  /Sentences,  interspersed,  nevertheless,  wath  old  Pythago- 
rean precepts,  supposedly  through  the  influence  of  Sotion. 

The  P^clectic  popular  philosoph}^,  not  as  a  school,  but  as  the 
conviction  of  cultured  men,  was  propagated  throughout  an- 
tiquity nearly  in  the  manner  that  Cicero  had  presented  it. 
Its  most  remarkable  later  literary  representative  of  this  is 
the  well-known  physician  Claudius  Galenus  (died  about  200). 
He  has  immortalized  his  name  in  the  history  of  formal  logic, 
through  the  unfortunate  discovery  of  the  fourth  figure  of  the 
syllogism,  named  after  him.  See  K.  Sprengel,  Beitrdge  znr 
Gescliiclite  der  Medicin,  I.  117  ff.  Ch.  Daremberg,  Essai  sw 
Galien  considere  comme  philosophe  (Paris  and  Leipzig,  1848) ; 
a  series  of  discussions  by  E.  Chauvet  (Caen  and  Paris,  1860- 
82)  ;  Ueberweg,  Logik,  §  103. 

50.  It  was  a  result  of  the  Sophistic  Enlightenment  and 
its  destruction  of  all  belief  in  the  supernatural  that  Pla- 
tonic immaterialism  could  not  at  first  find  fast  footing  in 
the  circles  of  Greek  and  Roman  civilization ;  and  that, 
therefore,  all  the  different  schools  united  in  laying  the 
whole  strength  of  their  convictions  in  ethics,  while  cheiish- 


342  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

ing  their  coldly  rational  natural  religion.  In  the  mean 
time,  however,  among  the  Roman  peoples,  the  religious 
spirit  grew  to  a  mighty  desire  for  a  saving  faith.  It  began 
to  invade  philosoj^liy  also  more  and  more.  The  masses 
lost  the  Hellenic  trust  in  the  satisfactoriness  of  earthly 
existence.  In  its  place  there  entered  that  feverish  longing 
for  a  higher  mysterious  satisfaction,  which  longing  showed 
itself  in  the  groping  about  after  all  cults  that  were  foreign 
and  fantastic.  In  this  way  belief  in  the  self-sufficiency  of 
the  Wise  Man  vanished  from  philosoi)hy,  and  yielded  to 
that  expectancy  that  a  higher  power  would  give  a  bless- 
edness and  release  from  the  world,  —  a  thing  that  virtue 
could  not  guarantee.  When  the  consciousness  of  the  old 
world,  broken  as  it  were,  thus  rose  in  its  longing  for  super- 
natural help,  philosophy  passed  out  of  the  sensualism  and 
rationalism,  which  had  governed  the  post-Aristotelian 
time,  into  Mysticism.  From  its  inmost  need  philosophy 
seized  then  upon  that  conception  of  the  world  which 
contrasted  the  sensible  and  supersensible  worlds:  viz., 
upon  Platonism. 

The  centre  of  this  movement  was  Alexandria,  where  in 
liveliest  intercourse  of  the  people  of  the  Orient  and  Occi- 
dent the  amalgamation  of  religions  was  completed  on  the 
grandest  scale.  Here,  at  the  beginning  of  our  era,  two 
tendencies  in  mystic  religious  Platonism  became  prominent. 
One  of  these  accorded  more  with  tlic  Greek,  the  other  with 
the  Oriental  life.  They  were  the  so-called  neo-Pythagorean- 
ism  and  the  Judaic-Alexandrian  philosophy.  Both  seem  to 
have  gone  back  to  the  attempt  to  develop  into  a  scientific 
theory,  with  the  help  of  Platonism,  the  views  which  had 
been  fundamental  in  the  Pythagorean  mysteries. 

J.  Simon,  Histoire  de  I'ecole  d'Alexandrie  (Paris,  1848  ff,); 
E  Matler,  Essai  sur  I'ecole  d'Alexandrie  (Paris,  1840  ff.)  ;  E. 
Vacherot,  Histoire  critique  de  Vecole  d' Alexandrie  (Paris,  1846 
ff.) ;   see  W.  J.  Thiersch,  Politik  u.  Philos.  in  ihreni   Verhdltnis 


SKEPTICISM  AND  SYNCRETISM  343 

zur  Religion  unter  Trajan^  Hadrian,  u.  den  Antoninen  (Marburg, 
1853) ;  Th.  Ziegler,  Ueher  die  Entstehung  der  Alexandrisclien 
Philos.  {Philologenversammlung^  1882). 

That  the  so-called  neoPythagoreanism  is  only  a  branch  of 
eclectic  religious  Platonisin  is  obvious  from  the  content  of  the 
theory.  It  has  very  little  to  do  with  the  original  Pythagorean 
philosophy  (§  24),  but  the  more  with  the  religious  spirit  of  the 
Pythagorean  mysteries.  But  neoPythagoreanism  shares  (Zeller, 
V^.  325  ff.)  this  with  the  Jewish  sect  of  Essenes  to  such  a  degree 
that  the  origin  of  the  Essenes  and  their  new  religious  concep- 
tion may  be  sought  in  the  contact  of  Judaism  with  these  Orphic- 
Pythagorean  mysteries.  The  practical  consequence  of  this 
contact  was  in  Palestine  the  origination  of  the  Essenes ;  the 
theoretic  consequence  was  in  Alexandria  the  philosophy  of 
PhUo. 

The  Pythagorean  band,  which  in  the  course  of  the  fourth 
century  b.  c.  lost  its  character  as  a  school  of  philosophy, 
but,  as  we  may  suppose,  liad  always  retained  its  character 
as  one  of  the  Mysteries  and  as  an  asceticism,  reappeared  in 
the  first  century  b.  c,  with  philosophic  teachings.  These 
were,  it  must  be  said,  essentially  of  a  religious  cast,  and 
were  developed  during  the  next  two  centuries  in  a  very 
large  literature,  which  the  band  foisted  almost  altogether 
upon  Pythagoras  or  other  older  Pythagoreans,  especially 
Archytas.  Among  the  personalities  who  represented  this 
direction  of  thought,  and  were  therefore  called  neo-Py- 
thagoreans,  were  P.  Nigidius  Figulus,  a  friend  of  Cicero, 
Sotion,  a  friend  of  the  Sextians  (§  49),  and  particularly 
Apollonius  of  Tyana,  Moderatus  of  Gades,  and,  in  later 
times,  Nicomachus  of  Gerasa  and  Numenius  of  Apamea. 

See  M.  Hertz,  De  Nigidii  Figuli  studiis  atque  operibus  {HerVm, 
1845);  also  dissertations  by  Breysig  (Berlin,  1854)  and  Klein 
(Bonn,  1861). 

Apollonius  was  the  ideal  of  neo-Pythagorean  wisdom  to  him- 
self and  to  others,  and  he  appeared  witli  great  eclat  at  the  time 
of  Nero  as  the  founder  of  a  religion.  His  life  is  oddly  embel- 
lished by  Philostratus  (220)  (published  by  Westerraann,  Paris, 
1848,  and  Kayser,  Leipzig,  1870-71).  See  Chr.  Baur,  Apollo)tiiis 
von  Tyana  unci  Christus  (in  three  editions,  Leipzig,  1876)  ; 
Ueberweg-Heinze,  I''.  300  f. 


344  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Numenius,  who  lived  in  the  second  half  of  the  second  cen- 
tury, was  ali'eady  under  Philo's  influence,  and  probably  also 
under  that  of  the  Gnostics.  The  doctrine  of  the  three  gods  is 
characteristic  of  him:  (1)  the  supreme  and  supersensible; 
(2)  the  demiurge  giving  form  to  material  things ;  (3)  the  uni- 
verse thus  formed.  (See  F.  Thedinga,  De  Numenii  philos.  2^lat.^ 
Bonn,  1875.)  AVe  possess  only  the  arithmetical  and  musical 
works  of  his  younger  contemporary  Nicomachus.  For  the  spu- 
rious literature  essentially  accounted  for  by  a  need  of  authority 
for  the  school,  see  in  Fr.  Beckmann,  De  Pythagoreorum  rdiquiis 
(Berlin,  1844) ;  Zeller,  V''.  100  fif. 

Neo-Pythagoreanism  joined  monotheism  to  its  fantastic 
cult  of  gods  and  daemons  in  entirely  the  same  way  in  which 
we  meet  this  in  the  old  Pythagoreans,  in  Plato,  and  in  a 
systematic  way  among  the  Stoics.  But  neo-Pythagorean- 
ism  transformed  its  monotheism  with  the  help  of  the  Pla- 
tonic-Aristotelian teaching  into  a  reverence  for  God  as  a 
pure  spirit,  which  man  has  to  serve  not  by  outward  sacri- 
fice and  act  but  in  spirit,  with  silent  prayer,  with  virtue 
and  wisdom.  Apollonius  travelled  about  the  ancient  world 
as  the  proclaimer  of  this  pure  knowledge  of  God  and  this 
higher  worship.  Pythagoras  and  he  were  honored  as  the 
perfect  men  in  whom  God  had  revealed  himself.  The  sci- 
entific significance  of  the  school,  however,  consisted  in  the 
fact  that  it  united  with  this  cult  a  philosophical  point  of 
view.  One  finds,  indeed,  this  point  of  view  in  all  its  essen- 
tials in  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  in  part  in  the  Stoa ;  yet  it  is 
distinguished  from  the  other,  one-sided  moralizing  impulse 
of  the  time  by  its  lively  theoretic  interests,  which,  although 
dependent  and  unproductive,  extended  to  logical  and  phys- 
ical questions  as  well. 

A  sharp  dualism  of  spirit  and  matter  is  the  fundamental 
postulate  in  this  theory  in  the  sense  that  the  former  is  the 
good,  pure  principle  in  life,  and  the  latter  the  bad,  unholy 
principle.  Although  God  is  here  likewise  pictured  in 
Stoical  fashion  as  the  irvevfia  immanent  in  the  whole 
world,  nevertheless  he  must,  on  the  other  hand,  be  free 


SKEPTICISM  AND  SYNCRETISM  345 

from  all  contact  with  matter  which  might  pollute  him. 
Consequently  he  cannot  directly  act  upon  matter,  but  the 
demiurge  for  this  purpose  is  introduced  as  a  mediator 
between  God  and  matter  (Timaeus).  The  Ideas  according 
to  which  God  perfects  the  world  passed  for  the  neo-Pythago- 
reans  only  as  archetypes  in  the  divine  spirit.  They  became, 
in  a  similarly  fantastic  way,  partly  identified  with  the 
Pythagorean  numbers,  partly  set  in  some  secret  relation- 
ship, as  they  had  begun  to  be  regarded  by  Plato  and  his 
immediate  pupils.  At  the  same  time  they  are  the  forms  of 
matter  in  the  Aristotelian  sense.  In  the  graded  interval 
between  God  and  matter,  the  dasmons  and  stellar  gods 
find  place  above  men. 

The  anthropological  dualism  of  the  neo-Pythagoreans  is 
consistent  with  their  metaphysical  dualism.  The  spirit  is 
punished  by  being  confined  in  a  corporeal  prison,  and  can 
free  itself  again  through  purification  and  expiation,  through 
mortification  of  the  flesh,  and  through  godly  life.  The  Pla- 
tonic theory  of  the  three  parts  of  the  soul  is  blended  w^th 
the  Aristotelian  teaching  of  the  vov<i  (Timaeus),  and  im- 
mortality is  represented  in  the  (partially  conscious)  mythical 
form  of  transmigration.  The  moral  and  religious  problem 
is  how  to  suppress  the  senses.  In  the  solution  of  this  prob- 
lem man  is  helped  by  mediating  daemons  and  by  divine 
revelation,  which  speaks  in  holy  men  like  Pythagoras  and 
Apollonius. 

Pythagoras  is  said  to  have  revealed  such  doctrine  to  his 
band  and  to  have  veiled  it  in  his  theory  of  numbers,  Plato  to 
have  borrowed  it  from  him.  The  later  neo-Pythagoreans,  par- 
ticularly Numenius,  referred  the  revelation  still  further  back  to 
Moses.     This  is  due  to  Philo's  influence. 

The  authoritative  importance  which  the  fundamental  opposi- 
tion of  good  and  bad  has  for  the  neo-Pythagorean  idea  of  the 
world  makes  this  philosophy  appear  an  offshoot  of  the  Old 
Academy.  Its  historical  transition  is  through  eclectic  Plato- 
nism,  supposably  in  the  form  that  Posidonius  connected  it  in 
Stoicism.     See  R.  Heinze,  Xenocmtes,  p.  156. 


346  HISTORY  OF  ancient  philosophy 

The  divergence  of  neo-Pythagoreanism  from  the  Platonic 
metaphysics  consisted  essentially  in  its  stripping  the  Ideas  (and 
numbers)  of  their  metaphysical  independence  and  in  making 
them  thoughts  in  the  divine  mind.  This  is  also  the  authorita- 
tive conception  for  neo-Platonism.  The  far-reaching  signifi- 
cance of  this  change  consisted  in  the  fact  that  the  immaterial 
substance  was  thought  as  spirit,  as  conscious  Immanence.  The 
beginning  of  this  thought  is  to  be  found  in  the  Aristotelian 
vo.yo-is  vor/crew?,  its  wider  preparation  in  the  Stoic  doctrine  which 
contrasted  the  content  of  the  ideas  (t6  Xcktov)  as  incorporeal 
to  the  objects,  all  of  which  are  corporeal.  This  tendency 
reached  its  perfect  develoi)ment  in  Philo's  concept  of  the  divine 
personality. 

Neo-Pythagoreanism  was  the  Jirst  system  wJiich  expressed  the 
principle  of  authority  in  the  form  of  divine  revelation^  and  thus 
against  sensualism  and  rationalism  it  initiated  the  mystic  di- 
rection of  ancient  thought.  The  saints  of  this  philosophical 
religion  are  divinely  favored  men,  to  whom  the  pure  doctrine 
has  in  part  been  given.  Theoretically  this  new  source  of  knowl- 
edge was  designated  still  as  voCs,  as  the  immediate  intuition  of 
the  intelligible  {virrp-ov).  It  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the 
Stavoia,  or  the  knowledge  of  the  understanding,  as  also  from  the 
So^a  and  the    aio-^r/cris. 

Daemonology  was  the  theoretic  basis  for  the  peculiar  amal- 
gamation of  this  monotheism  with  the  Mysteries.  It  rested 
upon  the  need  of  bridging  the  chasm  between  God's  tran- 
scendence and  the  world.  But  it  offered  the  possibility  of 
uniting  all  the  fantastic  faiths  and  cults  into  one  system. 
The  detailed  system  of  divination  which  the  neo- Pythagoreans 
got  from  the  Stoics  was  united  with  this  theory. 

The  peculiar  blending  of  Platonism  and  Judaism  was 
also  closely  related  to  the  above  neo-Pythagoreanism,  and 
was  completed  at  the  beginning  of  our  era  in  the  so-called 
Alexandrian  religious  philosophy.  Philo  of  Alexandria 
was  its  leader. 

A.  Gfrorer,  Philo  und  die  alex.  Tlieosoj)Me  (2  ed.,  Stuttgart, 
1835)  ;  F.  Diihne,  Die  jUdisch. -alex.  Religionsphilosophie  (Halle, 
1834) ;  M.  Wolff,  Die  philonische  PhilosojMe  (2  ed.,  Gothen- 
burg, 1858).  Concerning  the  Aoyos  doctrine,  see  F.  Keferstein, 
Philo's  Lehre  von  dem  gottlicJien  Mittelicesen  (Leipzig,  1846) ; 
J.  Bucher,  Philonisthe  Studieu  (Tubingen,  1848) ;  Ferd.  De- 
launey,  Philo  d'Alex.  (Paris,  1867) ;  J.  R6ville,  Le  logos  d'apres 


SKEPTICISM   AND   SYNCRETISM  347 

Pliilo  (Geneva,  1877)  ;  Histories  of  Judaism  by  Just,  Graetz, 
and  Abr.  Geiger;  Ewald,  Gesch.  des  Volkes  Israel;  Dorner, 
Entwlckelungsgesch.  der  Lehre  von  der  Person  Christi  u.  andere 
dogmengesch.  Werke ;  see  Ueberweg-Heinze,  V.  292  f. 

Philo  (born  about  25  u.  c.  and  died  50  a.  d.)  came  from  one 
of  the  most  influential  Jewish  families  in  Alexandria.  He 
headed  the  embassy  in  30  an'd  40  that  the  Alexandrian  Jews 
sent  to  Caligula.  His  wi-itings,  among  which  there  is  much 
that  is  doubtful  and  spurious,  have  been  published  by  Th.  Man- 
gey  (London,  1742),  C.  E.  Richter  (Leipzig,  l<So8  ff.),  and 
stereotyped  by  Tauchnitz  (Leipzig,  1851  ff.).  See  Ch.  G.  L. 
Grossman,  Qiicestiones  PhUone(e  (Leipzig,  1829,  and  other  edi- 
tions) ;  Jac.  Bernays,  Die  iinter  Philo' s  Werken  stehende  Schrijl 
ilber   die   Ewigheit  der    Welt  (published   by  Berlin   Academy, 

1877)  ;  concerning  the  writing  Trept  tov  iravTa  cnrovSaiov  ctvat  eXev- 

Oepov,  see  K.  Ausfeld  (Gottingen,  1887)  and  P.  Wendland, 
Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos.,  I.  509  ff.  ;  H.  v.  Arnim,  Quellen- 
Studien  zxi  Philo  (Berlin,  1889)  ;  J.  Drummond,  Philo  Judceus 
(London,  1888)  ;  M.  Freudenthal,  Die  Erkenntnistheorie  Philo's 
(Berlin,  1891). 

As  early  as  the  middle  of  the  second  century  before  this  era 
there  can  be  seen  influences  of  Greek  philosophy,  especially 
Platonic,  Stoic,  and  Aristotelian  theories,  at  work  in  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  Jewish  scriptures  (Aristobulus,  Aristeas, 
etc.).  All  doctrines  of  any  essential  importance  are  included 
by  Philo. 

In  the  philosophy  of  Philo,  the  theory  of  the  transcen- 
dence of  God  is  more  distinct  than  in  any  other  form  of 
Alexandrian  thought.  God  is  so  far  beyond  all  finiteness 
that  he  can  be  defined  only  negatively  through  the  denial 
of  every  empirical  quality  (aTroio?),  and  wholly  abstractly, 
as  an  absolute  Being  {ro  6v,  —  according  to  the  Platonic 
principle  also  to  yeuviKcoraTov').  This  absolute  Being  is 
beyond  all  human  ideas  of  perfectness,  even  beyond  virtue 
and  wisdom.  Nevertheless  the  divine  Being  is  the  force 
that  forms  the  universe  by  his  goodness  and  rules  it  with 
his  might.^  Since  God  cannot  enter  into  direct  relations 
with  impure  and  evil  matter  which  in  contrast  to  him 
is  passive,  potencies  (8vvd/jiet<i)  go  out  from  him  with  which 

^  The  references  here  are  similar  to  those  in  the  writing  irejA  Koa-fiov 


348  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

he  forms  and  directs  the  world.  These  (Stoical)  potencies 
were  identified  on  the  one  hand  with  the  Platonic  Ideas,  and, 
on  the  other,  with  the  angels  of  the  Jewish  religion.  Their 
unity,  however,  is  the  Logos,  the  second  God,  the  con- 
tent, on  the  one  hand,  of  all  original  Ideas  (\0709  evhiddero^ 
=  ao^la)^  and,  on  the  other,  of  the  teleological  formative 
forces  (Xojo'i  irpo^opLKosi)  that  reveal  God's  presence  in 
the  world. 

In  man,  as  the  microcosm,  the  spirit  (yov<i)  in  its  eternal 
heritage  stands  in  contrast  to  the  body  of  mortality  (adp^). 
It  is  so  involved  by  its  own  guilt  that  it  can  only  get 
release  from  the  universal  sinfulness  by  divine  help.  Its 
problem  is  how  to  become  like  the  pure  spirit  of  God.  .  Its 
attainment  of  indifference  to  all  desires,  modelled  after  the 
Stoic  apathy,  and  its  purification  Avhich  rises  above  this 
ethical  ideal  into  knowledge  (the  Aristotelian  dianoetic 
virtue)  are  upward  steps  toward  that  highest  blessedness 
which  is  only  reached  in  an  ecstatic  state  of  absorption  in 
the  divine  Being,  with  the  full  surrender  of  one's  individu- 
ality. This  supra-conscious  ecstasy  (eK(yTaai<i)  is  accorded 
as  a  revelation  and  gift  of  God  only  to  the  most  perfect 
men. 

Platonic  and  Stoic  thories,  and  incidentally  also  the  Aris- 
totelian, were  mingled  in  the  Philosophy  of  Philo  in  the  most 
complicated  manner.  With  an  abundant  employment  of  the 
Stoic  method  of  allegorical  myth-interpretation  he  read  these 
theories  into  the  primitive  records  of  his  religion,  i.  e.,  into  the 
teaching  of  Moses.  He  found  not  only  in  Moses  but  in  the 
teachings  of  Greek  philosophy  that  revelation  of  God  to  which 
human  knowledge  alone  can  never  attain.  In  these  religions 
revelations  Philo  distingnished  the  corporeal  and  spiritual,  the 
verbal  and  conceptual  sense.  God  has  to  reveal  himself  to 
sensuous  man  in  a  manner  that  man  may  comprehend.  There- 
fore it  is  the  task  of  philosophy  (or  theology)  to  reinterpret  the 
religious  records  into  a  system  of  conceptnal  insight.  Compare 
Siegfried,  Philo  von  Alex,  als  Ausleger  des  alien  Testaments 
(Jena,  187")). 

The  later  so-called  "negative  theology,"  which  in  Philo  re- 


PATRISTICS  349 

garded  God  as  the  absolutely  inconceivable  and  inexpressible, 
corresponded  to  the  theory  of  ecstasy  in  which  also  the  human 
spirit  was  conceived  to  be  lifted  out  of  everything  limited 
and  represen table,  and  thereb}'  itself  became  God  (aTro^eoucr^ai, 
deijicatio). 

The  mediation  between  the  neo-Pj^thagorean  transcendence 
and  the  Stoic  immanence  was  in  the  divine  potencies.  These 
on  the  one  side  inhere  in  God  as  Ideas,  and  on  the  other  work 
upon  matter  as  independently  active  potencies.  The  Logos  has 
also  the  same  specious  double  aspect  of  a  divine  potenc}'  and 
an  independent  personality.  The  need  of  a  unifying  mediation 
between  God  and  the  world  is  consistentl}'  conceived  in  the 
conception  of  the  Logos. 

Finally,  in  a  similar  manner,  the  Platonists  of  the  first 
and  second  centuries  of  this  era,  under  the  influence  of  the 
neo-Pythagorean  teaching,  perfected  a  mysticism  which  sub- 
stituted a  confident  faith  in  divine  revelation  for  the  ethical 
Wisdom  of  the  earlier  philosophy.  The  exponents  of  this 
are  Plutarch  of  Cluvronea  and  Apuleius  of  Madaura. 

See  Zeller,  V^  203  flF. ;  Ueberweg-Heinze,  303  ff .  To  this 
religious  eclectic  circle  belong  the  writings  current  under  the 
name  of  Hermes- Trisme(iist us.  See  R.  Pietschmann,  Hermes 
Trismegistus  (Leipzig,  IfSTo). 

Plutarcli's  philosophical  writings  (Moralia)  form,  in  the  edi- 
tion of  Diibner  (Paris,  1841).  volumes  II L  and  IV.  See  R. 
Volkmann,  Lehen^  Schriften  nod  Philos.  des  Plutarch's  (2  ed., 
Berlin,  1872) ;  E.  Dascai'itis,  Die  Psi/cholor/ie  u.  Piidagogik  des 
Phdarch's  (Gotha,  1880)  ;  C.  Giesen,  l)e  Phdardio  contra 
Stok'os  disputationibu^  (^Ifinster,  1800)  ;  von  AVillamowitz- 
Mollendorf.  Za  PJut(irch^  Gastmald  der  siehen  Weisen  (in  the 
Hermes,  l.sOO).  There  belongs  in  the  same  connection  with  the 
philosophical  writings  of  Apuleius  (collected  by  Hildebrand, 
Leipzig.  1842)  his  well-known  romance,  tiie  Golden  Ass,  whose 
sharp  satire  seems  to  be  based  allegorically  upon  the  neo- 
Pythagorean  mystic  view  of  the  world  and  life. 

3.     Patristics. 

The  religious  Platonism  of  the  first  centuries  of  our  era, 
in  the  breadth  and  variety  of  its  assimilations  of  the  most 
different  religious  convictions,   showed   a  change   in   the 


350  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

philosophical  point  of  view.  Science  as  well  as  philosophy 
was  placed  in  the  service  of  a  feverish  religious  need. 
Philosophy  was  no  longer  to  be  an  ethical  art  of  life  but  a 
religion.  When,  on  the  other  hand,  science  was  beginning 
to  be  weary  of  the  problem,  the  new  religion  began  its  tri- 
umphant march  through  the  ancient  world. 

The  Gospel  originally  took  no  note  of  science ;  it  was 
neither  its  friend  nor  foe,  and  its  attitude  to  the  ancient 
political  state  was  like  its  attitude  to  science.  It  had,  nev- 
ertheless, to  assume  more  of  a  positive  relation  to  both,  the 
more  it  spread,  following  its  own  natural  impulse  among 
the  people  on  the  Mediterranean  Sea.  In  both  cases  the 
course  of  things  was  as  follows  :  the  Church,  in  its  need  of 
self-justification,  found  itself  in  positive  contact  with  the 
world,  and  assimilated  gradually  the  ancient  life ;  thus 
it  finally  overcame  Greek  science  as  well  as  the  Roman 
state,^  —  an  impossible  result  unless  Christianity  reacted 
in  turn  and  adopted  the  essentials  of  antiquity  for  its  own. 

The  philosophical  secularizing  of  the  Gospel  which  went 
on  parallel  with  the  organization  and  political  growth  of  the 
church  was  called  Patristics,  and  extended  from  the  second 
to  the  fourth  and  fifth  centuries  after  Christ. 

Patristics  in  the  general  history  of  philosophy  is  usually  sep- 
arated from  the  development  of  ancient  thought,  and  then  is 
afterwards  generally  treated  as  the  beginning  of  Christian  phi- 
losoph}'.  It  is  not  our  purpose  to  pass  judgment  upon  the 
propriety  and  usefulness  of  the  usual  arrangement,  when  we 
make  tliis  sketch  deviate  from  that  arrangement,  or  when  we 
draw  the  most  general  outlines  of  Patristic  philosophy.  This 
sketch  is  made,  not  only  because  the  Patristic  philosopliy  be- 
longs in  its  time  relations  to  antiquity,^  but  the  principal  reason 

^  See  K.  J.  Neumann,  Der  roinische  Staat  itnd  die  allgemeine  KircTie 
his  auf  Diokletian,  I.  (Leipzig,  1890). 

^  These  actual  relations  show  themselves  so  strong  that  the  present 
author  develops  the  arrangement  introduced  here,  in  his  general  Ge- 
schicTtte  der  Philosophie ;  and  he  has  found  them  by  far  the  best  for  the 
exposition  of  scientific  development  in  the  first  centuries  of  our  era. 


PATRISTICS  351 

is  that  in  it  is  to  be  seen  a  final  development  of  ancient  thought 
corresponding  throughout  to  ueo-Platonism.  It  is  obvious  that 
all  specific  theological  moments  are  left  out  of  account,  and  the 
survey  is  limited  strictly  within  philosophical  bounds.  There  is 
certainl}^  not  much  of  philosophical  origiualit}'  to  be  expected 
in  this  period.  Originality  can  be  found  to  some  extent  only 
among  the  Gnostics  and  in  Origen.  Patristics  is  only  a  variation 
and  development  of  Greek  thought,  and  then  only  from  a  re- 
ligious point  of  view,  —  a  point  of  view  in  which  ardent  long- 
ing has  given  place  to  the  firm  conviction  of  faith. 

AVith  the  text-books  on  the  histor}'  of  philosophy  we  must 
compare  the  following  histories  of  the  church  and  of  dogmatics, 
if  we  would  understand  this  subject.  See  Harnack,  Lelirhuch 
der  Dogmengeschichte,  Vol.  I.  (Freiburg  i.  B.,  1886);  Deutinger, 
Geist  der  ChristUclien  Ueherlieferumj  (Regeusburg,  1850-51); 
A.  Ritschl,  Die  Entsfehung  der  aUkatolische  Kirche  (2  ed., 
Bonn,  1857)  ;  F.  Chr.  Baur,  Das  Christentuni  der  ersten  drei 
Jahrlmnderte  (Tubingen,  1860)  ;  Joh.  Alzog,  Grundriss  der 
Patrologie  (3  ed.,  Freiburg  i.  B.,  1876) ;  Alb.  Stockl,  GeschicJite 
der  Philosopliie  der  patristischen  Zeit  (Wiirzburg,  1859);  Joh. 
Huber,  Die  Philosopliie  der  Kirchenvdter  (Munich,  1859)  ;  E. 
Havet,  Le  christianisme  et  ses  origines  (2  vol.,  Paris,  1871)  ; 
Fr.  Overbeck,  Tiber  die  Anfcinge  der  patristischen  Litferatur  (in 
Hist.  Zeitschrift,  1882).  The  sources  of  Patristic  literature 
are  most  completely  collected  by  J.  P.  Migne  in  his  collection : 
Patrologice  cursus  completus  (Paris,  since  1860). 

The  occasion  for  Christianity  taking  some  position  toward 
Greek  science  arose  partly  out  of  its  polemically  apologetic 
interests,  partly  out  of  those  that  were  dogmatic  and  con- 
structive. With  its  missionary  spirit  Christianity  stepped 
out  upon  a  scientifically  blase  world  in  which  even  the  less 
educated  people  had  learned  to  flee  from  their  religions 
doubt  to  philosophy,  and  in  which  philosophy  was  trying  to 
vouchsafe  to  those  in  religious  need  a  contentment  that 
had  been  lost  to  the  world.  Christianity  entered  at  the 
same  time  into  the  religious  controversies  w*here,  under 
these  circumstances,  the  victory  would  belong  to  that  party 
which  absorbed  most  completely  the  culture  of  antiquity. 
It  therefore  followed  that  the  new  religion  had  to  defend 
its  faith  theoretically  against  the  mockery  and  contempt  of 


352  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

heathen  wisdom,  but  at  the  same  time  it  had  to  vindicate 
itself  as  the  fulfilment  of  human  need  of  salvation.  The 
Apologists  undertook  to  accomplish  this. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  unity  and  purity  of  the  Christian 
conceptions  threatened  to  be  lost  with  the  spreading  of  the 
community,  on  account  of  the  many  ways  in  which  those 
conceptions  came  into  contact  with  the  religious  elements 
of  the  Graeco-Roman  and  Oriental  philosophies.  The  church 
needed  for  its  inner  constitution  not  only  the  simple  regula 
fidei,  but  also  a  fundamentally  scientific  expression  of  tliis 
formula,  a  fixed  and  conceptually  developed  system  of  dog- 
matics. The  Gnostics  were  the  first  to  attempt  such  a 
philosophical  structure  for  Cln'istianity.  But  inasmuch  as 
they  at  the  first  step  made  a  striking  departure  from  the 
rule  of  faith,  the  solution  of  their  problem  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Alexandrian  School  of  Catechists,  which  cre- 
ated for  Christianity  its  scientific  dogma  from  the  ripest 
thought  of  the  Grecian  world. 

51.  To  a  philosophical  vindication  of  Christianity,  natur- 
ally only  such  members  of  that  communion  could  be  called 
who  had  a  mastery  over  the  thought  of  Greek  and  Roman 
philosophy.  But  even  these  men,  if  their  purpose  was  to 
rationalize  the  new  religion,  would  be  necessarily  inclined 
to  bring  the  content  of  the  new  faith  as  near  as  possible  to 
the  results  of  ancient  science,  and  to  read  into  the  old 
philosophy  the  teachings  of  the  new  faith.  Unintention- 
ally, therefore,  the  Gospel  was  hellenized  by  the  Apolo- 
gists, the  most  important  of  whom  are  Justin  Martyr, 
Athenagoras,  and,  among  the  Romans,  Minucius  Felix, 
and,  later,  Lactantius. 

Corpus  Apolocjetarum  Christianorum  seculi  secundi,  published 
by  Otto  (Jena,  since  1842). 

Of  the  predecessors  of  Justin,  we  must  notice  Aristides  of 
Athens  especially,  wliose  fragments  (published  in  Venice,  1878) 
contain  a  philosophical  argumentation  for  Christianity  as  a  re- 
vealed monotheism. 


PATRISTICS  353 

Flavius  Justin  Martyr  of  Sichem  (Flavia  Neapolis),  in  Sa- 
maria, a  man  of  Greek  origin  and  culture,  after  investigating 
several  contemporaneous  systems  of  science,  came  to  the  con- 
viction that  only  the  Clu'istian  faith  was  the  true  philosophy. 
He  suffered  death  at  Rome  (163-166)  for  defence  of  this  doc- 
trine. Of  his  writings  (see  first  volumes  of  Otto's  edition)  the 
Dialogue  with  the  Jew  Triphon  and  both  the  Apologies  are  gen- 
uine. See  K.  Semisch,  Justin  der  Mdrtyrer  (Breslau,  1840-42)  ; 
B.  Aube,  /St.  Justin,  philosopJie  et  martyr  (Paris,  1861);  M.  v. 
Engelhardt,  Das  Christenthum  Justin  d.  Mdrtyrer  (Erlangen, 
1858).  Justin's  two  Apologies  have  been  translated  into  Ger- 
man and  analyzed  by  H.  Veit. 

Athenagoras  of  Athens  addressed  to  Marcus  Aurelius  (176- 
177)  his  Trpecr/Jeta  Trepi  XptcrTtavwi'.  There  is  also  preserved  his 
Trept  dvacTTacretos  twv  v€Kpwv  (in  Otto's  edition.  Vol.  VII.).  See 
Th.  A.  Clarisse,  De  Athenag.  vita  scrijjtis  et  doctrina  (Leyden, 
1819)  ;  F.  Schurbring,  Die  Philosojjhie  des  Athenag.  (Bern, 
1882). 

The  conception  which  Theophilus  of  Antioeh  (about  180) 
embodied  in  his  address  to  Autolycus  in  writing  {Corpus,  Vol. 
VIII.)  is  related  to  the  above.  The  Apology  oi  Melito  of  Sardis 
and  ApoUinaris  of  Ilierapolis  is  likewise  related. 

The  apologetic  dialogue,  Octavius  (about  200),  of  Minucius 
Felix  (published  in  the  Corpus  scrijjtorum  eccksiasticorum  lati- 
norum,  by  C.  Halm,  Vienna,  1867)  presents  Christianity  nearly 
entirely  in  the  sense  of  ethical  rationalism.  See  A.  Soulet, 
Essai  sur  V  Octavius  de  Min.  Fel.  (Strassburg,  1867)  ;  R.  Kiihl, 
Der  Oktavius  d.  Min.  Fel.  (Leipzig,  1882). 

Similar  ideas  are  found  in  beautiful  form,  but  without  philo- 
sophical significance  in  the  rhetorician  Firmianus  Lactantius 
(died  about  325).  He  undertook  in  his  chief  work,  the  Institit- 
tiones  divince,  to  make  a  system  of  Cliristian  morals,  whose 
individual  characteristics  were  to  be  found  strewn  in  (ireek 
philosophy,  which  nevertheless  in  their  totality  could  only  be 
conceived  as  ultimately  grounded  through  a  divine  illumina- 
tion. See  J.  G.  Th.  Miiller,  Quctistiones  Xactantiece  (Gottingen, 
1875). 

These  hellenizing  apologists  sought  to  prove  that  Chris- 
tianity was  the  only  "true  philosophy,"  in  that  it  guaranteed 
not  only  correct  knowledge  but  also  right  living  and  true 
holiness  here  and  hereafter.  They  based  the  pre-eminence 
of  Christian  philosophy  upon  the  perfect  revelation  of  God 
in  Jesus  Christ.     For  only  through  divine  inspiration  does 

23 


354  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

the  rational  come  to  man,  who  is  buried  in  the  wicked 
sense-world  and  is  in  the  toils  of  daemons.  Nevertheless 
inspiration  has  been  active  from  the  beginning  in  human 
life.  Everything  that  the  great  teachers  of  Greece  —  Py- 
thagoras, Socrates,  Plato  —  have  known  of  the  truth,  they 
have  owed  not  solely  to  their  own  reason.  They  have,  in 
part,  got  it  directly  through  divine  revelation,  and,  in  part, 
indirectly  through  the  inspired  teaching  of  Moses  and  the 
prophets,  whom  they  were  said  to  have  used.  But  all  these 
revelations  are  only  sporadic  and  embryonic  (X070?  airep- 
fxaTLKoi).  In  Jesus  first  is  the  divine  Logos  perfectly  and 
completely  revealed  and  become  man.  For  the  Godhead, 
who  is  nameless  and  inexpressible  in  itself,  has  unfolded 
his  entire  essence  in  his  Son. 

The  peculiarity  of  the  teaching  of  these  men,  especially  of 
Justin,  is  the  thoroughgoing  and  detailed  identification  of  rea- 
son and  revelation.  The  way  was  prepared  in  the  Stoic  Logos- 
concept  for  this  and  in  its  transformation  at  the  hands  of 
Philo,  in  which  the  materialistic  character  of  the  Xoyos  was 
stripped  off  and  only  the  omnipresent  cliaracter  of  the  divine 
spirit  in  nature  and  history  remained.  When,  therefore,  Justin 
found  nearly  all  the  moments  of  Christian  truth,  the  ethical 
bearing  of  which  he  strongly  emphasized,  already  in  ancient 
philosophy,  when  he  opined  that  something  of  the  truth  of  sal- 
vation as  a  natural  endowment  (tfji<f>vTov)  has  come  to  all  people 
by  divine  grace,  he  was  regarding  as  inspired  what  is  natural 
and  rational  according  to  Greek  science.  Therefore  in  that 
teaching  approved  by  him  and  sanctioned  as  Christian,  he 
found  partly  an  immediate  revelation,  partly  an  appropriation 
of  the  statements  of  Moses  and  the  prophets,  of  whom  he 
thought  Plato  had  ample  knowledge.  Philo  had  already  done 
this  before  Justin.  On  the  other  hand,  in  contrast  to  the  in- 
definite search  forarevelation  which  characterized  neo-Pythago- 
reanism  and  the  other  forms  of  mystic  Platonism,  the  Apologists 
had  the  enormous  advantage  of  a  faith  in  a  determinate,  abso- 
lute, positive,  and  historical  revelation  in  Jesus  Christ  In  their 
representing  him,  they  united  the  Logos  conception  of  Philo 
with  the  ethical  religious  meaning  of  the  Jewish  ideal  of  a 
Messiah.  They  designated  him,  therefore,  as  the  "second 
God,"  created  by  the  Father,  in  whom  divine  revelation  had 
been  incarnated. 


PATRISTICS  355 

The  metaphysical  dualism  of  the  Apologists  stood  ia  intimate 
relation  to  their  theory  of  inspiration.  They  metaphysically  set 
the  d/Aop^os  v\r]  over  against  the  Godhead,  who  forms  tlie  world 
through  the  Logos,  entirely  in  a  Platonic  and  neo-Pythagorean 
sense.  The  end  of  this  is  to  conceive  matter  as  in  every  way 
reasonless  and  bad.  Thus  results,  as  their  fundamental  prin- 
ciple, the  following :  the  Logos,  as  the  content  of  divine  revela- 
tion, has  appeared  in  Jesus  Christ  the  man  in  order  to  redeem 
man  fallen  in  sin,  and  to  establish  the  kingdom  of  God. 

52.  The  desire  to  transmute  faith  (Tr/o-rt?)  and  its  au- 
thoritative content  into  conceptual  knowledge  (yvwaa)  be- 
gan very  early  in  the  Christian  communion.  The  Pauline 
epistles  show  this.  It  was  completed  in  a  larger  way  at 
the  beginning  of  the  second  century  within  the  Syriac- 
Alexandrian  circles  of  Christians.  Here  neo-Pythagorean, 
Platonic,  and  Philonic  thought  met  in  a  heightened  fancy, 
the  occasion  of  which  was  the  Syriac  mixture  of  Oriental 
and  Occidental  cults  and  mythologies.  The  rivalry  of  re- 
ligions w^as  reduced  in  the  presentation  of  these  Gnostics 
to  a  Christian  philosophy  of  religion,  whose  disciples,  being 
chiefly  the  members  of  the  communion  steeped  in  Hellenic 
culture,  constituted  themselves  in  many  localities  as  unique 
Mysteries.  They  perfected  an  idealism  with  the  fantastic 
mythological  formulae  of  the  East,  and  lost,  on  this  account, 
all  sympathy  W'ith  the  majority  of  the  Christian  commun- 
ion, so  that  they  were  finally  set  aside  as  heretics.  The 
leaders  of  Gnosticism  wxre  Saturninus,  Carpocrates,  Basil- 
ides,  Yalentinns,  and  Bardesanes. 

A.  W.  Neander,  Genetische  EntiHcTxeluvg  der  vornehmsfen 
gnostischen  Si/ste7ne  (Berlin,  1818);  F..  flatter,  Hisfoire  critique 
(he  gnosticisme  (2  ed.,  Paris,  1843)  ;  F.  Chr.  Baur,  Die  christ- 
Uc/te  Gnosis  oder  Religionsphilosophie  (Tubingen,  1835);  A. 
Lipsius,  Der  Gnostizisrnus  (Leipzig.  18C)0  ;  separately  published 
in  Ersch  u.  Gruber,  Vol.  71) ;  H.  8.  ]Mansel,  The  Gnostic 
Heresies  (London,  1875)  ;  A.  Ilarnack,  Zxr  QtieUenkritik  der 
Geschichte  des  Gnostizismus  (Leipzig,  1873)  ;  A.  Hilgenfeld, 
Die  Ketzergeschichte  des  Urchristentums  (Jena,  1884)  ;  M.  Joel, 
Blicke  in  die  ReJigionsgeschichte  zu  Anfang  des  ziceitefi  Jahr- 
hunderts  (Breslau,'  1880-1883) . 


356  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

Of  the  conditions  of  life  of  the  eminent  Gnostics  but  little 
is  known.  Only  very  few  fragments  of  their  writings  are 
preserved.  Among  these  is  particularly  the  ttio-tis  o-o^ta  of  an 
unknown  author  from  the  circle  of  Valentinians  (published  by 
I'etermann,  Berlin,  1851).  As  for  the  rest,  the  knowledge  we 
have  of  the  doctrine  of  these  men  is  limited  to  what  their  op- 
ponents say  about  them,  especially  Irena>us  (tA.fy;^os  koL  dva- 
TpoTTTy  T^s  i//£u8u)vr/xou  y»'oio-£(i>s,  Leipzig,  1853),  Ilippolytus  (eXcy^os 
Kara  na<ru)v  aipco-cwv,  Oxford,  1851),  Justin,  TertuUian  (adversus 
Valentiidanos),  Clement  of  Alexandria,  Origen,  Eusebius, 
Augustine,  and  Saturninus,  who  came  from  Antioch  and  taught 
ill  the  time  of  Hadrian.  Carpocrates  flourished  about  130  in 
Alexandria,  and  was  contemporary  to  Basil  ides  the  Syrian. 
Tlie  career  of  the  most  notable  of  these  men,  Valentinus,  falls 
somewhat  later.  Valentinus  lived  at  Rome  and  died  in  Cyprus 
about  IGO.  Bardesanes  was  born  in  Mesopotamia  and  lived 
155-225. 

See  Uhlhorn,  Das  hasilidianische  Si/stem  (Gottingen,  1855)  ; 
G.  Ileinrici,  Die  valenthiianische  Gnosis  n.  die  lieil.  Schrift 
(Berlin,  1871)  ;  Fr.  Lipsius,  Valentinus  u.  seine  Sclmle  {Jahvb. 
f.  prot.  Tlieol.^  1887);  G.  Kostlin,  Das  r/nost.  System  des  Bucks 
TTtoTts  (ro<f}ia  {Theol.  Jahrh.  Tiihingen,  1854)  ;  A.  Hilgenfeld,  Bar- 
desanes der  letzte  Gnostiker  (Leipzig,  18G4). 

The  fundamental  principle  which  secures  to  the  Gnostics 
a  permanent  place  in  the  history  of  philosoj)hy  in  spite  of 
the  seusualistic  and  mythological  fanciful ness  with  which 
they  developed  this  principle,  is  their  plan  on  a  great  scale 
of  a  philosophy  of  history.  This  plan  originated  in  their 
fundamental  religious  thought.  Since  Christianity  wished 
to  conceive  itself  as  a  victory  both  over  Judaism  and 
Heathenism,  the  Gnostic  interpreted  the  battle  of  religions 
allcgorically  as  a  battle  of  the  gods  of  these  religions. 
They  interpreted  this  battle  intellectually  also  into  a  theory 
that  upon  the  appearance  of  the  Redeemer  not  only  the  de- 
velopment of  the  human  race  but  also  the  history  of  the  uni- 
verse reached  its  denouement.  This  denouement,  however, 
is  the  fundamental  part  of  Christianity :  the  redemjjtion  of 
the  wicked  through  the  perfect  revelation  of  the  highest  God 
through  Jesus  Christ. 

The  transformation  of  all  nature  philosophy  into  ethical- 


PATRISTICS  357 

religious  categories  is  consequently  the  fundamental  form 
of  the  philosophy  of  the  Gnostics.  They  undertook  at  first 
with  a  radical  one-sidcdness  to  conceive  the  universe  en- 
tirely from  a  religious  point  of  view.  They  thought  of  the 
cosmic  process  as  a  strife  between  good  and  evil,  which  is 
ended  in  the  redemption  of  the  world  by  Christ,  giving  the 
good  the  victory. 

So  far  as  this  antithesis  was  logically  conceived,  it  ap- 
peared in  the  form  of  a  neo-Pythagorean  dualism  of  spirit 
and  matter.  In  the  mythological  embodiment  of  it,  how- 
ever, which  took  up  by  far  the  greatest  space  in  the  Gnos- 
tic systems,  the  heathen  daemons  and  the  god  of  the  Old 
Testament,  who  had  the  form  of  the  Platonic  demiurge, 
were  considered  the  powers  of  this  world  to  be  overcome. 
They  were  brought  into  opposition  to  the  true  God,  who 
conquered  them  by  the  revelation  of  Jesus,  to  the  same  ex- 
tent as  other  religions  are  brought  in  opposition  to  Chris- 
tianity. 

The  beginnings  of  the  Greek  natural  sciences  were  of  sucli  a 
nature  that  there  seemed  to  be  no  possibihty  of  giving  a  satis- 
factory answer,  even  in  the  great  teleological  systems,  to  the 
question  of  the  significance  of  historical  development  in  its  en- 
tirety. The  science  that  was  wanting  to  them  was  the  philosophy 
of  history,  and  of  this  want  the  world  must  needs  become  con- 
scious when  ancient  culture  was  in  its  senility.  The  Gnostics 
are  therefore  the  first  philosophers  of  histonj.  Since  there 
stands  as  the  centre  of  their  philosophy  of  history  the  Christian 
principle  of  the  salvation  of  the  world  by  Jesus  Christ,  they 
must  be  acknowledged  as  philosophers  of  Christian  history  and 
religion,  in  spite  of  their  deviation  from  later  orthodoxy. 

The  conquest  of  Judaism  by  Christianity  was  thus  mytholo- 
gized  by  men  like  Cerinthus,  the  Syrian  Cerdo,  and  particu- 
larly Mareion  and  his  pupil  Apelles.  The  God  of  the  Old 
Testament  who  formed  the  world  and  gave  the  .Judaic  law  was 
conceived  as  a  da;mon  lower  than  the  highest  God,  who  was 
revealed  by  Christ.  The  former  is  recognizable  in  nature  and 
in  the  Old  Testament ;  the  latter  is  inexpressible  and  unknow- 
able :  the  former  is  only  just,  the  latter  is  good,  —  an  ethical 
distinction  emphasized  by  Mareion  particularly. 


358  HISTORY   OF   ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

This  way  of  representing  things  led  the  Gnostics  into  a  dual- 
ism between  good  and  bad,  s[)irit  and  matter.  The  dnalism  be- 
tween spirit  and  matter  was  developed  in  a  true  Hellenic 
fashion  with  a  most  decided  leaning  to  neo-Pythagorean  syncre- 
tism by  Carpocrates,  but  by  Saturninus,  and  particularly  by 
Basilides  (see  Irenajus),  by  means  of  Oriental  mj^thology.  Accord- 
ing to  the  astronomical  dualism  of  the  Pythagorean  and  Aris- 
totelian thought,  tiie  space  between  God  and  the  world  is  filled 
by  whole  races  of  dsemons  and  angels  that  are  arranged  ac- 
cording to  numerical  symbols.  The  lowest  of  these  is  far 
enough  distant  from  the  divine  perfectness  so  that  the  lowest 
can  have  relationship  with  the  impure  material,  and  as  demiurge 
form  the  world.  In  this  world  then,  as  already  in  the  spirit 
world,  the  battle  of  the  perfect  and  imperfect,  of  light  and 
darkness,  waged  until  the  Ao'yo?,  the  vous,  Christ,  the  most  per- 
fect of  the  {eons,  came  down  to  the  world  of  the  flesh  to  re- 
lease the  spirit  shut  up  in  matter.  This  is  the  fundamental 
idea  of  Gnosticism,  and  its  different  mythological  shadings  are 
of  no  philosoi)hical  importance. 

Their  anthropology  in  a  corresponding  manner  distinguished 
in  man  the  material  of  sense  (uA?;),  the  daemonic  soul  (</a^x^), 
and  the  divine  spirit  (Trvcv/xa).  According,  then,  to  the  preva- 
lence of  one  of  these  three  elements  man  is  either  spiritual, 
psj-ehic,  or  material, — a  distinction  which  was  incidentally 
identified  by  Valentinus  with  that  between  Christianity,  Ju- 
daism, and  rieathendom. 

This  dualism  originated  apparently  in  the  Alexandrian,  that 
is,  the  Hellenic,  circle,  and  assimilated  later  some  analogies  from 
Parseeism.  Manichaeism  arose  later  (third  century)  from  the 
influence  of  the  Gnostics  upon  the  religions  of  the  East.  It 
was  an  extreme  dualistic  religion,  and  played  an  important  role 
in  the  intellectual  controversies  of  the  following  centuries  (F. 
Chr.  Baur,  Das  manlchmsche  Religionssi/stem  (Tubingen, 
1831);  O.  Fliigel,  Mani  ti.  seine  Lehre  (Leipzig,  1862);  A. 
Geyler,  Das  System  des  Manichdismus  (Jena,  1875). 

This  dualism  accorded  with  the  Christian's  ethical  convic- 
tions as  well  as  with  those  growing  out  of  his  need  of  redemp- 
tion ;  but  not  with  his  metaphysical  principles,  which  could 
recognize  no  other  power  in  the  world  besides  the  living  God 
and  be  consistent  with  its  Jewish  traditions.  The  monistic 
feeling  naturally  turned  away  from  the  dualism  of  Greek 
thought  and  tried  to  overcome  it.  Later  forms  of  Gnos- 
ticism approached  Monism,  which  predominated  among  the 
orthodox  churchmen.  At  the  same  time  it  sought  to  explain 
dualism  by  a  theory  of  emanation  from  the  divinity,  and  it  had 


PATRISTICS  359 

as  its  model  the  Stoic  theory  of  the  change  of  the  cosmic  fire 
into  its  elements.  It  itself  in  turn  thus  became  the  model  for 
neo-Platonism.  The  school  of  Basilides,  if  the  statement  of 
Hippolytus  refers  to  it,  followed  out  this  motive,  and  it  was 
perhaps  influenced  by  the  notable  Gnostic,  ^'^alentinus. 

Valentinus  undertook  first  to  transfer  the  antithesis  to  the 
original  divine  being  (  7rpoirdTu>p) .  He  called  it  the  eternal 
Depth  (jSv^ds),  which  created  out  of  its  underived  and  unspeak- 
able content  (o-iyiy  —  ewoia)  in  the  first  place  the  irk-qpwu.a,  the 
world  of  Ideas.  From  this  world,  one  Idea,  aocj>ia,  falls  on 
account  of  its  unbridled  longing  for  the  Father  and  creates 
the  sense  world  ^  through  the  demiurge.  There  was  here  at- 
tempted for  the  first  time  in  entirely  mythical  form  the  conquest 
of  Greek  dualism  and  the  establishment  of  an  idealistic  mon- 
ism, which  was  a  fantastic  precreation  of  neo-Platonism. 

In  their  teaching  and  their  cult  the  Gnostic  mysteries 
were  so  far  distant  from  the  Christian  Church  which  had 
been  continuously  developing  its  organization,  that  Gnosti- 
cism was  placed  under  the  ban  as  heresy.  Its  bold  phi- 
losophy of  religion  called  forth  on  the  one  hand  an  ex- 
treme reaction  against  turning  faith  into  a  science,  and 
on  the  other  a  polemical  limitation  of  dogma  to  the 
simplest  content  of  the  regula  fidci.  Tatian  and  Tertul- 
lian  are  to  be  named  here:  the  one  as  the  radical  cham- 
pion of  Orientalism,  which  beheld  in  all  Greek  culture  the 
work  of  the  Devil ;  the  other  as  the  ingenious  and  narrow- 
minded  opponent  of  rationalism.  Terlullian  pushed  the 
anthropological  dualism  so  far  as  to  maintain  that  the 
truth  in  the  Gospel  is  confirmed  just  because  it  contradicts 
human  reason.  Credo  quia  absurdum.  Contem))oraneously 
with  Tcrtullian  and  Tatian,  IreuEeus  (140-200)  and  his 
pupil  Hippolytus  combated  the  anti-Judaic  philosophy  of 
history  of  the  Gnostics  with  the  Pauline  theory  of  a  divine 
method  of  education.  According  to  this  theory  the  Judaic 
Law  was  "  our  schoolmaster  to  bring  us  to  Christ."  They 
also  formulated  a  religious  philosophy  of  history  in   that 

[1  Windelband,  Hislort/  of  Philosophy,  251,  n.  2.  —  Tr.] 


360  HISTORY  OF  Al^CIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

they  conceived  the  historical  process  as  a  teleological  series 
of  acts  of  divine  redemption,  which  expresses  in  the  con- 
ception of  tlie  church  (jKKk'qa-ia)  the  ideal  community  of 
mankind.  This  anti-Gnosticism  was  not  able  to  maintain 
itself  without  help  from  Greek  philosophy  (Stoicism  in 
Tertullian,  Philonism  inlrenaeus  and  Hippolytus)  and  even 
from  Gnosticism  itself,  especially  in  Tatian,  who  later 
went  over  entirely  to  Valentinian  Gnosticism. 

Tatian  was  an  Assyrian.  His  treatise,  xpos 'EXA-jyi/a?,  which 
used  the  Justinian  reflections  for  a  polemic  against  all  phi- 
losophy and  set  up  against  the  Greek  pretended  wisdom  the 
faith  of  the  barbarians,  is  to  be  found  in  Otto's  collection, 
Vol.  VI.  (Jena,  1851),  printed  lately  by  E.  Schwartz  (Leipzig, 
1888).     See  Daniel,  Tertullian  der  Ajyologet  (Ilalle,  1837). 

Tertullian  (160-220),  in  his  last  years  champion  of  the  Mon- 
tanists,  is  the  Christian  Stoic.  His  strict,  relentless  morality 
and  his  abrupt  contrast  of  sensationalism  and  morality  is  con- 
joined with  a  fantastic  materialism  and  sensualism.  His 
numerous  writings,  partly  apologetic,  partly  polemic,  partly  hor- 
tatory, are  published  by  F.  Oehler  (Leipzig,  1853  ff.).  Compare 
A.  W.  Neander,  Antignosticus  ;  Geist  des  Tertullian  und  Ein- 
leitiing  in  dessen  Schriften  (2  ed.,  Berlin,  18-49)  ;  A.  Hauck, 
Tertidlian' s  Leben  und  Schriften  (Erlangeu,  1877)  ;  G.  R. 
Hauschild,  Tertullian''s  Psychologie  und  ErJcenntniss-Theorie 
(Leipzig,  1880). 

This  same  spirit,  but  without  the  paradoxical  originality  of 
Tertullian,  occurred  later  in  the  African  Khetorician,  Arnobius, 
who  wrote  his  thesis  Adversus  gentes  about  300  (published  by 
A.  Reifferscheid  in  the  Corjnis  scriptorum  eccl.  lot.,  Vienna, 
1875).  He  and  Tertullian  uphold  in  a  t^-pical  way  the  theory 
that  orthodoxy,  intending  to  demonstrate  authority,  grace, 
and  revelation  to  be  absolutely  necessary  for  men,  suppresses 
the  natural  intelligence  as  far  as  possible,  and  makes  com- 
mon cause  with  sensualism  and  its  skeptical  consequences. 

Excepting  some  fragments,  the  writings  of  Irenaeus  exist 
only  in  Latin  translations.  See  Bohringer,  JJie  Kirche  Christi 
(Zurich,  1861),  I.  271  ff.  ;  H.  Ziegler,  Irenaeus,  der  Bischof  von 
Li/on  (Berlin,  1871)  ;  A.  Gouilloud,  St.  Irena'us  et  son  temps 
(Lyon,  1876).  The  work  of  Hippolytus,  whose  first  book  was 
earlier  than  the  cf)i\o(ro(f>ovfji€ia  of  Origen,  is  published  by  Duncker 
and  Schneidewin  (Gottingen,  1859).  See  Bunsen,  Jlipjjoli/tus 
und  seine  Zeit  (2  vols.,  Leipzig,  1852  f.). 


PATRISTICS  361 

53.  The  scientific  statement  of  the  religion  of  the  Chris- 
tian church  likewise  took  final  form  in  Alexandria  in  the 
use  of  the  Gnostic  and  the  Apologetic  theories  hy  the 
School  of  Catechists.  Clement  of  Alexandria  (about  200) 
and  Origen,  the  founder  of  Christian  theology,  were  the 
leaders  of  this  school. 

Guerike,  De  schola^  quce  Alexandrice  floruit  catechetica  (Halle, 
1824  f.)  ;  C.  W.  Hasselbach,  De  scholn,  qvce  Alexandrim  floruit 
catechetica  (Stettin,  1826j  ;  further  the  writings  of  E.  Matter,  J. 
Simon,  I.  Vacherot. 

The  thi'ee  chief  writings  that  are  preserved  of  Clement  are 

Aoyos  ■""poTpeTTTtKos  Trpos   EA-A-T^ras,  TratSayoj  ^  os"  au(t  orpw/xaTCts.      The 

last  has  especial  significance  in  the  history  of  philosophy. 
Clement's  dependence  on  Philo  appears  clearly  in  his  teaching. 
It  is  mutatis  mutandis  the  application  of  the  principles  of  Philo 
to  Christendom,  and  it  is  related  to  Christendom  in  exactly  the 
same  way  as  Philo's  teaching  to  Judaism.  Although  there- 
fore not  throughout  philosophically  independent,  Clement  has 
the  great  significance  that  through  him  and  the  more  orig- 
inal form  of  his  theory  in  Origen,  eclectic  Platonism,  strongly 
mixed  as  it  was  with  Stoical  elements,  was  definitely  crystal- 
lized into  Christian  dogma.  See  DJihne,  De  yvwo-et  Clementis 
Alex,  et  de  vestigiis  neoplatonicce philosop1ii(je  in  ea  obviis  (Leip- 
zig, 1831)  ;  J.  Reinkens,  De  flde  et  yvwo-ct  Clementis  (Breslau, 
1850)  and  De  Clemente  preshytero  Alexandrino  (Breslau,  1851)  ; 
Liimmer,  Clement  Alex,  de  Ao'yw  doctt'ina  (Leipzig,  1855) ; 
Hebert-Duperron,  Essai  siir  la  polemique  et  la  philosopliie  de 
Clement  (Paris,  1855) ;  J.  Cognat,  Clement  d'Alexandrie  sa 
doctrine  et  sa  jyole niique  (Paris,  1858)  ;  H.  Treische,  De  yvwcrcL 
Clementis  Alex.  (.Jena,  1871). 

Origen  (185-254),  whose  surname  was  the  Adamantine, 
appeared  early  as  teacher  in  the  School  of  Catechists  that  had 
been  directed  by  Clement.  He  attended  afterward  the  lectures 
of  Ammonius  Saccus  (§  54).  He  had  to  endure  much  persecu- 
tion on  account  of  his  teaching,  and,  driven  from  Alexandria, 
he  spent  his  old  age  in  Caesarea  and  Tyre.  The  most  important 
philosophical  writings  of  his  are  Trepi  apx^^v  and  Kara  KeXcrov. 
Celsus,  a  Platonic  philosopher,  wrote  between  170  and  180  his 
dXr]6r]<;  Adyos,  whicli  was  partly  a  reconstruction  of  the  opposing 
thesis  of  Origen,  and  contained  an  arsenal  of  verbal  weapons 
against  Christianity.  See  Th.  Keim.  Celsvs's  wahres  Wort  (Zurich, 
1873);  E.  Pelagaut,  ^tude  svr  Cdse  (Lyon,  1878);  Origin's 
thesis  concerning  Principles  is  preserved  almost  exclusively  in 


362  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

the  Latin  version  by  Ruflnus.  See  Migne,  vol.  11-17  ;  G.  Tho- 
masius,  Orlyenes  (Nlirnberg,  1837)  ;  Redepenniug,  Origines, 
eine  Darstelhtng  seines  Lebens  u.  seiner  Lehre  (2  vols.,  Bonn, 
1841-46)  ;  J.  Denis,  De  la  philosopJiie  d'Origene  (Paris,  1884) ; 
A.  Harnack,  Dogniengeschichte^  I.  512  fif. 

Anticipated  thus  by  Clement,  Christian  theology  was 
founded  by  Origen  as  a  scientific  system.  For  if  the  church 
then  and  later  took  offence  at  some  of  Origen's  doctrines 
and  supplanted  them,  yet  his  philosophical  point  of  view 
and  his  conceptual  structure  remained  in  a  manner  authori- 
tative for  the  permanent  foundation  of  Christian  dogma  in 
the  shape  into  which  he  had  developed  it  from  the  ideas  of 
the  Alexandrian  school.  Origen  has  the  significance  that 
in  trying  to  transform  Trt'crTt?  into  <yv6iai.'i  (he  called  it  also 
ao(f)la),  he  was  not  carried  away  from  the  Christian  fun- 
damental principles  by '  mythical  speculation  or  by  philo- 
sophical theories.  So  far  as  its  purpose  is  concerned,  his 
teaching  is  then  wholly  parallel  to  Gnosticism.  But  while 
the  Gnostic  boldly  and  deliberately  created  a  separate  and 
individual  form  of  Christianity,  the  Alexandrian  school  of 
Catechists  gradually  began  a  scientific  organization  of  the 
universal  Christian  faith  from  within  itself,  and  Origen 
drew  with  steady  hand  the  fundamental  outlines  within 
whose  limits  later  detailed  developments  were  made. 

Tlie  regxda  fidei  and  the  canon  accepted  by  the  church  of  the 
Holy  "Writ  of  the  Old  and  New  Testament  were  therefore  for 
Origen  the  source  and  measure  of  religious  knowledge.  The 
science  of  faith  is  the  methodical  explanation  of  the  Gospel. 
After  the  manner  of  Philo,  Origen  said  this  method  consisted  in 
the  translatioii  of  historical  into  conceptual  relations.  The 
historical  element  in  revelation  is  only  the  "  somatic  "  meaning 
of  revelation,  and  is  intelligible  to  the  masses.  The  "  psychic" 
meaning  of  revelation  is  its  moral  interpretation,  and  is  especially 
applicable  to  the  Old  Testament.  Above  both  is  the  ' '  pneu- 
matic "  meaning  of  the  philosophical  teaching  expressed  in  Holy 
Writ.  If  thereby  an  esoteric  is  distinguished  from  an  exoteric 
Christianity  (^pto-Tiavo?  o-w/xariKo's) ,  Origen  justified  himself  by 
claiming  that  revelation,  equal  everywhere  in  its   content,  is 


PATRISTICS  363 

suited  in  its  form  to  the  different  endowments  and  stages  of 
development  of  the  mind.  As,  therefore,  the  true  spirit  of  the 
Old  Testament  was  first  revealed  in  the  Gospel,  so  ever  behind 
the  New  Testament  is  the  eternal  pneumatic  gospel  to  be 
sought,  which  is  now,  for  the  first  time,  revealed  only  to  a  few, 
by  the  grace  of  God. 

As  the  leading  principle  of  the  teaching  of  Origen,  stands 
the  concept  of  God  as  the  pure  spirit,  who  in  perfect 
changelessness  and  unity  (em^  —  /iom?)  above  all  Beings 
{eireKeiva  rf]^  ovala-i)  is  recognizable  as  the  everlasting 
author  of  all  things,  but  in  his  entire  fulness  transcends  all 
human  knowledge.  His  essential  characteristic  is  the  abso- 
lute causality  of  his  tvill.  Creativeness  is  an  essential  ele- 
ment of  his  being,  and  therefore  his  creative  activity  is  as 
eternal  as  himself.  On  account  of  his  unique  unchange- 
ableness,  nevertheless,  his  creative  activity  cannot  deal 
directly  with  ever-changing  individual  things,  but  only 
with  the  eternal  revelation  of  his  own  essence,  with  his 
image  the  Logos  (6  X6709).  The  Logos  is  expressly  con- 
ceived by  Origen  as  a  person,  as  an  hypostasized  being. 
He  is  indeed  not  0  ^eo9,  but  still  ^eo9,  a  Sevrepo^  ^eo9,  and 
the  Holy  Spirit  stands  related  to  him  as  he  is  related  to  the 
Father.  The  X0709  is  related  to  the  world  as  the  IBea 
ISeMv,  the  archetype  according  to  which  the  divine  will 
creates  all  things.  Creation  then  is  also  everlasting,  and 
made  up  of  the  endless  number  of  spirits  who  are  destined 
to  participate  in  divine  blessedness,  and  all  of  whom  shall 
finally  become  part  of  the  divine  essence  (OeoTroLovfjLevoL). 
They  are  endowed,  liowever,  with  freedom,  to  which  is  due 
the  fact  that  they  each  to  a  greater  or  less  degree,  in  his 
own  manner,  fall  away  from  the  divine  essence.  For  their 
purification  God  created  matter,  and  thus  do  the  spirits  in 
heaven  become  materialized  and  graded  according  to  their 
worth :   the  angels,  the  stars,  mankind,  and  evil  daemons. 

In  a  characteristic  and  specifically  Christian  way,  and  in 
opposition  to  Hellenic  intellectualism,  Origen  emphasized  the 


364  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

will  and  the  nietapliysical  meaning  attaebed  to  it.  The  will  of 
God  appears  here  as  tlie  eternal  necessai-y  development  of  his 
being,  but  the  wills  of  the  spirits,  as  free  temporal  choice.  The 
two  stand  in  a  mutual  relation  that  in  the  Platonic  system 
obtains  betxveen  ova-la  and  ycVccns.  In  contrast  to  the  unchange- 
ableness  and  unity  of  the  divine  will,  the  freedom  of  will  of  the 
spirits  includes  the  principle  of  variety,  of  change,  in  a  word, 
of  nature  processes.  Freedom  is  the  ground  both  of  sin  and 
of  materiality.  So  Origen  made  it  possible  to  join  with  his 
conception  of  the  absolute  causality  of  God,  which  conception 
forbids  the  originality  of  matter,  the  existence  of  wickedness, 
sense,  and  imperfection.  He  reconciled  ethical  transcendence 
with  ph^'sical  immanence,  —  God  as  creator,  but  not  creator  of 
evil.  Faith  in  divine  omnipotence  and  the  consciousness  of  sin 
are  the  two  fundamental  antithetical  principles  of  Christian 
metaphysics.  Origen  mediated  between  them  by  his  conception 
of  freedom. 

Eternal  creation  involves  the  acceptation  of  an  endless  series 
of  aeons,  and  of  world  systems,  wherein  fall  and  redemption 
are  continually  repeated  in  new  individuals.  Yet  this  difficult 
point  is  not  further  treated  by  Origen,  but  is  avoided  on  ac- 
count of  the  concentration  of  his  attention  upon  the  realm  of 
spirits. 

The  fallen  spirits  strive  to  rise  from  matter,  to  which 
they  are  condemned  for  purification,  and  to  return  to  their 
divine  source.  In  their  own  freedom  do  they  aspire  on 
account  of  the  divine  essence  within  them,  which  is  never 
entirely  lost,  however  deeply  they  may  be  abased.  But 
they  do  not  have  to  act  without  the  help  of  grace,  wliich 
was  always  active  in  man  as  a  revelation  from  heaven,  and 
is  revealed  perfectly  in  the  person  of  Jesus.  One  recog- 
nizes that  a  propedeutic  value  was  given  by  Origen  here, 
after  the  manner  of  the  Apologists,  to  the  heathen  philoso- 
phy, especially  to  Platonism  and  Stoicism.  The  eternal 
\0709  has  connected  itself  with  the  blameless  ^xrx/i  of  Jesus 
in  a  divine-human  unity.  Through  his  suffering  he  has 
presented  redemption  as  a  temporal  fact  for  the  whole 
body  of  believers,  but  through  his  essence  the  true  illumina- 
tion has  been  brought  to  those  especially  chosen  (the  pneu- 
matically inspired).     With  his  help,  the  eternal  spirit  has 


NEO-PLATONISM  365 

attained  dififercnt  grades  of  redemption  :  faith,  —  the  reli- 
gious understanding  of  the  perceptual  world, — knowledge 
of  the  \0709,  and  finally  absolute  absorption  in  the  God- 
head. Through  the  conjoined  action  of  freedom  and  grace, 
all  souls  shall  finally  be  redeemed,  material  existence  shall 
vanish,  and  salvation  of  all  things  be  perfected  in  God 
{dTroKaTdaTaai<;). 

These  are  the  conceptual  principles  of  Christian  theology,  as 
Origen  developed  them.  They  show  that  Christianity  seized 
the  ideas  of  ancient  philosophy  and  revised  it  with  its  own 
religious  principle.  The  changes  which  dogmatic  develop- 
ment made  in  the  system  pertain  especially  to  eschatology 
and  Christology.  As  to  Christology,  Origen  emphasized  more 
the  cosmological  than  the  soteriological  aspect  of  the  Aoyos,  and 
neither  is  fully  developed.  The  battles  waged  over  his  theory 
in  the  third  and  fourth  centuries  until  the  perfect  consolidation 
of  the  Catholic  dogma,  are  attributable  to  specific  theological 
motives,  and  change  none  of  his  fumiamental  philosophical 
principles. 


4.   Neo-Platonism. 

The  Hellenistic  thought  that  ran  parallel  to  Christian 
scientific  faith  was  neo-Platonism.  Out  of  the  same  circles 
of  Alexandrian  culture,  in  which  all  the  forms  of  Greek 
science  and  all  religions  met,  arose  two  contemporaneous 
theories, — the  theory  of  Origen  and  that  of  Plotinus.  As 
we  can  sec  in  Gnosticism  a  kind  of  procreation  of  Christian 
theology,  so  in  the  eclectic  Platonism  influenced  by  Philo 
(particularly  in  Numenius)  can  we  also  see  a  preparation 
for  neo-Platonism. 

Xco-Platonism  and  Christian  theology  had  a  community 
of  purpose  and  a  common  origin.  Both  were  scientific 
systems  that  methodically  developed  a  religious  conviction 
and  sought  to  prove  that  this  conviction  was  the  only  true 
source  of  salvation  for  the  soul  needing  redemption. 

But  there  is  a  great  difference  between  the  two.     Chris- 


366  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

tian  theology  was  not  only  supported,  but  also  gradually 
regulated,  by  the- religious  consciousness  of  a  community 
organizing  itself  into  a  church.  Neo-Platonism  was  a  doc- 
trine thought  out  and  defended  by  individual  philoso- 
phers, which  spread  to  associations  of  scholars,  and  then 
sought  to  profit  by  contact  with  all  kinds  of  mysteries. 
Christian  theology  was  the  scientific  external  form  of  a 
faith  that  had  already  mightily  developed.  Neo-Platonism 
was  an  erudite  religion,  which  tried  incidentally  to  assimi- 
late all  the  then  existing  cults.  Although  the  scientific 
strength  of  neo-Platonism  was  certainly  not  less  than  that 
of  Christianity,  this  attempt  at  assimilation  was  the  cause 
of  its  downfall. 

The  historical  unfolding  of  neo-Platonism  was  in  three 
stages.  In  the  first  stage  it  was  essentially  a  scientific 
theory.  In  the  next  it  was  a  systematic  theology  of  poly- 
theism, and  in  this  it  was  in  pronounced  opposition  to 
Christianity.  After  it  had  gone  to  pieces  in  this  way,  it 
sought  in  its  third  stage  to  become  a  scholastic  recapitula- 
tion of  the  entire  Greek  philosophy.  We  are  accustomed 
to  designate  these  different  phases  as  the  Alexandrian,  the 
Syrian,  and  the  Athenian  schools,  and  to  place,  as  the  head 
of  each  respectively,  Plotinus,  Jamblichus,  and  Proclus. 

See  E.  Matter,  J.  Simon,  and  Vacherot;  Barthelemy  Saint- 
Hilaire,  Sur  le  concours  oi/vert  jhiv  I'acadeniie,  etc.,  sur 
Vecole  d' Alexandrie  (Paris,  1845)  ;  K.  Vogt,  Neojdatonisnuis  u. 
Christentum  (Bei'lin,  1836) ;  K.  Steinhart  (in  Pauly's  Realen- 
cyklopadie  des  Mass.  Altertums)  ;  R.  Hamerling,  £Ji7i  Wort  ilber 
die  NeAiplatoniker  (with  examples  translated  into  German, 
Triest,  1858) ;  H.  Kellner,  HeUenismns  u.  Cliristentuin  oder  die 
geistige  Realdion  des  antiken  Heidentnms  gegen  das  Christen- 
tum (Cologne,  1866)  ;  A.  Harnack,  Dogmengeschichte,  I.  663  ff. 

54.  The  founder  of  neo-Platonism  was  Plotinus,  born 
204  A.  D.  in  Lycopolis  in  Egypt.  He  received  his  philo- 
sophical education  in  Alexandria,  especially  at  the  hands 
of  a  certain  Ammonius  Saccus.     He  took  part  in  the  expe- 


NEO-PLATONISM  367 

dition  of  the  Emperor  Gordian  in  his  Persian  campaign  in 
order  to  pursue  scientific  studies  in  the  Orient.  About  244 
he  appeared  with  great  dclat  as  a  teacher  in  Rome,  and 
died  in  269  at  a  country  e&tate  in  Campania.  Among 
his  pupils  were  Amelius,  and  especially  the  publisher  of 
his  documents,  Porphyry. 

Ancient  traditions  designate  the  porter  Ammonias  (175- 
242)  as  the  founder  of  neo-Platonism.  He  abandoned  Chris- 
tianity for  Hellenism,  and  held  impressive  lectures  in  Alexan- 
dria. Among  his  pupils  were  said  to  be,  besides  Plotinus  and 
the  Christian  Origen,  Herennius  (Erennius),  Origeu  the 
Platonist,  and  the  rhetorician  and  critic  Longinus  (213-273). 
Nothing  is,  however,  at  all  certain  about  the  teaching  of  Am- 
monius,  and  these  so-called  pupils  travel  such  theoretically 
different  waj'S  that  there  is  no  good  reason  to  speak  of  Ammo- 
nius  as  the  founder  of  the  specific  philosophy  of  Plotinus.  See 
W.  Lyngg,  Die  Lehre  des  Ammonius  (publication  of  Gesell- 
schaft  d.   Wissenschnft  at  Christiania,  1874). 

The  Platonist  Origen  is  not  the  Patristic,  as  C  A.  Heigl 
supposes.  See  Der  Bericht  des  Porphyrins  iiber  Origenes 
(Regensburg,  1835)  ;  G.  Helferich,  Untersuchungen  aus  der 
Gehiet  der  klass.  Alterthumswisseiischaft  (Heidelberg,  1860). 
He  asserted  (probably  in  opposition  to  Numenius)  the  identity 
of  God  with  that  of  the  world-builder.  See  his  writing  ort/xdvos 
T70LrjTT]<;  6  ftaa-iXev^.     Compare  Zeller,  V^.  461,  2. 

El's  Toi  /jLeTacjiva-LKa.  is  the  name  of  a  document  transmitted 
under  the  name  of  Herennius,  but  it  is  a  compilation  of  much 
later  origin.  See  A.  Mai,  Classicorum  Auctorum,Y!^.\  E.  Heitz 
(Berlin  Sitzungsberichte,  1889). 

Longinus,  who  taught  in  Athens,  held  fast  to  the  pure  Pla- 
tonic teaching  of  the  reality  of  Ideas  independent  of  the 
Spirit,  and  was  opposed  to  Plotinus'  interpretation.  In  spite 
of  many  doubters  on  the  point,  he  is  presumably  the  author  of 
a  treatise  under  his  name,  Trepi  vij/ov^  (published  by  J.  Vahlen, 
1887).  The  rhetorical  phases  of  the  subject  seem  to  have  been 
of  chief  interest  to  the  author;  j'et  the  treatise  has  real  value 
beyond  this,  for  it  developed  in  the  highest  spiritual  and  intel- 
lectual manner  the  aesthetic  concept  of  the  sublime  as  not  only 
independent  of  the  idea  of  the  beautiful  and  co-ordinate  with  it, 
but  also  in  its  numerous  variations  and  applications.  This 
treatise  had  a  very  great  influence  on  the  aestlietic  theory  and 
criticism  of  later  time. 


368  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

If,  in  comparing  the  great  systems  of  Origen  and  Plotinus, 
one  wishes  to  draw  a  couclusion  as  to  the  doctrine  of  their 
common  teacher,  one  meets  only  the  most  universal  principles 
of  the  Alexandrian  religion-pliilosophies,  and  even  then  perhaps 
only  the  fundamental  principles  of  overcoming  metaphysically 
the  dualism  which  forms  the  presupposition  of  that  philosophy. 
There  is  not  even  a  hint  that  would  let  us  trace  these  philoso- 
phies back  to  Ammonius.  He  existed  rather  in  the  air,  so  far 
as  the  development  of  Alexandrian  thought  was  concerned. 
The  form  of  Ammonius  is  historicall}'  as  colorless  as  perchance 
the  view  ascribed  to  him  that  Aristotelianism  and  Platonism  are 
in  essential  agreement.     See  Zeller,  V^  454  ff. 

Plotinus  found  so  great  recognition  in  the  highest  circles  of 
Rome  that  he  desired  to  found  a  city  of  philosophers  in  Cam- 
pania, with  the  help  of  the  Paiiperor  Gallienus.  ]t  was  to  be 
called  Platonopolis.  It  was  to  be  arranged  after  the  model  of 
the  Republic,  and  would  be  a  retreat  for  religious  contemplation, 
an  Hellenic  cloister.  But  it  came  to  naught.  Plotinus  was 
active  in  a  literary  way  only  in  his  old  age,  and  he  wrote  his 
doctrine  in  single  treatises  and  groups  of  such.  They  were 
classified  by  his  pupil,  Porphyry,  in  six  enneads,  and  published. 
They  were  translated  into  Latin  by  Marsilius  Ficinus  (Florence, 
1492),  and  into  Greek  and  Latin  (Basel,  1580);  new  publica- 
tions of  them  are:  Oxford,  1835,  Paris,  1855;  Leipzis;  (by 
Kirchhoflf),  1856  ;  Berlin  (by  H.  Mliller),  1878-80.  There  is 
also  a  German  translation  of  them  (Leipzig,  1883-84)  by 
Volkmann. 

See  K.  Steinhart  (in  Pauly's  Realencyklojmdie)  ;  H.  Kirchner, 
Die  Philosoj^hie  des  Plotufs  (Halle,  1854)  ;  A.  Richter,  Ncvpla- 
tonische  Studien,  five  volumes  (Halle,  1864-67)  ;  H.  v.  Kleist, 
Plotinische  Studien  (Heidelberg,  1883). 

Porphyry,  probably  born  and  certainly  brought  up  in  I'yre, 
became  the  true  disciple  of  Plotinus  in  Rome.  Besides  pre- 
senting and  defending  the  doctrine  of  Plotinus,  he  busied 
himself  especially  with  making  commentaries  on  the  Platonic 
and  Aristotelian  writings,  and  particularly  on  the  logic  of  the 
latter.  His  Eto-aywyr^  d<s  TOLs  K-aTT/yopias  is  preserved.  It  is  pub- 
lished by  Busse  (Berlin,  1887).  This  became  exceedingly  im- 
portant for  the  Middle  Ages,  as  was  also  his  biography  of 
Plotinus  (see  Kirchhoff  and  MliUer's  publication  of  the  works 
of  Plotinus)  and  his  smaller  single  writings.  See  bibliography  in 
Ueberweg-Heinze,  F.  313.    See  also  the  Parisian  Plotinus  edition. 

The  problem  of  the  Alexandrian  philosophy  of  religion 
V  as  the  same  for  the  Hellene  as  for  the  Christian.     In  the 


NEO-PLATONISM  369 

development  of  ancient  thought,  the  individualization  and 
the  contemplativeness  of  the  spiritual  life  kept  equal  pace, 
and  created  finally  the  burning  desire  to  conceive  the 
divine  essence  immediately  and  wholly  with  the  inner- 
most activity  of  the  soul,  —  to  unite  oneself  entirely  and 
undividedly  with  that  essence.  But  the  more  that  con- 
fidence in  the  ancient  forms  of  mythical  representation 
vanished,  the  farther  off,  the  more  unknown,  and  the  more 
incomprehensible  appeared  the  divine  essence.  The  Chris- 
tian faith  overcame  this  difficulty  by  the  principle  of  love  ; 
the  mythical  religion  by  the  interpolation  of  countless 
grades  between  God  and  matter  ;  science,  by  attempting  to 
conceive  the  totality  of  things  as  a  series  in  diminishing 
perfection  from  the  one  all-creative  divine  power,  and,  con- 
versely, by  looking  upon  the  entire  cosmic  life  as  the  simi- 
larly graded  returning  series  of  things  completed  in  God. 
The  neo-Pythagorean  dualism  was  to  be  overcome  both 
ethically  and  metaphysically  and  therein  Plotinus  and  Ori- 
gen  agreed.  But  while  the  latter,  absorbed  in  the  mysteries 
of  the  fall  into  sin  and  the  redemption,  analyzed  the  entire 
physical  existence  in  ethical  and  religious  terms,  the  former 
strove  to  make  conceptual  in  the  terms  of  sense  the  spir- 
itual unity  of  the  universe.  Whereas  the  return  to  God 
according  to  the  conception  of  Origen  formed  a  tremendous 
historical  cosmic  process  for  the  entii-e  spiritual  realm,  it 
was  limited  by  Plotinus  to  the  mysterious  ecstasy  of  the 
individual. 

Metaphysics  and  ethics  to  Plotinus  were,  then,  in  inverted 
parallelism  :  ethics  teaches  the  way  of  salvation  to  be  the 
same  series  of  stages  of  development  toward  an  end,  which 
is  known  in  metaphysics  as  the  process  of  origination  from 
a  beginning. 

To  Plotinus  the  Godhead  is  the  original  Being  {to 
irpSiTov)  superior  to  all  oppositions,  inaccessible  to  all  defin- 
itive characterization,  wholly  unspeakable  (cipprjroi').     As 

24 


370  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOJPlir 

absolute  unity  it  is  superior  to  all  oppositions,  especially  to 
those  of  thought  (yo-qa-a')  and  Being  {ova- la).  Only  by 
relative  determinations  can  it  be  conceived  as  a  cosmic 
final  cause  {to  dyaOov)  and  a  cosmic  force  (TrpcoTr)  Bvvafii<;), 
as  pure,  substratum-less  (^substratlos') ,  creating  activity.  As 
such,  it  creates  the  world  out  of  itself  in  an  eternal,  time- 
less, and  necessary  process.  It  is  present  in  all  creatures, 
yet  it  is  separate  and  distinct  from  plurality.  Itself  eter- 
nally finished,  it  lets  the  fulness  of  things  proceed  from  it- 
self without  division  of  itself  or  losing  anything  of  its 
essence.  The  emanation  of  the  world  from  the  Godhead 
is  an  Overflowing  in  which  the  Godhead  is  as  unchanged  as 
light  when  it  throws  its  gleam  into  the  depths  of  the  dark- 
ness. But  as  its  gleam  becomes  less  and  less  strong  with 
the  increase  of  distance  from  its  source,  so  the  creations  of 
the  Godhead  are  only  a  reflection  of  its  glory,  which  re- 
flection becomes  less  and  less  bright  and  finally  ends  in 
darkness. 

The  attempt  to  reconcile  the  monistic  causality  of  God 
with  the  fact  of  the  imperfection  of  individual  things,  and  on 
the  other  hand  of  reconciling  (religious)  transcendence  with 
(Stoical)  pantheism,  became  also  very  prominent  in  Plotinus. 
Ilis  "  dynamic  pantheism  "  completed  an  abstract  monotheism 
which  sought  to  regard  the  Godhead  neither  as  spirit,  soul,  nor 
matter,  nor.  in  fact  under  any  category.  Yet  the  theory  con- 
ceived the  Godhead,  though  entirely  contentless,  as  the  origin 
of  all  determinations  and  as  superior  to  them  all.  The  Hght 
in  the  darkness  is  an  illustration ;  yet  this  simile  defines  also 
the  thought  of  the  philosopher  from  his  point  of  view. 

There  are  three  particular  steps  in  which  emanation  pro- 
ceeds from  the  divine  being :  spirit,  soul,  matter.  Spirit 
(voO?)  as  the  image  {elKwv)  of  the  One  bears  in  itself  the 
principle  of  duality.  For  all  thinking,  even  consciousness 
of  self,  involves  the  opposition  of  subject  and  object,  of 
thought-activity  and  thought-content  (votjtSi/).  The  i-oO? 
having    its  source  in    the    Godhead   is  indeed   a   unitary, 


NEO  PLATONISM  371 

self-related,  intuitive  function.  Nevertheless  it  includes 
within  itself  the  entire  manifold  of  objects,  the  Ideas 
which  are  the  archetypes  of  individuals.  These  are  then 
designated  as  single  spiritual  potencies  (i/oi).  They  are  in 
the  V0O9  and  form  in  it  the  /c6o-/ao9  vorjrof;,  but  as  efficient 
powers  they  are  at  the  same  time  the  particular  causes  of 
events. 

From  reflection  npon  the  essential  duality  of  the  activity 
and  the  content  of  thought,  there  resulted  tlie  fact  that  the 
neo-Platonists  were  the  tirst  to  fornuilate  and  investigate 
with  exactness  the  psychological  conception  of  consciousness 
{(rvvaL(r6r}(TL<;).  The  Al'istotelian  theory  of  alaOrj-njptov  KOLKuv 
gave  them  a  point  of  departure  which  they  happily  further 
followed  out.  The  distinction  between  the  unconscious  content 
of  an  idea  and  the  activity  to  be  directed  upon  that  content  is 
current  in  their  psycholog}'  and  was  their  most  important  service. 
See  H.  Siebeck,  Gesch.  der  Psych.,  I.  b,  331  ff. 

This  distinction  naturalh'  ceases  to  apply  to  the  divine  voi's 
in  so  far  as  it  thinks  its  entire  content  of  ideas  as  eternally 
actual.  In  Aristotelian  Phraseology,  Plotinus  said  that  the 
duality  (erepoTT]^)  within  the  Spirit's  essence  presupposes  the 
antithesis  of  thought-form  (ror/o-is)  and  thought-content  (vA.?; 
vorp-iK-ij),  —  a  content  which  is  distinguished  nevertheless  from 
sense-content  by  the  fact  that  it  is  formed  without  residuum 
and  in  timeless  cvepycia. 

"Matter"  is  here  the  principle  of  plurality,  and  Plotinus 
followed  this  thought  also  so  far  as  to  develop  the  manifold  of 
Ideas  in  a  Pythagorean  number-speculation.  In  this  the  Idea 
is  however  no  longer  the  Platonic  class-concept,  but  the  (Stoic) 
archetype  of  the  particular  thing. 

In  respect  to  the  intelligible  world  the  Aristotelian  categories 
were  cast  aside  in  so  far  as  they  refer  to  spatial  and  temporal 
relations  and  especially  empirical  events.  For  these  Plotinus 
substituted  five  fundamental  conceptions  which  were  experimen- 
tally  treated  in  the   dialogue   Sophist   (254  b)  as  Kotvuivia  twv 

to€w  :   oi',  oracrts,  KiV/^o-t?,  TavTOTr]<;,  crepoTi^s. 

So  far  as  Ideas  are  causes  of  events,  the}'  are  called  Xoyoi,  as 
for  that  maCt^^  the  vois  of  Plotinus  has  throughout  to  take  the 
place  of  the  Xoyos  of  the  Philonic  and  Christian  philosophy. 
See  M.  Heinze,  T>ie  Lehre  vom  Logos,  p.  306  flf. 

The  Soul  (-^vxv)  stands  in  the  same  relation  to  the  Spirit 
as  the  Spirit  to  the  ev.     Since,  although  it  belongs  to  the 


372  HISTORY   OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

world  of  light,  it  stands  on  the  bounds  of  the  world  of 
darkness,  there  is  a  duality  in  it:  (1)  unity  and  (2)  divisi- 
bility, the  higher  and  the  lower  souls.  This  duality  is 
predicated  in  the  first  place  of  the  world-soul,  which  Plo- 
tinus  divided  into  two  potencies,  and  the  lower  part,  the 
(f)vaL<i,  as  a  directly  formative  power  {Oeaixa)  creates  the 
body  of  the  world  and  enters  into  it.  It  is  the  same  with 
the  individual  souls  into  which  the  world-soul  has  dis- 
charged itself.  There  exists  also  in  mankind  the  super- 
sensible soul,  to  which  were  ascribed  the  functions  of  the 
Aristotelian  vov'i.  (See  above.)  This  has  pre-existed,  and 
shall  after  death  undergo  metempsychosis  according  to  its 
deserts.  This  soul  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the  lower 
soul  which  has  built  up  the  body  as  an  instrument  of  its 
working  power  and  is  present  in  all  its  parts  as  well  as 
in  its  sensational  and  functional  activities. 

As  the  light  gradually  fades  away  into  darkness,  the 
streaming  out  of  the  divine  essence  degenerates  finally  in 
matter.  Plotinus  regarded  matter  expressly  as  yu,^  6v  in 
the  sense  that  it  has  no  metaphysical  dualistic  independ- 
ence in  relation  to  the  Godhead.  It  is  the  absolute 
aTepr)at<;,  the  irevla  iravre\r)<^f  and  as  airovaia  rov  a^aOov  it 
is  also  irpwTov  kukov.  Plotinus  founded  his  theodicy  upon 
these  negative  determinations.  Whatever  is  true,  is  divine 
and  good  :  the  bad  is  only  what  belongs  to  the  firj  6v.  By 
the  same  necessity  with  which  the  gleaming  of  light  is  lost 
in  the  darkness,  souls  were  supposed  to  create  matter  out 
of  themselves  and  enter  into  it  as  formative  powers. 
The  world  of  sense  phenomena  has  an  existence  that  is 
just  as  eternal  as  the  soul.  In  a  circular  process  of  me- 
chanical development  it  unrolls  the  archetypes  of  Ideas. 
Then  follows  not  merely  a  tclcological  conception  of  na- 
ture, but  a  downright  magical  one.  Every  event  is  an  activ- 
ity of  the  soul :  the  pure  world-soul  creates  gods,  star-spirits, 
and  the  0ucrt9-da3mons  out  of  itself.      In  the    mysterious 


NEO-PLATONISM  373 

co-operation  of  the  whole  is  the  individual  sympathetically 
bound  and  prophetically  to  be  foreseen.  All  investigation 
of  nature  was  here  annulled,  but  the  door  to  all  forms  of 
faith  and  superstition  was  opened. 

This  comprehensive  view  of  nature,  however,  was  under 
these  premises  cleft  in  two.  The  entrance  of  the  soul  into 
tiie  matter  created  by  it  is  its  fall  into  the  darkness,  its 
alienation  from  the  divine  source  of  light.  The  world  of 
sense  is  bad  and  irrational.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
world  of  sense  is  formed  by  the  soul  which  enters  into  it  as 
X6yo9  o-7re/)/xaTi«o9,  and  to  that  extent  is  it  reasonable  and 
beautiful.  In  this  respect  Plotinus,  in  spite  of  the  dualistic 
point  of  departure  made  necessary  by  his  religious  problem, 
held  distinctly  to  the  Greek  conception  of  the  beauty  of  the 
world  of  sense,  and  he  knew  how  to  connect  it  in  the  most 
happy  way  with  the  fundamental  outlines  of  his  picture  of 
the  world.  When  he  enthusiastically  praised,  in  opposition 
particularly  to  the  Gnostic  disdain  of  nature,  the  harmony, 
soulfulness  and  perfection  of  the  world,  and  proved  this 
out  of  his  idealistic  construction  of  the  world,  he  gave  us  a 
metaphysical  esthetic.  Beautiful  is  the  object  of  sense 
when  it  makes  its  X0709,  its  ideal  form,  its  etSo?,  appear  in  a 
perceptible  form.  Beautiful  is  the  world  because  down  to 
the  lowest  deeps  it  is  permeated  and  illuminated  by  the 
divine  essence. 

Like  a  last  farewell  to  the  Grecian  world  was  this  theory  of 
the  beautiful  which  Plotinus  brought  into  close  connection  with 
the  ultimate  principles  of  his  system,  and  which  he  used  for  the 
first  time  as  an  integral  part  of  a  system  of  philosoph}'.  To  be 
sure,  he  strongly  used  Platonic  and  Aristotelian  thoughts  in  it. 
But  even  the  theory  of  the  beautiful  was  not  so  fully  developed 
by  Plato,  nor  was  it  so  essential  a  moment  of  Plato's  as  of 
Plotiuus's  system.  The  celebrated  Ennead,  I.  6,  is  doubtless 
the  most  original  scientific  achievement  of  Plotinus.  The  dis- 
tinction of  bodily  and  spiritual  beauty,  the  contrast  between 
the  beauty  of  nature  and  of  art,  the  organic  insertion  of  aesthet- 
ics partly  into  his  metaphysical  system  and  partly  into  the  de- 


374  HISTORY  OF   ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHY. 

velopment  of  his  ethics  and  psychology  —  all  these  are  great 
points  of  view  which  Plotinus  is  the  first  conceptually  to  define. 
See  Ed.  Miiller,  Gesch.  der  Theorie  der  Kunst  bei  den  Alten,  H. 
285  flf.  (Berlin,  1837)  ;  R.  Zimmermaun,  Gesch.  der  uiJsthetik 
(Vienna,  1858),  122  ff. ;  R.  Volkniann,  Die  Hohe  der  anliken 
u:Esth€tik  Oder  Plotin's  Abhandl.  vom  iSclionen  (Stettin,  1860)  ; 
E.  Brenning,  Die  Lehre  vom  Sclumen  bei  Ploiin  (Gottingen, 
1864);  A.  J.  Vitringa,  De  egregio,  quod  in  rebus  corporeis  con- 
stitait  Plotinus  pxdcri  prindiiio  (Amsterdam,  1864)  ;  J.  Walter, 
Gesch.  der  ^sthetik  in  Alterthum  (Leipzig,  1893),  pp.  73U- 
786. 

Plotinus  set  out  from  the  opposite  point  of  view  in  his 
ethics,  when  he  designated  the  share  that  men  have  in 
the  divine  life  and  their  independence  of  the  world  as 
their  goal ;  and  also  when  he  conceived  of  the  freeing  of 
the  soul  from  the  body  and  its  purification  from  sense  — 
in  a  word,  the  turning  away  from  the  material  —  as  the  fun- 
damental ethical  task^  There  is  not  lacking  a  positive  sup- 
plement to  tins  negative  morality  although  only  in  small 
measure  did  the  philosopher  indeed  find  such  positive  su|  - 
plementation  in  ethical  or,  as  he  called  it,  political  virtues. 
Conduct  was  of  little  value  to  him,  for  it  bind';  tlie  soul  to 
the  material  world.  Social  and  political  integrity  is  only  a 
preparation  by  which  the  soul  learns  how  to  become  free 
from  the  power  of  sense.  Therefore  the  teaching  of  Plo- 
tinus was  also  without  significance  for  political  life.  His 
attempt  to  realize  the  Platonic  Rej)ublic  seemed  to  be  not  a 
political  experiment  but  the  realizing  of  a  condition  in 
which  chosen  men  could  live  their  true  lives  of  "  contem- 
plation." 

The  return  of  the  soul  to  God  consists  in  its  soaring  to 
the  vov<i  from  which  it  came.  Pure  sense-perception  offers 
little  help  to  the  soul  for  this  return;  reflection  affords 
rather  more.  The  most  potent  incentive  is  found  in  love 
for  the  beautiful,  the  Platonic  epw?,  when  the  soul  turns 
from  sense  impressions  to  the  illuminating  Idea.  He  who 
has  an  immediate  recognition  of  the  pure  Idea,  is  pressing 


NEO-PLATONISM  375 

on  to  higher  perfection.  Yet  true  blessedness  is  neverthe- 
less attained  only  when  man  in  an  ecstasy  (e/ccrrao-tsO  tran- 
scending thought  for  a  more  complete  contact  and  union 
(ac^i;,  airXaxTisi}  with  the  divine  unity,  forgets  himself  and 
the  objective  world  and  becomes  one  with  the  Godhead  in 
such  moments  of  consecration. 

Plotinus  regarded  this  highest  holiness  as  a  grace  which 
comes  only  to  few,  and  to  these  but  seldom.  He  granted  that 
the  culture  of  positive  religion  is  a  help  to  the  attainment  of  this 
ecstatic  condition,  although  in  other  respects  he  opposed  posi- 
tive religion.  This  help,  however,  had  earlier  seemed  essential 
to  Porphyry,  and  among  the  later  members  of  the  school  it  be- 
came the  all-important  thing. 

55.  A  pupil  of  Porphyry,  the  Syrian  Jamblichus,  used  the 
philosophy  of  Plotinus  as  the  grotmdwork  of  a  speculative 
theology  of  polytheism,  which  co-oi'dinated  all  the  cults  of 
ancient  religions  in  a  systematic  whole,  and  while  exclud- 
ing Christianity  attempted  to  consider  the  religious  move- 
ment as  complete.  Among  the  enthusiastic  supporters  of 
this  speculative  theology  are  Theodorusof  Asine,  Maxinms 
of  Ephesus,  the  Emperor  Julian,  his  friend  Sallustius,  and 
the  martyr  Hypatia. 

Jamblichus  came  from  Chalcis  in  Coele-Syria,  and  listened  to 
Porphyry  and  his  pupil  Anatolius  in  Rome.  He  himself  went 
to  Syria  as  a  teacher  and  religious  reformer,  and  had  verj^  soon 
a  numerous  school,  which  exalted  him  as  a  worker  of  miracles. 
Nothing  further  is  known  of  his  life,  and  his  death  also  is  only 
approximately  set  about  330.  His  literary  activity  was  limited 
almost  entirel}'^  to  commentaries  on  Plato  and  Aristotle,  as  well 
as  on  the  theological  works  of  the  Orphics,  Chaldit?ans,  and  the 
Pythagoreans.  Portions  of  liis  exposition  of  Pythagoreanism 
are  preserved  :  ttc/ji  tov  TlvOayopiKov  ftiov  (published  by  Kiessling, 
Leipzig,  1815  f.,  and  Westermann,  Paris,  1850) ;  Aoyos  TrporpcTr- 
TiKo?  €ts  (fiLXo(ro(}iiav  (Kiessling,  Leipzig,  1813) ;  Trepl  t^s  koif^s 
fxaOqfxaTLKTJ^  i-!rL(rTr)fjirj<s  (Villoison,  Venice,  1781)  ;  Trtpi  T-^s  Nt/co- 
fjid)^ov   apiO fxiqriKri'i    ela-ayoryt]    and   ra   OeoXoyovfJLCva  ttJs    apLUixrjTLKrji 

(Fr.  Ast,  Leipzig,  1817).     Related  (and  probably  erroneously 
ascribed  to  him)  is  Be  mysteriis  JEgyptiorum  (by  Parthey,  Ber 


376  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

lin,  1857) ;  see  Ilarless,  Das  Buck  vofi  den  iigi/ptischen  Myste- 
rien  (Munich,  l«o8);  II,  Kellner,  Analyse  der  Schrift  des 
Jariiblichus  De  Mysteriis  (in  TheoL  QnartahscJiriJl,  1867). 

^desius,  Chrysan thins,  Priscus,  Sopater,  Eusebius,  Dexip- 
pus  are  other  menil)ers  of  the  school.  A  writing  of  Dexippus 
concerning  tlie  Aristotelian  categories  is  preserved  (edited  by 
Spengel,  Munich,  IHi'A)).  8ome  of  the  biographies  of  philoso- 
phers of  the  time  by  Eunapius  of  Sardis  are  also  preserved 
(edited  by  Boissonade,  Amsterdam,  18*22).  Maximus  played  a 
great  r61e  at  the  court  of  Emperor  Julian,  whose  short  reign 
marks  the  zenith  of  the  power  of  this  Syrian  school.  Precisely 
these  same  court  connections  drove  the  school  into  its  hopeless 
war  with  Christianity.  Julian  himself  was  a  devoted  follower 
of  Jamblichus.  The  letters  published  under  his  name  are  spuri- 
ous. His  views  ai)pear  in  ins  speeches  and  in  the  fragments  of 
his  thesis  against  the  Christians.  Jnliaiu  contra  C/in'stianos 
(jiue  supersnnt  (E.J.  Neuman,  Leipzig,  1880;  translated  into 
(Jerman,  Leipzig,  1.SH0) ;  other  editions  of  his  writings  by  E. 
Talbot  (Paris,  1«(;;3)  and  V.  C.  Ilertlein  (2  v<»ls.,  Leipzig,  1875 
ff.).  See  A.  W.  Neander,  Ucber  den  Kaiser  Julian  u.  seine 
Zeitnlter  (Leipzig,  1H12);  \V.  S.  Teuffel,  De  Jnliano  Imp. 
Christianismi  confemtore  et  osoi-e  (Tubingen,  1844);  D.  Fr. 
Strauss,  Julian  der  Ahtriinni(je,  der  Roniantikor  auf  dem  Thron 
der  Cdsaien  (Mannheim,  1M47) ;  Auer,  Kaiser  Julian  (Vienna, 
1855)  ;  W.  Alangold,  Julian  der  Ahtriinniije  (Stuttgart,  1862)  ; 
C.  Semisch,  ,/»//><«  der  Ahtriinnirje  (Breslau,  18r)li);  Fr.  Liibker, 
Julianas  Kainj)/  u.  Eude  (Hamburg,  1864) ;  A.  Miicke,  Julian 
nack  den  Quellen  ((lotha,  1866-68)  ;  A.  Naville,  Julien  VApo- 
slat  et  sa  philos.  du  jiolytheisme  (Neufchatel,  1H77)  ;  F.  Rode, 
Gesch.  der  RracUon  Julian's  ffer/en  die  christlicfie  Kirche  (Jena, 
1X77) .  A  compendium  by  Sallust  of  the  theology  of  Jamblichus 
is  preserved  (published  by  Orelli,  Zurich,  1821). 

Concerning  Hypatia,  see  Rich.  Hoche  (in  Philol.  1860);  St. 
Wolff  (Czernowitz,  1871)) ;  U-  Ligier  (Dijon,  1880).  Her  pupil 
was  the  bishop  Synesius,  who  tried  to  unite  Xeo-Platonism  to 
Christianity  in  a  unique  way.  See  R.  Volkmann,  Synesios  von 
Kyrene  (Berlin,  1869). 

The  theology  of  Jamblichus  included  no  new  point  of 
view  for  philosophy.  His  metaphysics  and  ethics  were  en- 
tirely those  of  Plotinus  so  far  as  the  treatment  is  conceptual. 
But  this  was  exactly  what  did  not  satisfy  the  theologian. 
Born  in  a  land  of  the  greatest  religious  eclecticism,  a  land 
where  Christian  Gnosticism  had  arisen,  he  wished  to  trans- 


NEO-PLATONISM  377 

form  this  philosophy  into  an  amalgamation  of  all  religions. 
Since  he  regarded  the  ordinances  of  the  Mysteries  and  the 
activities  of  all  their  fantastic  cults  as  indispensable  for 
sinning  man  in  solving  moral  and  religious  problems,  he 
used  the  neo-Platonic  metaphysic  only  for  inserting  by  alle- 
gorical interpretation  the  forms  of  gods  of  all  religions  in 
the  intermediate  grades  which  Plotinus  had  supposed  to  lie 
between  the  human  soul  and  God.  In  order  to  find  place 
for  this  fantastic  pantheon,  he  had  to  increase  consider- 
ably the  number  of  these  intermediaries ;  and  in  order  to 
bring  the  entire  world  of  gods  into  a  system,  he  had  noth- 
ing better  to  use  than  the  Pythagorean  number-scheme. 

The  passing  success  that  this  theory  had  in  the  cultured  and 
political  world  shows  only  the  obstinacy  with  which  the  Hel- 
lenic, as  opposed  to  the  Christian  world,  held  fast  to  the  hope 
of  solving  the  religious  problem  from  within  itself ;  and  Julian 
also,  who  gave  historical  signilicanee  to  this  fantastic  theory, 
can  only  thus  be  understood. 

The  details  of  this  polytheism,  and  indeed  those  of  the  theurgic 
undertakings  of  Jamblichus  and  his  pupils,  are  philosophically 
unimportant.  Even  his  fancy  of  setting  the  iravTrj  dpprjTos  apxv 
over  the  h  of  Plotinus,  which,  bare  of  qualities,  must  not  also 
be  identified  with  the  ayaOov,  is  still  only  aimless  sophistry. 
Plotinus  set  up  the  opposition  of  subject  and  object  in  the 
VOV9,  and  Jamblichus  made  out  of  this  opposition  the  Koa-p-os 
vor]T6<;  and  the  Koa-fjios  voep6<;.  These  are  two  worlds  which  are 
peopled  with  their  own  gods,  and  are  again  trebly  divided. 
Some  of  his  pupils  further  developed  these  divisions,  and  in 
this  showed  a  preference  for  the  triad  schema,  as  did  Jam- 
blichus also  to  a  certain  extent. 

56.  The  failure  of  this  philosophical  restoration  of  the 
old  religions  frightened  neo-Platonism  back  to  erudite 
studies,  the  centre  of  which  again  appeared  finally  at 
Athens.  Through  the  influence  of  Plutarch  of  Athens 
and  his  pupils  Syrianus  and  Hierocles,  the  school  turned 
back  to  the  study  of  Plato  and  Aristotle.  In  the  person 
of  its  leader  Proclus  (410-485)  it  tried  to  systematize  iu  a 


378  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

dialectic  way  the  entire  historical  content  of  Greek  philo- 
sophic thought. 

The  commentators  stand  out  advantageously  against  the 
background  of  fantastic  theories  of  the  time.  As  Themis- 
tius  previously,  so  Siniplicius  and  Philoponus  now,  trans- 
mitted their  learned  compilations  of  the  works  of  Aristotle, 
which  became  of  value  to  subsequent  time.  But  when  the 
pupils  of  Proclus — Marinus  and  Damascius  —  undertook 
to  develop  the  system  of  tiieir  master,  then  they  fell  victims 
to  unfruitful  quibbling.  The  effect  of  this  was  unfortunate 
in  proportion  as  the  diction  was  bombastic  and  assertive. 

The  power  of  Greek  thought  was  extinguished.  The 
simple  magnificent  spirit  of  Greek  philosophy  had,  to  sf>eak 
after  the  manner  of  Plotinus,  grown  so  weak  through  all 
the  Hellenic  emanations  that  it  passed  away  into  its  o\> 
posite,  into  ostentatious  vapidity. 

The  edict  by  which  the  Em{)eror  Justinian  in  529  closed 
the  Academy,  confiscated  its  property,  and  prohibited  lec- 
tures on  Greek  philosoj)hy  in  Athens,  was  the  official  certi- 
fication of  the  death  of  ancient  piiilosophy. 

Plutarch  was  called  "The  Great"  by  bis  pupils  after  the 
neo-Platonic  manner  of  excessively  admiring  the  leaders  of 
their  school.  By  this  title  he  is  generally  distingnished  from 
his  really  more  significant  namesake.  He  died  soon  after  430. 
He  seems  to  have  been  particularly  interested  in  psychological 
questions,  and  he  further  developed  a  theory  of  consciousness, 
defining  it  as  the  activity  of  the  reason  in  sense  perception. 

Of  the  Syrian  commentaries  on  Aristotle's  writings,  that 
upon  a  part  of  the  Metaphysics  is  preserved  and  published  in 
the  fifth  volume  of  the  Berlin  edition  of  Aristotle  (p.  837  flf.). 
The  commentary  of  Hierocles  on  the  Golden  Poem  of  the  Py- 
thagoreans is  in  MuUach's  Fragments  (I.  408  flf.) ;  Photius  has 
preserved  extracts  from  Hierocles'  writing,  Trcpl  Trpovota?. 
Hierocles  and  his  pupil  Theosebius  worked  in  Alexandria,  and 
Syrianus  was  scholarch  in  Athens. 

Proclus  was  the  intimate  pupil  and  follower  of  Syrianus. 
He  was  of  Lycian  family,  born  in  Constantinople,  educated  in 
Alexandria  under  Olympiodorus  the  Aristotelian,  and  was  re- 


NEO-PLATONISM  379 

vered  as  head  of  the  school  by  his  pupils  with  extravagant  de- 
votion. His  life  was  written  by  his  pupil  Marinus  (Cobefs 
Edition  of  Diog.  Laert.).  Among  the  works  of  Froclus  (see  J. 
Freudenthal  in  the  Hermes,  1881,  and  Zeller,  V,  778  ff.),  espe- 
cially noteworthy  is  TrepI  t^s  Kara  nXuTwva  OeoXoyias ;  and  there 
are  also  the  commentaries  on  the  Timceus,  Republic,  and  Par- 
menides.  These  are  collected  by  V.  Cousin  (Paris,  1820-25), 
with  Supplement  (Paris,  1864;.  See  A.  Berger,  Froclus,  exjiosi- 
tion  de  sa  doctrine  (Paris,  1840);  H.  Kirchner,  I)e  Prodi 
metaphysica  (Berlin,  1846) ;  K.  Steinhart,  article  in  Paulifs 
Realencyclopddie. 

Of  the  pupils  of  Proelus  there  are  mentioned,  besides  his 
successor  Marinus,  Ilermias,  who  wrote  a  commentary  on  the 
Phaedrus;  the  son  of  Hermias,  Ammonius,  who  edited  the 
writings  of  Aristotle ;  the  mathematician  Asclepiodotus,  and 
further,  Isidorus,  Hegias,  and  Zenodotus.  The  biography  of 
Isidorus  by  Damascius  is  partly  preserved  in  the  writings  of 
Photius. 

The  last  scholarch  of  the  Academy  was  Damascius,  who, 
like  Isidorus,  returned  to  the  fantastic  theories  of  Jamblichus. 
He  was  born  in  Damascus  and  studied  in  Alexandria  and 
Athens.  After  the  closing  of  the  school  he  emigrated  with 
Simplicius  and  other  neo-Platonists  to  Persia.  They  returned 
soon,  however,  after  some  hard  experiences.  Of  his  writings  we 
possess,  besides  fragments  of  various  commentaries  and  his 
biography  of  Isodorus,  also  a  portion  of  his  writing  7re/jt  twv 
Trptirwv  tui^inv  (published  by  J.  Kapp,  Frankfort  on  the  Main, 
1826,  with  details  of  his  personality),  and  also  the  conclusion  of 
his  commentary  on  the  Parmenides.  This  commentary  shows 
markedly  the  influence  of  Proelus.  See  Ch.  E.  Ruelle,  Le 
Philosophe  Damascius  (Paris,  1861,  and  also  in  Arch.  f.  Gesch. 
d.  Ph.  1890) ;  E.  Heitz  (particularly).  Per  Phllos.  Damascius 
(in  Strassburger  Abhandl.  zur  Phllos.,  Freiburg  i.  B.  und  Tu- 
bingen, 1884). 

Among  the  commentators  who  occupied  a  position  of  greater 
independence  toward  the  neo-Platonic  theory  was  Themistius, 
called  6  €v(f>f}a.ST^<;  on  account  of  his  remarkable  manner  of  presen- 
tation. He  lived  about  317-387,  and  taught  in  Constantinople. 
Those  of  his  preserved  paraphrases  upon  Aristotle  are  upon 
the  second  Analytics,  the  Physics,  and  the  Psychology  (pub- 
lished by  Spengel,  Leipzig,  1866).  The  paraphrase  erroneously 
ascribed  to  him  on  the  first  Analytics  can  be  found  in  the  Ber- 
lin edition  of  commentators  (M.  Wallies,  Berlin,  1884).  See 
V.  Rose  (in  the  Hermes,  1867). 

Of  the  commentaries  of  Simplicius  the  Cilician,  who-  next  to 


380  HISTORY  OF  ancip:nt  philosophy. 

Alexander  of  Aphrodisias,  was  the  most  notable  expounder  of 
Aristotle  and  the  contemporary  and  companion  of  Damascius, 
there  are  preserved  those  upon  the  first  four  books  of  the  Physics 
(published  by  H.  Diels,  Berlin,  1882),  and  his  commentary  on 
JJe  cnpln  (published  by  S.  Karstein,  Utrecht,  I860),  on  De  anima 
(published  by  M.  Hayduck,  Berlin,  1882),  on  the  Categories 
(Basel,  1551),  and  on  Epictetus'  Enrheiridion. 

By  the  side  of  Priseianus  and  Asclepius  there  was  the  younger 
Olympiodorus,  whose  commentaries  on  the  Gortjias^  Philehns^ 
Ph/jedo,  and  Hw^i  Alcibiadcs  (with  the  life  of  Plato)  are  preserved. 
There  was  also  John  Philiponus,  of  whose  numerous  commenta- 
ries (Venice,  1527  f.)  those  on  tiie  Ph},sics  have  been  published  in 
the  Berlin  collection  by  Vitelli  (1887). 

Of  still  greater  significance  than  these  men  for  our  present 
knowledge  of  ancient  philosophy  there  was  a  neo-Platonist, 
who,  a  contemporary  to  them,  came  out  of  the  movement  in 
the  P^ast.  This  was  Boethius,  who  was  condemned  in  525. 
Although  calling  himself  a  Christian,  he  recognized  only  the 
arguments  of  ancient  science  in  his  treatise,  De  con  sola  t'wnc, 
philosoj/hioi  (published  by  R.  Peiper,  Leipzig,  1871).  His 
translations  and  expositions  of  Aristotle's  Lo(jic  and  of  the  /.va- 
goge  of  Porphyry  belong  among  the  im|)ortant  writings  on 
philosophy  in  the  early  Middle  Ages.  See  F.  Nitzsch,  D<is 
Sifsteni  des  Boefliius  (Berlin,  1800);  II.  Usener,  Aiitdcdotou 
liolderi  (Bonn,  1877) ;  A.  Ililderbrand,  Jlocthius  u.  seine  Stel- 
lung  zuni  Christenthi/m  (Uegensburg,  1885). 

The  peculiarity  of  the  work  of  Proclus  was  his  union  of 
mythological  fancifulness  with  barren  forninlisni,  of  his 
insatiable  desire  for  faith  with  the  gift  of  dialectic  combina- 
tion. He  was  a  theologian  to  the  same  extent  as  was  Jam- 
blichus,  but  he  constructed  for  his  teaching  a  philosophical 
schematism  which  was  carried  out  with  exactness  even  to 
the  smallest  detail.  He  got  the  content  of  his  teaching  from 
authority  :  from  the  barbarian  and  Hellenic  religions,  and  in 
addition  from  the  great  philosopliers,  especially  Plato, 
Plotinus,  and  Jamblichus.  He  had  himself  initiated  into 
all  the  mysteries,  and  no  superstition  however  childish  was 
so  bad  as  to  be  rejected  by  him.  He  did  not  rest  until  he 
had  given  a  place  in  his  universal  system  to  every  such 
significant  thought ;  and  he  was  the  true  systematizer  of 
Heathendom  and  the  scholastic  of  Hellenism. 


NEO-PLATONISM  381 

The  fundamentally  constructive  thought  in  his  system  was 
its  abstract  expression  for  the  universal  problem  of  neo- 
Platonism  :  the  problem  to  make  comprehensible  the  de- 
velopment of  the  One  into  the  Many  and  the  return  of  the 
Many  into  the  One.  The  manifold  effect  is  similar  to  the 
unitary  cause,  and  yet  different  from  it ;  and  this  contra- 
diction is  reconciled  by  the  fact  that  the  effect  strives  by 
means  of  that  very  similarity  to  return  to  the  cause  from 
its  state  of  separation  from  the  cause.  Hence  these  three 
moment?),  permanence,  going-forth,  and  return  (fj^ov^,  tt/jooSo?, 
i7rtaTpo(f)i]),  are  essential  in  every  event.  This  is  the  lead- 
ing idea  of  the  conception  of  nature  of  Plotinus,  who  had 
also  added  the  further  principle  that  the  return  is  through 
the  same  phases  as  the  going-forth.  Proclus,  however, 
applied  this  triadic  schematism  with  a  powerful  dialectic  to 
every  distinct  phase  of  development  in  nature,  and  repeated 
it  again  and  again  even  in  treatment  of  the  finest  details. 
Every  form  of  his  metaphysical  theology  divides  into  three 
parts,  each  of  which  is  again  subjected  to  the  same  dialectic 
fate  ad  infinitum. 

A  certain  formal  likeness  is  obvions  between  this  metliod  of 
Proclus  and  the  thesis,  antithesis,  and  synthesis  of  Fichte, 
Schelling,  and  Hegel.  It  must  not  be  overlooked,  however, 
that  by  the  latter  the  relationship  is  considered  as  between  con- 
cepts, by  the  former  between  mythical  potencies.  But  Hegel 
and  Proclus  are  particularly  alike  in  striving  to  systematize  a 
very  large  given  content  of  ideas  in  a  dialectic  way.  (W. 
Windelband,  Gesch.  der  neueren  Philos.,  II.  306  ff.) 

The  development  of  tlic  world  out  of  the  Godhead  was, 
then,  represented  by  Proclus  as  a  system  of  triadic  chains, 
in  which  the  descent  is  from  the  universal  to  the  particu- 
lar, from  the  slm])le  to  the  complex,  from  the  perfect  to 
the  imperfect.  At  the  apex  stands  the  original  One,  the 
original  Good,  which  is  raised  above  all  determinations, 
entirely  inexpressible,  and  only  figuratively  represented  as 
tlie  One,  the  Good,  the  alnov.     Out  of  this  One  emanate 


382  HISTORY  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY. 

(even  before  the  vov<i)  a  limited,  but,  for  our  knowledge,  an 
indeterminable  number  of  unities  (emSe?)  which  are  also 
unrecognizable.  These  are  above  Being,  life,  and  reason, 
and  are  gods  having  power  over  the  world. 

These  Henades  had  this  theological  significance  for  Proclus, 
that  they  place  at  his  disposal  a  great  number  of  supernatural 
incognizable  gods.  Metaphysically  these  appear  in  place  of  the 
second  h'  of  Jamblichus.  Another  "Somewhat"  accordingly 
perhaps  plays  a  part  here.  Proclus  is,  like  Porphyry,  an 
outspoken  realist  in  the  spirit  of  the  Middle  Ages.  The  uni- 
versal stands  over  against  the  particular  as  a  higher  and  more 
nearly  primitive  actuality.  Cause  is  identical  with  the  universal, 
and  the  highest  cairse,  the  tv,  is  identical  with  the  highest,  most 
nearly  characterless  abstraction.  One  might,  accordingly,  sup- 
pose these  simple  abstract  concepts  to  be  the  Henades,  over 
and  above  which  conceptions  only  the  "  Somewhat  "  remains. 
They  have  then  a  meaning  similar  to  the  Spinozistic  attributes 
of  the  divine  substance. 

The  Spirit  is  divided,  in  the  scheme  of  Proclus,  into  the 
vorjTop,  the  vorjTov  cifia  koL  voepov,  and  the  voepov.  The 
Plotinian  distinction  between  thought  content  and  thought 
activity  is  fundamental  here,  but  it  is,  however,  at  once  dis- 
regarded on  account  of  the  theological  construction.  For 
here  the  votjtov  is  divided  into  three  parts,  in  which  the 
concepts  of  irepa^,  direLpov,  and  imlktov  are  combined  re- 
spectively with  nrarrjp,  Svvap,i<;^  and  v6r)(Ti<i.  Further,  the 
concepts  of  ovcria  and  virap^i^i,  of  ^wj;  and  al(ov  are  com- 
bined in  so  multifarious  a  relationship,  and  with  so  many 
interchangeable  meanings  that  a  whole  army  of  gods  re- 
sults. This  same  play  repeats  itself  in  the  second  sphere, 
and  in  part  with  the  same  categories.  In  the  third  sphere 
there  are  the  seven  Hebdomades  of  intellectual  gods, 
among  which,  for  example,  the  Olympians  appear. 

This  entire  construction,  which  in  accordance  with  the 
same  scheme  is  carried  in  the  psychical  world  to  gods, 
di^mons,  and  heroes,  has  no  real  intellectual  motive  at  its 
basis.     It  is  a  kind  of  philosophical  "mummification"   of 


NEO-PLATONISM  383 

Hellenism.  This  is  partly  due  to  the  dialectic  architectonic, 
and  partly  to  the  need  of  giving  to  every  form  of  poly- 
theism its  place  in  the  hierarchy  of  mythological  formulae 
into  which  Proclus  had  translated  the  Greek  conceptual 
world. 

The  physics  and  ethics  of  Proclus  show  little  individuality. 
He  stood  far  off  from  the  first,  and  adduced  only  this  new 
thought  that  the  material  is  not  derived  from  the  psychical,  hut 
directly  from  the  aireLpov  of  the  first  intelligihle  triad,  and  that 
it  is  fancifully  formed  by  the  lower  world-soul,  the  <^i'ori9.  His 
attempt  in  ethics  is  to  lower  the  metaphysical  dignity  of  the 
human  soul  and  to  make  it  appear  thereby  the  more  needy  of 
the  help  of  positive  religious  exercise  and  of  divine  and  daemonic 
grace.  Proclus  thinks,  therefore,  that  the  characteristic  of  the 
soul  is  its  freedom,  and  therefore  its  guilt.  The  steps  of  its 
redemption  are  here  also  "political"  virtue,  scientific  knowl- 
edge, divine  illumination,  faith,  and  finally  ecstasy  (jiavia)  for 
which  a  peculiar  power  of  the  soul  is  presupposed. 

The  two  great  streams  of  theosophy  which  burst  forth 
from  Alexandria,  on  the  one  hand,  into  Christian  theology, 
on  the  other  into  neo-Platonisra,  were  not  long  separate 
from  each  other.  Although  neo-Platonism  was  destroyed 
by  scholasticism,  it  sent  its  thought  through  a  thousand 
channels  into  the  orthodox  as  well  as  the  heterodox  de- 
velopment of  Christian  thought  after  Origen.  Both  systems 
of  thought  found  their  perfect  reconciliation  in  an  original 
thinker,  who  was  the  philosopher  of  Christianity,  —  Augus- 
tine. The  doctrine  of  Augustine,  however,  was  much  more 
than  a  receptacle  for  tli6  confluent  streams  of  Hellenic- 
Roman  philosophy.  It  was  rather  the  living  fountain  ol 
the  thought  of  the  future.  His  was  an  initiating  rather 
than  a  consummating  work,  and  therefore  he  does  not 
belong  to  the  history  of  ancient  philosophy. 


.*f 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


(A  list  of  works  on  Ancient  Philosophy  for  English  readers.) 


[Histories  of  Philosophy:  by  Stanley,  London,  1655;  Tenne- 
mann,  Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  English tr.  in 
Bohn  Library,  1833,  1852;  Ueberweg,  3  vols,,  8th  ed.,  tr.  by 
G.  S.  Morris,  New  York,  1872-74;  Hegel,  Vorlesungen  Uber  die 
Geschichte  der  Philosophie  (vols.  XIII. -XV.  of  the  Complete 
Works),  tr.  by  E.  S.  Haldane,  3  vols.,  London,  1892-96; 
Schwegler,  tr.  bj'  Seelye,  New  York,  1856  ff.,  and  by  J.  H. 
Sterling,  7th  ed.,  Edinburgh,  1879;  Cousin,  tr.  by  0.  W. 
Wight,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1889;  Lange,  Geschichte  des  Ma- 
terialismus,  3  vols.,  tr.  by  E.  C.  Thomas,  London,  1878-81; 
Erdmann,  3  vols.,  tr.  edited  by  W.  S.  Hough,  London,  1890; 
Lewes,  2  vols.,  3d  ed.,  London,  1863;  Windelband,  tr.  by 
J.  H.  Tufts,  London  and  New  York,  1893 ;  Weber,  tr.  by  F. 
Thilly,  New  York,  1898. 

Histories  of  Greek  Philosophy:  by  Zeller,  5  vols.,  in  3  parts, 
5th  ed.,  tr.  by  S.  F.  Alleyne  and  O.  J.  Eeichel,  London  and 
New  York,  1876  1883;  ibid.,  Grvndnss,  tr.  by  S.  F. 
Alleyne  and  Evelyn  Abbot,  New  York,  1890;  Ferrier,  Lectures 
on  Greek  Philosophi/,  2  vols.,  Edinburgh  and  London,  1866, 
London,  1888;  Burnet,  Earbj  Greek  Philosophers,  London  and 
Edinburgh,  1892;  IMayor,  A  Sketch  of  Ancient  Philosophi/ 
from  Thales  to  Cicero,  Cambridge,  1881  ff.;  Benn,  The  Greek 
Philoso2)hers,  2  vols.,  London,  1883;  Marshall,  A  Short  Histori/ 
of  Greek  Philosojjhij,  London,  1891;  Butler,  Lectures  on  the 
History  of  Ancient  Philosophy.,  2  vols.,  London,  1866;  Ritter, 
History  of  Ancient  Philosophy,  tr.  by  J.  W.  Morrison,  Oxford, 


386  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1838-46;  Anderson,  The  Philosophy  of  Ancient  Greece  Inves- 
tigated in  Origin  and  Progress,  Edinburgh,  1791. 

Histories  of  Greece,  Greek  Literature,  etc. :  Grote,  History  of 
Greece,  6th  ed.,  10  vols.,  London,  1888;  Mahaffy,  History  of 
Classical  Greek  Literature,  2d  ed.,  3  vols.,  London,  1892; 
Laurie,  Historical  Survey  of  pre-Christian  Education,  London, 
1895;  Sidgwick,  History  of  Ethics,  London  and  New  York, 
1892;  Flint,  History  of  the  Philosophy  of  History,  New  York, 
1894;  Bosanquet,  History  of  ^Esthetics,  London  and  New  York, 
1892;  Wundt,  Ethics,  vol.  II.,  tr.  by  M.  F.  Washburn,  New 
York,  1897  ;  Cushman,  History  of  the  Idea  of  Cause,  Har- 
vard College  Doctorate  Thesis,  Harvard  Library;  Botsford, 
History  of  Greece,  New  York,  1899;  Holm,  History  of  Greece, 
English  tr.,  4  vols.,  Boston,  1894;  How  and  Leigh,  History  of 
Rome  to  the  Death  of  Cmsar,  New  York,  1896;  Bur}^,  History 
of  the  Roman  Empire,  New  York,  1893;  Mommsen,  History  of 
Rome,  5  vols.,  New  York,  1869-70;  Peter-Chawner,  Chronolog- 
ical Tables  of  Greek  History,  New  York ;  Kiepert,  Atlas 
Antiquus,  Berlin  and  Boston,  1892 ;  Kiepert,  Manual  of 
Ancient  Geography,  New  York,  1881  ;  Teuffel,  Geschichte  der 
romischen  Literatur,  tr.  by  G.  C.  W.  Warr,  New  York,  1891; 
Jebb,  Primer  of  Greek  Literature,  New  York,  1878;  A.  S. 
Wilkins,  Primer  of  Roman  Literature,  New  York,  1890;  Ma- 
haffy, History  of  Classical  Greek  Literature,  2  vols.,  New 
York,  1891;  Cruttwell,  History  of  Roman  Literature,  New 
York,  1878;  Middleton  and  Mills,  The  Student^ s  Companion 
to  Latin  Authors,  New  York,  1896;  J.  W.  Mackail,  Latin 
Literature,  New  York,  1895. 

The  pre-Socratic  Greeks :  Burnet,  Early  Greek  Philosophy 
with  translations,  London  and  Edinburgh,  1892;  Patrick, 
Heracleitus  on  Nature,  Baltimore,  1889  ;  Bolin's  Classical  Li- 
brary, translations  ;  Encyclopcedia  Britannica,  especially  article 
by  H.  Jackson  on  Sophists  ;  Davidson,  The  Fragments  of  Par- 
menides,  in  Jour,  of  Spec.  Phil.  IV.,  1,  St.  Louis,  Jan.  1870. 

Works  on  Socrates  :  Plato,  Apology,  Crito,  and  Phcedo,  Phce- 
drus,  Meno,  Thecetetus,  etc.  ;  Xenophon,  Memorabilia  and  Sym- 
posium; Aristotle,   Metaphysics,   I.,   6  ff. ;    Grote,    History   of 


BIBLIOGKAPHY  387 

Greece,  vol.  VIII.,  ch.  68;  Potter,  Characteristics  of  the  Greek 
Philosophers,  Socrates  and  Plato,  Loudon,  1845;  R.  D.  Hamp- 
den, The  Fathers  of  Greek  Philosophy,  Edinburgh,  1869  ;  see 
also  articles  in  Encyclopcedia  Britannica. 

Works  on  Plato :  Jowett,  Translation  of  the  Dialogues,  with 
introductions  and  analyses,  in  5  vols.,  3d  ed.,  New  York  and 
London,  1892;  Grote,  Plato  and  Other  Companions  of  Socrates, 
3  vols.,  London,  1865;  Pater,  Plato  and  PLatonism,  New  York 
and  London,  1893;  Van  Oordt,  Plato  and  His  Times,  Oxford 
and  the  Hague,  1895  ;  Bosanquet,  A  Companion  to  Plato's  Re- 
public, New  York,  1895;  Hartmann,  Philosophy  of  the  Uncon- 
scious, tr.  by  E.  C.  Tliomas  of  the  chapter  On  the  Unconscious 
in  Mysticism ;  Martineau,  Typ)es  of  Ethical  Theory,  London 
and  New  York,  1886  ;  see  also  Essays  ;  Campbell,  in  Encyclo- 
pcedia Britannica,  article  Plato  ;  Nettleship,  in  Sellenlca,  The 
Theory  of  Education  in  Plato's  Republic ;  Mill,  J.  S.,  Essays 
and  Discussions. 

Works  on  Aristotle,  Translations  :  Psychology  in  Greek  and 
English,  page  for  page,  with  introduction  and  notes,  by  E. 
Wallace,  Cambridge,  1882  ;  Nicomachoean  Ethics,  tr,  with 
analysis  and  notes  by  J.  E.  C.  W^elldon,  New  York  and  London, 
1892  ;  also  by  Williams,  1876,  Chase,  1877,  Hatch,  1879,  Peters, 
1881,  Gillies,  1892 ;  Politics,  tr.  by  Welldon,  Cambridge,  1888, 
also  by  Jowett,  2  vols.  1886-88,  Ellis,  with  introduction  by 
Morley,  1892 ;  On  the  Constitution  of  Athens,  tr.  with  notes  by 
Kenyon,  London,  1891;  Politics,  tr.  by  Wharton,  Cambridge, 
1883 ;  Rhetoric,  tr.  by  Welldon,  London  and  New  York,  1886 ; 
Metaphysics,  Organon,  and  History  of  Animals,  tr.  in  the  Bohn 
Library  ;  Lewes,  Aristotle,  London,  1864;  Grote,  Aristotle,  2 
vols.,  incomplete,  3d  ed.,  London,  1884;  E.  Wallace,  Outlines 
of  the  PhilosojDhr/  of  Aristotle,  3d  ed.,  Oxford,  1883;  A.  Grant, 
Aristotle,  in  Ancient  Classics  for  English  Readers,  Edinburgh 
and  London,  1878  ;  Davidson,  Aristotle  and  Ancient  Educational 
Ideals,  New  York,  1892  ;  Th.  H.  Green,  Works  ;  Bradley,  in 
Hellenica,  on  Aristotle's  Theory  of  the  State  ;  Taylor,  Disserta- 
tion on  the  Philosophy  of  Aristotle,  London,  1813;  Bain,  Senses 
and  Intellect,  supplement  by  Grote,  London,  1869. 


3a8  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  post-Aristotelian  period:  "W.  Wallace,  Epicureanism, 
London,  1880;  Grote,  Aristotle  (see  Aristotle)  ;  Jackson,  Seneca 
and  Kant,  1881 ;  Bryant,  The  Mutual  Influence  of  Christianity 
and  the  Stoic  School,  London,  1866;  Capes,  Stoicism,  London, 
1880;  Lightfoot,  St.  Paul's  Epistle  to  the  Philippians,  4th  ed., 
London,  1878. 

For  Epictetus,  the  Aiarpifiai  and  *Eyx€tpi8u>v,  tr.  by  T.  W. 
Higginson,  Boston,  1865;  for  Marcus  Aurelius,  to.  cis  iaxrrov, 
tr.  by  G.  Long;  Watson,  Life  of  Marcus  Aurelius,  London, 
1884;  Drumniond,  Phiio  Judceus,  London,  1888;  Schiirer,  His- 
tory of  the  Jeicish  People,  5  vols.,  New  York,  1891 ;  Munro, 
tr.  of  Lucretius'  poem,  De  Natura  Rerum,  London,  1886; 
Masson,  The  Atomic  Theory  of  Lucretius,  London,  1884; 
Courtney,  in  Hellenica,  subject.  Epicureanism;  Maccoll,  The 
G-reek  Sceptics,  London,  1869;  Owen,  Erenings  with  the  Sceptics^ 
London,  1881;  A.  Seth,  in  EncyclopcBdia  Britannica,  article 
Scepticism;  Cicero,  Translations  of,  in  the  Bohn  Library; 
Tredwell,  Life  of  Apollonius  of  Tyana,  New  York,  1886;  Pater, 
Marius  the  Epicurean,  London  and  New  York,  1888 ;  Yonge, 
tr.  of  Philo,  4  vols.,  Bohn  Librar}-^,  London. 

Works  on  neo-Platonism  and  Patristics:  Plotinus,  tr.  of 
parts  of  works  of,  by  Th.  Taylor,  London,  1787,  1794, 
1817;  Harnack,  Neo-Platonism  in  Encyclopcedia  Britannica; 
St.  Paul,  Epistle  to  Corinthians,  L,  XV.  ;  ihid.,  Philippians,  I. ; 
Gale,  Life  of  Protagoras,  of  Plotinus,  and  Epistle  to  Anebo,  by 
Porphyry,  Oxford,  1678  ;  Taylor,  Life  of  Pythagoras,  London, 
1818;  Chiswick,  Egyptian  Mysteries,  1821,  also  by  Taylor; 
Schaff  and  Wace,  Library  of  Xicene  and  post-Nicene  Fathers, 
New  York,  1890;  Mansel,  The  Gnostic  Heresies,  London, 
1875 ;  Allen,  Continuity  of  Christian  Thought,  Boston,  1884  ; 
Donaldson,  Critical  History  of  Christian  Literature  and  Doc- 
trine ;  Neander,  Expositions  of  the  Gnostic  Systetns,  tr.  by 
Torrey,  Boston,  1865 ;  ibid.,  Antignostic^ts,  tr.  in  Bohn  Li- 
brarj- ;  Bigg,  Christian  Platonists  of  Alexandria,  Oxford, 
1887;  Harnack,  Encyclopcedia  Britannica,  article  Origen ; 
Taylor,  tr.  of  works  of  Proclus. 


INDEX 


Academy  (see  also  under  names  of 

its  representatives). 

Older,  224  ff.,  249. 

Middle,  224,  332. 

New,  224. 
Acusilaus,  27. 
Adrastus,  303. 
^desius,  376. 
^nesidemus,  33  £f. 
.^schines,  127. 
jEschylus,  109. 
Alcidamus,  114,  123. 
Alcma;on,  106,  108. 
Alexander  of    Aphrodisias,    303  f., 

380. 
Alexandrian  philosophy,  342. 
Alexinus,  137,  139. 
Amafinius,  321. 
Amelias,  367. 

Ammonias  Saccus,  362  ff.,  366. 
Ammonias,  379. 
Anatolius,  375. 
Anaxagoras,  80-87,  88  f.,  93  f.,  102  f., 

110  f.,  165  f.,  175  f.,  199  f.,  229, 

314. 
Anaxarchus,  173,  331. 
Anaximander,  36,  39-43,  49,  70. 
Anaximenes,  36,  43^5. 
Andronicus,  237  f.,  243. 
Anniceris,  145  f.,  149. 
Antimaerus,  114. 
Antiochus,  224  f.,  338  f. 
Antipater,  303. 
Anytus,  126  n. 
Antisthenes,  140-145,  135. 
Apellicon,  243. 
Apelles,  357. 
ApoUinaris,  353. 


ApoUodorus,  43,  303. 

ApoUonius  (mathematician),  343. 

Apologists,  352  ff. 

Apuleius,  349. 

Arcesilaus,  224,  332  ff. 

Archagoras,  114. 

Archelaus,  87,  103  f.,  123. 

Archytas  (philosopher  and  mathema- 
tician), 94,  225  f.,  229. 

Aristeas,  25,  347. 

Aristides,  352. 

Aristippus,  145-151,  135. 

Aristobulus,  347. 

Aristo  of  Chios,  302  f. 

Aristo  of  Ceos,  302. 

Aristo  of  Cos,  302. 

Aristophanes,  113,  127,  130. 

Aristotle,  224  f.,  36  n.,  37,  74,  81,  83, 
124,  152  f.,  160,  188,  230-292, 
314  ff. 

Aristagoras,  24. 

Aristoxenus,  298  f.,  301  ff. 

Arius  Didymus,  339. 

Arnobius,  360. 

Arrian,  306. 

Asclepiades  (The),  24. 

Asclepiodotus  (philosopher),  379. 

Asclepius,  380. 

Aspasius,  303. 

Athenagoras,  352  f. 

Athenian  (emba.ssy),  340. 

Atomists,  68,  73,  87-93,  151-174, 
104,  229. 

Augustine,  228,  356,  383. 

Averroes,  237. 

Bacon,  154. 
Bardesanes,  355  f. 


390 


INDEX 


Basileides,  355  f.,  358  f. 

Bias,  20. 

Bibliography  coucerning  philosophy, 

7-15. 
Bion,  141. 
Boethius,  380. 
Boiithus  (Peripatetic),  303. 
Boethus  (Stoic),  305. 

Cadmus,  25. 
Callicles,  114,  122. 
Callippus,  272. 

Carneades,  224  f.,  332  £f.,  339. 
Carpocrates,  355  f. 
Catechists  (school  of),  352. 
Cebes,  94. 
Celsus,  361. 
Cerdou,  357. 
Cerinthus,  357. 
Chamaileon,  302. 
Chrysauthiu-s,  376. 
Chrysippus  (i)hilosopher),  303  f. 
Cicero,  338  £f. 
Cleauthus,  303  f.,  316. 
Clearchus,  302. 
Cleideinus,  105. 

Clement  of  Alexandria,  356,  359  ff. 
Clinias,  94. 
Clitoraachus,  332. 
Cuidian  Sentences,  24. 
Colotes,  320  f. 
Cornutus,  306. 
Crantor,  225  f.,  230. 
Crates  of  Athens,  225  f.,  303,  332. 
Crates  the  Cynic,  140. 
Cratinus,  109. 
Cratylus,  103,  110,  175, 
Criti'as,  114,  123. 
Critolaus,  302,  339. 
Cynics,  140,  145,  135,  296  f. 
Cynics  (later),  307  f. 
Cyrenaics,  145-151,  135,  171,  296  f., 
320  f. 

Damascius,  378  £E. 
Demetrius  of  Phalerus,  302. 
Demetrius,  Cynic,  307. 
Democritus,  151-173,  87  ff.,  195,  207 
n.,  263  ff.,  322,  326  f. 


Demonax,  307. 

Dexippus,  376. 

Diagoras,  123. 

Dicajarch,  298,  301  f. 

Diodes,  94,  107. 

Diodorus  Cronus,  136  f. 

Diodorus  of  Tyre,  302. 

Diogenes  of  ApoUonia,  101  f. 

Diogenes  of  Sinope,  140-144. 

Diogenes  the  Babylouiiiu,  303  f.,  340. 

Diogenes  Laertius,  157,  237  f. 

Diouysius  (logograplier),  25. 

Dionysius  of  Syracuse,  146. 

Dionysiodorus,  120. 

Duris,  302. 

ECHECRATES,  94. 

Ecphantes,  103,  229. 
Elean-Eretrian  school,  139. 
Elcatics,  46-52, 59-65, 1 52, 1 75, 1 93  £f ., 

260  f. 
Empedocles,  23, 69,  73-80, 81  ff.,  88  £., 

102  f.,  113  f.,  164. 
Epicharmus,  109. 
Epictetus,  306  f. 
Epicurus  and   Epicureans,  319-329, 

164  ff.,  297,331  f. 
Epimenidcs,  27. 
Eratosthenes,  303. 
Erennius,  367  f. 
Eristic,  138. 
Euathlus,  1 14. 
Eubulide-s,  137,  139, 
Euclid  (philo.soplier),  125  f.,  170. 
Eudemus,  298-301,  239,  245  f. 
Eudorus,  339. 
Eudoxus,  225  f.,  229,  272. 
Euernus  of  Paros,  114. 
Euemerus,  145  f.,  150. 
Eupolis,  109. 
Eurytus,  94. 
Euryphon,  24. 
Eusebius,  356,  376. 
Euthederaus,  120. 

Galenus,  341. 
Galileo,  154. 
Gasseudi,  154. 
Gelon,  18. 


INDEX 


391 


Gnomic  poets,  26,  28,  32,  50,  109. 

Gorgias,  113  f.,  119,  79,  142. 

Greeks,  the  early,  15  ff. ;  and  the 
Orient,  21  fE.;  poetry,  18,  24, 
26  f.;  later  poetry,  109. 

Hecateius,  25. 

Hegel,  243  n. 

Hegesias,  145  f.,  150. 

Hegias,  379. 

Hellenic-Roman  philosophy,  293  ff. 

Heracleides  of  Pontus,  220  f.,  229. 

Heracleides  Lembus,  302. 

Heracleitus,  46,  52,  59-63,  70  S.,  76, 
82  f.,  88  f.,  93  ff.,  llOf.,  117  f., 
159  f.,  175,  193  f.,  260  f.,  310  ff. 

Heracleitus  (Stoic),  306. 

Heracleiteans,  103. 

Herbart,  194. 

Herennius,  see  Erennins. 

Herillus,  303,  308. 

Hermarchus,  321. 

Hermeius  (Academician),  233  f. 

Hermeius  (Neo-Platouist),  379. 

Hermes  Trismegistus,  349. 

Hermias,  378. 

Herminns,  303. 

Hermippus,  302. 

Hermodoms,  176. 

Hermotimus,  27. 

Herodotus,  108,  24. 

Hesychius,  237. 

Hesiod,  20. 

Hicetas,  105. 

Hiero,  18. 

Hipparchia,  140  f. 

Hipparchus,  302. 

Hippasus,  103. 

Hippias,  112,  122. 

Hippodamns,  123  n. 

Hippocrates  of  Cos,  107,  24,  101, 
156. 

Hippolytus,  356  f.,  359. 

Hippo,  105. 

Homer,  28. 

Hypatia,  375  f. 

Id.ecs,  101. 
Irenaeus,  356,  359  £E. 


Isiodorus,  379. 
Lsocrates,  30  n.,  231  f. 

jAMBLiCHrs,  366  f.,  375-^77. 
Jewish      Alexandrian     phUosophv, 

346  ff. 
Julian,  375  f. 
Justin,  353  ff. 
Justinian,  Emperor,  378. 

Lactaxtius,  352  f. 

Lacydes,  332. 

Leucippus,  69,  87-93,  159  £. 

Logographers,  The,  25. 

Longinus,  367. 

Lucretius,  320  f. 

Ljcis,  94. 

Lyco,  126  n.,  302. 

Lycophron,  114,  123. 

Manicileism,  358. 

Marcion,  357. 

Marcus  Aurelius,  306  f.,  337,  353. 

Marinus,  378. 

Martyr,  Justin,  352  f. 

Maximus,  376  f. 

Megarians,  135-140,  194. 

Meletus,  126  n. 

Melissus,  69. 

Melito,  353. 

Menedemus,  140. 

Metrodoms    of   Lampsacos,  28,   87, 

320  f. 
Metrodorus  of  Chios,  173. 
Metrocles,  140f. 
Minucius  Felix,  352  f. 
Moderatus,  343. 
Musonius,  306. 
Mysteries,     The,      26,     31    f.,     47, 

56. 

Nausiphaxes,  173,  326,  331. 
Xeleus,  243. 
Neocleifles,  229. 
Xeo-Platonists,  The,  365-383. 
Neo-Pythagoreans,  The,  97,  342  ff. 
Nicolaus,  303. 
Xicomachus,  343  f. 
Numenius,  343  f. 


392 


INDEX 


Ocellus,  94, 

Oinomaas,  307. 

Oljmpiodorus,  367,  378. 

Origen  (Christian),  356,  361  ff.,  367. 

Origen  (Neo-Platonist),  367. 

Orphics,  32. 

Pan.«tiu8,  305,  337. 

Parmenides,    23,    46,    59-65,    69  ff. 

73  f .,  80,  88  ff.,  93  f .,  1 10  f .,  135  f. 
Pasicles,  34,  302. 
Peisistratus,  18. 
Periander,  18. 
Pericles,  87. 

Peregrinas  Proteus,  307. 
Peripatetics,  The,  298  ff. 
Persaeus,  303,  306. 
Phaedo,  140. 
Phaedrus,  320f. 
Phaleas,  123  n. 
Phanias,  302. 
Phanto,  94. 
Pherecydes,  27,  30. 
Philip  of  Opus,  189,  225  f. 
PhOodemus,  320. 
Philolaus,  93-100. 
Philo  of  Larissa,  224  f.,  338. 
Philo  the  Jew,  343-349. 
Philopomus,  378  ff. 
Photius,  379. 
Pindar,  109. 
Pittacus,  18,  20. 
Plato,     174-224,    124  ff.,     146,     151, 

232  ff.,  250  ff.,  260  f. 
Platonism,  Eclectic,  339  ff. 
Plotinus,  366-375. 
Plutarch  of  Chaeronea,  349. 
Plutarch  of  Athens,  376  f. 
Points  of  view  regarding  philosophy, 

6f. 
Poetry,  Early,  18. 
Potamo,  339. 
Polemo,  225,  303. 
Polycrates,  18. 
Polymnastus,  94. 
Porphyry,  367  ff. 
Posidonius,  305,  337,  345. 
Positivism,  116. 
Priscianus,  380. 


Priscus,  376. 

Proclus,  366  f.,  377-383. 

Prodicus,  112,  115,  123. 

Prorus,  94. 

Protagoras,    114-123,    146  f.,    152  £., 

159  f.,  175,  190ff. 
Protarchus,  114. 
Pyrrho,  173,  329  ff. 
Pythagoras,    28  ff.,   23,  56,  79,    171, 

344  ff. 
Ptolemaeus,  237. 
Pythagoreans,  The,  23,  24,  26,  64  ff., 

72,  77,  79,  93, 100,  175ff.,  199  ff., 

229  f. 

RuFOS,  C.  McsoNins,  306. 

Sallustics,  375  f. 

Satuminus,  355  f. 

Satyrns,  302. 

Seneca,  305  f . 

Sextians,  The,  341  f. 

Sextus  Empiricus,  333  f. 

Seven  Wise  Men,  19,  132. 

Sicilian    school    of    rhetoric,    7,    9, 

113. 
Simmias,  94. 
Simon,  127. 
Simonides,  109. 
Simplicius,  379  f. 
Skeptics,  The,  329-337. 
Socrates,  123-135,  152,  172,  296  f. 
Socratics,  The,  135f. 
Solon,  20,  28. 
Sopater,  376. 
Sophists,   The,    34,    108-123,    128  f, 

159. 
Sophocles,  109. 
Sosigenes,  303. 
Sotion  (Peripatetic),  302. 
Sotion       (Neo-Pythagorean),      341, 

343. 
Speusippus,  224  f . 
Sphaems,  303. 
Stilpo,  136,  139,^303  f. 
Stoics,  The,  303*-^19,  230,  299. 
Strato,  299-302. 
Synesins,  376. 
Syrianus,  377 1 


INDEX 


893 


Tatian,  359. 

Teles,  141. 

TertuUian,  356,  359  f. 

Thales,  20,  22,  36-39,  105. 

Themistius,  378  f . 

Theodorus  (mathematician),  114. 

Theodorus  (Cynic),  14.5-151. 

Theodorus  (of  Asine),  375. 

Theophilus,  353. 

Theophrastus,243f.,298f.,300ff.,332. 

Theosebius,  378. 

Thrasymachus,  123. 

Thrasybulus,  39. 

Thrasyllus,  157. 

Thucydides,  108. 

Timaeus,  94. 

Timon,  330  f. 

Tubero,  335. 


Valentinus,  355  £f. 
Varro,  339  ft. 

Xantippe,  126  n. 

Xeneniades,  114,  141. 

Xeuocrates,     225  f.,      230     f.,     233, 

303. 
Xenophanes,     28,     46-52,     56,     62, 

267. 
Xenophon,  124,  127  ff.,  183  f. 
Xuthus,  104. 

Zeno      of    Elea,    51,     65-69,     119, 

136  ff. 
Zeno  of  Cition,  137,  303  ff. 
Zeno  of  Tarsus,  303. 
Zeno  of  Sidou,  320. 
Zenodotus,  379. 


A  System   of  Ethics 


By    FRIEDRICH    PAULSEN 

Professor   in    the    University    of  Berlin 


Translated  and  edited  by  Frank  Thilly,  Ph.D. 

Professor  of  Philosophy    in    the    University    of  the 
State  of  Missouri 


8vo        -        -        -        $3.00  net 

Of  this  work  it  may  be  said  that  it  has  taken  its  place  as  a  standard 
authority  on  the  subject,  and  its  style,  moreover,  is  so  fascinating  that  a 
subject  ordinarily  regarded  as  heavy  and  didactic  is  invested  with  a  genuine 
human  interest.  We  know  of  no  work  in  which  the  ethical  impulses  oi 
Christianity  are  more  clearly  described.  —  Ne^u  York   Tribune. 

The  book  itself  I  have  admired  for  many  years,  its  adequate  plan,  lucid 
exposition,  and  abounding  scale  of  life.  It  will  be  a  great  gain  to  have  it 
in  English,  especially  English  so  clear  and  idiomatic.  Most  translated 
books  do  not  quite  come  over  into  the  new  language.  Eut  Professor  Thilly 
has  taught  Paulsen  English  so  that  he  speaks  it  like  a  native.  —  Professor 
George  H.  Palmer,  Harvard  University. 

It  is  a  splendid  book.  —  Professor  William  James. 

Just  those  problems  are  selected  for  discussion  which  sooner  or  later  are 
bound  to  force  themselves  upon  the  attention  of  the  thoughtful  layman, 
while  matters  of  purely  academic  interest  have  been  vigorously  e.xcluded. 
Professor  Paulsen  seems  rather  to  have  written  a  laboratory  manual  of  life 
than  a  text-book  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word.  —  Professor  Frank 
Chapman  Sharp,  University  of  Wisconsin. 


CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS,  Publishers 

^53~^57   Fifth  Avenue,  New  York 


A  History  of  Philosophy 


By     ALFRED      WEBER 

Professor  in  the  University  of  Strasbourg 


Translated  by  Frank  Thilly,  Ph.D. 

Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the   University  of 

the  State  of  Missouri 


From  the  Fifth  French  Edition 
Revised  and  Enlarged  With  Bibliography 

8vo        -        _        -        $2^0  net 

The  value  of  Weber's  book  lies  especially  in  his  method,  which  gives  a 
clear,  untechnical  exposition  of  the  several  systems  and  points  out  their 
fundamental  errors,  and,  above  all,  exhibits  the  regular  development  of  one 
philosophical  system  out  of  another.  This  is  useful  in  the  exposition  of 
Kant  and  his  successors.  —  The  Outlook. 

For  the  first  time  a  sketch  of  the  history  of  philosophy  which  unites  the 
three  necessary  qualifications  for  a  text-book,  —  fulness,  brevity,  and  read- 
ableness.  —  Presbyterian  and  Reformed  Review. 

While  the  author's  expositions  and  criticisms  of  ancient  philosophy  are 
skilful,  and  his  treatment  of  the  philosophy  of  the  Middle  Ages  fuller  and 
better  than  would  be  expected  in  so  brief  a  manual,  it  is  in  the  exposition 
and  criticism  of  modern  philosophy,  to  which,  as  already  said,  more  than 
half  of  the  volume  is  devoted,  that  we  regard  him  as  most  successful.  It  is 
difficult,  however,  where  all  is  good,  to  select  for  especial  mention  the  ex- 
position of  any  one  system.  The  expositions  of  Descartes,  Spinoza,  Locke, 
and  Kant  are  all  models  of  their  kind,  and  would  be  readily  understood  and 
enjoyed  by  the  young  student  and  the  general  reader.  The  exposition  of 
Hegel,  too,  is  about  as  luminous  as  so  brief  a  presentation  can  well  be 
made.  —  Professor  George  Martin  Duncan,  of  Yale  University,  in  The 
Philosophical  Review. 


CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S   SONS,  Publishers 

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